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ABSTRACT
SANDRA CHAPMAN OSTERKATZ: Commitment, Capacity, and Community:
the Politics of Multilevel Health Reform in Spain and Brazil.
(Under the direction of Evelyne Huber)
Inequality is a primary concern for many social and political actors, yet often the
distributive profile of society seems over-determined by structure and institutions.
Federalism, ethnic heterogeneity, and greater numbers of veto actors are near uni-
versally associated with higher levels of inequality and less generous public support
for the most vulnerable members of society. A key challenge for scholars has been
unpacking multilevel governance and empirically assessing the way the territorial dis-
tribution of authority interacts with other forces that determine policies, inhibiting
clear theorizing about why and how particular territorial arrangements matter for
distributive outcomes. In this dissertation I choose two “hard” cases in which we
would not expect equity-enhancing social policy reforms and assess a similar attempt
at universal health reform in both cases. Spain and Brazil share long histories of
authoritarian rule, ethno-linguistic or racial heterogeneity, lack of fiscal capacity, and
asymmetry in the territorial distribution of authority. Spain has been more successful
than Brazil at establishing a universal health system that is efficient, sustainable, and
broadly supported in society. In both cases the role of structural factors has been
significant, yet I argue that particular constellations of ideological commitment at
multiple levels of government and at key moments in the reform process, combined
with fiscal and administrative capacity, explain much of the difference in outcomes. I
take a mixed-method approach, using statistical and comparative historical analysis
and assessing variation both between and within the countries.
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1 THE DEMOCRAT’S CONUNDRUM
Inequality is a primary concern for many social and political actors, for a variety of
reasons including an ideological preference for social justice, desire to remove barriers
to economic development, and concern about crime and public security. Yet often the
distributive profile of society seems over-determined by fairly immobile institutional
characteristics. Within the broad literature in comparative political economy and the
welfare state, federalism, ethnic heterogeneity, and greater numbers of veto actors are
near universally associated with higher levels of inequality and less generous public
support for the most vulnerable members of society.
Not only are these structural features of society unlikely to go away, they have
become increasingly salient. Immigration, globalization, and conflict have made many
countries more diverse over time. Achieving governance structures that can channel
the aspirations and identities of the inhabitants of a territory lies at the heart of
the democratic endeavor, so the territorial distribution of authority is often front
and center as countries transition away from authoritarianism. Forty per cent of
the world’s people live in federal polities, most of which are highly diverse. Even
in non-federal societies, multilevel governance has become an increasingly important
component of state reform. Given this reality, there is a pressing need for multilevel
theories of politics.
Under what conditions, then, can policy makers in these countries hope to success-
fully implement “equity-enhancing”1 reforms, despite what appear to be inauspicious
1Widely used today to explore the distributional impact of social policies, one of the first to
introduce the concept was Kurt Weyland in his work on social policy reform in Brazil (1996).
structural conditions? To answer this question one must shift away from “control-
ling for” diversity, federalism, or veto actors at the country level and articulate the
mechanisms by which particular constellations of policies, actors, and institutions—at
multiple territorial levels—generate outcomes in a given historical context.
As we shall see, multilevel territorial analyses are methodologically challenging.
The territorial distribution of authority is usually policy-specific and the interests
of territorial actors are highly contingent, depending a great deal on their relative
position in the central and even international political economy and shifting over
time as conditions change. I take up this challenging analytical problem by assess-
ing the trajectory of multilevel health reform in Spain and Brazil—middle-income
countries that represent “hard” cases for successful countrywide equity-enhancing
reform. Policy makers in these countries faced high levels of decentralization, territo-
rially concentrated inequality, and ethno-linguistic or racial heterogeneity, as well as
asymmetry in the territorial distribution of authority, limited capacity, and several
economic crises. Both countries had long years of centralizing military rule followed
by “third wave” pacted transitions to democracy. In both cases the transition process
included the creation of a new constitution—Spain in 1978 and Brazil in 1988. Both
constitutions guaranteed health care as a universal citizenship right and coverage and
access the responsibility of public authorities. In addition, both had achieved fairly
high levels of coverage under authoritarianism, which might make reform less pressing
(Falleti 2010b).
After the new constitutions, the reform processes diverge and variation exists both
within and between the countries in the realization of the new mandate, as well as the
overall process of decentralization and state reform. In both cases some structural
characteristics made implementation more difficult while other factors helped propel
reform forward. In neither case has the constitutional guarantee been fully realized,
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but Spain was able to consolidate a high quality system early on, which included
publicly provided primary care for all, as well as specialist, curative, and emergency
services, which are all overwhelmingly used across the population.
Brazil, on the other hand, has struggled to extend various aspects of universal
coverage, of which primary care was the weakest link early on. While nearly all
Brazilians use the public system for complex and expensive hospital care, the primary
network is still almost exclusively used by the poor. Access, quality, and coverage
vary across regions in both countries, but far more so in Brazil.
I argue that the timing and content of decentralization, the presence (or lack)
of actors ideologically committed to equity-enhancing reform at crucial moments in
the reform process, and the fiscal and administrative capacity of those responsible for
reform have been the driving forces behind variation in outcomes. Tables A.1 and A.2
summarize the levels of commitment, capacity, and health authority at different points
in time in the two countries, relationships that are discussed in more detail in the
chapters that follow.
Ideological commitment to equity could conceivably come either from left/right
partisanship or from commitment to social solidarity within a salient and territorially
defined identity group. While for some actors the two are difficult to disentangle,
I expect ideological commitment on the left to generally trump nationalism in the
successful implementation of equity-enhancing reforms. In addition, it is not hetero-
geneity, as such, that places constraints on equity-enhancing reform. Rather, it is the
presence of high levels of conflict over actors’ visions of the legitimate territorial scope
for redistribution—what I call the “reference community” for policy making—which
hampers reform.
As the only political actors capable of redistribution or policy implementation
across the country, central government authority and action are necessary conditions
3
for countrywide equity-enhancing reform. If central authority, commitment, and ca-
pacity are lacking at important moments in the reform process, the results should be
less equity-enhancing.
The international context was influential for the health reform process in both
countries. Choosing cases in different world regions allows one to say something about
the differing experiences of multilevel health reform in the European Union (EU)
sphere of influence vs. the Latin American context. Policy legacies and starting points
matter and were held constant along some important dimensions by the case selection,
while varying on others. Finally, while democracy is not necessary or sufficient for
equity-enhancing reform, it is a clear and powerful enabling force, particularly with
regard to the ability of committed actors to gain access to power.
The consistent findings that federalism, ethnic heterogeneity, veto points, and even
some forms of decentralization make redistribution more difficult capture dimensions
of reality that have been under-theorized and empirically under-tested. Focusing
on comparable attempts at equity-enhancing reform under conditions of asymmetric
multilevel governance permit a nuanced assessment of the conditions for successful
reform. I take a mixed-method approach to empirical analysis, utilizing time series
data with the regions as the unit of analysis in Chapter 2 to explore the relation-
ship of the hypothesized causal variables to a particular component of health reform
(universal primary care coverage), as well as testing the impact of reform on health
outcomes at the regional level. In addition to careful consultation of primary and
secondary sources, the empirical evidence presented in this dissertation comes from
18 months of field research—Spain in 2012 and Brazil in 2009 and 2011.
In Chapter 3 I elaborate the theory for case study analysis. In Chapters 4 and
5 I use comparative historical analysis to trace the process of democratization, de-
centralization, and multilevel health reform in each country—in Spain at the level of
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the center, the Comunidades Auto´nomas (ACs, Autonomous Communities), and—to
a lesser degree—the provinces and in Brazil at the level of the center, the Unidades
Federativas (Federative Units or states), and the municipalities. In the case studies
I consider health reform in the broader context of social policy and service provi-
sion, as well as fiscal policy. This dissertation is therefore part of an expanding body
of scholarship that assesses crucial questions in political science through a multilevel
territorial lens while striving to increase the availability of regional-level data to allow
for more sophisticated theory testing2.
In Chapter 6 I step back and consider the potential to draw conclusions from com-
parison of the two country cases. I argue that differences in presidential vs. parliamen-
tary system, as well as federal institutions have been less relevant for equity-enhancing
policy reform in these cases than the timing and sequence of decentralization and the
presence of ideological commitment at the center during key moments in the reform
process. Higher levels of inequality and lower levels of development in Brazil have
been potent historical constraints on equity-enhancing reform, particularly regarding
the ability of the central government to implement a progressive tax system that
would permit adequate funding of social policy commitments. The weakness of the
health reform in Brazil has been due in large part to the fact that it took much longer
for ideologically committed actors who prioritized redistribution to win control of the
central government, as well as the particular constraints those actors faced in the
Latin American context.
In Chapter 7 I offer a brief summary and conclusion, considering the policy im-
plications of the results. Ultimately, the process of reform in both countries suggests
that the equity-enhancing policies necessary to undergird a sustainable process of
2This literature is extensive and includes case studies as well as projects that combine theorizing
with the creation of new cross country and cross regional data (Giraudy 2010; Gervasoni 2010;
Daughters and Harper 2007; Falleti 2010a; Gibson 2004; Grindle 2007; Montero and Samuels 2004;
Hooghe, et al 2010; Hooghe, et al 2014 forthcoming; Charron, et al 2012).
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redistribution can be implemented even when the stars are far from aligned in their
favor. Clear conditions can be laid out for creating the ideal (and next best) environ-
ments for successful reform, given a context of multilevel governance and diversity.
That funding has never been sufficient and reform never complete in either country
has made them particularly vulnerable to economic crisis. Fiscal pressures since 2008
have exposed the weakness in both reforms and in the Spanish case, threatens to bring
the health system to its knees. Yet the gains made since the democratic transitions
and the guarantees in the constitutions continue to be important rallying points for
the defense of health reform in both countries.
1.1 Case Selection
For all the reasons discussed above, Spain and Brazil represent “hard” cases (Eck-
stein 1975) where we would expect equity-enhancing reform to be difficult to achieve.
But why these particular countries and why not consider a broader group of cases in
both regions? The focus of this dissertation—on regional variation within a country
in the context of multilevel governance—requires that the unit of analysis be below
the level of the country. In Spain there are 17 ACs and in Brazil 27 states, which for
the statistical analysis offers over 400 unit years for Spain and over 600 for Brazil,
depending on the model. While multilevel, cross-national comparisons may be on
the horizon as data availability improves, the need to control for both cross country
and regional level differences poses some challenges. Within country analysis of the
regions allows me to hold political institutions and shared history constant.
For an inquiry with so many moving pieces, balancing variation and commonality
with care is essential. It is fairly uncommon for decentralization to be substantively
asymmetric across units with the same constitutional status (in the same “tier”). Yet
in both of these countries the distribution of policy responsibilities has varied between
regions at given time points. Counterfactuals in social science are rarely observable,
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yet assessing decentralization in a particular policy area when regions shift from a
shared starting point to asymmetry offers the closest approximation.
Still, cross-national comparison is central to comparative political studies and for
generalizing beyond a particular world region or country experience. While not all
theories must travel widely, the relationship between multilevel governance and suc-
cessful equity-enhancing reform can be articulated in a way that permits the genera-
tion of expectations beyond these particular cases. I therefore choose two countries in
different world regions where the institutional and historical conditions surrounding
decentralization and policy reform are broadly comparable.
Spain and Brazil both share classic features of Latin American and Southern Euro-
pean development patterns and had similar high levels of income and land inequality,
as well as welfare state effort, before the transition to democracy (Huber and Stephens
2012; Frankema 2009). Both countries had long periods of conservative authoritar-
ian rule in which early welfare programs were implemented in efforts to incorporate
the growing working class, with Social Europe as a powerful point of reference, even
in Brazil (Weyland 1996). Democratic transitions in both cases were pacted, rather
than revolutionary. The pro-democracy efforts in both countries were protagonized
by actors on the left who also supported substantive decentralization.
In both cases, Bismarckian social insurance schemes covered large portions of
formal sector workers in a hierarchical fashion, though the nature of the labor force
meant that this provided higher levels of coverage in Spain than in Brazil. In addition,
while in Spain this health provision had a large public component, in Brazil it was
almost exclusively contracted with private providers, which generated different policy
legacies for the extension of public coverage down the road.
Health reform took place in both countries in the 1980s—beginning in Spain in
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1984 and in Brazil in 1988. The reform process involved efforts to guarantee univer-
sality and bring together the disparate pre-existing schemes for access to care. In
neither case was a National Health Service (NHS) created in the pure sense, as public
agencies were permitted to contract for services with private providers rather than
provide them directly and the systems were never fully integrated. Private medical
providers and interests have been the strongest opponents to reform in both countries
and have made reform significantly more difficult. Yet direct public provision of the
majority of services in the public system, free at the point of delivery, and with uni-
versal access has been the goal and the standard, despite differences and difficulties
in consolidation.
The territorial distribution of authority over health has differed, as has the nature
of regional finance, but in both cases the central government retains control of the
basic structure and definition of the system, while regions (and in the case of Brazil,
municipalities) provide the infrastructure and services. While in Spain both policy
scope and fiscal autonomy have varied regionally over time, in Brazil only the level
of authority in health policy has varied asymmetrically. These broadly shared char-
acteristics of structure, politics, and reform make it possible to explore the impact
of differences in decentralization, timing and sequence, commitment, and capacity in
the two cases.
Several differences between the two country cases should be mentioned. First,
while both have high levels of ethno-linguistic or racial heterogeneity, the character-
istics of these differences vary. In Spain, minority national groups are clearly tied
to particular territories and have been politically salient for centuries. Spain has
no history of forced labor, even though the cultural rights of minority groups have
been a salient and contested issue. In Brazil, indigenous groups have tended to be
either small and isolated or dispersed due to geography and the nature of colonial
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administration. Racial domination of indigenous peoples and African slaves and their
descendants has been a defining element of power relations. Ethnic mixing and the
radical changes in urbanization and land use over time have diminished the ties be-
tween particular territories and ethnic groups in Brazil. While land rights are a salient
political issue with an important ethnic dimension, they are not primarily focused on
the political rights of self-determination for groups in certain territories. Minority
nationalism in Spain, however, has a territorial base and has defined the organization
of and conflicts over the state since its inception.
For Spain, Europe has been the dominant frame of reference for policy making.
Economic performance, democracy, and policy are always considered in comparison
with the rest of Europe. EU preferences and norms were salient in both progressive
tax reform and the design of health care in the early 1980s and have continued to
matter since Spain joined the EU in 1986. Brazil is a big country with a big internal
market and has historically been less interested in looking to its neighbors or inter-
national organizations for direction. Yet the strength of the Washington Consensus
in the region, combined with the timing of health reform implementation, meant
that neoliberalism was more influential for the orientation of technocrats and pol-
icy makers there. As we shall see, Spain experienced similar pressures at the same
time, but its geo-political context was different and it had progressed much further
in consolidating its health system by the time neoliberal influence peaked. These
trends generated strong pressures for cost-containment in both health systems, even
though in comparative terms both systems were frugal and efficient and neither had
yet achieved full extension across their populations or territories.
There are also significant differences in the organization of political institutions.
Brazil is a presidential system with open list proportional representation for the legis-
lature and first-past-the-post elections to the Senate, which is a body of representation
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for the states. Spain is a parliamentary system with closed list proportional repre-
sentation and an upper chamber that is partly elected from the provinces and partly
by AC governments, which has never served as a functional body of territorial repre-
sentation. Parties in Spain are highly disciplined and programmatic, while in Brazil
programmaticness, discipline, and party loyalty vary significantly among parties, with
only the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Worker’s Party) historically possessing all
three. These features represent constraints, making reform less likely. Yet as I discuss
in Chapter 6, these have not been the dominant roadblocks to reform in either case.
Within each country I include regional case studies chosen on the basis of varia-
tion in commitment and capacity. In Spain the regions are Extremadura, the Basque
Country, and Castilla y Leo´n. Extremadura is a case of high commitment through-
out and low capacity at the outset while Castilla y Leo´n is a case of intermediate
capacity and low commitment and the Basque Country of high commitment and
high capacity. In Brazil the cases are Bahia and Sa˜o Paulo. Bahia is a case of low
capacity throughout and low commitment at the outset, while Sa˜o Paulo is a case of
high capacity and intermediate commitment. In both cases I include shadow cases
of contrasting regions. For Brazil I also include assessment of municipal variation,
assessing the capital cities of the states in contrast to other municipalities. In the
statistical analysis all ACs and states are included and the time periods are dictated
by data availability, generally beginning in the early 1980s for both countries. In
the case studies I consider the historical preconditions to reform in some detail, but
focus primarily on the democratic period. In Spain the ACs did not exist before the
democratic transition.
1.2 Understanding Health Outcome Indicators
In Chapters 2 and 3 I discuss the indicators of health outcomes used in the sta-
tistical and comparative historical analyses. Because different indicators tell quite
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different stories, a brief summary of the possible measures and how they respond
to policies and changes in society can be helpful. Infant mortality rates, which I
use in regression analysis, are a good choice for testing the impact of public policies
concerned with equity but present some challenges, as well. Precisely because infant
mortality responds fairly quickly to modest investments in improved access to basic
health and sanitation, and is concentrated among the poor, it is usually the first
indicator of health outcomes to improve as levels of economic development rise. Yet
this means that infant mortality often declines even when structural factors do not
seem to support improvements in health.
In Spain and Brazil, infant mortality has been declining since the middle of the
20th century and made rapid improvements under authoritarian rule as economic de-
velopment increased in the seventies. It is therefore relevant that subnational analysis
shows regional infant mortality to be significantly impacted by variation in the extent
of primary care reforms in both countries, particularly in Spain where convergence to
quite low levels had already taken place.
Life expectancy is a measure of health outcomes at the other end of the cycle and is
much more difficult to tackle with public policies and can mask substantive differences
between groups and across age cohorts. Life expectancy is impacted by every input
over the course of someone’s life and is therefore affected by culture, behavior, the slow
accumulation of environmental stressors, and sometimes even biology. Women tend
to live longer than men by five or six years, even when domestic violence is common,
formal equality is low, and rates of depression and anxiety are higher among women.
Life expectancy in good health is increasingly being utilized by the international
health community, and is much more clearly affected by public policies related to oc-
cupational and housing safety, quality of the environment, social class and community
structure, and access to quality health care.
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While asking patients about their health is the most direct and reliable way to
obtain accurate information about an individual, health surveys are still plagued with
the typical problems of survey data. In addition, health perceptions change frequently
and may be biased not randomly, but by cultural or structural differences in attitudes
of respondents. Because health surveys and nuanced measures such as life expectancy
in good health are generally not available below the country level, we are left with
indicators such as infant mortality and life expectancy for cross-sectional comparison.
These are meaningful measures that provide empirical information about the reality
in a particular community, yet it is still helpful to understand the limitations of the
data.
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2 THEORY
What are inequalities in health and health care? The question is not as straight-
forward as it might appear. The most commonly accepted definition was produced
by Margaret Whitehead in 1992 as part of an initiative by the Programme on Health
Policies and Planning of the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for
Europe:
Equity in health implies that ideally everyone should have a fair oppor-
tunity to attain their full health potential and, more pragmatically, that
no one should be disadvantaged from achieving this potential, if it can be
avoided...Equity is therefore concerned with creating equal opportunities
for health and with bringing health differentials down to the lowest level
possible...Equity in health care is defined as: equal access to available care
for equal need, equal utilization for equal need, [and] equal quality of care
for all. (1992: 8)
We can see from this definition why health inequality is not determined exclusively
by health policies, yet how equity-enhancing public policies are necessary as part
of an overall realization of health. The definition also suggests that some crucial
causal variables for equity-enhancing reform are also important for equity in health
outcomes.
2.1 Equity-Enhancing Health Reform
Health outcomes are determined by a wide array of factors, some of which are
behavioral or environmental, and many of which are difficult to impact with public
policy in the short term. Yet health policies are quite directly the result of political
action. Equity in health care should be increased by improvements in universality,
quality, access, sustainability, and progressiveness of financing. Policies that improve
these characteristics of health care are “equity-enhancing.” Because both countries
have constitutional guarantees of public responsibility for health care as a universal
citizenship right, accompanied by National Health Systems designed to fulfill this
guarantee, measures of equity in health policy are broadly comparable. The concepts
of universality, quality, access, sustainability, and progressiveness of financing are
incorporated into the case study assessments of policy legacies in both countries.
The type of care prioritized by public policy matters for sustainability and equity,
as well as for outcomes. Curative hospital care and specialist care are inherently more
costly than preventive and primary care (Donaldson 1996; McGuire 2010). Specialist
care is also less effective in producing improved health outcomes compared to primary
care (Starfield, et al 2005) and in most countries is more intensively used by wealthier
individuals1. Consuming curative health services carries with it the inherent risk
associated with the treatment itself, which is often significant. Universal access to
primary care is one of the most important determinants of health for the poor in
developing countries (McGuire 2010). The empirical support for high quality primary
care as the foundation for universal public health systems is strong, so this is the
dimension I explore in the statistical analysis.
Primary care is also an important policy from a hypothesis testing perspective.
In countries where markets for private health services exist (true in both Spain and
Brazil), primary care is the one part of a public health system whose only utterly
dependent stakeholders are the poor. Middle and upper class users can afford to
access primary care privately because it is relatively inexpensive, while very few people
in any society can afford to privately purchase specialist and complex hospital care
1See Hanratty, et al 2007; Victora, et al 2000; Palencia, et al 2011; Vikum, et al 2011. Generally,
what this research finds is that the poor, with poorer health, make use of primary care and prevention
when it is affordable and are higher users of in-patient and emergency room care related to higher
levels of need. High income users tend to “over” utilize specialist and out-patient hospital services—
the most expensive, particularly in the absence of an emergency.
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without assistance. Defense of public primary care is therefore fundamentally about
concern for those at the bottom. Because it is the most effective form of health care in
terms of the ratio of inputs (money) to outputs (good health outcomes), it should be a
natural choice for public investment, particularly when resources are tight. Therefore,
when an established health system faces resource constraints, primary care should be
the first place to invest and the last place to cut for actors committed to equity.
That international organizations have discovered these features of primary care
and begun to support them in poor countries as part of an overall emphasis on means-
testing makes them no less equity-enhancing. The evidence from the literature on
basic universalism2 suggests that certain forms of targeting may not be regressive or
unsustainable when populations are overwhelmingly poor. Improving the life chances
of those at the bottom is a first step in enabling democratic participation as well
as improving levels of education and human capital development. Regardless, the
primary care reforms assessed in this chapter are both universal—not means-tested.
Despite the importance of primary care, the most urgent procedures cannot be
managed through prevention and basic care, so a constitutional guarantee of universal
coverage must include far more. Universality is achieved when all inhabitants of the
territory have an equal right to receive the health services that enable good health.
The government must guarantee this right through capable oversight and regulation,
as well as systems to ensure access and coverage, or it will not be realized. Limitations
to universality are less equity-enhancing3. Formally excluding from the public system
those who could pay for services privately is regressive because it diminishes pressure
for the public system to be “good enough” for those who have alternatives. It also
2Filgueira, et al 2005; Huber 2010; Mart´ınez Franzoni 2012; Huber, Pribble, and Stephens 2009.
3The literature on why universality is better for equity than targeting and means-testing is large.
A useful selection includes Stephens 1979; Korpi 1980; Castles and Mitchell 1992; Esping-Andersen
1990; Weale 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001.
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decreases the number of political stakeholders who would defend the system against
retrenchment or demand its expansion (Korpi 1980; Huber and Stephens 2001). Pub-
lic systems will do the best job for the most needy when they must pass muster with
those who could go elsewhere for care. Services just for the poor tend to be poor
services.
Universal direct access also reduces administrative costs by eliminating the need
to determine eligibility and enforce exclusion from coverage. The equity-enhancing
capabilities of services that are directed to the poor are somewhat greater in places
where the poor are a majority of the population and services therefore reach a broad
electoral base. Yet this “basic universalism”is still more vulnerable than truly uni-
versal services, as we shall see in the case of Brazil. It may be impossible to achieve
perfectly, but universality is the key to political sustainability.
Universality of access also includes whether people are capable of using the services
that are provided. If transportation is inadequate or expensive, clinics and hospitals
are not accessible to particular population groups, or are understaffed, access is lim-
ited. Linguistic and cultural competency is also important for access, particularly in
multi-ethnic societies.
Equity-enhancing health coverage should include those services for health edu-
cation, prevention, and treatment, which have been empirically proven to improve
health outcomes. More is not always better if the public system is spending scarce
resources on expensive new technology with no proven track record, or that works no
better than less expensive conventional treatments (Ellwood 1988; Evans 2001). In
most advanced industrial countries, public health systems struggle with the pressures
of citizens and private medical interests to cover an array of services that may have
little relationship to health outcomes. Cuts in covered services are easy to politicize,
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even when they may be equity-enhancing by eliminating wasteful spending and redi-
recting it to services that do a better job of improving the quality of life and health
of the population. Yet major areas of health coverage that decrease future costs and
play a crucial role in individual health are often still under-covered, including dental
care (particularly for the young), mental health services, women’s health, health edu-
cation, and prevention. These challenges are present for political actors of all stripes,
in most countries.
Universal access does not require direct public provision, yet particular forms of
organization tend to be more or less equity-enhancing. If private medical practi-
tioners operate alongside the public system, permitting dual practices by individual
providers is problematic because it creates incentives to channel low cost patients to
private practices and high cost patients to the public system (Gonza´lez 2004). When
a framework for public provision of care exists, choosing to contract services with
private providers rather than hire through the public system may limit the collective
bargaining and workplace protections of health workers, which are often stronger in
the public sector. Choosing to support private provision rather than strengthen in-
vestment in an existing public system can lead to the loss of popular support for the
public system, as users develop a set of assumptions about where care will be best. In
addition, evidence suggests contracting services privately with public money is more
expensive than directly hiring service providers (Barros 2010).
It is sometimes argued that the use of private services by those with means could
remove some of the burden of use from the public health system, yet there is no
evidence of a descent in the use of public services connected to the use of private
alternatives—particularly because for emergencies and hospitalization, the most ex-
pensive services, the vast majority of the Spanish and Brazilian populations use public
facilities. Analyzing more directly the question of subcontracting, a 2004 study of 180
17
Catalan health centers (where experiments with “contracting out” in Spain have gone
the furthest) finds no evidence of efficiency gains in the purchase of health services
where there exist public-private contracts (Puig-Junoy and Ortu´n 2004).
Yet as we shall see in the case studies, some regions have developed innovative
systems of public contracting with public employees to introduce incentives for per-
formance and cost control that have helped to keep the systems solvent without
compromising their equity-enhancing nature. In addition, if regulation and oversight
of private services is identical to that used for the public sector, there may be minimal
differences in the equity-enhancing nature of funding and provision of services, or the
rights of health workers.
Quality of care can be measured in a number of ways but they are almost all con-
tested4. Both process (how care is provided, in what settings, with what resources
available and applied) and outcome measures are part of the story of quality (Zeisler
and Pettiti 2006: 236). Yet causal links between process and outcomes are hard to
prove. Whether users believe their services are high quality (a patient-focused out-
come indicator) depends entirely on what they believe they should be getting, which
is conditioned by how good the system has been historically and cultural expectations
about public care. Where expectations are low, satisfaction may be higher. Indicators
of avoidable hospital illnesses and deaths, or deaths from infections contracted in the
hospital are indicators of malpractice but do not touch on other aspects of quality.
Higher levels of household private health spending indicate poor coverage by the
public sector (leaving important services out that must then be paid for privately),
poor quality (inducing the purchase of private health insurance by those who can
afford it), or both. Such data have been used cross-nationally to assess the equity-
enhancing nature of health policy (van Dooslaer, et al 1999; Huber and Stephens
4For an accessible discussion of the challenges of measuring the quality of care from the perspective
of purchasers, providers, and patients, see McGlynn 1997.
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2012). Unfortunately, reliable regional data on private health spending are limited5.
The more progressive the financing of social policy, the more progressive a given
policy will be, ceteris paribus. The most redistributive way to fund social policy in
a country is through progressive taxes raised over the entire population and spent
with a criterion of need. Health care is usually financed in four ways: taxes, social
insurance, private insurance, and out of pocket payments (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer
2000). In the comparative historical analysis I discuss changes in the composition of
financing over time. If regions are lucky enough to be in a lower-income country
that is a member of the EU, they may even be able to finance social policy with
revenue raised progressively over people in wealthier countries. Where transfers for
the center are used for health financing, per capita formulas are less equity-enhancing
than formulas with a need-based criterion, but more than when criteria are politically
subjective or based on formulas not related to either need or population.
Quantifying the progressivity of tax systems is complex. Direct taxation of income
and wealth tend to be more equity-enhancing sources of financing than consumption
and payroll taxes6. Within any particular type of tax, the burden can vary signifi-
cantly depending on the structure of the tax. If services are included in consumption
taxes or finished and luxury goods are taxed at higher rates than basic necessities,
consumption taxes can be made less regressive. Changes to income tax rates and
5In Spain, I compiled regional data on private household spending from the Household Budget
Survey (Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares), which are only available for 1998-2010. There is a
major break in comparability in 2006 when the survey was fundamentally restructured and it does
not include several sources of private spending captured by the OECD for its cross-national dataset.
The most significant issue for the Spanish case, however, is that variation is minimal. In all ACs
for this time period, public spending as a portion of total health spending is between 80 and 90 per
cent using public and private household health spending data. This makes it almost impossible to
gain traction in the statistical model.
6For in-depth discussion of the progressivity of financing for health policy see Wagstaff and van
Doorslaer 1997; Wagstaff, et al 1999 and of income tax progressivity Aronson, et al 1994. Efforts
to rank and categorize the progressiveness of tax systems are discussed in Kakwani 1977, which
has remained the dominant indicator for measuring the progressiveness of systems of health care
financing and focuses on how far the tax system departs from a principle of proportionality.
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brackets significantly modify the burden on different income groups. Whether caps
are placed on payroll taxes impacts how progressive they are. The system of deduc-
tions and credits modifies the overall distributive character of the tax system, as does
the capacity of the government to collect taxes and prevent fraud. While a case study
of fiscal policy in Spain and Brazil is beyond the scope of this project, the theoretical
expectations are clear and I discuss significant shifts that impact the financing of
health and social policy in the case studies.
2.2 Determinants of Health Inequality
A commission within the Spanish Health Ministry in 2010 spent two years work-
ing with regional health secretariats and academics to produce a report naming the
following culprits in social inequalities in health, in order of importance: 1) The dis-
tribution of power, wealth, and resources, 2) Living and working conditions over the
course of the life cycle, 3) Dignified housing and access to physical spaces that favored
good health and health behaviors, 4) Equity-enhancing health services, and 5) Infor-
mation, oversight, research, and education7. This is in line with the Acheson report in
1998 from the United Kingdom, which found that sufficient means, income inequality,
access to health care, education levels, environment, and lifestyle all played a role in
determining health inequalities (Acheson, et al 1998; Gordon 1999). While democ-
racy is excluded from these studies, which took place within consolidated democratic
regimes, citizen participation in governance and oversight were important in both.
In his groundbreaking book on public policy and health outcomes in developing
countries, Jim McGuire (2010) argues that human welfare requires access to the
basic inputs for quality of life—economic sufficiency, safe water and basic sanitation,
education, access to basic health care, family planning—and that these are determined
by both economic factors such as income and inequality, as well as public policy
7Comisio´n para Reducir las Desigualdades Sociales en Salud en Espan˜a. Mayo 2010. Direccio´n
General de Salud Pu´blica y Sanidad Exterior, Ministerio de Sanidad y Pol´ıtica Social.
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and service uptake. Democracy matters not only in its theorized role as guarantor
of the expression of public preferences, but as an often transformative force in the
way individuals interact with their communities and form expectations about their
relationship with public institutions. This vision of how health “happens” finds strong
empirical support in his case studies and statistical analysis.
2.3 The Territorial Distribution of Authority
In terms of its impact on equity, a series of case studies have been conducted
in poor countries by international financial institutions (often in the role of policy
advisors) to understand the impact of decentralization. While these institutions took
a strong normative position in favor of decentralization in the early 1990s based on
theoretical assumptions regarding efficiency and subsidiarity, subsequent investigation
has found little evidence of improvement in policy or outcomes after reform8. This
has caused a shift to more nuanced positions over time (Qian and Weingast 1995;
Weingast 1995; Oates 1999; 2005).
A common finding in the comparative political economy literature is that fed-
eralism is related to higher inequality9. However, as Jonathan Rodden points out,
federalism is not the cause of anything, but is simply an indicator that may or may not
tell us something about the institutional processes at work within a country (2005).
Yet levels of regional authority do tend to be higher in federal systems and the veto
points literature clearly lays out the mechanisms by which increased numbers of actors
capable of blocking policy inhibits redistributive reform10.
8Empirical studies finding increased inequality under decentralization include Kim, Hong and
Ha 2003; Kanbur and Zhang 2002; Zhang 2006. For health policy decentralization, the empirical
evidence has been overwhelmingly negative, finding that it generally worsens equity and effciency,
except in regions with high levels of administrative and fiscal capacity (Akin, et al 2001; Angeles, et
al 1999; Bossert and Beauvais 2002; Fiedler and Suazo 2002; Blas and Limbambala 2001; Bossert,
et al 2000; 2003; Saltman, et al 2011).
9Linz and Stepan 2000; Beramendi and Anderson 2008; Obinger, Liebfried, and Castles 2005;
Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988.
10Immergut 1992; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Tsebelis 2002; 2011.
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Studies of decentralization have become more prevalent in comparative politics
in recent years, yet have tended to focus on determinants of decentralization, its
relationship to democracy, or the intergovernmental balance of power, rather than
on inequality and social outcomes11. Comparative historical studies of advanced
industrial countries have explored the nexus between welfare states, territory, and
nationalism in the past decade12. Obinger, Castles, and Liebfried argue that “the
impacts of federalism on welfare state development are multiple, time-dependent, and
contingent on a number of contextual parameters, including, most conspicuously, the
design of federal institutions and the power resources of social and political actors”
(2005: 2).
In research on ethnic diversity and impulses for redistribution, high levels of ethnic
heterogeneity are consistently associated with less support for redistribution13. These
findings offer support for assessing power constellations at multiple territorial levels,
and for identifying the way conflicts over the reference community can produce shifts
in the territorial rules of the game, but do not tell us much about precisely what to
expect from decentralization.
This diverse literature has been unable to coalesce around a given set of expec-
tations regarding the impact of shifts in the territorial distribution of authority on
distributive outcomes in large part because of a lack of comparable data. Perceiving
both the problems of widely differing operationalizations for decentralization and the
paucity of data available to study its effects, Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel (2010) de-
veloped the Regional Authority Index (RAI) to measure eight dimensions of regional
11On causes and relationship with democracy see Montero and Samuels 2004; Montero 2001b;
Cornelius, Eisenstadt, and Hindley 1999; Diamond and Tsalik 1999; Eaton 2001; Gibson 2004 and
Samuels and Mainwaring 2004 on federalism; Manor 1999. On the intergovernmental balance of
power see Falleti 2005, 2010 and Montero 2001a.
12Be´land and Lecours 2008; Obinger, Castles, and Liebfried 2005; McEwen and Moreno 2005.
13Grove 1979; Luttmer 2001; Soroka, et al 2004; Lee, et al 2006; Eisenberg 2007; Keely and Tan
2008.
22
authority in 42 OECD countries for 1950-2006. We have expanded the dataset to
include 27 Latin American cases and several in Southeast Asia through 2010, the
number of dimensions from eight to ten, and to cover periods of authoritarian rule
(Hooghe, et al 2014 forthcoming). The dimensions are split between the concepts of
self-rule and shared-rule. Increased shared rule should generally be associated with
constraints on equity due to the effect of veto players, while the impact of self-rule
within the region will depend on commitment and capacity.
The RAI is the best existing conceptual framework for parsing out the different
types of regional authority. The extension of the dataset beyond the OECD is recent
and there have been few efforts to theorize how different dimensions might impact
equity-enhancing reform. In Spain and Brazil, the territorial distribution of author-
ity shifts over time and across regions. There is not enough variation to capture
most dimensions in the quantitative analysis. But in the case studies, the territorial
distribution of authority is considered in more detail. Increased shared rule should
be associated with constraints on equity due to the effect of veto players, while the
impact of self-rule within the region will depend on commitment and capacity.
Territorial units can exert influence up, down, or across depending on the formal
distribution of authority as well as their actual power (sometimes economic, some-
times cultural, technical, or historical). The focus of this dissertation is the central
government of a country and the highest intermediate territorial level of government
within it. In both Spain and Brazil there are also supranational and local actors
that exert influence over the distributional impact of health policies and cannot be
ignored. While there are important ways in which territorial units exert authority
upward or laterally, the primary application of territorial authority is within the unit.
A country government generally has more authority within the country than it has
over other countries or over the supranational organizations of which it is a member,
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and regional governments usually have more authority over their own territory than
they have over the central government or other regions.
In Figures 2.1 and 2.2 one can see the operationalization of the RAI dimensions.
Institutional depth is the extent to which regional government is autonomous rather
than deconcentrated, while representation is the extent to which a region is endowed
with an independent legislature and executive. Both are features of self-rule. Having
elected, non-deconcentrated regional political institutions increases ideological varia-
tion among policy makers in a country, compared to having only a central government.
Even if the responsibilities of the regional institutions are initially few and regional
demands for self-rule did not drive the decision to decentralize, non-deconcentrated
regional governments can be expected to try to expand their policy scope and re-
sources, particularly if they are accountable to regional voters. They should also
express regional positions and preferences, attempting to become veto players, even
if they have little authority in shared rule or self rule in a given policy area. This
increases the possibilities of conflict over the territorial scope of the reference com-
munity. Whether or not this constitutes a (new) source of intergovernmental conflict
depends on what the relationship of the center was with the regions before increases
in representation and/or institutional depth took place.
Regional institutions of self-rule represent the mechanisms by which the num-
ber of veto players begins to increase (deconcentrated regions can have no say in
shared-rule, by definition) and the evidence about quality of regional governance
compared to central governance is unclear. Yet regional governments can potentially
be held accountable for regional performance more easily than central governments,
and where minority nationalisms or historical regional identities are strong, institu-
tions of regional self-rule are a crucial part of democratic government. Expectations
for institutions of self-rule are therefore mixed and conditioned by other factors.
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Policy scope is the range of policies for which a regional government is responsible.
Several authors have found that decentralized countries have poorer performance on
public service delivery and pro-poor public spending (Ravallion 2002; West and Wong
1995), particularly in health care (Treisman 2000; Saltman, et al 2011). Yet Santos
(1998) finds pro-poor outcomes under participatory budgeting reforms in Brazil. I
argue this is because the impact of decentralization is indirect. The amount of au-
thority different levels of government have in particular policy areas influences how
important their levels of commitment and capacity are, which influence outcomes
more directly.
Decentralized policy scope should still be expected to increase variation in policy
provision relative to a hypothetically uniform centralized starting point, yet some pol-
icy areas are more likely than others to have been uniformly applied in the territory
prior to decentralization. Centralized policies that require investments in infrastruc-
ture or staffing of regional offices (health, education, culture, transportation, public
works) are likely to show more variation than those that are applied from the cen-
ter (taxation, social security, unemployment insurance). The mechanisms through
which commitment and capacity influence outcomes are the same regardless of the
territorial distribution of authority, so if commitment and capacity were lacking prior
to decentralization, regional inequalities in the application of policies and in social
outcomes likely existed even under centralization.
Fiscal autonomy is the extent to which regional governments can independently
tax their own populations and borrowing autonomy is the extent to which they can
borrow. This definition of fiscal autonomy is substantively different from that used
in most previous literature14. As an indicator of self-rule, measures that include how
much money a central government decides to transfer to a region are inappropriate,
14See for example Falleti (2005; 2010a).
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even if they give us information about the resources available for regional policy pro-
vision (included in our capacity measure in Chapter 2). Fiscal autonomy is therefore
fundamentally different from fiscal capacity. The Spanish case is illustrative, where
the correlation between the RAI fiscal autonomy score for the ACs is almost per-
fectly correlated with own source regional tax revenue, but not total revenue, which
is mostly made up of ceded taxes from the center and EU funds. Having the authority
to independently tax the regional population is a substantively meaningful dimension
of self-rule and fundamentally different from regional transfers, which can be high
even in the absence of self-rule.
Fiscal autonomy is the feature of self-rule most likely to increase regional varia-
tion and the most clearly regressive from the perspective of country-wide progressive
taxation. If decisions about how revenue is raised are made and applied regionally,
territorial variation in the progressivity of revenue generation will be higher than it
would be under central control. Decentralized borrowing power will also increase
variation in the resources available for policy provision by regions. Fiscal autonomy
places downward pressure on revenue generation if regions can engage in competition,
particularly by granting tax concessions to attract investment (Oates 1999; Bucovet-
sky 1991). Empirical evidence suggests that in practice, regional taxes may also tend
to be more regressive than central taxes (Chernick 1992).
Yet even in this case, the effect of fiscal autonomy is likely contingent. For exam-
ple, in Spain Catalonia has often been in a position to block redistributive changes in
regional finance because it loses a great deal of money in these arrangmenets and has
few independent sources of revenue. In Brazil, because the states control an impor-
tant value added tax and have significant own source revenues, wealthy states have
been less obstructionist when the center has implemented redistributive criteria for its
revenue-sharing. It may be that permitting certain formally regressive arrangements
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creates the political conditions for other redistributive policies that would otherwise
produce excessive opposition from rich regions.
Tax policy rarely varies regionally under central authority, even if some taxes
impact regions differently because of differences in the economic activity and em-
ployment structure. Therefore, decentralizing tax bases and/or rates should increase
regional variation in revenue generation. The progressivity of revenue generation
across the country will decline if regions keep revenues raised over their own popula-
tions because existing inequalities are almost always territorially concentrated. Poor
regions will raise fewer revenues than rich ones, even if their tax structure is the same.
To generate the same resources for social provision, poor regions would need higher
taxes or borrowing, at the same time that their social provision needs are greater
than in rich regions.
If commitment is higher in the region than it was at the center, increased fiscal
autonomy and borrowing power may result in greater revenue for social policy in those
regions compared to what was provided by the center. If the committed regions are
wealthy—which was the case in Brazil until the mid-2000s—they will have greater
resources to implement equity-enhancing social policy for a population with lower
levels of need. If the committed regions are poorer—which has often been the case in
Spain—they will be limited by their tax bases, while having greater need. Increases
in fiscal autonomy and regional borrowing power are therefore the dimensions of
regional authority with the greatest capacity to inhibit equity-enhancing policy across
a country and in poor regions, effects that can only be ameliorated by redistribution
from a higher level of government.
The dimensions of shared rule tell us how regions participate in country-wide
policy-making. Regions can influence central policies that impact the entire territory
through regional representation in central government institutions (law-making and
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fiscal control). In addition to legislative representation, regions may have varying
levels of authority over central policies that impact the distributional character of so-
cial policies through intergovernmental bargaining at the central level (executive and
fiscal control), or in special input over constitutional reform (constitutional reform).
Shared rule carries the ideological variation present in regional governments into
the central government, increasing veto opportunities and variation in ideology within
central institutions. If federal institutions (such as a territorial upper chamber) have
authority, they diminish the ideological weight of centrally elected officials. This
impacts outcomes differently depending on the direction of the shifts (particularly
in terms of level of commitment), but generally preferences the status quo, which
we know tends to inhibit welfare state development and therefore tends to be less
equity-enhancing.
Giving regions greater say in setting the constitutional rules of the game does not
have a clear expected impact on distributive outcomes. While increases in shared rule
may generally be expected to constrain maximum levels of equity-enhancing reform
or even cause greater variation between regions, rules about how regions participate
in constitutional reform are almost always the same across a country. While increased
authority in constitutional matters may empower veto players and therefore have the
same constraining effect, it may also constrain asymmetrically powerful regions and
force them to play by the same rules that apply to weaker or poorer regions.
Starting points and sequence matter for the distributive consequences of shifts in
regional authority because redistribution must always be “compared to what/when?”
Decentralization of policy scope or fiscal autonomy, departing from a highly egali-
tarian starting point, will increase inequality because of regional policy variation—
barring the unlikely scenario of identical policy implementation in a group of regions
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that have no variation in any other important characteristics. Even when certain re-
gions implement policies that are equity-enhancing within their own territory (which
has been the case for several regions in both Spain and Brazil), how this impacts
countrywide redistribution depends on the relative status of those regions and what
is happening everywhere else.
If the starting point prior to decentralization is high inequality, as was the case for
both Spain and Brazil, then the field of possible outcomes is much larger and under
many scenarios inequality in outcomes can decrease under decentralization, particu-
larly if economic development and democracy take place in all regions in conjunction
with decentralization. Still, decentralization will cap the possible levels of equity
that can be achieved within the country, even if social outcomes improve across the
board. International research on the impact of health policy decentralization across
the OECD supports this theory, finding that in general inequalities in health and ac-
cess to services have increased with decentralization of health policy responsibilities
(Saltman, et al 2011: 201). I argue that decentralization reforms tend to exhibit in-
creasing returns—they are hard to reverse democratically, once new territorial actors
are invested. Therefore, these long-term possibilities for limits to equity-enhancing
reform should be taken seriously by committed actors.
Substantive asymmetries in regional authority when wealthy regions have greater
autonomy should diminish the equity-enhancing capacity of social policy reforms
across a country. Asymmetry in regional authority is, in essence, institutionalized
inequality between regions. This does not necessarily translate into more unequal
outcomes, yet once again tends to place upper limits on the reach of equity-enhancing
reforms. Assessment of shared-rule in Spain must be considered carefully because the
formal weakness of the upper chamber persists in part because the strongest ACs
have found that they are highly successful negotiating bilaterally and do not wish to
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be constrained by the formal role of the Senate (Montero 2005). The combination
of fiscal and executive control, as well as informal mechanisms of bargaining, permit
asymmetric influence of different ACs over policy-making at the center.
The central state is still the international standard for maximum sovereignty—it
is the status minority nationalists aspire to and is recognized as the core unit for
membership in international organizations. If authority over the relevant inputs for
equity-enhancing reform resides at the center, the center will have greater capacity to
impact the entire territory than if those same resources are controlled by the regions.
Even if the regions have shared rule over central policy-making, the coordination costs
and number of veto actors decrease the chances of uniform implementation. Central
governments therefore have greater capacity to implement policy across the country
than regional governments do, even where regional governments are the protagonists
in a particular policy arena. This suggests an additional mechanism through which
increased shared rule may diminish capacity for equity-enhancing policy output. As
I discuss in the following sections, how central capacity is used is what determines
distributive outcomes. Centralization in no way guarantees equity-enhancing reform.
2.4 Commitment
My argument is rooted in the expectation that the balance of domestic class and
party political power is a major driver of distributive outcomes in society (Rueschemeyer,
Stephens and Stephens 1992; Huber and Stephens 2001; 2012). The mechanism that
translates ideology into action is commitment. An ideological commitment to eq-
uity is the cornerstone of redistributive policy production at any level of government.
There are two potential sources of commitment—left partisanship or social solidarity
within a salient and territorially defined reference community. This second poten-
tial source of commitment usually manifests itself as nationalism. Both leftist and
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nationalist forces often claim to be committed to equity, so both are analyzed15.
From whatever source, commitment plays a dominant role in equity-enhancing
policy output because it cannot be substituted for, while its presence can make up
for initial shortcomings in other factors that also impact the distributive character
of policies. For example, commitment should spur investments to increase fiscal and
administrative capacity. The reverse is not true—existing capacity does not produce
incentives for increased commitment. The connection between governance by actors
committed to equity and equity-enhancing reform should be clear—such policies are
at the heart of what these parties and actors stand for.
If actors are committed, their presence in government should impact health out-
comes through policy priorities that feed into the social determinants of inequalities
in health: basic education and health care, poverty and income inequality, collec-
tive bargaining rights, the regulation and oversight of working and living conditions,
environmental protection and recovery, and investments in equity-enhancing public
infrastructure such as public transportation and subsidized housing.
Cross-national literature on the welfare state, as well as work on Spain and Brazil,
has clearly established the protagonism of left parties in achieving policies that de-
crease inequality and poverty16. In Latin America and Western Europe, the ability of
15Christian Democracy is clearly another potential source of welfare state development, but for
these cases it does not represent a credible source of commitment to equity. Because I am not assess-
ing social spending or overall welfare state effort, but policies that are explicitly equity-enhancing,
the theoretical foundation for the role of Christian Democracy is weak. Huber, Ragin, and Stephens
find the welfare state investments of Christian Democrats to have a significantly less redistributive
profile than that of Social Democrats (1993). In addition, the Spanish case is the only one in this
dissertation where such parties play an important role (Brazil has only one and it is minor) and
most of these actors are openly antagonistic to the idea of redistribution and often to social spend-
ing in general. The primary exception is in the Basque Country, which I explore in Chapter 4.
Given the weak theoretical argument for assuming Christian Democratic forces should be commit-
ted to equity-enhancing reform, as well as the lack of traction available in my cases, I exclude this
dimension.
16Stephens 1979; Korpi 1980; Huber and Stephens 2001; 2012; Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Brady 2009;
Moller, et al 2003; Huber, et al 2006; Sandbrook, et al 2007; Scruggs and Allan 2006; Navarro and
Shi 2001; Borges-Sugiyama 2007; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011.
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left parties to govern and influence policies has been tied to democracy (Huber and
Stephens 2012), just as preventing left governments from taking root often caused its
demise, where democratic regimes existed before the onset of authoritarianism. The
orientation of nationalist parties to equity should depend on how their territorial ref-
erence community lines up with the actual territorial distribution of authority, which
is discussed in the next section.
Commitment is most important at whatever territorial level has primary responsi-
bility for policies. However, in all cases of multilevel governance, decisions are made at
several levels that are relevant for social outcomes—often including international or-
ganizations. The third cluster in the power constellations theory (Huber and Stephens
2012)—the role of international forces—is considered in this context. In Spain and
Brazil, the commitment of international forces (or its lack) has been relevant.
2.4.1 Commitment vs. Electoral Strategy
A tension exists between electoral strategy and commitment because one could
reasonably argue that rational actors will support those policies that will be popular
with voters and that—if motivated by electoral interests—these cases should not be
defined as commitment. There are several situations in my cases where this tension
must be addressed, though the most important would be if we find that actors who
are ideologically opposed to equity-enhancing reform support such reforms anyway
because of electoral strategy. In addition there are several cases in which one might
wonder whether ideological moderation is actually an electoral strategy, rather than
a change in beliefs.
This tension is not unique to my operationalization of the concept of commitment.
The partisan codings from Coppedge (1997), based on expert surveys, and from Power
and Zucco (2009; 2012) based on legislator surveys both clearly capture changes in
ideological placement that correspond to behavior changes by party actors, many of
34
which are arguably tied to electoral strategy. In this broader sense, my dissertation
does not attempt to resolve the difficulty.
Yet I address this tension in two ways. First, the coding scheme utilized for
statistical analysis broadly captures actual changes in party platforms and overall
ideology and is not directly based on party behavior on the specific health reforms that
are the focus of this dissertation. Second, the reason I argue that commitment matters
most at particular moments is precisely because of the assumption that opposition
to social policies on ideological grounds will diminish if they prove popular, which
they usually do. This means that I place the greatest importance on the very time
periods (constitutional mandate, legislation, and implementation of reform) at which
it is easiest to differentiate between electoral strategy and commitment.
But what about the particular cases in which this objection could be raised? Let
me briefly take positions, which I flesh out in the case studies. In neither country have
uncommitted actors pushed for constitutional mandates, protagonized the passage of
equity-enhancing legislation, or made efforts to implement progressive reforms—even
when there was broad popular demand for the reforms and these would arguably have
been popular electorally. They have sometimes been willing to take them up or not
dismantle them later, but have almost always been highly opposed at the outset.
In Spain opposition was stronger at first becuse the reform was more progres-
sive and a more substantive break from the past, but this opposition also dissipated
more quickly than in Brazil. The conservative Partido Popular (PP, Popular Party)
chose not to dismantle the Spanish health reform in the early 2000s (when it had
an absolute majority and could have). This should be seen primarily as an electoral
strategy. The programs were consolidated and clearly popular and there was little
need for reform with a strong economy, but the party has been thoroughly willing to
dismantle the same programs when the political and economic logic shifted in 2011.
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In addition, the PP did attempt to privatize the health system in the early 2000s and
its decision to completely devolve authority to the ACs was rooted in the failure of
its central government strategy. In Spain, multilevel intergovernmental conflict has
caused parties to position themselves differently at times depending on which party
was in power at various levels and in the case studies I articulate the instances where
this has impacted health reform.
In Brazil, the PT moderated substantially toward the center after winning the
presidency in 2002. In addition, the Brazilian parties on the right have often not
played an obstructionist role in the development of the PT’s social program, partic-
ularly in recent years. This is reflected in the most recent Power and Zucco partisan
placement surveys of Brazilian legislators, who see the PT and the parties on the
right converging toward the center (Power and Zucco 2012: 7).
The PT could afford to be as committed to equity-enhancing reform as it wanted
to be when it was in the opposition, marking out its electoral space by taking highly
principled stances. Is the party less committed to equity now that it is in office? The
party has shifted from the left to the center left, but the core changes appear to have
been in response to electoral and institutional realities that had to be accommodated
(Hunter 2009). As we shall see in the case studies, Lula was less committed to health
care than to education and social assistance, but even here the Health Ministry was
reorganized to focus on primary care with a clear ideological view that this would be
more equity-enhancing. Party militants continue to be committed to equity-enhancing
reform and the implementation of federally incentivized programs has born clear signs
of differential results depending on the orientation of bureaucrats and policy makers
toward the ideological goals of the programs (Borges Sugiyama 2007).
I would therefore argue that the PT has moderated due to electoral strategy, but
has ultimately not become less committed to equity-enhancing reform. Because of
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Brazil’s strong presidentialism and the role played by individual ministers, coupled
with the PT’s relatively weak legislative authority in the context of Brazilian alliance
culture, health policy suffered relative to other social policy areas under Lula. Yet
this is not because of lack of commitment to equity-enhancing reform. As we shall
see, because all equity-enhancing social policies feed into health outcomes, the fact
that Lula was highly committed and focused on other such policies still produced
important improvements.
The Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB, Brazilian Social Democratic
Party) was never leftist in the way that the PT was, but while its early rightward shift
was caused in large part by alliance politics, the party has drifted right ideologically
over the past 15 years. The PSDB is considered a center left party until 1994 and then
it shifts to the center and then the moderate center right. Because of the complexities
of Cardoso’s policies from an ideological perspective, as well as the differences in
commitment among particular ministers, I consider the PSDB Health Ministries to
be moderately committed during the Cardoso years.
For the parties of the right, it was clear both from interviews and field research
that the overwhelming popularity of the PT’s program combined with federal carrots
to induce policy adoption have discouraged ideological opposition. However, as can
also be seen from the Power and Zucco survey data on party placement, as well as from
the Kitschelt and Kselman (2011) expert survey, the Brazilian parties on the right
have never been as ideologically coherent as the parties on the left. They are more
opportunistic and less programmatic, so attempts to differentiate between electoral
strategy and ideological commitment are less meaningful for these cases.
In the case studies I take the issue up in greater detail because it has played out
in different ways in the two countries. In both these cases commitment is far easier
to discern from electoral strategy earlier on. Overall, this is a problem that arguably
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plagues any study of partisan placement—what is ideology and what is electoral
strategy? Yet ideology clearly influences a party’s decision about the portion of the
electorate that it will try to win over. This is a broader problem for the study
of partisanship that will not be resolved here. For my cases, I argue that while
electoral strategy will always be part of how political parties determine their stances
in democratic regimes, I have reliably identified the most problematic cases—those
in which uncommitted actors support equity-enhancing policies for electoral reasons
only—and have avoided mistaking this for an ideological commitment to equity.
2.5 Conflict Over the Reference Community
Communities are social constructs—they are “imagined” but certainly real (An-
derson 1983). When policy makers act, they must answer the question: “for whom?”
For questions of distributive politics, the question must be addressed overtly. The vi-
sion of community that is activated when a policy maker considers the target audience
for their effort is what I call the “reference community.” Reference communities can
be smaller or larger in territorial scope, more or less inclusive, more or less egalitarian,
and more or less salient for actors. In this dissertation I focus only on the territorial
dimension. Territorial scope refers to the physical boundaries of the reference commu-
nity. The vision of a particular political actor is used for their policy-making efforts
and the aggregate results (in the form of policy output and actual characteristics of
society) will generally not conform to all actors’ individual visions.
When conflict exists between the visions of the reference community that are
held by actors regarding the status of communities in the institutions of government,
pressures emerge to change the rules of the game. When the dominant visions of
the reference community are highly salient and difficult to reconcile, political conflict
over the institutional organization of governance dominates politics. This impacts
distributive outcomes in two related ways. First, it diminishes capacity by tying up
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scarce political capital in existential battles over the rules of the game rather than
substantive policy making. Second, it moderates left-right partisanship by forcing
actors to prioritize policy efforts along multiple dimensions, which may place dis-
tributive politics lower on the list. Such conflict likely favors the status quo in terms
of policy output, and how this impacts distributive outcomes depends on how unequal
the status quo is. Conflicts may be unavoidable when the different visions of the ref-
erence community held by actors within an existing polity are salient, yet cannot be
equally realized within the existing institutional arrangements.
Like beliefs and norms more generally, an actor’s vision of the reference community
can be fluid and will be impacted not only by individual identity, but also by insti-
tutional socialization17. Because this is a study about the distribution of territorial
authority and its impact on inequality, I focus on the malleability of territorial scope.
When social rights, resources, democracy, or other aspects of public and private life
are given a new territorial definition, incentives are generated for shifts in the vision
of the reference community. This is the institutional dimension of social construction
of identity, applied to a political actor’s reference community for the application of
public policies.
In discussing commitment, I argued that nationalism could offer a potential al-
ternative source of ideological commitment to equity, beyond traditional left/right
partisanship, but that I expected the non-nationalist left to be more significant for
reform. The reason is tied up in the way that conflict over the reference community
can limit capacity. Whether because increased self-rule has created new visions of
the territorial scope for policy making or because strong existing regional identities
generated demands for increased self-rule, conflict over the reference community—the
territory over which political actors believe policy should be applied—exists in many
17See Hooghe 2005.
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countries. In such cases, committed policy makers will have to set priorities. Some
actors who would ordinarily militate in favor of redistributive social policies will com-
promise elements of this program if they conflict with basic stances on group rights
or identity that are considered sacrosanct.
Where powerful regional actors contest the notion of the existing country as a
legitimate sphere for redistribution, support for country-wide progressive policies is
weakened among potential ideological allies. If decentralization is asymmetric and
the territorial contest seems to yield greater resources to regions with high levels of
autonomy, a decentralizing race to the top can leave the center with limited authority
to ensure social cohesion, even in those parts of its territory without a distinct identity.
While minority nationalist forces at the regional level may advocate social cohesion
and a sense of internal group solidarity, political resources are limited and the need to
fight for group rights takes time and political capital. Also, these groups may be more
inclined toward intra-regional redistribution than their location on the traditional left-
right spectrum would suggest, but they may not. Regardless, a price is paid both
in their own region for expending resources on ongoing battles over sovereignty, and
for the poor in the rest of the country if these battles take central energy away from
redistributive efforts. This does not mean equity-enhancing policy reform cannot
emerge under these circumstances, only that we should expect more modest results
when conflict over the reference community is high.
When intergovernmental bargaining takes place between regions and the center,
autonomy itself becomes a goal and often pushes issues of social welfare to a sec-
ondary plane. If minority nationalist regions are higher income than average, these
conflicts are more intense because the higher regional autonomy is more costly for the
rest and more beneficial for the region. Even when formal arrangements are uniform,
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conflict over perceived differences in resources, location of investment and infrastruc-
ture projects, or partisan access to central officials causes conflict in federal systems.
If increased political autonomy, more authority in shared rule, extra revenue, or other
valuable resources are distributed asymmetrically, then institutional competition over
the rules of the game will absorb political resources for all regions acting rationally,
even if they are not part of the conflict over the definition of the reference community.
This has been the case for many non-nationalist regions in Spain. This conflict should
be negative for equity-enhancing policy provision.
Settling the rules of the game in a way that mostly satisfies veto players and
eliminates conflict allows policy to return to the fore. This is more easily said than
done, yet the point is that this is not a normative argument against changing the
rules of the game. It is an observation that prolonged conflict without resolution (or
with a resolution that is unacceptable to powerful sectors) has political costs for all
actors, particularly those committed to equity. While ethnically heterogeneous soci-
eties perform worse across the board on various quality of government indicators (La
Porta et al. 1999; Alesina et al. 2003), there appears to be a significant improvement
when the rules of the game can be settled using the compromise of ethno-federalism,
rather than a unitary structure (Charron 2009). In other words, if conflict is high, set-
tling on arrangements that accommodate multiple alternative visions of the reference
community improves capacity.
For understanding the territorial distribution of authority in society, incorporating
an analysis of conflict over the territorial scope of the reference community is central.
In Brazil there is little disagreement that the country is the legitimate sphere for
political action over a range of issues that are competences of the central government.
Yet in Spain, nearly a quarter of the population lives in ACs where the dominant
elected representatives believe the existing central state is not the legitimate territorial
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scope for the application of any public policies.
There is no silver bullet for managing complex questions of national identity and
sovereignty, yet we can still generally expect such conflicts to reduce the weight of com-
mitment (whether nationalist or leftist) in determining outcomes. The left in Spain
has historically been committed to democratic minority national self-determination,
or at the very least strong federalism, which has created high levels of internal conflict
regarding the legitimate territory for progressive redistribution—a conflict that does
not exist within the Brazilian left. Because the cost of political conflict is hard to
measure, while the immediate financial implications of shifts in the territorial distri-
bution of authority are more easily quantified, actors may underestimate the resources
taken up in ongoing struggles over the rules of the game.
While such conflicts have been common in Europe and less central in Latin Amer-
ica historically, an ongoing shift toward special indigenous rights tied to particular
territories in Bolivia, Colombia, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru (Hooghe, et al 2014
forthcoming) may produce greater conflict moving forward. Employing the concept
of the reference community helps us understand why capacity and commitment may
not be enough to generate equity-enhancing policy in such cases. Where conflict over
the reference community is sharp and salient, the space for ideological commitment
to equity-enhancing policy is diminished, as is administrative capacity. This should
lead to less redistributive social policy output at the central level and possibly at the
regional level as well, depending on the constellation of resources and commitment
available in each one.
2.6 Capacity
Holding government office cannot be translated into the power to change social
outcomes without administrative and fiscal resources. Capacity—fiscal and administrative—
is a crucial link between policies and outcomes in society. For actors committed to
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equity, a residual state will not do and capacity can be increased with time. Actors
who are not committed to equity need less social provision by the government—
they and their constituents are more capable of meeting their needs through private
channels. Therefore, committed actors have stronger incentives to increase fiscal and
administrative capacity.
In the city of Porto Alegre, Brazil (in the state of Rio Grande do Sul), decentral-
ization allowed a committed local governing party to mobilize community members
for direct democratic decision making over a small range of local budget priorities
(orc¸amento participativo, participatory budgeting). Though limited and difficult be-
cause of low capacity, this process improved social outcomes and the quality of gover-
nance, which in turn increased capacity over time. But Rio Grande do Sul is a fairly
high capacity state where GDP per capita is 1.6 times the national average and the
population is 84 per cent white (one of the whitest states in the country).
In Brazil’s poor and highly unequal Northeast where slavery was deeply rooted
and oligarchic family rule has only been challenged in the past decade, decentral-
ization placed inhabitants more thoroughly under the control of the entrenched elite
interests that dominated the region. In those communities, there was little incentive
for increased capacity and the possibilities for equity-enhancing reform decreased even
further. In the state of Bahia, only when committed actors were able to win election
to state government in 2007 were improvements in capacity prioritized, a slow and
frustrating process for those trying to implement the equity-enhancing policy reforms
they had promised voters.
While the importance of administrative and fiscal capacity for effective policy
implementation are rarely questioned, their distributive impact has not often been
studied, particularly at the regional level. In fact, few characteristics of regional ca-
pacity have been systematically studied at all because of the enormity of the empirical
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challenges. Most of the quantitative measures used in the cross-national literature
are either rough proxies or are based on data that rarely exists at the regional level.
Concepts such as human capital or the Human Development Index are generally op-
erationalized using income, education, and health in ways that make them impossible
to use to test a theory such as mine, since those individual measures are all mean-
ingful indicators of other important parts of the model. The level of education in
the population will certainly be associated with the administrative capacity of the
bureaucratic corps, but is not available in many countries at the regional level and is
generally too highly correlated with GDP per capita.
Corruption is commonly used as a proxy for capacity, but the relationship between
corruption and bureaucratic capacity is not completely clear (Schilde and Tubin 2009).
This is neatly summed up by the old Brazilian adage about politicians who “rouba
mas faz” (steal but get things done). Further illustrating these idiosyncrasies, while
regional respondents to an EU Quality of Governance survey in Spain believed their
public services were among the fairest and most equitable in Europe, they think levels
of corruption in the regional administration of those services is higher than in Europe
(Charron, et al 2012: 18).
Likely, the type of corruption matters for its impact on capacity to produce equity-
enhancing reforms: we should expect forms of corruption that siphon off public re-
sources into private hands, compromise public agencies that provide important ser-
vices, or require payment of bribes for receipt of services to be most problematic.
However, as with high levels of conflict over the rules of the game, administrative ca-
pacity can also be diminished when corruption scandals take center stage and require
major investments of time and energy by parties, or the resignation of agency man-
agers and policy makers. The current state of the data requires that such indicators
be assessed qualitatively in the case studies, as they are not available systematically
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across regions.
Charron, et al (2012) regionally disaggregate the EU Quality of Governance data
to produce indicators below the level of the country. These data are imperfect because
they combine answers on questions about corruption, the quality of public services,
and the fairness of access to those services, along with questions about process and
the rule of law. The findings across the Spanish regions are mostly consistent with
the case study evidence of administrative capacity I present in the chapters to come.
Variation is high, with the Basque Country at the top and Catalonia at the bottom.
Some high-income regions like Madrid or Valencia perform as poorly as low-income
regions like Andalusia, and the poorest region of all—Extremadura—performs better
than all three. The reliance on survey data with few time points and on a topic
sensitive to framing, social values, and the salience of the topic hamper reliability.
Yet this study and the data on which it relies are an important part of incremental
progress in measuring important concepts such as these. Overall, capacity measures
are highly contested and some scholars argue that good measures of quality of public
administration simply do not exist (van de Walle 2005: 2) .
Finally, under conditions of high poverty and inequality we might expect a “U-
curve” in the level of capacity necessary to implement public policy given the size
of the community. The smallest villages and townships are likely to have very low
capacity, which may make reform difficult. As the size of a city increases, adminis-
trative capacity will likely increase and this could yield substantive improvements in
public service provision and generate economies of scale. Yet beyond a certain point,
mega-cities may require much higher levels of commitment and capacity to produce
the same level of reform because of the complexities of service provision in large urban
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areas18. In poor countries with high inequality, these often include daunting prob-
lems of service provision in slums, high levels of violence, and large cities with only
minimal levels of urban planning.
Capacity is necessary but not sufficient for equity-enhancing reform. While gov-
ernment capacity is not required for the health outcomes of any given individual, it
is necessary for addressing inequality in health. Some types of corruption, persistent
high levels of intergovernmental conflict, high turnover in leadership of important
state agencies, and persistent low levels of economic development can limit capacity.
Globalization, demographic transition, and the decline of industry and manufactur-
ing in favor of services broadly constrain the fiscal capacity of governments of all
ideological stripes by reducing the potential base for revenue generation and narrow-
ing the set of macroeconomic policy making tools available to governments. The
revenue-generating system and the economic reality in the country and regions di-
rectly influence the availability of resources.
2.7 Timing and Sequence
For social policy outcomes, timing and sequence matter. For equity enhancing
reform to take place and be implemented, particular constellations of commitment,
capacity, and territorial distribution of authority at particular moments in the reform
process influence how redistributive the reform is likely to be. Starting points cannot
be ignored. Most forms of decentralization should, by definition, increase regional
variation if the starting place were a very high level of equity. When the starting point
is a high level of inequity under centralization, the possibilities are more complex.
Many of the causal variables hypothesized here are more important for successful
18Paraphrasing Peter Spink, expert in municipal policy innovation at the Fundac¸a˜o Getulio Vargas,
“In a small municipality, one committed and capable person can make a very large difference. In
large cities, it takes much greater commitment and capacity to achieve the same results because the
systems are exponentially more complex.”
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equity-enhancing reform at certain moments and generally exhibit patterns of increas-
ing returns—with decisions made early in the reform process carrying more weight
than at later moments (Pierson 2000). The crucial moments for the health system
are constitutional guarantee/organic law, enabling legislation, implementation, and
consolidation. If a universal health system of sufficient quality and coverage can be
established, commitment is somewhat less important later on. Popular social bene-
fits become accepted and thought of as social rights, which makes certain types of
fundamental reform unpalatable for any governing party. Actors opposed to equity-
enhancing reform understand this process and often fight reforms the hardest at the
beginning when they believe there will be little chance of overturning them once they
are implemented. Lacking government committed to equity at these key points in the
reform process tends to diminish the equity-enhancing nature of the policy.
The importance of sequence for capacity is more complex. Variation in capacity
will have more impact over the life cycle of the policy and the minimum level needed
for successful system consolidation at the outset is hard to define ex ante. While a
certain level of capacity is required at the moment of implementation and for consol-
idation (to keep a reform from being marginalized as residual), if the policy gains a
foothold socially and politically, demands for increased capacity can force actors to
generate resources and invest in administrative capacity that can improve the system
gradually over time. Low capacity can diminish the equity-enhancing character of a
reform at any point, since budget shortfalls or inept management can quickly dete-
riorate social services. Financing can also be made more regressive even when the
policy itself is untouched, which makes it less progressive immediately.
The sequence of particular types of decentralization matters for social policy pro-
vision primarily because of how it interacts with capacity. Because experience with
managing budgets and governance institutions should increase overall administrative
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capacity, for regions without a history of self-government a lag between the creation
of decentralized political institutions and the assumption of major social policy re-
sponsibilities should improve the way administrative capacity can be leveraged in
implementing equity-enhancing reforms. Gaining policy responsibilities without ca-
pacity when a major reform is first being implemented can lead to inequalities in the
system that become entrenched and difficult to remedy later. This has been prob-
lematic in Spain, where the logic of health devolution had nothing to do with proof
of capacity to manage service provision and several relatively low-capacity ACs took
on health responsibilities early. Devolution without capacity was also the standard
in Brazil in the early 1990s, as well as in several states that were uncommitted to
equity-enhancing reform and devolved greater authority to municipalities regardless
of their level of capacity. Losses in capacity later matter, but are less likely to shape
the fundamental nature of the system. Tables A.1 and A.2 summarize the patterns
of commitment, capacity, and decentralization at different stages of health reform in
Spain and Brazil. The cut off points are not exactly the same for each variable
The public-private split in health provision is a particularly good example. If
capacity is low in what should be a universal public system, the demand for alterna-
tive private services and insurance will be high from the beginning. The chances of
the system being stigmatized as a poor resource for the poor then increase, just as
qualified personnel will not see the public system as a viable place to make a dignified
career. This has been a particularly daunting problem in Brazil.
Problems of corruption are generally worse where the rule of law is weakest, demo-
cratic institutions and accountability are weakly established, and problems of poverty
and inequality are high. This suggests an additional boon to a lag between politi-
cal decentralization (institutional depth and representation) and extension of policy
scope. Especially in new democracies, allowing time for civil society to develop and
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establish mechanisms of accountability and oversight with public institutions before
granting broad policy making authority and resources to those entities should produce
better outcomes across the board, and a more programmatic attention to policies for
the poor in particular.
Finally, decentralization itself likely exhibits increasing returns. Once political
actors come to think of particular spheres of responsibility as “theirs,” taking them
away is challenging. When theory suggests that higher levels of decentralization will
make equity-enhancing social policies harder to implement across a country, the best
chances for redistributive social policies is to consolidate them prior to decentraliza-
tion. In this sense, Brazil is a somewhat mixed case because states and municipalities
had a high level of social policy authority coming out of the democratic transition,
but so did the center, and the center controlled most of the money.
Spain, however, offers a telling illustration. When health reform was passed cen-
trally from 1984-1986, health competences had already been devolved to several ACs
and they were partially beyond the reach of central policy implementation, with sev-
eral more following before consolidation of the health system had progressed much.
Indeed, Catalonia battled the center in the courts to prevent its encroachment in
this new area of responsibility and ended up being the latest AC (by two years) to
implement the reform. The extension of the equity-enhancing primary care reform of
1984 was much more uneven in the early decentralizers than in those that took over
health after the consolidation of the reforms, and the poor regions that were early
decentralizers have not performed as well as those that took on responsibilities later.
2.8 Democracy
The relationship between democracy and equity-enhancing reform is more com-
plex than it might seem, and difficult to assess in a multilevel statistical analysis
constrained by data limitations. There are two potential ways that democracy might
49
influence equity-enhancing reform—by giving the representatives of those at the bot-
tom a chance to compete and govern (Huber and Stephens 2001; 2012) and through
transforming civil society and its relationship to the state (McGuire 2010). For health
outcomes directly, significant evidence exists that democracy is associated with im-
provements in health19 and the arguments are similar to those for other elements
of social welfare—that health care is a public good that tends to be demanded and
defended when the majority of the population can express its preferences.
Yet democracy is neither necessary nor sufficient for equity-enhancing reform or
health outcomes. Economic development is one of the primary drivers of improved
health outcomes in developing countries and the biggest shifts in my two cases took
place under authoritarian rule. In addition, high levels of health access and cover-
age were attained under authoritarian governments—certainly equity-enhancing com-
pared to the previous status quo. Still, for equity-enhancing health policy the evidence
is clear that democracy is an important enabler of progressive reform and I explore
the links directly in the case studies.
The question of assessing multilevel democracy has received increasing attention in
comparative politics20. Yet for a number of reasons I do not incorporate such a mea-
sure here. First, the same problem that exists at the central level exists at the regional
level for my cases—that the transition to and consolidation of democracy are highly
correlated with left rule. In Brazil, where concern about variation in subnational
quality of democracy are strongest, clean government and participatory democracy
have been important parts of the program of left parties and when they have won of-
fice in the historic strongholds of oligarchic rule, the quality of democratic governance
has improved. Certainly corruption is not limited by left/right partisanship, but this
19Franco, et al 2004; Besley and Kudamatsu 2006; Ruger 2005.
20See for example Gervasoni 2010; Giraudy 2010, among others.
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brings us to the second challenge for measures of subnational democracy: if formal
democracy at the center exists, parties are legal, suffrage is universal, and formal civil
liberties are in place, then the level of subjectivity involved in differentiating between
corruption and subnational authoritarianism (which should not be collapsed into one
category) is problematic. Finally, even the definitions and measures of national-level
democracy are highly contested. Shared understandings, measures, and datasets of
subnational democracy are still in the very earliest stages of development. The bur-
geoning scholarly effort taking place in this arena will hopefully permit the inclusion
of such measures in the future.
2.9 Income Inequality
For equity-enhancing social policy reform, higher income inequality means a smaller
middle class and therefore more limited social consensus in favor of universality. While
being poor is bad for the health of an individual, the relationship with income in-
equality is somewhat more tenuous. Most studies of inequality and health have been
carried out in the United States. International comparative research suggests there
is a threshold at which income inequality appears to have an independent impact
on health outcomes, one that most European countries do not reach (Subramanian
and Kawachi 2004). In the United States, the effects appear to operate at the state
level, rather than the central or local levels, and have been linked robustly to a large
variety of negative health outcomes21. In studies that work with individual level data,
income inequality is particularly bad for the health of the poor (Wagstaff and van
Doorslaer 2001), yet is statistically significantly across countries as well (Doorslaer,
et al 1997). I therefore expect income inequality to be negatively associated with
both equity-enhancing reform and health outcomes.
21Blakely, Lochner, and Kawachi 2002; Kennedy, et al 1998; Soobader and LeClere 1999; Subra-
manian, et al 2000.
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2.10 Income and Growth
Empirically, the relationship between income and health, for individuals and coun-
tries, follows the “Preston Curve” in which we observe significant health gains asso-
ciated with increased income at the low end, with decreasing returns at higher levels
(Preston 1975; Bloom and Canning 2007). Yet Preston assessed health at differ-
ent levels of income, not at change over time in particular places or among specific
populations. Rapid fluctuations in growth, as well as recessions, have a negative im-
pact on the ability of policy makers to sustain equity-enhancing social and economic
policies, which in turn support equitable distributions of health. In addition, some
bases of growth are more sustainable than others over the long term. McGuire (2010)
finds levels of income to be an important predictor of health outcomes in developing
countries, but finds ambiguous effects for economic growth.
I therefore do not expect economic growth to have a clear impact on either equity-
enhancing policies or health outcomes. Because neither Spain nor Brazil have reached
the height of the Preston curve, I expect levels of income to be positively associated
with improved health outcomes. In terms of the impact on equity-enhancing policy,
there is no guarantee that increased revenue from population wealth or economic
growth will be applied to equity-enhancing policy production, as with capacity more
broadly. Even when committed governments are in power, if the needy are a smaller
portion of the population there may be little political will for reform.
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3 EVIDENCE FROM THE SPANISH ACS AND BRAZILIAN
STATES
In this Chapter I present statistical analysis testing the hypothesized relationships
discussed in the previous chapter. I discuss the data and their measurement, which
are summarized in Table 3.1, below. For health outcomes, the presence of equity-
enhancing health policies should be central and socio-economic factors should continue
to have an independent effect. Ideological commitment and the territorial distribution
of authority have an indirect effect on outcomes through equity-enhancing policies,
rather than a direct effect.
In political science, a number of theories about the institutional organization of
the state have been found relevant for policy and social outcomes. These include the
structure of federal institutions, the electoral system, and the party system, among
others. In studies where long enough time periods are covered, or where regions are
pooled across countries, such factors will need to be included, but in this case they
are held constant by the time period and within-country analysis. In Chapter 6 where
I discuss the patterns in Spain and Brazil at the country level, I bring these factors
back in, but they are not included in the statistical analysis.
The measurement challenges for regional level statistical analysis are significant,
as we shall see. While there is a clear trend toward collecting more and better data
below the country level, we are still in the early stages of this process. The data
for these two cases have been compiled from country and regional sources. Coding
of several new variables is based on field research in Spain and Brazil in 2011 and
2012. In both countries, the highest intermediate tier is the unit of analysis, though
T
ab
le
3.
1:
V
ar
ia
b
le
s,
M
ea
su
re
s,
an
d
S
ou
rc
es
fo
r
S
p
an
is
h
A
C
s
an
d
B
ra
zi
li
an
S
ta
te
s
V
ar
ia
bl
e
M
ea
su
re
S
ou
rc
e
(S
pa
in
)
S
ou
rc
e
(B
ra
zi
l)
H
:
P
ol
ic
y
H
:
IM
R
In
fa
n
t
M
or
ta
li
ty
D
ea
th
s
u
n
d
er
on
e
ye
ar
p
er
10
00
li
ve
b
ir
th
s
IN
E
IB
G
E
O
u
tc
om
e
E
q
u
it
y
-e
n
h
an
ci
n
g
h
ea
lt
h
re
fo
rm
P
op
u
la
ti
on
co
ve
ra
ge
u
n
-
d
er
p
ri
m
ar
y
ca
re
re
fo
rm
G
o´n
za
le
z,
et
al
20
04
;
L
o´p
ez
C
as
as
n
ov
as
,
et
al
20
01
D
A
B
S
U
S
O
u
tc
om
e
-
H
ea
lt
h
D
ec
en
tr
al
iz
at
io
n
0-
4
sc
al
e
A
u
th
or
A
u
th
or
+
/-
F
is
ca
l
A
u
to
n
om
y
R
eg
io
n
al
A
u
th
or
it
y
In
d
ex
H
o
og
h
e,
et
al
20
14
n
/a
+
/-
C
en
tr
al
C
om
m
it
m
en
t
P
ar
ti
sa
n
w
ei
gh
t
in
ce
n
tr
al
ca
b
in
et
(F
u
ll
ca
b
in
et
)
A
u
th
or
;
C
H
E
S
(E
x
ec
u
ti
ve
)
H
u
b
er
,
et
al
20
12
;
P
ow
er
&
Z
u
cc
o
20
12
+
R
eg
io
n
al
C
om
m
it
m
en
t
P
ar
ti
sa
n
w
ei
gh
t
in
re
gi
on
al
ca
b
in
et
(F
u
ll
ca
b
in
et
)
A
u
th
or
(E
x
ec
u
ti
ve
)
A
u
th
or
+
/-
C
ap
ac
it
y
R
ev
en
u
e/
G
D
P
B
A
D
E
S
P
E
&
IN
E
IP
E
A
+
-
C
on
tr
ol
s
L
eg
ac
y
of
S
la
ve
ry
W
h
it
e
p
er
ce
n
t
of
p
op
u
la
ti
on
n
/a
IB
G
E
+
/-
-
D
em
o
cr
ac
y
Y
ea
rs
of
ce
n
tr
al
d
em
o
cr
ac
y
F
ro
m
19
78
20
-y
ea
r
la
g
fr
om
19
85
+
-
In
eq
u
al
it
y
In
co
m
e
G
in
i
G
o
er
li
ch
20
12
IP
E
A
-
+
P
ov
er
ty
P
ov
er
ty
ra
te
on
ly
p
os
t-
20
04
IP
E
A
(s
ta
te
sp
ec
ifi
c)
+
/-
+
G
D
P
/C
ap
it
a
R
eg
io
n
al
,
C
P
I-
ad
ju
st
ed
IN
E
&
A
u
th
or
IP
E
A
+
/-
-
G
D
P
gr
ow
th
R
eg
io
n
al
,
C
P
I-
ad
ju
st
ed
IN
E
&
A
u
th
or
IP
E
A
+
/-
+
/-
54
several country-level variables that change over time are also included. In the case of
Spain, data for 17 ACs cover the period 1980-2010. In Brazil, the data for 27 states
cover the period 1983-2010. The Brazilian panel is slightly unbalanced, as the state
of Tocantins was created in 1988.
In Spain there is no doubt that central and AC actors are primarily responsible for
health policy, even though the 8,112 municipalities provide the land for building clinics
and hospitals. While the provincias (between the local and regional level) are major
actors in the provision of social services, they are generally even less involved in health
policy than municipalities. Yet in Brazil, the 5,564 municipalities are all responsible
for primary care provision and larger cities have also been empowered to take on
medium and high complexity service provision. Brazilian states build hospitals, train
municipal health officials, oversee quality control, and manage epidemiological data.
They coordinate service provision in groups of smaller municipalities and directly
provide specialist and hospital services for all but the larger cities. In addition, where
municipal governments do not competently manage their responsibilities, there have
been cases of central and state actors stepping in. The Brazilian states are crucial
actors in health, though without the unique protagonism of the Spanish ACs, and are
particularly important when municipal commitment and capacity are low.
Many variables for the statistical analysis were challenging to obtain and some
have not-insignificant problems of reliability and quality—particularly those coming
from survey data. These weaknesses are magnified exponentially for local level in-
formation, so lower tiers of regional authority are discussed and included in the case
studies, but are excluded from the statistical analysis.
3.1 Health Outcomes
Health outcomes can be measured in different ways, yet few indicators are avail-
able over time at the regional level. Infant mortality rates are appropriate for my
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hypotheses because they are more responsive to public policies, more quickly, than
some outcomes (McGuire 2010). Infant mortality is more highly concentrated among
the poor and therefore should be a target for equity-enhancing policies. It is also one
of the few regional indicators collected over sufficient periods of time in both cases.
In Spain, infant mortality rates in the ACs are available for 1975-2010 from the
Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica (INE, National Statistics Institute). For Brazil I
utilize sources from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografa´ e Estat´ıstica (IBGE, Brazilian
Geographic and Statistics Institute) and DATASUS-IDB, the government database of
health statistics (Indicadores e Dados Ba´sicos). Municipal infant mortality rates are
available for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 and at the state level annually for 1997-2010.
I aggregate and weight municipal data for a state-level indicator for 1980-1996 and
then use the state level series for the later years. Missing data are interpolated, which
is appropriate because in all cases the trend is steadily downward over time.
As McGuire discusses in detail, even from different government sources, Brazilian
infant mortality data vary significantly and various authors have shown undercount-
ing of infant deaths by as much as 25-30 per cent (2010: 150). In addition, this
pattern should not be random, as infant births and deaths are much more likely to
go uncounted in poorer areas. Yet this particular weakness in the data makes for a
more conservative test of the theory, as variation between rich and poor areas is likely
underestimated.
In the Spanish ACs and Brazilian states, estimates of infant mortality vary more
from year to year than the actual reality likely does, indicating the need to see these
more as ballpark figures than highly accurate measures. In Spain for recent years,
infant mortality rates are so low in all ACs that some variation may result from actual
changes in infant deaths from year to year, particularly in small ACs.
Figures A.1 and A.2 show average regional patterns of infant mortality over time
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in both countries. In Spain infant mortality in 1975 ranged from a low of 14 in
Madrid to a high of 24 in Castilla y Leo´n, while all ACs were below 4 by 2010. In
Brazil, health outcomes, like other socio-economic and demographic characteristics,
are concentrated regionally. In 1980 the highest infant mortality rates were over four
times higher in the poor Northeast than in the Southern and Southeastern states,
where rates were between 30 and 40. Yet the decline in infant mortality in Brazil has
been no smaller as a per cent change than in Spain and has been even more radical
in some areas, as the figures show.
Two shortcomings should be kept in mind for aggregated regional infant mortality
rates and country averages. First, for regional aggregates, without the microdata,
there is no way to know how infant mortality is distributed in the population. Because
of the nature of infant mortality as a highly avoidable outcome when proper basic
conditions are met, it is quite likely that in rich regions where infant mortality is low,
what persists is still almost entirely concentrated among the poor. Higher inequality
should exacerbate these trends. This is particularly important in Brazil, where it is
quite likely that among the middle and upper classes, infant mortality rates look like
they do in most advanced industrial countries, while the poor in those states suffer
infant mortality rates more similar to the averages in very poor states. The favelas
of Sa˜o Paulo would be an example to consider—huge pockets of deep poverty in the
middle of one of the highest average income states. Second, the central averages
presented are not weighted by population—they are state and AC means. These
figures are not used in the models, but for illustration only, yet likely inflate infant
mortality rates because more populous areas tend to be higher income and have lower
infant mortality rates.
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3.2 Equity-Enhancing Health Policy
While health outcome indicators are fairly consistent across countries and the
literature on determinants of health is large, there have been no unified efforts at
measuring “equal access for equal need, equal utilization for equal need, or equal
quality for all.” To tell us whether policies are equity-enhancing, we need indicators
of actual policy implementation, rather than party platforms or legislation passed.
To this end I have collected data on central primary care reform coverage rates.
While the Spanish government has never published formal statistics on coverage
rates, the most prominent health policy experts in the country used the govern-
ment health maps to construct population coverage rates for the reform for each AC
(Gonza´lez and Urbanos 2004; Lo´pez-Casasnovas, et al 2001). A government report
on health care in 1991, the Informe Abril assesses primary reform coverage rates in
that year, which match up precisely with scholarly estimates. Variation in coverage
has been high and early decentralizers have had much higher variation and overall
lower levels of implementation than those ACs that remained within direct central
government health provision (INSALUD) until 2001. Figures A.5 and A.6 show the
differing trends for the seven early decentralizing ACs and the 10 late decentralizing
ACs. It was not until 2004, a full two decades later, that reform was considered
complete in all ACs.
In Brazil, there is a Primary Care Division within the National Ministry of Health
(DAB-MS, Departamento da Atenc¸a˜o Ba´sica) that keeps tabs on coverage rates for
the primary reform, called the Programa Sau´de da Famı´lia (PSF, Family Health
Program). The PSF is not a state level program, but is implemented with state
support in the municipalities and the center publishes aggregate data on rates of
population coverage in each state. The reform began in 1994 country-wide and shows
similar variation to the Spanish case. Figure A.4 shows the average trajectory of
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the PSF in Brazil. After 15 years, coverage has been nearly 100 per cent in many
states for some time, while remaining very low in others. I interpolate the years 1994-
1998, as central figures were not kept until this year but in all states it is much more
accurate to assume a trend from 1994 to the level achieved in 1998, than to omit the
first four years of the program.
There were quite a few state and municipal programs for primary care before the
PSF began and the vast majority of these were folded into the PSF in order to take
advantage of federal incentives for implementation. These processes are captured by
high early levels of PSF in places like Bras´ılia or Ceara´, which had their own programs
earlier. A handful of municipalities chose to forgo federal subsidies for primary care
in order to maintain their own programs. Sometimes these were less generous, less
efficient programs that were eventually scrapped (Sa´o Paulo city) and in some cases
they are more generous programs (Porto Alegre). Regardless, even Porto Alegre has
PSF operating alongside its municipal program. Determing the coverage levels of
the handful of municipal programs that accompany the PSF is unfeasible, so these
programs are not captured in the variable.
This indicator is not without problems, but its meaning is clear and the mea-
sure is comparable across regions and in both countries. The main drawback is that
the composition of primary care teams has varied regionally and over time in both
countries, though fairly consistently in the direction of more complete teams (incor-
porating dentists and pediatricians in addition to nurses and General Practitioners
(GPs), for example), with better training and more resources. However, the current
economic crisis has begun to erode the resources of the primary care network in Spain,
while in Brazil it is still in an expansionary phase, having been implemented over a
decade later. The Spanish data are somewhat less reliable because of higher regional
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authority over program design, which means that there have not been uniform ti-
tles and terminology used for all ACs, making assessment of reform somewhat more
difficult (Lamata 2012).
Assessing primary care also allows me to avoid using health spending as an indica-
tor of equity-enhancing policy effort, which can be particularly problematic in health
care. Uncommitted actors are often quite happy to spend public money on health
when their electoral supporters include private medical and pharmaceutical interests
and the construction industry. Because both countries still have under-funded health
systems overall, I do consider health spending in the case studies.
The extent of equity-enhancing health policy should depend on the level of com-
mitment to equity among governing actors at all relevant levels of government, the
level of capacity in the region, and the territorial distribution of authority, while con-
trolling for the legacy of democracy, income inequality, economic development levels,
poverty, and growth. In Spain, conflict over the territorial scope of the reference com-
munity means that left and right parties that defend minority nationalisms should be
considered independently. While in Brazil the territorial scope of the reference com-
munity is not politically contested, the legacy of slavery is territorially concentrated.
One should control for the racial composition of the states—capturing the dominant
dimension of ethnic heterogeneity in the country.
3.3 Territorial Distribution of Authority
There are no policy-specific measures of decentralization at the regional level es-
tablished in the literature. Territorial authority over health policy is therefore coded
along a 0-4 scale for each region in both countries. Like the RAI more broadly in
policy scope, this measure aims to assess the formal reality—written or unwritten—of
regional authority in health. However this measure combines depth and scope in an
effort to minimize complexity.
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A 0 indicates that the region has limited or no authority in health policy. This is
the case either when no health legislation exists or when a region is formally granted
a residual role. A score of 1 indicates a significant role in implementation, but a
limited role in policy-making. A score of 2 indicates that regions play a role in
implementation and also have the authority to expand and organize health services.
A score of 3 indicates that regions have substantive policy making authority in health,
but authority is shared with another level or levels of government. A score of 4
indicates that regions are the dominant health policy makers.
In Spain, the ACs score 0 until 1981 when public health and planning responsibil-
ities are devolved to all at once and they score 1. Then, whenever they take on full
health competences the score increases to 4. This took place in Catalonia in 1981,
Andalusia 1984, the Basque Country and Valencia in 1987, Galicia and Navarre in
1990, Canarias in 1994, and the remaining 10 ACs in 2001. The process of health de-
volution was completely separate from the implementation of health legislation at the
center—a part of the process of state reform rather than part of the implementation
of the Sistema Nacional de Salud (SNS, National Health System).
In Brazil, the states score 0 until 1988 when the Constitution grants states and
municipalities the right to supplement and complement central social policy and the
score increases to 1. When the Norma Operacional Ba´sica 1996 (NOB 1996, Funda-
mental Operating Rule) is passed by the center, a process for territorial organization
of responsibilities for the nascent Sistema U´nico de Sau´de (SUS, Single Health Sys-
tem) is developed. Some states are habilitados (qualified) for an intermediate level
of health service management after 1996 and others are qualified for gesta˜o plena or
full health service management. The first group is coded 2 in the year of qualifica-
tion and the second group, 3. After the Norma Operacional de Assisteˆncia a` Sau´de
2001 (NOAS 01/2001, Operating Rule for Health Care) is passed in 2001, states
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begin to accede to full health responsibilities if they were not already qualified. By
2004 all states have attained a score of 3, but because the central government retains
significant authority in health legislation and state health secretariats are vertically
integrated into the central Ministry of Health (not the case in Spain), no Brazilian
states score 4. A key difference, which we shall broach in the discussion, is that in
Brazil increased authority was tied to increased resources controlled by the center.
For Spanish municipalities and Brazilian states and municipalities, the competence
“roof” in health is somewhat unclear, and has been more or less concrete at different
points in time. Before the creation of the SNS in 1986 and the SUS in 1988, there was
no overarching central health legislation. In Brazil states had historically provided
public clinics where the poor went for services and sometimes even free or subsidized
medicines. In Spain provincial governments had owned and operated mental hospitals
and homes for the elderly. Municipalities often had their own family doctors, paid for
by the city council and available to residents. These have been important services and
their presence or absence is tightly tied to local capacity, as they were not fulfilling
central mandates accompanied by financing. Yet these were not citizenship, residency,
or employment rights for users. If money was tight, clinics and hospitals were closed.
If one region had resources and another did not, provision was vastly different. There
is no way to accurately code what was done with no formal authority and no legislative
guarantee, yet these practices should not go unmentioned.
While the dimensions of the RAI capture important variation across OECD and
Latin American countries from 1950 to 2010, because of when most other data become
available for regional analysis in Spain and Brazil, there is very limited variation across
regions or over time. The exception is borrowing power in the Brazilian states, which
decreases in 2000 because of the Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (Fiscal Responsibility
Law). In Spain, fiscal autonomy increases in 1997 and was asymmetrical—with the
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two special fiscal regimes having maximum scores from the start of the democratic
period. But because the changes in fiscal autonomy modified the levels of revenue in
the regions, there are serious problems of multicollinearity that prevent the inclusion
of measures of fiscal autonomy with measures of capacity.
3.4 Power Constellations
The partisan placement of policy makers offers a good basic indicator of left/right
sources of commitment, with policy makers on the left being more committed to
equity than those on the right and significant variation existing within these broad
categories—variation explored in the case studies. I use the model for ideological
party scores developed by Coppedge (1997) and extended by Huber, et al (2012),
using the Power and Zucco 2012 Brazilian legislative coding as a reliability check.
Tables A.3 and A.4 list the political parties of the regional executive across the time
period in each country, with their scoring and a brief description. Coppedge’s coding
scheme—based on expert surveys—permits parties and coalitions to be coded as left
(L), center left (CL), center (C), center right (CR), and right (R). Then, these parties
can either be secular (S) or Christian (X). Parties may also be coded as personalist
(P), independent (I), or unknown (U). Coppedge codes the Brazilian parties and
coalitions and in the case of Spain I extend his coding model and verify its reliability
based on the results of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker, et al 2012).
In Spain I score left and center left parties 1 and all others 0 because no centrist
parties have governed. While I do not argue that there are no differences between left
and center left parties, the narrower the categories become, the more likely there will
be significant discrepancies among experts regarding coding. If broad differences are
robust in statistical analysis, this is a more conservative test than if particular parties
are cherry-picked. While the regional affiliates of the major central parties differ in
both countries, they do not differ across the 1/0 divide, which facilitates comparison
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at the regional level.
In Spain, the Partido Socialista Obrero Espan˜ol (PSOE, Spanish Socialist Work-
ers’ Party coded SCL) and the Euro-communist coalition Izquierda Unida (IU, United
Left coded SL) are considered left parties, as well as a host of regional and minority
nationalist parties. There are very few parties in Spain where left/right partisanship
is not easy to discern reliably. There are no parties that have switched from left to
right over the course of the democratic period.
In Brazil, weak programmaticness of parties may call into question the ability
to reliably code parties as left or right. Yet left parties in Brazil have tended to
be the most disciplined and programmatic (Kitschelt and Kselman 2011; Chapman
Osterkatz 2012). In addition, the coding process for both Coppedge and Huber, et
al takes into account actual policy effort rather than just party platform. Therefore,
there are only five relevant parties coded as left or center left in post-1988 Brazil
and we can be fairly confident of the use of the label. These parties are the Partido
dos Trabalhadores (PT, Workers’ Party coded SL), the Partido Socialista Brasileiro
(PSB, Brasilian Socialist Party coded SL), the Partido Comunista Brasileira (PCB,
Brazilian Communist Party, which became the PPS—Partido Popular Socialista—
in 1992 and is coded SL), the Partido Democra´tico Trabalhista (PDT, Democratic
Workers’ Party coded SCL), and the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB,
Brazilian Social Democratic Party coded SCL until 1994).
The one case where I modify the Coppedge coding is in the case of the PSDB, a
case that is problematic for Huber and Stephens for the same reasons (2012: 125).
The PSDB coalition that governed federally in 1994 included a hard right and a
center right party (the PFL and the PTB) and the PSDB victory would have been
impossible without their support. The coalition was highly criticized because of
the PFL’s affiliation with the dictatorship and cemented a shift to the right for the
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PSDB, which could not compete with the increasingly popular PT on the left and
has continued drifting to the right in opposition. In the Power and Zucco survey of
legislators, the PSDB was to the left of the PMDB in 1990 and 1993, yet by the 1997
survey registered a significant rightward shift, now to the right of the PMDB, and
has moved steadily rightward in each successive survey wave (2012: 9).
Yet as we shall see in the case studies, the PSDB at the center from 1995-2002 not
only increased the capacity of the central state by stabilizing the economy, but began
implementing modest social reforms and even redistributed a significant amount of
land. At the subnational level, many of the states that pioneered equity-enhancing
health reforms were governed by the PSDB1. While the PSDB is commonly referred to
as a neoliberal party, the fiscal responsibility and market-conforming macroeconomic
policies put in place under Cardoso did not adhere to the orthodoxy of the IMF at the
time. Equity-enhancing social policies must be sustainable to be consolidated and the
macroeconomic position of the PSDB from 1994-2002 was not radically different from
that of traditional nordic social democracy. Its lack of emphasis on social questions
is primarily where the party loses its claim to the center left.
I therefore code the PSDB as center left until 1994, but then give the center
and state affiliates a .5, after2. This shift is defensible precisely because the PSDB
position in 1994 was so unpopular among actors on the center left. In Maranha˜o
and Bahia, where the PFL represented the old guard and the PSDB was a bitter
opponent of oligarchic rule, state party affiliates refused to sign on to the central
electoral coalition. The cost to unhappy PSDB politicians of joining other parties
was fairly low, as only the PT presented barriers to party membership. Politicians
1Though in nearly all cases this was prior to 1994, a period over which there is little disagreement
about the coding.
2I test the models with various specifications for the PSDB and report the differences in the
Results section.
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uncomfortable with the shift could choose alternative affiliations, and many did.
Cumulative left variables can capture processes of increasing-returns. However,
such measures are too highly correlated with democracy and economic development
in these countries. I therefore use a ten-year moving average that bounds left control
of the executive between 0 and 1, yet allows the effect to persist over time, as well as
more realistically modeling the early years of new left governments—where inevitably
previous policy legacies cannot be changed overnight. In Spain I code all members of
the AC cabinet because the system is parliamentary, whereas in Brazil I code only the
Governor because the running mate is chosen prior to the election and the cabinet is
named independent of the state assembly. Figures A.7 and A.8 show the trajectory of
partisanship over time in each country, by AC or state, and without the modification
of the PSDB after 1994.
3.5 Conflict Over The Reference Community
In Brazil there is no substantive conflict over the territorial scope of the reference
community. In Spain, I assess the strength of alternative territorial reference com-
munities by weighting minority nationalist political representation in AC cabinets,
distinguishing between left and right3. Minority nationalism is a more useful indi-
cator than party system nationalization (Jones and Mainwaring 2003) because the
operationalization of these concepts does not take into account the vision of commu-
nity held by particular actors. In Spain there are many parties that only operate in
the AC, contributing to a lower score on an index of nationalization, yet which see
Spain as the territorial reference community for most public policies.
The same Table A.3 that includes Spanish left-right partisanship coding shows
3I tested alternative specifications in which there was only one category with left and right
minority nationalists together, as well as one in which I allowed individual cabinet members to
be double-counted—allowing left minority nationalists to appear as part of the proportion of the
cabinet that is left as well as that which is nationalist. In part because there are very few left
minority nationalist cabinet members in AC governments, the different specifications had no impact
on the model.
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coding on the reference community. The PSOE is distinguished as a federalist party
because of its unique orientation toward minority nationalist right to self-rule. Yet
the PSOE is only coded as a minority nationalist party in two cases. First, the Basque
affiliate (the PSE-PSOE) in the pre-autonomic period when the Basque Statute of
Autonomy was first being negotiated ran in a pre-electoral coalition with the Basque
Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV) and took a firm stance in favor of the right to Basque
self-determination. This is the only period for which the PSE-PSOE is coded with
the minority nationalist parties. Second, the Catalan affiliate (the PSC) is one of the
primary pro-independence forces in Catalonia and has been for some time. In this
regard, it is unique among PSOE regional affiliates in wholeheartedly distinguishing
itself from the federalist project embraced within the PSOE more broadly.
In the regression analysis I use the same ten-year moving average as for the role of
left parties in government. Minority nationalism is very common and in Andalusia,
Arago´n, Baleares, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, La Rioja, and Navarre
minority nationalist parties have held cabinet portfolios, while in many others they
win legislative seats but have never formed part of the government.
3.6 Capacity
In Chapter 2 I discussed the challenges of measuring capacity and the types of
corruption and indicators of administrative capacity that can be drawn upon for case
comparison. Given these constraints, capacity can be broadly captured for statistical
analysis with revenue as a portion of GDP—the standard in the literature on state
capacity4 and an indicator that is available regionally over time. In Spain, funding
from the EU radically enhanced the fiscal capacity of poor ACs beginning in 1987.
There has been no similar force to benefit the poor states of Brazil, which have much
lower capacity than the worst off Spanish ACs. The distributive role of the center
4See Pribble 2008: 77 for a discussion.
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is apparent in higher revenue/GDP ratios in poor areas in both countries. Still, in
Spain the best off ACs have revenues over 20 per cent of GDP whereas in Brazil the
best off states often are closer to 10 per cent.
3.7 Race
Despite having no legal segregation or disenfranchisement based on race, Brazil’s
political economy is still deeply tied to the history of slavery. This is both because of
the plantation economies that supported oligarchic white family rule in the Northeast
for generations, and because there had never been substantive efforts to mitigate the
accumulated effects of slavery until the rise of the PT in the 2000s. Because universal
primary care began to expand in Brazil in the late 1990s, becoming a focus for the Lula
government after 2002, and focused specifically on building centers first in the poorest
neighborhoods before expanding, one would hope not to find an association between
race and the implementation of the primary care reform. Yet health outcomes are
another story and we should expect white populations to have better health outcomes
for quite some time.
The IBGE has collected data on race in the Brazilian states only since 2002. In
most states the breakdown does not shift much over this period, but there is a gen-
eral trend toward greater numbers of inhabitants identifying as black or mixed, across
most states. Yet it appears that this shift is not primarily because of changing demo-
graphics, but because of changes in the level of social stigma attached to blackness,
with mixed race respondents who previously identified as white beginning to claim a
mixed heritage. Because my purpose is primarily to control for the political legacies
of racial oppression, small changes in racial composition over time are not especially
meaningful. I therefore take the average white population of the past decade and
apply it to the entire democratic period. Assessing whiteness as a residual category is
more appropriate than developing an arbitrary theory about which particular racial
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categories and subcategories matter the most for outcomes. Figure 3.1 presents the
data, grouped alphabetically by the five regions in order to permit the reader a sense
of the geographic shift.
Figure 3.1: Race in the Brazilian States
3.8 Democracy
Because most of my data are only available since the onset of the democratic
transitions, a binary indicator for democracy provides little traction. Cumulative
weights for democracy are the alternative, yet in the case of Spain are simply too
highly correlated with other important variables that also increase steadily over time.
Following the findings of Huber and Stephens (2012), I apply a 20-year democracy
lag in Brazil. While governors were elected in 1982, not only was political competi-
tion still constrained, but the literacy requirements that had disenfranchised half the
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population even before the onset of military rule were not eliminated until after 1985.
Therefore, in addition to no variation across regions, there are very few years still in
the post-20-year lag. Ultimately, comparative historical evidence can illuminate the
role of democracy in social and policy outcomes for regions within a given country,
but it is hard to gain traction statistically after the onset of democracy.
3.9 Income Inequality
State and AC income ginis are used, but a note of caution is in order because
the figures come from household survey data. The sample sizes are almost certainly
smaller than they should be for truly reliable estimates and so variation from year
to year, as with infant mortality, is likely excessive. Still, differences between units
and broad shifts over time capture an important empirical reality. In Brazil, several
years are missing (1991, 1994, and 2000) and so are interpolated. In both cases gi-
nis are post-tax and transfer from household surveys—in Spain provided by a team
of economists who have been working with the microdata data from the Encuesta
de Presupuestos Familiares (EPF, Household Budget Survey) for many years (Go-
erlich 2012; Goerlich and Villar 2009) and in Brazil from the Instituto de Pesquisa
Econoˆmica Aplicada (IPEA, Institute for Applied Economic Research).
In the case of Brazil, where improvements in income inequality have been ob-
served overall, it is important to understand the difference between a national gini
and subnational ginis. It is entirely possible for income inequality patterns within
subnational units to vary considerably from the national gini because the unit for
spacial comparison is completely different. In Brazil the subnational evidence sug-
gests that we should not be overly optimistic about the national trend downward in
income inequality. What we see at the state level is that income inequality increased
in most states during the 1990s and then began to fall. Yet in the poorest and most
unequal states, levels of inequality are still very similar to what they were in 1981
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when the first indicators become available. In the South and Southeast, where income
inequality was lower to begin with and incomes far higher, income inequality has im-
proved the most. Figures A.9 and A.10 clearly show this pattern in the Northeast
and in the South. What are the long term implications for equity if the worst-off
places in the country are becoming pockets of persistent inequality, while the whitest,
richest, and most egalitarian become more and more so?
3.10 Income and Growth
State and AC GDP per capita are used as a measure of income and, as with growth
rates, control for local inflation. The Spanish data are constructed using GDP, census
data, and the Consumer Price Index for each AC all published by the INE, and in
Brazil are provided in constant reais directly by the IPEA.
Ideally we would test for the impact of poverty in both cases. In Spain, data
are only available beginning in 2004 and for some ACs have sample size problems.
Regardless, because primary care reform was mostly complete by 2004, the data
are not useful for the Spanish model. In Brazil poverty data for the regions are
provided by the IPEA and are calculated as double the rate of extreme poverty,
based on a state-specific poverty line that quantifies the cost of a basic minimum
basket of necessary purchases following WHO norms. The same years are missing as
for the income inequality data (1991, 1994, and 2000). In 1986 the poverty data were
unreliable for all states, nearly half the rates of the years on either side and dropping
to zero in some cases, so I also interpolate 1986 for all states.
3.11 Analytic Technique
For this analysis I use Prais-Winsten regression—ordinary least squares regression
with panel corrected standard errors and a correction for first order auto-correlation.
Prais-Winsten estimation has been used for similar data in comparative political econ-
omy and sociology (Hicks 1999; Swank 2002; Huber and Stephens 2012). Arguments
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have been made for the superiority of models with the incorporation of lagged de-
pendent variables and fixed effects (Beck and Katz 1995; Garrett and Mitchell 2001)
yet these concerns have been adequately addressed in the methodological literature
(Achen 2000; Plu¨mper, et al 2005; Beck and Katz 2011). For units within a country,
fixed effects are arguably even less useful, as major sources of variation not incor-
porated in the model should be minimal and significant events and economic shocks
should be felt almost simultaneously. In sensitivity analysis, I test all four models
with lagged dependent variables and the results are consistent with my conclusions.
I first test the hypotheses for determinants of primary care coverage in each coun-
try and then include a lagged primary coverage variable in the model of health out-
comes. While health decentralization, income inequality, race, and poverty can be
applied for a given year, revenue/GDP and GDP growth should be lagged one year
to give time for incorporation into the annual budget cycle. Because nearly every
variable in this model could be theorized to have conditional effects5 (commitment,
capacity, decentralization, growth, and income are the most obvious candidates, and
all terms must be included), yet more than three-way interactions are virtually impos-
sible to interpret, I reserve discussion of conditionalities for the comparative historical
analysis.
3.12 Results
Tables 3.26, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 present the regression results for the four models and
Figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 permit comparison of the magnitude of the effects.
In both countries, commitment at the center matters for equity-enhancing policy
output. Central commitment has large significant effects on the extension of primary
5See Hall 2003 for a discussion of this issue in comparative historical political data.
6The structure of the Spanish data on primary care coverage causes the Prais Winsten model to
omit an R2 value. Alternative specifications with panel corrected standard errors, random effects,
and robust cluster have R2 values between .66 and .71.
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care coverage. In both cases, the extension of primary coverage has a large and
significant negative effect on infant mortality, which is particularly interesting for the
Spanish case where infant mortality was already low prior to reform.
In Spain, left government in the ACs has been important for primary care exten-
sion, which one would expect given their greater authority over transferred health
policy. Capacity has also been significant. Minority nationalist presence in regional
governments has not been significant, nor has health decentralization. In Brazil the
effect of left parties at the state level is actually negative7. These findings are dis-
cussed in the next section8.
In both countries, capacity matters directly for outcomes, as does income. Ca-
pacity is not significant in determining primary care extension in Brazil, where the
policy’s expansion was funded in large part by direct transfers from the central Min-
istry of Health. Because GDP per capita is measured in the thousands of euro or
reais, a 100 unit increase in per capita GDP decreases infant mortality by about .09
in Brazil and .05 in Spain. In line with the impact of poverty, income is negatively
associated with higher levels of coverage in Brazil—a stark contrast to the Spanish
case, which I discuss in the next section.
As expected, economic growth is insignificant in all models except that of infant
mortality in Brazil, where it is positive. In Spain, income inequality has a large effect
in depressing primary care coverage and augmenting infant mortality. In Brazil, prob-
lems with multicollinearity due to inclusion of poverty measures preclude assessing
inequality in the same model. Yet in preliminary analysis, inequality in Brazil was
7The negative association between left state governors and PSF coverage is driven by coding
Cardoso’s central government .5, rather than 0. Regardless of whether the state-level PSDB is given
.5 or 0 after 1994, state governors become negatively associated with PSF coverage once Cardoso is
included. The R2 when Cardoso is included is much higher, yet otherwise the results are similar.
8The democracy control in Brazil is negative, but the indicator is highly correlated with the
slowdown in coverage expansion caused by the economic downturn and the plateau experienced as
the “easy” expansion associated with the initial implementation began to level off.
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insignificant. This is not especially surprising once one views the patterns of inequal-
ity in the states. While inequality in Brazil has decreased since the 1990s and this
pattern is true in many states, it is not universal. Income inequality has decreased
the most in the highest income states, where it was the lowest to begin with, while
in some states it has shifted little.
3.13 Discussion
The large effect of central commitment on primary coverage rates in the regions
exists both in Spain, where the major equity-enhancing health reforms were initiated
at the center, but also in Brazil, where state and municipal actors innovated and
implemented policies first. For Spain the estimated effect of a two standard deviation
change is 13.3 and for the ACs, 5.15, while in Brazil for the center it is a whopping
34.4 and for the states is actually negative9. Shifting from non-left to left government
(from 0 to 1) at the center is therefore associated with significant increases in primary
care extension (measured as a per cent of the total population).
9Widespread primary care coverage has been a federally driven project and the poorest states
were mostly governed by the right during the period of greatest expansion of coverage during the
late 1990s and early 2000s. In addition, while states can play a central role in expanding primary
coverage—as in the case of Ceara´—if large capital cities choose not to implement the reform, the
average for the state is pulled down.
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Table 3.2: Determinants of Primary Care Reform in the Spanish ACs
Prais-Winsten Regression: Primary Coverage Rates
Variable Estimate PCSEs Pr(>|z|)
Health Decentralization 1.01 .746 0.177
Revenue/GDP (1 lag) 1.04 .244 0.000
Central Left 20.53 6.62 0.002
AC Left 7.43 4.35 0.088
AC Left Nationalist -6.98 13.96 0.617
AC Right Nationalist 3.58 5.39 0.506
Gini -1.97 .538 0.000
GDP/capita .017 .003 0.000
GDP growth (1 lag) -.119 .122 0.326
N=438
R2=.
Figure 3.2: Comparison of Effects on Spanish Primary Care Reform
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Table 3.3: Impact of Primary Coverage on Infant Mortality in the Spanish ACs
Prais-Winsten Regression: Infant Mortality in the Spanish ACs
Variable Estimate PCSEs Pr(>|z|)
Primary Care Reform (1 lag) -.045 .004 0.000
Revenue/GDP (1 lag) -.029 .018 0.109
Gini .074 .044 0.092
GDP/capita -.0005 1.40 0.000
GDP growth (1 lag) .017 .015 0.293
N=455
R2=.65
Figure 3.3: Comparison of Effects on Spanish Infant Mortality
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Table 3.4: Determinants of PSF Coverage in the Brazilian States
Prais-Winsten Regression: PSF in the Brazilian States
Variable Estimate PCSEs Pr(>|z|)
Health Decentralization .353 .828 0.670
Revenue/GDP (1 lag) .127 .095 0.182
Central Left 99.29 9.16 0.000
State Left -8.40 3.62 0.020
White Population .019 .059 0.748
Poverty .095 .077 0.215
GDP/capita -.0009 .0005 0.087
GDP growth (1 lag) .013 .026 0.603
Democracy (20 lag) -8.71 2.85 0.002
N=642
R2=.52
Figure 3.4: Comparison of Effects on Brazilian PSF
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Table 3.5: The Impact of PSF Coverage on Infant Mortality in the Brazilian States
Prais-Winsten Regression: Infant Mortality in the Brazilian States
Variable Estimate PCSEs Pr(>|z|)
Primary Reform (1 lag) -.179 .029 0.000
Revenue/GDP (1 lag) -.167 .041 0.000
White Population -.179 .039 0.000
Poverty .304 .040 0.000
GDP/capita -.001 .0002 0.000
GDP growth (1 lag) .026 .015 0.091
Democracy (20 lag) .871 1.33 0.512
N=668
R2=.69
Figure 3.5: Comparison of Effects on Brazilian Infant Mortality
The large impact of committed central actors illustrates the importance of the center
for taking up, funding, and extending regional innovations. In neither Spain nor
Brazil have the most innovative regional reforms been initiated by poor regions with
low capacity—arguably the ones who need them the most.
In Spain, minority nationalism ultimately has little to show for its time in gov-
ernment. At the AC level, it is the Spanish left that has delivered better coverage of
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equity-enhancing social policy. This result could be surprising for two reasons. First,
minority nationalist parties generally espouse a high level of commitment to social
cohesion within their territory. Second, in Spain the ACs with the strongest minority
nationalisms have tended to be higher income than average, so have greater resources
to spend on expanding coverage. Why the lack of a relationship? First, the minor-
ity nationalist parties that have governed ACs in Spain have been overwhelmingly
center-right parties. While leftist minority nationalist parties are active in Andalu-
sia, Baleares, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, Navarre, and Valencia, these
parties have not been strongly represented in AC cabinets. Arago´n, the Basque Coun-
try, Canarias, Cantabria, Catalonia, and La Rioja are the only ACs where minority
nationalists have played an important role in cabinet formation, and these have all
been right of center parties except for Catalonia for 2003-201010.
Second, the ACs in Spain where minority nationalism tends to be strongest also
had early devolution of health responsibilities, which meant they were often running
the entire show themselves from an earlier date. This is partly a story about adminis-
trative capacity, because many nationalist ACs took on health not because they were
better able to provide it but because their sense of national identity demanded that
they control their own social policies. There were losses of scale and administrative
capacity under early devolution in several ACs. But it has also been an issue of
commitment, since the central socialist government was oriented toward ameliorating
historic inequalities through social policy, while for minority nationalists gaining au-
thority was an end in and of itself, not necessarily imbued with a strong commitment
to equity within the territory.
10The Basque Country is an outlier because while the PNV that has dominated politics since the
transition is a center-right party, it has governed most years in coalition with parties of the left and
has a unique history of commitment to social cohesion. Since the weight of partisanship in the ACs
is calculated based on the number of cabinet seats held, this complex reality is reflected clearly in the
data, with left nationalists, center-right nationalists, and center-left federalists all holding portions
of the Basque cabinets at different times.
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As it turns out, the central health program for providing primary care in the
non-devolved ACs was quite equity-enhancing and produced high levels of coverage
quickly in almost all ACs. On the other hand, outcomes varied wildly among the early
decentralizing ACs, encompassing some of the best and worst performers on primary
coverage and other aspects of the SNS. Ultimately, performance on the extension of
primary care coverage suggests that early decentralization did no favors for most ACs.
In Brazil, the rise of the PT has come with an ideological commitment to acknowl-
edging racism and the legacy of slavery for the first time. While indigenous people
have also suffered, they are a much smaller portion of the population. Because the
measure is of the white portion of the population, these groups are included as well.
The fact that regional racial distribution and poverty do not impact the expansion
of the primary care network is significant. It offers support for the notion that the
goals of the central government are being achieved in terms of prioritizing poor neigh-
borhoods for the initial investments for new primary care teams and ensuring that
uncommitted governors do not get in the way. Brazil has been far more capable (or
heavy handed, depending on one’s perspective) at tying strings to funding than has
the central government in Spain.
The more pressing problems of poverty in Brazil and the more firmly leftist posi-
tion of the PT help explain the party’s willingness to incorporate redistributive and
pro-poor criteria directly into the implementation of the primary care reform, which
has not been the case in Spain. Unfortunately the Spanish data do not permit a
comparison on the role of poverty. It is also important to note that while the imme-
diate benefits to the poorest members of society are clear in the Brazilian strategy
for PSF extension, the overarching challenge of the SUS is to solidify support within
the middle and upper class, a process that may not be helped by this model.
In this same vein, one of the most striking differences between the two countries
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lies in the impact of per capita GDP, which I argue is largely tied to the role of high
inequality11, as well as the timing and pace of reform. In Spain, higher regional levels
of per capita GDP are associated with better primary care extension, independent of
capacity. This is the relationship one would expect in a context where per capita GDP
also likely captures elements of administrative capacity—the educational level of the
population and those working in health and government administration, etcetera.
But these effects also illuminate one of the starkest differences between Spain
and Brazil—the ghettoization of public primary care. In Spain, while this shift may
happen if the crisis continues, public primary care is prized across the population.
This was not true at the outset of the democratic transition, but the quality of the
reform and the level of investment under the new SNS throughout the 1980s created
a high quality network used by almost the entire population. Defense and support of
the primary care reform has been widespread and outrage over cuts near universal.
In Brazil, this has not been the case and we can see the result. In Spain, increases
in per capita GDP are associated with significant increases in primary care coverage.
In Brazil, the relationship is the opposite.
The Brazilian primary care program, the PSF, has always been perceived as a
service for the poor. This is not because it has targeted poor neighborhoods first,
because the goal has always been for the system to act as gatekeeper to public care
across the population. The reason for the stigma is twofold. First, despite being
in economic crisis in the early 1980s, Spain put significant resources into extending
its primary care reform quickly across the country. While the transformation of the
health teams and posts took time (what is measured here), the number of hours
in which doctors were available to see patients extended from two morning hours
11Given that the overall range of income inequality by region is fairly constricted within each
country, a cross-country analysis would be required in order to condition the effects of a particular
level of inequality on the role of per capita income.
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to a full work day quite rapidly across the country (Bengoa 2012). In addition,
the system that existed prior to reform was largely operated directly by the central
government. In Brazil, the military regime had almost exclusively contracted with
private providers and had no network of public providers that it could rapidly modify
when reforms were ready to put in place. In addition, inefficient revenue generating
systems and lack of commitment at the center meant no significant money was put
toward the SUS for nearly a decade after its passage as law. These were the years for
establishing a reputation, yet lacking major investments from the center, most states
and municipalities could only provide the bare minimum of coverage.
Second, income inequality in Brazil is so extreme, the middle class historically
so small, and private medical provision so entrenched, that no one with money has
ever relied on the public system for primary care. Brazilian reformists were fighting a
bigger uphill battle for user hearts and minds than were Spanish reformers, and their
arsenal was more limited.
In both countries capacity is important. Revenue as a portion of GDP is associ-
ated with higher primary coverage rates in Spain and lower infant mortality in both
countries. These findings support the argument in favor of redistributive transfers as
the basis for financing important social policies, and the risk that insufficient funds
can pose for health outcomes in society. For poor regions in Spain, EU transfers
often make up nearly half of total transfers (all revenue not generated from taxes
and fees levied independently by the region), and transfers, including ceded central
tax revenues, are the dominant basis of regional finance for all but the two special
fiscal regimes. In Brazil, the lack of external redistribution is partially made up for
by the overtly redistributive criterion in the distribution of the block transfers from
the Fondo de Participac¸a˜o dos Estados (FPE, state revenue sharing fund)—a crite-
rion that has never played a major role in Spanish regional finance. Yet the FPE
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is not the primary source for health financing, which generally comes in part from
own-source state and municipal revenues and in part through a direct line from the
National Health Ministry. Since a constitutional reform increased state and munici-
pal health financing responsibilities in 2000, while holding central financing constant,
health finances in Brazil have become increasingly regressive.
Economic growth has no relationship in three of the models, but is associated
with higher infant mortality in Brazil. The general lack of relationship is consistent
with concerns that international financial institutions and policy makers have focused
excessively on economic growth as an enabler of expanded social provision. Volatil-
ity may decrease the possibilities of growth, and uncommitted actors may not use
increased revenue from growth to expand social policy. In addition, if tax systems
are dysfunctional, as is largely true in Brazil, increased economic growth may not be
effectively harnessed for increased public revenue.
3.14 Conclusion
What to expect from decentralization is highly contingent and there is no silver
bullet for the democrat’s conundrum. For maximum equity-enhancing social reform,
ideological commitment to redistributive goals, as well as capacity, are necessary at
all territorial levels that influence policy making. While policy-making has become an
increasingly multilevel process over the past century, political theories have remained
focused at the country level and so an important part of the causal story—inherently
present in observed outcomes—has not been theorized. In general regional data have
been lacking, which has hampered attempts at multilevel analysis. Expanding power
resources theory to account for multilevel governance requires developing a theory of
how traditional economic attitudes toward redistribution interact with the territorial
scope of an actor’s reference community.
In the cases of Spain and Brazil, ideologically committed actors with a reference
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community whose territorial scope spanned the entire country, acting at the central
level, have protagonized the most equity-enhancing health reforms. Most importantly,
this has been true for regional level outcomes—the greater the role of the committed
center, the more equity-enhancing health policy was within the regions. Need is
territorially concentrated and regions with high need tend to have low capacity. While
committed actors in Brazil have faced more significant problems of limited revenue
and high poverty and inequality, they have faced fewer internal conflicts over central
government authority to redistribute through social policy reform. In both cases the
extension of an efficient, frugal, universal primary care reform (even when incomplete)
has had a clear and significant impact on health outcomes for the most vulnerable
members of society.
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4 SPAIN
The Spanish Sistema Nacional de Salud (SNS, National Health System) was cre-
ated in 1986 during the first legislature controlled by the Spanish socialists after
democratization.1 The system is designed to be universal, financed through gen-
eral taxation and free at the point of delivery—all features that took some time to
establish. The SNS represented a shift from contribution-based Bismarckian social
insurance, which had been consolidated for formal sector workers under Franco in
the decade before his death in 1975 and offered some coverage to over 80 per cent of
the population. Prior to the democratic transition, the intermediate level of govern-
ment was the provincia (province). The Comunidades Auto´nomas (ACs, Autonomous
Communities) were created over the period 1979-1983, above the level of the province,
and became the dominant sphere for decentralized public policy, including health.
Devolution of health policy control has been asymmetric, with Catalonia (1981)
and Andalusia (1984) taking over before the SNS was even created. Devolution to
the Basque Country and Valencia (1987), Navarre and Galicia (1990), and Canarias
(1994) came after the start of the health reform process. The other ten ACs were all
under the control of the central health system, called the Instituto Nacional de la Salud
Gestio´n Directa (INSALUD GD, National Institute for Health Direct Management),
until 2001 when health responsibilities were devolved all at once to all ten. Unlike
Brazil, increased health responsibilities in the ACs has been more of a zero sum
process and significantly limited health authority at the center.
1Portions of this chapter are adapted from my MA thesis (Chapman 2005).
Until 1993 the system was financed through negotiated transfers, special funds,
and revenue sharing from the center for all ACs, even those with early devolution
and the two with a special fiscal regime (discussed below). In 1993 the socialists
decentralized revenues from a portion of direct taxes levied by the center in the ACs,
but maintained the designated formulas that determined how much each AC would
receive for the provision of health services in its territory. The system has vacillated
since then, with an increasing portion of financing coming from these “ceded” or
shared revenues generated in the ACs. Funding for all AC responsibilities was radi-
cally decentralized in 2001, but partially recentralized in 2009 due to the inability of
the ACs to keep up with health care costs, which had produced massive debts. As
the economic crisis continues, with cuts in health care at the heart of major public
unrest, the model of regional finance may continue to change.
The central government still manages health services directly in the North African
Ciudades Auto´nomas (Autonomous Cities) of Ceuta and Melilla through the Instituto
Nacional de Gestio´n Sanitaria (INGESA, National Institute of Health Management).
Local governments coordinate with ACs on the placement and financing of new fa-
cilities, but neither fund, provide, nor administer major components of health care.
These units are mostly excluded from the case study.
The progressivity of the SNS has been shaped by the relative power of ideolog-
ically disparate political leaders at key historical moments at the central and AC
level, the relationship of democratic consolidation with pressures for regional author-
ity, the subsequent multidimensionality of partisanship along left-right and minority
nationalist vs. Spanish nationalist lines, the health policy legacy of the past, and the
scarcity of fiscal resources. Table A.1 offers a general overview of the main variables
over time at the central level as well as in the three case study ACs. Overall, the
system has made great strides with limited resources and has historically been an
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equity-enhancing feature of social policy in the country. The strength of the private
medical lobby, the neglect of primary care in favor of more expensive and less redis-
tributive curative hospital services, and the lack of accountability and oversight in a
now highly decentralized system contribute to lowering the equity-enhancing impact
of the SNS across the country and within the ACs. Ongoing conflict over the terri-
torial distribution of authority and the rules of the game inhibit substantive policy
making at all levels.
The relatively high overall quality and equity-enhancing nature of the SNS are
due to three primary factors: the ability of committed forces to make the govern-
ment responsible for health care at the drafting of the 1978 constitution, the absolute
majority of the Partido Socialista Obrero Espan˜ol (PSOE, Spanish Socialist Workers’
Party) in the central government at the moment when enabling legislation was passed
(prior to decentralization for most ACs), and the decade of socialist government that
followed and ensured full implementation. Ideological commitment to equity in this
critical period meant that subsequent variation has taken place within a more con-
strained policy space. Yet within this more limited arena, commitment and capacity
continue to determine differences between ACs.
In general, the SNS under central government control was more redistributive,
favoring the poorest ACs and people, than it has been in the ACs with early re-
gional control. The central Spanish socialists have done a better job of redistribution
and improving outcomes in the ACs than minority nationalist parties have. Central
PSOE policies had a greater equity-enhancing impact when they were implemented
before decentralizing reforms, which then placed limits on the reach of central legis-
lation and increased the strength of AC veto players. Poor ACs with low capacity
but high commitment did a better job of implementing progressive health policies
when decentralization took place later. ACs without high commitment, but with
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late decentralization, have also been constrained in the possibilities for retrenchment.
Central governments that were not committed to equity have attempted to roll back
the more redistributive components of health policy and strengthen private interests
within the system. Some of the most significant decentralizing reforms in health
policy and finance have been undertaken by conservative forces after unsuccessful
attempts to liberalize the system at the central level.
Figure A.7 illustrates patterns of partisan governance in the ACs from 1977-2010,
with the Spanish right as the null category. Under decentralization of health, lower
regional commitment has meant less egalitarian outcomes in those ACs and sometimes
in the country, depending on how much authority an uncommitted AC has exercised in
institutions of shared rule. Because there are cases of early and late decentralization
across levels of capacity and commitment, AC case studies allow me to tease out
these complex relationships. The Basque Country represents a case of high ideological
commitment (in this case from Christian Democratic minority nationalism) and high
capacity under early decentralization. In fact, the Basque case is the only one in
either country where actors whose ideological commitment came from nationalist
solidarity, rather than left of center partisanship, protagonized and innovated equity-
enhancing health reform. Basque nationalist actors are fundamentally uninterested in
redistribution across the Spanish territory, yet because the AC has been outside the
standard fiscal system from the beginning, it has not fought for (centrally) regressive
forms of fiscal autonomy, as the Catalans have.
Revenue scarcity has constrained the progressivity of health policy and health
outcomes throughout the democratic period. Spain has faced three recessions during
this time: 1981, 1991, and 2008 on. There has never been a time in which scholars
of health policy and political leaders in the ACs have perceived resources for health
care to be sufficient. The Basque Country and Navarre come the closest to having
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historically been able to fund their health systems as they desired. Since the SNS
is popular and highly valued, when fiscal capacity is high, uncommitted actors have
little incentive to retrench the system.
Leftist ideological commitment to equity dominates explanations of the distribu-
tive nature of the SNS for three reasons. First, because the authoritarian rule of
Franco was unabashedly conservative, yet leftist political forces had been strong prior
to the Civil War, pressure for democratization and its consolidation were tightly tied
to progressive politics and established left parties. Before the transition to democracy
there had been an ideological vacuum for four decades in which the left exercised no
role in policy making, but persisted in exile and underground. Democratic aspirations
in Spain cannot be disentangled from a shift from conservative political domination
to more progressive politics2. The ideological legacy of the Second Republic, the Civil
War, and Franco fundamentally shaped the role of parties of the left and right in the
democratic era.
Second, the most significant decisions made about the health system from a dis-
tributive standpoint were ideologically contested and implemented in a partisan fash-
ion: when the PSOE had absolute majorities it implemented the most progressive
policies, when the Partido Popular (PP, Popular Party) had absolute majorities it
implemented the most regressive policies. Third, the distributive nature of health fi-
nancing and service organization has been determined in large part by the ideology of
governing political parties at the center and in the ACs. These facets of health policy
feed back into the distributive character of health care, even when the overarching
structure of the system changes little.
For Spain, in the context of Social Europe, the baseline assumptions about what
2This stands in sharp contrast to the post-transition politics of countries of the former Eastern
bloc that were governed by authoritarian regimes that enforced egalitarian resource distribution and
in which democratic aspirations were not tied to support for the left.
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the welfare state should look like and what citizens in a modern economy expect from
their government means both left and right parties are less antagonistic to public
health provision than they might be elsewhere. While ideologically uncommitted
actors do not initiate and innovate equity-enhancing policies, retrenchment has been
a low priority when the economy was booming.
Decentralization has been championed by different ideological actors at different
moments depending on how far the country was from the centralized legacy of author-
itarianism and how actors perceived their political fortunes to be tied to central vs.
regional exercise of power. While left parties generally take into consideration the im-
pact of decentralizing reforms on equity, conflicting visions of the reference community
confound left/right positioning on even those forms of decentralization that can be
expected to have a clear distributive impact. Historically, right parties considered the
country to be the legitimate reference community, so in the early years of democracy
these parties defended centralization in ways that, paradoxically, resulted in greater
state capacity for equity enhancing reforms across the country, later on. During the
transition in 1977, views on decentralization were tightly tied to left/right ideology3.
This tendency has waned over time, as both major parties have come to accept region-
alization and actors on the left have realized some of the equity-constraining features
of the territorial model they once defended without question.
The Spanish left continues to struggle with an existential conflict between support
for the right of nations to democratic self-rule and a desire for cohesion and solidarity
across the country. When the Catalan left demands greater home rule, including
the right to keep the taxes it raises over its population and use them at home, it
is increasing its fiscal capacity for equity-enhancing reform. Yet satisfying those
3In order of preference for centralization ranging from 76 per cent at the high end to three per
cent at the low end: Francoists, the Falange, Conservatives, those with no partisan identification,
Christian democrats, Liberals, Carlists (only this far down the list because of their strength in the
Basque Country), Social Democrats, Socialists, Communists, and Revolutionaries (Linz 1981: 25).
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demands for the Catalans reduces the ability of the center both to increase equality
across the country and to address the acute investment needs of poor regions, since
taxes from Catalonia make up a large portion of central revenue. Because the reference
community for Spanish parties on the right is one in which high levels of internal
inequality are permissible, these conflicts have been less important and have been
dealt with pragmatically.
Ultimately, in the presence of commitment and capacity, the center has the great-
est ability to create equity-enhancing social policy by ensuring that social policies
mediate territorial variation in outcomes and are applied across the country. Yet in
Spain, a number of regions possess a national identity that cannot be squared with
an overarching sense of responsibility for countrywide redistribution, regardless of
ideological orientation. As independent units, these territories might be governed by
capable and committed actors who would prioritize equity-enhancing policies. But
they are not independent and persistent territorial struggle has sapped resources for
equity-enhancing policy production both at the center and in the regions. As the
social policy director for the CCOO4 in the Basque Country expressed,
El Conflicto Vasco en este pa´ıs ha tapado muchos problemas. Hay un
Euskoproblema, ¿Y no hay otros problemas? Pero s´ı que los hay! Hay
problemas de paro, de calidad en el empleo, de seguridad laboral, de dis-
criminacio´n, otros tipos de violencia que no sean la violencia de ETA y
eso es lo que realmente me preocupa. No es que no me preocupa el con-
flicto vasco, pero a ver si resolvemos el conflicto y podemos hablar de otras
cosas. Mientras sigamos con eso encima de la mesa, tapa todo para unos
y para otros.5 (Chapman 2006)
4Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) was historically affiliated with the Spanish Communist Party, but
became independent in the 1990s. It is the largest union in Spain and second strongest in the Basque
Country after ELA, which is affiliated with Basque nationalism.
5“In this country, the Basque Conflict has covered up many problems. There is a Basque Problem,
but does that mean there are no other problems? Of course not! There are problems of unemploy-
ment, quality of work, employment security, discrimination, other kinds of violence besides ETA’s
violence, and these are the ones that really worry me. It’s not that the Basque Conflict doesn’t
concern me, but let’s see if we can resolve that conflict so we can talk about other things. As long
as that continues to be on the table, it crowds out everything else, on all sides of the issue.”
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The impact of minority nationalism on health policy across the Spanish territory
has been mixed. From a simple arithmetic perspective, conflict with the center has
consumed governing resources on all sides and encouraged policy and fiscal devolution
that has not been equity-enhancing for the country or for poor regions. Minority
nationalist parties have also been less effective, on average, at implementing equity-
enhancing health policies within their own territories. Yet the best performers in
equity-enhancing health reform and innovation have also been the (culturally Basque)
foral regimes and there have been visible diffusion effects to other regions, which is
equity-enhancing for Spain.
What follows this summary and introduction is a detailed case study of the SNS
with a focus on the policies that have shaped the distributive profile of the health
system. I begin with the central government, weaving together the story of com-
mitment, capacity, and territorial organization of responsibilities. The case study
proceeds chronologically, first at the center and then in three ACs: Extremadura,
the Basque Country, and Castilla y Leo´n. “Shadow” cases are explored in the three
ACs—other ACs that share most characteristics but differ along a dimension of par-
ticular interest. Table A.3 lists all parties that have been active in central and AC
cabinets since the democratic transition, their left-right ideology, the territorial scope
of their reference community, and brief notes. Tables A.5 and A.6 show a timeline
of major policy and fiscal events and their equity-enhancing impact in Spain and the
three case study ACs.
4.1 Health Inequality in Spain
What is the status of health inequality in Spain? Health outcomes have im-
proved across the board and continuously since the mid-20th century, with large
improvements in the 1970s linked to rapid increases in economic development and
implementation of the first wave of Social Security reforms. As we saw in Chapter 2,
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health outcomes are sensitive to income inequality, levels of economic development,
and capacity, in addition to equity-enhancing reform. Life expectancy at birth and
infant mortality rates have increased and decreased, respectively, across all ACs (See
Figures 4.1 and 4.2). The differences in infant mortality in 1975 were much higher
than at the end of the period, with Castilla y Leo´n the highest in the country at 24
and Madrid the lowest at 14. By 2010 the Spanish average had fallen to below three
and variation was quite low across ACs. Life expectancy has increased steadily across
the board, but retains larger variation6.
Figure 4.1: Spanish Infant Mortality
6It is worth noting, however, that regional variation in life expectancy with good health varies
much more than life expectancy, yet the data are unavailable for comparison over time. While
Castilla y Leo´n, the Basque Country, Cantabria, and La Rioja had high life expectancy with good
health, Extremadura, Valencia, Murcia, and Galicia had the lowest, with an overall variation of 15
years between the highest and lowest (MSPS 2008: 41).
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Figure 4.2: Spanish Life Expectancy
4.2 Foral Regimes: The Basque Country and Navarre
In this section I review the asymmetric fiscal regime in Spain, in which two ACs
collect their own taxes and cede a small portion back to the center to cover the services
the country provides in its regions, while keeping the rest. These amounts are referred
to as the “cupo” or quota and are calculated, more or less, as the regional portions of
what the center spends on non-transferred competencies. The amount was politically
determined and amounts to approximately 6.24 per cent (Basque) and 1.62 per cent
(Navarre) of the center’s budget for non-transferred responsibilities. The amounts and
covered activities have shifted over time, as we shall see in the case of health care,
and are hard to pin down because they represent the residual effort of the central
government after specific tasks have been removed, rather than a comprehensive list
of activities. In addition, some responsibilities such as social security pensions are
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jointly managed but centrally financed.
The variation in fiscal autonomy among Spanish ACs is uncommon, even in other
countries in the OECD7. In interviews, one of the most common reasons that Basque
politicians and health experts gave for superior social policy provision was the fiscal
system, which allows the Basque Country higher levels of revenue than other regions,
as well as funding stability and the ability to plan budgets. Yet this system illustrates
the kinds of differences that can emerge when regional fiscal authority (control of the
base and rate of major taxes) is high and/or asymmetric. Therefore, understanding
these cases is crucial.
In Spain, the term fueros is given to the local laws that were preserved in vari-
ous kingdoms, sometimes unwritten until included in a pact when one kingdom was
conquered or absorbed by another. The Basque territories were not the only ones to
have fueros, but they were the only ones that retained special fiscal, civil, and judicial
regimes into the 19th century. The Basques had long resisted feudalism and used their
fueros to declare the general citizenry nobility (Strong 1893). From the 15th century,
the fueros allowed the Basque provinces to operate as free trade zones without being
subject to Castilian levies on exports and imports, avoid sending their young men
to the crown’s armed forces except under extreme circumstances, and pay no taxes
to the crown (Castells 2003: 121). As a modern central state took shape during the
19th century, the Basque territories chose the losing side of the Carlist civil wars in
which Liberals were pitted against the conservative monarchy. In part because the
monarchy had mostly respected the fueros while the centralizing, secular tendencies
of the liberal opposition promised to generate conflict, the Basque provinces fought
for the monarchy, losing all but their special fiscal regime when the Liberals won.
While the Basque AC is composed of three historically defined territories, Navarre
7Belgium is the only other OECD country with variation in subnational fiscal autonomy among
regions with no special status, in the same tier (Hooghe, et al 2010).
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is a uni-provincial AC that is sometimes considered culturally Basque. Basque speak-
ers are concentrated in the north of Navarre and the AC was historically differentiated
from the other three Spanish Basque territories with the existence of the independent
Kingdom of Pamplona at a time when the other Basque territories were part of the
Castilian crown (Blinkhorn 1974: 587). The decision of whether Navarre should join
with the other Basque provinces or go it alone (“¿Navarra, so´lo o con leche?”)8 was
made during the Second Republic, but was reopened during the democratic transition.
During the Spanish Civil War, the northern and most heavily Basque nationalist
provinces of Vizcaya and Guipu´zcoa sided with the Republican cause while A´lava and
Navarre sided with Franco. The result was that Navarre and A´lava were permitted
their fiscal regime under Franco, while Vizcaya and Guipu´zcoa lost theirs when the
Republic fell. While Franco made modifications to the amounts of the cupo, it was
not abolished, whereas in the two coastal provinces the tax regime was forced into
the common system of the national treasury.
How the two territories recovered their foral regimes during the democratic transi-
tion is discussed in the Basque case study. The special fiscal arrangements of Navarre
and the Basque Country are not identical, but the outcome is the same from an
intergovernmental perspective. These two ACs have political authority over their
tributary system and collect their own taxes9. The same taxes generate far greater
revenue for these two ACs than they do in the common regime ACs, but the center
also redistributes resources to make up some of the difference. Figure 4.3 shows what
the imbalance looks like before the redistributive efforts of the center, which even
things out somewhat but still leave the foral regimes with higher overall revenues and
far greater budget stability.
8“Navarre, black or with milk?”
9With minimal requirements that the overall tax burden not be exceptionally different for their
citizens and for others, though this has never been defined juridically or contested.
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Figure 4.3: Ceded Taxes in Spain
It has not always been the case that the foral regimes were also better off—the
Basque Country went through a powerful economic downturn at the height of de-
industrialization in the 1980s. However, the situation does highlight precisely why
Catalonian demands for independence are so much more powerful than in the Basque
Country, despite a more intense history of conflict in the latter. The Basque Country
already gets to keep most of its own money, whereas Catalonia, which has historically
always been one of the highest income ACs, sends a great deal of money to the central
coffers for redistribution to poorer ACs. Independence for the Basque Country can
be considered on its own merits from an ideological standpoint, whereas for Catalonia
it is tied tightly to the issue of fiscal capacity. The two foral regimes are also much
smaller than Catalonia, so the fiscal pressure of losing the latter would be more
extreme.
97
4.3 Health Politics Before Democracy
Prior to the transition to democracy that began after the death of Franco in 1975,
health policy in Spain consisted of contribution-based social insurance for a subset
of workers. The Instituto Nacional de Previsio´n (INP, National Welfare Institute)
was founded in 1908 to administer social security and was expanded under socialist
government during the Second Republic to include health care for low-income workers.
It was implemented by Franco in 1942. From the beginning the system was fragmented
because the administration of responsibilities could be delegated to private entities
(Guille´n and Cabiedes 1997: 152). Although the government of the Second Republic
attempted an expansion and unification of social services in the early 1930s, the
Spanish Civil War began before the new institutions could be set up. The risks
covered by the INP only included maternity, work accidents, and retirement (Guille´n
and Cabiedes 1997: 153). Voluntary employer coverage, charity, and private provision
were to meet the needs for the rest of the scope of social risks.
During the Franco regime from 1939-1975, health care fell under the Ministerio de
Gobernacio´n (Ministry of Governance) and the Subsecretar´ıa de Seguridad Social (So-
cial Security Subsecretariat). Various public health services were created in the 1940s
but these were not integrated until after the transition to democracy. The various
programs of social insurance that existed were brought together with the creation of
the social security system in the 1960s, after the end of autarky in 1959, maintaining
the distinction between the workers’ mutualidades laborales (mutual funds)—to cover
workplace illnesses and accidents—and government social insurance. In the 1960s
and early 1970s, public hospitals were opened in all the provincial capitals and access
to primary and specialized care expanded significantly. Industrialization was moving
rapidly and by the mid-1970s Spain’s GDP per capita was higher than Japan’s.
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The health system under Franco was in the Bismarckian social insurance tradi-
tion, but never provided full coverage and paid little attention to regional disparities
in economic development or health needs. Addressing inequality was not an ideolog-
ical priority for the regime—its commitment to redistributive health policy was low.
In addition, the public sector was divided into three separate networks—the largest
was social security, followed by public health and social assistance, which belonged to
the Ministry of the Interior (Guille´n and Cabiedes 1997: 322). Primary care was pro-
vided in a residual fashion in local consultorios or ambulatory care facilities for only
two hours in the mornings (EUOHS 2000). Administrative capacity had increased
markedly in the 1960s when a significant effort was put into improving the social
security bureaucracy, but failure to unify the various systems created roadblocks.
In the early 1970s strikes and mobilization took place among health professionals
advocating for the transition to an NHS, but forces within the regime were antag-
onistic. One progressive health reform proposal was put forth just before Franco’s
death by a parliamentary commission and another just after by the Ministry of the
Interior, but neither made headway due to internal ideological opposition as well as
the lack of a coherent plan among reformers (Guille´n 1996). Guille´n and Cabiedes
argue that the reasons health reform did not take place between 1960 and 1980, de-
spite various initiatives and pressures, as well as economic growth and development
that would have permitted higher levels of spending and investment, were three-fold:
the regressive tax system, Franco’s personal opposition to progressive social policy
reform, and a lack of information about existing health resources and deficiencies
(1997: 324). These are very clearly limitations in ideological commitment and fiscal
and administrative capacity.
During the democratic transition, health reform was being debated in all the major
political parties and the socialists and the communists were pushing for an NHS. The
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lack of central government commitment and administrative capacity clearly played
a role in preventing redistributive health reform in this period, despite high growth
and social pressure.
Authoritarian centralization in Spain swept regional inequalities under the rug in
the context of Spanish nationalism that left no room for the expression of regional
grievances. The social safety net that existed had been developed in the context of
conservative economic and social ideology that did not place an emphasis on redis-
tribution and was designed to meet the needs of formally employed male heads of
household and their dependents. In 1975 Spain had the lowest number of hospital
beds per 1000 people of any country in Western Europe (Pardell Alenta 1975) and
infant mortality rates neared 19 per 1000 live births (INE 2012).
Spain, like Brazil, experienced a pacted transition to democracy in which no rev-
olution took place and the former authoritarian rulers themselves molded the process
of transition and—in exchange for leaving peacefully—were never tried for human
rights or political crimes. Unlike Brazil where a bureaucratic authoritarian regime
had been slowly liberalizing politically for many years prior to the creation of a demo-
cratic constitution, in Spain the shift was more abrupt. In addition, Spain had to
territorially reorganize the state, which was not necessary in Brazil. Despite massive
unrest and the quasi-revolutionary overthrow of authoritarianism in Portugal in 1974,
Franco died in his bed of natural causes in 1975.
4.4 The Transition and the UCD: 1975-1982
By 1975, 80 per cent of the Spanish population had health coverage through social
security either as workers or dependents, but the system remained fragmented at the
administrative and organizational level (FOESSA 1983: 805). The starting point for
democratic Spain is noteworthy: coverage rates were high under the military regime
and most workers were in the formal sector.
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Despite having sworn to uphold the ideals of the Franco’s Movimiento Nacional,
when Juan Carlos I was named King in 1975, he moved forward with a political
reform law that was passed by the legislature and then put to referendum in 1976.
This reform legalized political parties and paved the way for the writing of the new
constitution. In 1977 the Pactos de la Moncloa (Moncloa Pacts) were signed by
the parties with representation in congress, as well as business and unions, with the
goal of pacting and smoothing the transition process. The pacts were also aimed at
developing a quick plan of action regarding the economy, which was in inflationary
free-fall. Though not what they are best known for, the pacts began the process of
pulling social security policy making out of the hands of the small cadre of physicians
and politicians who had controlled it under Franco (Guille´n and Cabiedes 1997: 323).
Because the old guard was never ousted, the conservative parties that formed
when the party system was legalized were the direct heirs of the ruling elite under
Franco. Many of Franco’s ministers and legislators continued in politics at the center
or in the ACs. This was the case for Adolfo Sua´rez, who created the Unio´n del Centro
Democra´tico (UCD, Central Democratic Union) to run as a center right, democratic
and reformist coalition in the first elections. The UCD won in 1977 with 34.4 per cent
and governed Spain from 1977 to 1982, after also winning the first elections in 1979
under the democratic constitution. In 1979 the UCD government was formed with
the support of Alianza Popular (AP, Popular Alliance), a coalition of harder core
right wing parties that included many unreformed members of the regime. Internal
conflicts within the UCD caused Sua´rez to resign and with the economic crisis of 1981
and increasing unemployment and hardship, the coalition crumbled and disappeared.
The modern right of center party, the PP was born from reform of the AP in 1989.
Spain uses a closed list proportional representation system for elected offices, ex-
cept the Senate, which is elected partly in a plurality system from the provinces and
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partly by AC legislatures. The Spanish President is chosen by the lower house of
Parliament, the Congreso de Diputados, and formally named by the King10. The
Cabinet is chosen and organized by the President and if the President falls, so do the
Ministers. Unlike Brazil where ministerial portfolios are often distributed to powerful
politicians and run with great autonomy, Spanish Ministers are more tightly tied to
the ruling party and the President. One would not generally expect to see Spanish
ministers acting with significant ideological autonomy or against the platform of the
President, though cabinets still contain significant levels of ideological variation and
conflict over policies, as we shall see.
The first Ministerio de Sanidad (Ministry of Health) was created in 1977 by the
constituent legislature after Franco’s death (Real Decreto 1558/1977), though was
combined with the Social Security Administration at this time. Under the national
leadership of the UCD, there were six health ministers in five years. During the demo-
cratic transition a temporary health financing formula was developed, which lasted
only until the creation of a permanent system and did not address the entrenched in-
equalities between the ACs. At the outset, health care was financed slightly above 75
per cent from Social Security and 20 per cent from general taxation (Lo´pez-Casasnovas
1998). In 1978, as a cost containment measure, a 40 per cent copay on pharmaceuti-
cals was introduced, except for retirees, and has remained in place, since.
A number of major reforms took place during the UCD period that began the
process of addressing the issues that were holding back the development of an equity-
enhancing health system. One was the reform of the tax system in 1977-1978, which
introduced direct taxation of personal income for the first time with the Impuesto
sobre la Renta de las Personas F´ısicas (IRPF, Ley 44/1978). Spain was in dire need
of increased revenue and in the process of negotiating entrance into the EU, which was
10Both the Spanish and most regional executives are called “presidente” or “presidenta”, though
their method of election means they are what we call a Prime Minister in a parliamentary system.
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pushing for the implementation of a progressive income tax. This reform was pacted
with the PSOE and the UCD received harsh criticism internally for not supporting
conservative positions, taking on “progressive” legislation that was considered the
terrain of the socialists11.
In 1978 the World Health Organization and UNICEF had called a conference on
primary care, which was sponsored by the USSR and held in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan.
The The Declaration of Alma-Ata was significant in the international health com-
munity and influenced thinking about the organization of care in both Spain and
Brazil, pushing policy makers toward integrated public health systems founded on
primary care. The UCD, with the cooperation of all the ACs and broad consensus
among health professionals about the need for investments in primary care, passed
Real Decreto 2221 of 1978 to begin the process of creating mapas sanitarios (health
maps) so that policy makers could understand the actual state of health services in
the country and organize the territory for the public provision of care.
Until 1979, the highest intermediate territorial level was the province. The ACs,
which took on primary responsibilities in health provision, regulation, and financing,
were created after democratization and after the 1978 Constitution. While historical
territorial affinities existed across provinces, with varying levels of legality at different
moments, these regions had never been simultaneously recognized and institutional-
ized in a centralized framework. As we shall see, in some of the ACs that eventually
formed, the provincial composition of the territory was quite different from what had
been expected by political elites at the central level.
The 1978 constitution paved the way for the creation of the ACs (Art. 147),
which took place between 1979 and 1983 through bilateral negotiations and passage
of Estatutos de Autonomı´a (Autonomy Statutes) that were unique for each newly
11El Pa´ıs 2/1/1978 “La reforma fiscal.”
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created AC. The three “historic nationalities” that had acquired special statutes under
the Second Republic—the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia—were guaranteed
a fast track to autonomy called the v´ıa ra´pida (Art. 151). For these communities,
the Statute was developed by gathering the central government deputies and senators
elected from the provinces of those areas to write a proposed Statute, which then had
to be passed by an absolute majority of that group, then passed by the Constitutional
Commission of the lower house and within two months put to a referendum in the
affected provinces (Art. 151.2).
While this avenue was designed for these three communities and was meant to be
a more difficult but faster way to gain the maximum competences permitted (Art.
149), the provinces of Andalusia opted for this avenue as well. In fact, the UCD
preferred only limited decentralization and had not planned for any other ACs to
acquire autonomous political institutions. But when Andalusia pressed forward it
forced the major political forces to regroup and negotiate a special exception, while
trying to avoid having other ACs go down the same path. The v´ıa lenta was to be the
process of limited autonomy for the rest of the country and the process was initiated
by provincial and local governments and then submitted to the full lower house for
passage as organic law (Art. 143). This avenue was designed to yield lower levels of
policy devolution, more slowly and in general has had this effect.
The different paths to autonomy were not predetermined. These were critical
junctures in a highly volatile transition process. Once a path to was chosen, it defined
the next few decades and ensured that an AC would either have a high level of policy
autonomy in a wide variety of areas, quickly, or that the process would be slower and
more limited. For the UCD, it was a story about attempting to contain regionalization
as much as possible by forcing all but the most strident onto a slow path with Statutes
that could only be renegotiated every five years. But because of this vision, the v´ıa
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lenta was immediately stigmatized as being for less capable, less “special” ACs. The
UCD originally planned for only these three special ACs to have directly elected
institutions of self-government, which deepened the perception that democracy was
tied to decentralization.
The UCD’s reluctance to extend democratic institutions to all the new ACs so-
lidified support for the v´ıa ra´pida on the left in most provinces, which would have
been the only way to guarantee elected autonomous institutions. This attempt to
limit democratic political decentralization created high levels of partisan conflict and
caused the provincial left to push much harder for substantive devolution than it
might have if democracy and decentralization had not been so tightly intertwined.
Herein lies one key to the association between democracy and decentralization in
Spain. Because of the legacy of the dictatorship, the assumption that a strong Spain
meant weak regions existed on both the left and right and propelled these forces to-
ward often dogmatic stances in favor of particular territorial arrangements that have
muddied their ideological policy preferences over time. At this defining moment in the
democratic transition, the attempt of the UCD to limit democratic decentralization
helped solidify support for broad devolution—beyond just the creation of democratic
institutions—for actors on the left.
The government of Adolfo Sua´rez had created a commission in 1979 to advise
on “rationalizing” the process of autonomy. The central PSOE supported the idea
of a unified strategy because it wanted to expand legislative institutions to all the
ACs. It was also concerned about what would happen if ACs without a history of
self-government opted for the v´ıa ra´pida but could not meet the high thresholds of
absolute majorities for the provincial referenda12. This was a reasonable concern,
given that it was precisely what ended up happening in Andalusia, which opted for
12El Pa´ıs 12/2/1979 “UCD y PSOE estudian una fo´rmula para ‘racionalizar’ reivindicaciones
autono´micas.”
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the v´ıa ra´pida even though the provinces of Jae´n and Almer´ıa did not reach the
minimum threshold. But the PSOE’s commitment to democratic decentralization
extended into its own internal structure and its regional affiliates expressed territorial
independence. Almost all demanded higher levels of autonomy, more quickly, than
the central party supported. An unintended consequence of slowing the process and
keeping non-nationalist ACs out of the v´ıa ra´pida was that a larger number of ACs
fell into the newly created centralized health service, INSALUD.
The 1978 Constitution for the first time guaranteed health protection (Art. 43
and 49) and foresaw that it would be developed from the outset as a responsibility
of the ACs (Title XIII), even without knowing how many there would be. It took
five years for all 17 ACs to be created. The constitution grants the center exclusive
responsibilities in establishing the minimum services to be covered under the SNS,
coordinating the systems of the ACs, and legislating pharmaceutical coverage and
health policy that crosses regional borders (Art. 149.16). The document considers
health care separately from social security, suggesting that the framers intended to
put Spain on the path toward the creation of an NHS (Alonso Olea 1994; Guille´n and
Cabiedes 1996), which was also consistent with the impulses of Alma-Atal.
AC health secretariats are not hierarchically accountable to the central Ministry
of Health, as they are (partially) in Brazil, but only to their AC parliament. Neither
the Constitution nor later enabling legislation gave the central state authority to hold
ACs accountable or for mandatory data collection that would permit independent
monitoring. The courts have become the only source of arbitration over competences
and are kept exceptionally busy with parties, ACs, and central actors suing each other
over issues of the territorial distribution of authority. It is quite likely that the pacted
transition to democracy would not have been successful if the constitution had been
more explicit—its vagueness was quite intentional—yet the problems for the practice
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of government later have been significant.
Social protection was reorganized into thematic institutions in 1978, with the cre-
ation of INSALUD for health assistance and a stronger social security administration
for financing social expenditure. Social provision was to be handled by four new
agencies that took the place of the old INP. Between 1979 and 1981 all communities
gained authority over public health and health care planning. While Health Minis-
ter Sa´nchez de Leo´n began the process of modernizing the newly created INSALUD,
health policy and the development of the welfare state remained low on the list of
political priorities, far below the broader political reform project.
Despite the lack of focus on health policy at this time, state reform continued.
It had been hard enough for the UCD to force the Basques and Catalans to wait
for their Statutes until after the passage of the Constitution—not a minor point of
contention, but rather a fundamental question of the source of sovereignty and the
definition of the future limits to autonomy that would be defined for the historic
ACs. These communities had their Statutes drawn up and approved, waiting for the
constitutional process to be completed. The central government passed the Basque
and Catalan Statutes in 1979. The pressure of demand from these two ACs had forced
a fast pace and a higher level of devolution than the UCD had wanted. For much of
the rest of Spain, awareness of conflict over the territorial distribution of authority had
been relatively low (Linz 1981: 21). Blow by blow coverage of the tense negotiations
for Basque and Catalan autonomy in the newly-freed press captivated the country
and brought these questions to the fore in other ACs, as well. The pressure for a legal,
judicial, and administrative framework for the autonomy process became intense.
In 1979 the Ley Orga´nica del Tribunal Constitucional (LOTC, Organic Law of the
Constitutional Tribunal LO 2/1979) became the supreme judicial law for the country,
governing the ACs and their Statutes (Revorio 2009: 92). The Ley Orga´nica Sobre las
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Distintas Modalidades de Refere´ndum (Organic Law Regarding the Different Forms of
Referenda 2/1980) enabled the popular consultations required for beginning the au-
tonomy process through the v´ıa r’apida and for ratifying the Statutes in those cases.
The Ley Orga´nica de la Financiacio´n de las Comunidades Auto´nomas (LOFCA, Or-
ganic Law for AC Finance 8/1980) set out the framework for regional finance. This
included the Fondo de Compesacio´n Interrteritorial (FCI, Inter-territorial Compen-
sation Fund, Art. 16) with the express purpose of ameliorating inequalities in level
of economic development between the ACs through public investments. Also created
by the LOFCA was the Consejo de Pol´ıtica Fiscal y Financiera (CPFF, Council on
Fiscal and Finance Policy), which coordinated fiscal policy between the ACs and the
center and has become the dominant organ for intergovernmental bargaining in this
arena. Table A.6 places the creation of some of these institutions in the broader
timeline of fiscal changes in health policy.
An attempted coup took place on February 23rd, 1981 in which the Guardia Civil
took possession of the Congress, believing the monarchy to be on its side. While
there is still great speculation about the event because the King waited many hours
to appear publicly and renounce the events, the coup eventually failed. Democracy
in Spain is therefore not seen as fully consolidated until 1981. The negotiations and
policy-making that took place during these years were constrained by high levels of
uncertainty, as well as political and physical risk for reformers.
The Health Ministry was separated from the Social Security Administration in
1991. This paved the way for political decisions to be made autonomously regarding
the organization of an independent health service. Health maps were drawn up during
this period that allowed for assessment of where coverage was weak, while access and
coverage continued to expand. In 1982 the Ley de Integracio´n Social del Menusva´lido
(LISMI, Law for the Social Integration of the Disabled 13/1982) guaranteed the rights
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of the disabled in the work place and granted access to health care—the first extension
of health services not based on attachment to the labor market.
These pieces of legislation were primarily negotiated between the major politi-
cal parties, which became the norm for major policies during the 1980s and 1990s
(Encarnacio´n 2008: 9). Under UCD leadership, the Health Ministry tried to tighten
the relationship between the government and the private medical establishment13.
In 1981 health competences were devolved to Catalonia (Real Decreto 1517/1981)—
though because the state model was still in flux and the SNS was still five years out,
its level of authority in health material was contested politically and in the courts.
Because decentralization was a priority for all the political forces that had been
banned under Franco and substantive social policy decentralization was written into
the Constitution, the devolution process was part of political reform and not treated as
a secondary priority, as social policy reform generally was during this time. Therefore,
while health reform did not take place countrywide, devolution of health responsibil-
ities continued.
After the attempted coup, pressure within the PSOE for support of harmonization
in the autonomy process was strengthened. The UCD feared centrifugal decentral-
ization pressures that might create chaos and total asymmetry, or even independence
for some ACs. The PSOE feared centrifugal decentralization both from a distribu-
tional perspective, with an intellectual base in the centrism of socialist doctrine, but
also from a pragmatic concern about the level of autonomy the anti-democratic right
in Spain would tolerate before attempting to retake the state. After the 1981 coup
attempt, with the constitution still young, this was not a paranoid concern.
In 1982 the Ley Orga´nica de Armonizacio´n del Proceso Autono´mico (LOAPA, Or-
ganic Law to Harmonize the Autonomy Process) was passed with these ends in mind,
13El Pa´ıs 2/14/1982 “La idea de estrechar relaciones etnre el Estado y la medicina privada presidio´
el 27 aniversario de la Fundacio´n Jime´nez Dı´az.”
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but the Basques and Catalans sued in the Tribunal Constitucional, arguing that a
central law could not limit the authority invested in the ACs within their Statutes,
which had constitutional status and had been active for several years already. A third
of the articles in the law were overturned, but the UCD and PSOE had neverthe-
less been able to impose their preferences about the tempo of reform because they
dominated the central legislature, which had to approve each Statute.
As Spanish nationalists always claimed, and in what has turned out to be a pre-
scient concern, there was no way to open the door just a hair for special rights in
certain territories. The aspirations of the rest swung that door wide open. The issue
of which areas were linguistically different, could claim their own nation, or had au-
tonomy dating back to the Second Republic (the UCD’s criterion for autonomy) was
tricky. The combination of fuzzy distinctions between historic nationalities and oth-
ers and the clear benefits of having this special status have driven what Luis Moreno
calls “autonomic mimesis” in which all ACs claim special national traditions in order
to maximize leverage in bargaining with the center (1997).
Most of the Spanish territory could claim origins in kingdoms with traditions that
differentiated them from the rest of the country—one of the reasons Alfred Stepan
considered Spain a quintessential example of “holding together” federalism (1999). In
addition to Euskara (Basque) in the Basque Country, Gallego in Galicia, and Catala`
in Catalonia, linguistic difference abounds throughout Spain. Basque is spoken in
northern Navarre, while Valencia and Baleares both speak dialects of Catalan (or
Valencia`, to valencianos). Within Catalonia the Arane´s language is co-official and
spoken in the Valle de Ara´n. Aragone´s and Asturleone´s are spoken by minorities
in Arago´n, Asturias, and Castilla y Leo´n, respectively. A wide variety of dialects of
Castilian Spanish are recognized in the center and south of the country, as well.
The formation of the ACs could have turned out quite differently. In the Basque
110
Country, several counties of the southernmost Basque province of A´lava sit like penin-
sulas in La Rioja (the Rioja Alavesa). In Castilla y Leo´n, as we shall see, great effort
by central actors was put into ensuring that the nine provinces formed a single AC,
when arguably the cultural and political differences warranted the creation of more
than one. Arago´n and Cantabria had initiated the process of autonomy during the
Second Republic, but had not voted on their Statutes when the war began and so
were not fast-tracked. The status of Navarre was up in the air in the early years and
Madrid, La Rioja, and Cantabria were all originally conceived as pertaining to other
communities, yet all four ended up as uniprovincial ACs.Therefore, which provincial
groupings were considered “historic nationalities” was somewhat arbitrary, yet came
to define the process of devolution.
Perhaps the entire process would have evolved differently if the Senate had ever
been envisioned as a true territorial body of representation. But because possession of
minority national identity is asymmetrically distributed across the country, the level
of autonomy desired by these ACs was not the same as what was desired or reasonable
for the rest, at least at the moment of the transition. The Senate is therefore a body
composed of AC government appointed representatives, as well as provincially elected
members (and originally, a large block appointed by the crown), which does not have
the authority to initiate legislation and can be blocked by the lower chamber at every
stage. The limited authority it does possess has rarely been used.
The asymmetric nature of the Statutes and central actors’ desire for a slow and
orderly process played a significant role in determining how health responsibilities
developed over time. It takes time for institutions to gain experienced and capable
administration, so how long a community has run its own health system may influ-
ence administrative capacity. Yet ideological commitment is still the linchpin. For
the Basque Country, with high commitment and high capacity, early decentralization
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meant it could vastly improve health services, faster. For Extremadura, late decen-
tralization meant that the government had time to establish a capable administrative
institution before taking on health care, which seems to have prepared it well for
executing policies after 2001. Yet Madrid, lacking commitment, has been able to run
its health service into the ground quite quickly, even though it had late decentraliza-
tion and a great deal of money. Catalonia has had surprisingly poor performance on
health indicators and service coverage, despite early decentralization and high capac-
ity. There is therefore significant variation in the quality of health service provision
that cannot be explained by the timing of increased authority in self-rule.
4.5 Socialist Government in the New State of the Autonomies: 1982-1993
In the 1982 general election the PSOE won an absolute majority with comprehen-
sive health reform a part of its platform. The UCD imploded and disappeared and
the AP took its place as the primary opposition party—swapping a more moderate
and reformist right for a harder right. While for the Spanish right the shift in support
from the UCD to the AP and then the PP meant a shift from a centrist party to a
harder core right party that did not moderate until a decade into democracy, the
opposite was true on the left. The PSOE emerged as the dominant party of the left
under the leadership of the charismatic Felipe Gonzo´lez and over time the Partido
Comunista Espan˜ol (PCE, Spanish Communist Party) diminished. In 1986 the PCE
fomented the creation of Izquierda Unida (IU, United Left) coalition, which remains
the dominant party to the left of the PSOE at the center, garnering around ten per
cent in general elections until 2000 and dropping to around five per cent since then
(though with a notable increase in 2011 in mid-crisis). Both IU and the PSOE are
federalist parties, meaning that they support autonomy for the ACs and in some
cases, self-determination. It also means that the internal structure of the parties
allows regional affiliates a high level of independence.
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Ernest Lluch, an economist and historian, was appointed Health Minister in 1982.
Lluch represented a radical shift from the past five years. He was an anti-Franco
Catalan who had been a militant protestor against the regime and served as repre-
sentative of the Catalan Socialists in the Congress before becoming Minister. Unlike
his UCD predecessors, Lluch ran the ministry for the full term of the first PSOE gov-
ernment. During Lluch’s tenure, restricted access to abortion was legalized for the
first time (LO 9/1985) and both the primary care system and the SNS were created.
In 1984 health competences were devolved to Andalusia (RD 400/1984). Health fi-
nancing shifted during this period as well, primarily out of the social security budget
and into general revenues. Transfers to the ACs with devolved health responsibilities
were calculated on a mostly per capita basis.
In 1984, as the SNS was being developed within the government and Health Min-
istry, Lluch was protagonist in the creation of the first comprehensive health legisla-
tion in Spain—Real Decreto 137/84 de Estructuras Ba´sicas de Salud (Basic Health
Structures). This created Primary Care Teams and for the first time organized the
Spanish territory to ensure universal access to the teams, which would later operate
as gatekeepers for the new health system. The teams included a GP, nurses, pediatri-
cians, and other specialists. The goal was to reorient primary care toward prevention,
increasing the time dedicated to each visit, promoting teamwork and ending the prac-
tice of using ER specialists for routine visits (MSC 2004).
In practical terms, the hiring of primary care physicians as a distinct branch of
specialist care and their incorporation into existing care teams was rapid under the
reform, as well as their incorporation into the newly expanding health centers (Bengoa
2012). Some opposition came from the municipalities, many of which had full time
GPs contracted by the city council who were on call 24 hours a day. The reform
created health clinics that served outposts in several municipalities, meaning that
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many smaller localities no longer had their own full time providers (Lamata 2012).
The Ley General de Sanidad (General Health Law14/1986) created the SNS, defin-
ing it as the coordinated health services of the ACs14. Spain joined the EU in 1986
as Greece, Italy, and Portugal also began creating national health systems. The de-
velopment and implementation of the SNS were Lluch’s primary projects as Minister,
including confronting the entrenched conservative interests in politics and private
medicine that had dominated health policy making up that point15. Not only was
there more health policy production under the PSOE, but the role of the Health
Ministry was more significant than it had been under the UCD.
As part of the 1986 creation of the SNS, the Consejo Interterritorial del Sistema
Nacional de Salud (CISNS, SNS Interterritorial Council) was created. The CISNS
was composed of the Health Minister, with 17 weighted votes or representatives to
equal the ACs, and regional health ministers for all ACs (both those that had taken
on full competences in health care and those that had not). It was tasked with
coordinating the SNS, including making consensus recommendations. In practice,
the CISNS is where major decisions about the health system are negotiated.
The health reform that took shape from 1984-1986 was designed to place Spain
firmly in line with the European norm among Spain’s neighbors, but eventually
achieved better coverage and services at a lower cost than several wealthier coun-
tries. Compared to the residual welfare regimes of the Anglo Saxon countries, even
the 83 per cent coverage rates Franco had achieved were significant. The Spanish
socialists were strongly committed to the propagation of what they hoped would be a
progressive NHS: public provision, universal access, free at the point of delivery, and
financed from general taxation.
14“El Sistema Nacional de Salud se concibe as´ı como el conjunto de los servicios de salud de las
Comunidades Auto´nomas convenientemente coordinados.”
15Fundacio´n Ernest Lluch “Biograf´ıa” http://fundacioernestlluch.org/es/biografia.
114
The important role that a strong Ministry can play at key points in the reform
process is illustrated by the internal challenges the Ministry of Health faced from
other PSOE cabinet members, who felt the economic pressures of other state projects
were a bigger priority and did not want health care funded from general taxation. The
Health Ministry had to prevail against not only external ideological challenges, but
internal challenges based on differing priorities for the spending of scarce resources.
The PSOE had tried to exclude private actors and the opposition from the devel-
opment of the legislation, which produced high levels of conflict later on, but ensured
that the starting point for negotiation was determined by the socialists. Physicians
had been able to develop a system of dual practices, in which they maintained private
practices while employed in the public sector, an arrangement that was threatened by
the creation of the public system. But the dual practice norm was established in part
by mediocre public coverage prior to reform, which could only provide employment for
a few hours a day, leaving doctors no option but to also find other work. In the end,
the compromise required not tinkering with the private contracting system known as
conciertos, not demanding full coverage from the general budget, not providing full
universal coverage, and allowing a weak structural definition of the system to appease
the Basques and Catalans who wanted autonomy to define their own systems (Guille´n
and Cabiedes 1997: 325-326).
The highly redistributive and progressive system envisaged by the PSOE at the
start of the reform process in Spain could not be achieved because of the strength
of the private medical sector, the political opposition, and the ACs desiring higher
levels of policy autonomy. These ACs were not all antagonistic to health reform, but
wanted the authority to make decisions about redistribution within a distinct, highly
salient reference community that was smaller than the Spanish state.
The promise of what the system was supposed to have been and the comparison
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with Europe kept up the pressure for expansion to fulfill the constitutional mandate—
the constitutional mandate was meaningful in and of itself as a reference point for
committed actors. Creating a system that was clearly supposed to be universal and
public, yet was not, fueled demand for reform moving forward. Under a nationalist-
socialist coalition, the decentralized Basque health service opted to extend universal
coverage first in 1988, which created increased pressure for the central government to
move forward the next year. In Spain, an improving economy allowed for legislation
to be passed in 1989 that brought full financing into the general budget and nearly
full population coverage (Royal Decree 1088/89).
While many scholars and most Spaniards believe that the Spanish SNS became
a universal system of public coverage, this has never actually been true. Access to
the system has been primarily defined through social security status, even though
benefits were not financed this way. As we shall see, patches were created for various
groups at various moments, but if a person’s unemployment insurance ran out and
they were not a dependent of a retired or employed person, they would find themselves
without health coverage for a period of time, sometimes quite long, while traversing
the enrollment process to acquire status as someone too poor to pay for health care
(the “universalizing” extension passed in 1989). Even then, only if a person were
actually materially poor at the time would they qualify. Health officials have known
of the loophole since 1990 and estimate that during the recession beginning in 2008,
the number of people who lost their coverage from expiring unemployment reached
over 1.3 million. While most were able to negotiate access by establishing dependency
with a covered person, often they only discovered they did not have coverage when
trying to access services and being denied16. The loophole appears to have been
closed as part of the passage of the Ley de Salud Pu´blica (Public Health Law) in 2011
16El Pa´ıs 12/4/2011 “¿Pero la sanidad no es universal?”
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(Ley 33/2011). For the first quarter century, the constitutional guarantee did not
materialize into legal reality (Areta Mart´ınez 2011). These loopholes in the system
expose the cost of not ensuring universality from the beginning, generating cracks
that Spaniards fell through for decades.
The shift from a Bismarckian to a Beveridgean-esque model—in which (mostly)
universal access was guaranteed, financed with general taxation instead of payroll
contributions, and free at the point of delivery—represented a major coup in the role
health care could play in addressing existing inequalities. The General Health Law
of 1986 specifically mandates that health spending be oriented toward eliminating
health inequalities and guaranteeing equal access to health services (Ley 14/1986).
Civil servants covered by the mutual funds MUFACE, MUGEJU, and ISFAS are the
only group eligible to opt out of the SNS and may choose fully private provision,
taking up about three per cent of overall health spending.
Despite the shortcomings of the SNS, the achievement was monumental, partic-
ularly because Spain had been a developing country only a quarter century before
and was still a newly consolidated democracy. Lluch’s tenure was an important part
of this success. Spending enough time in office to learn the ropes, develop a trusted
and efficient team of administrators, and construct complex, large-scale policies is
a key component of administrative capacity. Even holding ideological commitment
constant, a project like the SNS could not have been completed with the ministerial
turnover of the UCD governments. Taking account of the UCD Ministers’ closeness
with the private medical establishment and lack of commitment to equity-enhancing
policies, the impossibility of reform between 1977 and 1982 was over-determined. In
2000, Lluch was assassinated by the Basque terrorist group, ETA.
In late 1987 the Basque Country (Real Decreto 1536/1987) and Valencia (Real
Decreto 1612/1987) took on health competences, bringing the total to four. In 1989
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general elections were held and while Gonza´lez did not quite win an absolute major-
ity, the fact that the centrally elected representatives of the radical independentist
left in the Basque Country (Herri Batasuna) abstained from participating in central
government meant the PSOE was able to form a government. This same year AP
reformed, becoming slightly more socially moderate and economically liberal as it
shifted away from its fascist roots and was renamed the PP. In December of 1990
Navarre (Real Decreto 1679/1990) and Galicia (Real Decreto 1680/1990) took on
health competences, bringing the total to six.
In 1987 Julia´n Garc´ıa Vargas took over the Health Ministry and carried the office
for the full term of the second Gonza´lez government. Garc´ıa was a centrist who
did not have Lluch’s long and militant socialist history. This period also coincided
with the upswing in international support for deregulation and neoliberal reform.
Attempts at rationalization and cost cutting in the new system began in earnest
under Garc´ıa Vargas’ administration. In 1991, at his request, the Spanish Congress
undertook a technocratic assessment of health reform since 1986, which included an
analysis of shortcomings in the system and possibilities for cost containment. Because
there was a widespread social and academic consensus that the system had never been
adequately funded, yet the report suggested it had maximized some of its possibilities
for expansion and was ready for rationalization, the report was skeptically received,
to put it mildly. The so-called Informe Abril recommended an array of rationalization
reforms that were not ultimately designed with a focus on ensuring equity and which
were rejected at the time by left of center forces. Some of the measures would be
adopted over the next few years, regardless.
Gonza´lez reshuﬄed his cabinet in 1991 and replaced the Health Minister, but in
line with the broader problems the government began to experience with corruption
and internal scandals, the new minister resigned ten months later when implicated in
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a corruption scandal unrelated to the Health Ministry. Corruption has been present
in both major central parties, often associated with party finance but also with use of
public resources for personal enrichment or (in the PSOE just after democratization)
extra-legal paramilitary action against ETA, and has been more prevalent in certain
ACs. The next Minister, the first to arrive from the ACs with a background managing
decentralized government health policy, stayed just six months before being shifted to
another post. His second in command became the first woman to head the Ministry
in 1993 and served out the last three years of the Gonza´lez government.
In addition to the internal difficulties of the PSOE, economic crisis in the early
1990s kept the focus on cost containment, even among socialists17. Yet there were
no cuts and extension of primary care in centrally controlled AC health services
continued. At the beginning of the 1990s the economy was souring, but the central
government had successfully passed and begun to consolidate major reforms in health
care. Yet AC pressure for decentralized policy control was mounting at the same time
that fiscal resources were at their tightest since the early 1980s. Even though the
Statutes of the v´ıa lenta regions stated they could renegotiate their responsibilities
after five years, in many cases the socialists held them off for far longer.
Center-right nationalists in Catalonia (Converge`ncia i Unio´, CiU, Convergence
and Union) and the Basque Country (Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea-Partido Nacionalista
Vasco, EAJ-PNV, Basque Nationalist Party) were supporting the central government
in parliament from 1993, on. The Catalans pushed hard for the decentralization of a
portion of the IRPF. Catalonia has the unique status as one of the wealthiest regions,
with stronger nationalist presence in AC government than any other AC, yet without
the special foral regime of the Basque territories. It loses the most by being part
of the central fiscal regime and faces constant powerful pressure by nationalists to
17El Pa´ıs7/18/1993 “Gastos sanitarios.”
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remedy what they see as an unjust fiscal arrangement. Keeping part of the income
tax collected in its territory would stem the outflow a bit and present a political
victory for nationalists. The proposal was for 15 per cent of the income tax revenue
generated in each AC to be sent directly on to the AC government.
Yet the central government was giving up no control over the base or rate of the
IRPF—this was the key difference between the version of this policy put forth by the
PSOE and that of the PP when it came to power in 1996. This was not a pro-poor,
redistributive policy measure. The PSOE would unburden itself of the responsibility
for negotiating and pacting part of the complicated AC finances. The compromise
for equity was that the central PSOE stood behind the LOFCA of 1980, stating that
the IRPF was not a tax that could be fundamentally decentralized (Art. 11).
Implemented by the UCD and PSOE during the transition, the IRPF had been
consolidated under the PSOE, a major equity-enhancing reform that meant social
policies were being funded from a much more redistributive base. Yet since 1986 the
tax had become less progressive in its application and rates, while also becoming a less
important part of the overall financing of public policies. These shifts were largely the
result of international pressures as neoliberalism reached its peak and the EU pushed
for a greater reliance on value added taxation. The ACs would gain resources but
with no fiscal autonomy, and the progressive nature of the IRPF would be protected
at one level, as it was compromised simultaneously by collection over a smaller and
more unequal set of AC bases at another.
A group of poorer ACs initially refused to go along with the plan. These ACs were
led by the popular, long-standing president of the Junta de Extremadura, Rodr´ıguez
Ibarra. Beginning with the first discussions of the 15 per cent IRPF revenue sharing
scheme, the Extremaduran President was vocally opposed, primarily because the
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amount generated in a poor AC would inevitably be less than in a wealthy AC18.
The Catalan nationalists were demanding 100 per cent of the IRPF19, aiming for the
equivalent of the Basque Concierto, as they had been since its inception. Basque
Lehendakari (President) Arzalluz, whose AC contributed less to the central coffers
than any other, told the Andalusians and Extremadurans: “Se le llama solidaridad
cuando ayuda a desarrollarse, pero se llama ego´ısmo cuando lo que se quiere es vivir
a costa de otros”20. A study by supporters of the PP from the Xunta de Galicia
estimated the cost of the reform and also found that Extremadura, Andalusia, and
Galicia would lose the most, while Madrid and other wealthy ACs would benefit21.
Ultimately, the leaders of the losing regions were cajoled one by one and convinced
to sign on. Yet Extremadura, Castilla y Leo´n, and Galicia opted out of the new system
for 1994 and Extremadura, alone, opted out in 1995 as well. These regions continued
operating under the old system, though because they all were still within INSALUD,
the impact on health care was not direct. In this particular example we see the large
number of veto players in the Spanish system braking a regressive reform, which
was primarily on the table because of pressure from one politically powerful region.
Just within the PSOE, the Catalan affiliate, the poor non-nationalist regions, and
the central government all found themselves on different sides. The political calculus
benefited the Catalans, who by this point were supporting a central PSOE without an
absolute majority. Without them, there was no government. In the end, the PSOE
18Rodr´ıguez Ibarra outlined his objections in an opinion editorial in El Pa´ıs 10/14/1992 “Mis
Razones.”
19El Pa´ıs 10/20/1992 “Serra replica a Pujol que su propuesta boicotea el dia´logo sobre la cesio´n
del IRPF a las autonomı´as.”
20“It’s called solidarity when the purpose is economic development, but it’s called egoism when
what you want is to live at the expense of others” El Pa´ıs 9/7/1993 “Gonza´lez frena la ira de
Rodr´ıguez Ibarra.”
21El Pa´ıs 7/12/1993 “Un informe del PP preve´ grandes desequilibrios entre comunidades si se
cediera el 15% sin compensaciones.”
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dealt with these contradictions by assuring poor regions that the center would make
up the difference if they did not reach the amount of revenue the negotiated formulas
guaranteed them to cover their policy responsibilities, while promising regions that
generated a boon from the transfer that they would be allowed to keep the extra22.
As we shall see, the cession of the IRPF has become a snowball quickly rolling down
hill toward greater and greater decentralization.
In 1993 the CPFF tried to implement cost controls by tying the growth of per
capita AC health finances for the early decentralizers to nominal GDP growth. Yet
because the central government had little authority over health policy or spending in
those regions, these efforts were largely unsuccessful. The impact on equity of such
attempts is debatable. It is only in recent years that health reformers have begun to
carefully unpack health spending and make a case for shifting away from expensive
curative services and drugs with no proven track record in improving outcomes. In a
system that has been chronically underfunded, blanket cost controls from the center,
when ACs controlled health policy, would still have allowed outcomes to be dictated
by the level of commitment and innovation in the ACs.
In March of 1994 Canarias (Real Decreto 446/1994) took on full health compe-
tences, the last bilateral devolution, bringing the total to seven regions with 63 per
cent of the Spanish population.
4.6 The Rise and Fall of the PP: 1996-2004
In the 1996 general elections the PP won a simple majority as the PSOE struggled
with corruption and the emerging scandal of the party leadership’s use of paramili-
taries in a dirty war against ETA. While the PP had run in coalition with the Unio´n
del Pueblo Navarro (UPN, Navarrese People’s Union) and the Partido Aragone´s (PA,
Aragonese Party)—both center-right regional parties—in the end it was forced to
22El Pa´ıs 9/3/1993 “Hacienda garantiza una ventaja financiera a las autonomı´as que participen
en el 15% del IRPF.”
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attain support from CiU, the PNV, and Coalicio´n Canaria (CC, Canary Coalition).
The reliance on minority nationalist parties, despite campaign promises to avoid
such a situation, fundamentally influenced and constrained the policies of the first
PP government. While the ideological preferences of the PP, CiU, and the PNV
were not as sharply divergent on economic issues as had been true in the previous
legislature, strongly centralizing forces were present in the Spanish executive for the
first time since the democratic transition and the differences in visions for the reference
community were enormous. Yet as it turned out, the PP’s vision of a centralized Spain
was not as salient for its leaders as other dimensions of its policy preferences. As we
shall see, the Catalans continued to exact preferential autonomous financing within
the common regime, while the PNV used its leverage to negotiate greater authority
over its foral regime.
The first Health Minister appointed by Jose´ Mar´ıa Aznar, the new Spanish pres-
ident, was Romay Beccar´ıa, who had been the head of health services for Franco. In
addition to the PP’s ideological opposition to public health expansion, Spain’s project
to join the euro required significant fiscal maneuvering and even stricter efforts at cost
containment. The PP did not have enough legislative backing in 1996 to push through
its plans to privatize the health system and by 2000, when it attained an absolute
majority, the economy was booming and the SNS was thoroughly entrenched.
Still, in 1997 the PP led a successful campaign for fiscal reform. In September of
1996 the CPFF pacted a new AC finance scheme, as it had done every five years. The
ACs would continue to receive 15 per cent of the IRPF collected in their territory, plus
another 15 per cent over which they would have some normative authority—they could
modify the rate of that 15 per cent by 20 per cent and they could control deductions.
This second 15 per cent was related to the devolution of education competencies in
the ten v´ıa lenta ACs and so was not applied at exactly the same time everywhere.
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For the first time a portion of personal income taxes, property taxes, and a series
of less important taxes were devolved to the ACs with normative authority over the
base and rate (MSC Anexo III 2003: 219)23. Poor ACs again objected, though those
controlled by the PP were not quite as vocal this time. Previously, only Extremadura
had been willing to go head to head with its own party at the central level and
the other two had been controlled by the PP. This time, Andalusia and Castilla la
Mancha, both socialist ACs, opted out of the new financing scheme, as well.
A section of these reforms, aimed at the decentralization and liberalization of
the health sector, did not pass Congress, largely due to the pressure of national
trade unions and healthcare workers. Still, the 1997 reforms included important
changes in the administration of health and social service centers, which enabled
them to bypass the rules of the public Social Security Administration (Puig-Junoy
and Rovira 2003; Lopez-Casasnovas, et al. 2004). New public hospitals received the
freedom of self-government outside the common administrative legal regime regulating
state-run hospitals. These changes opened the doors to a greater heterogeneity in the
administration, labor relations, and ordering of public services in the affected centers.
The new financing model drifted even further from measures of health need, while
appeasing regional elected officials by ensuring that each AC got an extra one-off
injection of funding (Ru´ız-Huerta and Lo´pez 1997: 19). Since 1999, pre-existing
public hospitals could negotiate a quasi-independent status as well.
These reforms were opposed by the PSOE and also by the trade unions in the
medical field, due to concerns of the personnel about working conditions, wages and
23The tinkering done by the ACs to date has mostly been limited to differing income tax deduc-
tions, which has marginally changed the effective rate paid by those living in different ACs (Dura´n
Cabre´ 2006: 20).
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the preservation of collective bargaining victories, and contracts negotiated and pro-
tected within the common administrative regime (Lopez-Casasnovas 1998; Lopez-
Casasnovas, et al. 2004). The focus of health policy in the 1990s was clearly oriented
toward cost containment (Puig-Junoy y Rovira 2003), yet under the PP it also took
on an ideological component in favor of private provision. While the system was too
established to be dismantled, an absolute majority was not necessary for substantial
changes, as nationalist ACs were often in favor of loosening central regulations and
decentralizing responsibilities.
In 2000 the PP won an absolute majority, allowing it to eliminate coalition agree-
ments with minority nationalists. For the final phase of health devolution instituted
in late 2001, the major regional players did not have a stake in the reform, regardless
of their coalition status—they already had devolved health competences and did not
stand to lose financially by having other ACs take on health care. The foral regimes
have little riding on fiscal decisions made between the center and other ACs.
In late 2001 the PP’s congress hurriedly passed legislation for the devolution of
health competences in the ten remaining ACs. In July of 2001 the PP had passed
a new system of financing for the ACs, which they proceeded to tie to acceptance
of health decentralization24. If the ACs wanted the new money that came with the
new fiscal arrangements, they had to take health care. With several ACs successfully
boycotting each of the past two financing accords, the PP was determined to have
as many ACs as possible under the same fiscal roof. The PSOE sued over the man-
handling, but was ultimately unable to prevent it. This did not save the PP from
costly bargaining with each individual AC to get their consent—even those governed
by the PP. Once again the poor ACs stood firmly against both the fiscal reform and
the devolution of health policy responsibilities. Even some middle-income ACs felt
24El Pa´ıs 12/27/2001 “El Gobierno an˜ade 300.000 millones ma´s para traspasar la sanidad.”
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better served by the centralized system—Cantabria and La Rioja were the last to
sign and for months had opposed the transfer, despite being governed by the party
that initiated the reform.
The new financing system was a significant shift from what had existed for the
seven early decentralizers, prior to 2001. The financing of health care was shifted
from general taxation at the center to the general AC budgets. In order to finance
this new expenditure, a series of taxes were ceded. The ACs were given 33 per cent of
the IRPF (with some normative control as in the previous cycle), 40 per cent of some
specific consumption taxes (alcohol, tobacco, and petrol were the most important),
35 per cent of the Value Added Tax (VAT), and 100 per cent of electricity and some
transportation taxes. In the case of the indirect taxes, only the funds were ceded and
full normative control remained with the center.
AC finances were therefore made up of taxes and fees levied directly by the ACs,
fully “ceded” taxes that were normatively enabled at the center, but collected (or
not25) and spent by the ACs (the property tax, inheritance and donation taxes, taxes
on gambling), and taxes collected by the center but whose revenues were destined to
the ACs (part of the VAT, IRPF, and taxes on alcohol and electricity). In some cases
of fully ceded taxes, ACs still had the center collect the taxes for them through special
agreements. In the case of the centrally controlled taxes, for the portion normatively
controlled by the ACs, for example the 20 per cent variation permitted in the portion
of the IRPF going to the ACs, the center applied AC rates in collection and then
turned over the revenue. In theory, the ACs may levy taxes if they do not violate
central law or double tax the same base of a central tax. Yet the caveats to these
taxes leave ample room for judicial challenge and ex-post changes in central legislation
to nullify taxes it does not want the ACs levying, as we shall see. In addition, the
25In 2013, Madrid opted out of levying the property tax.
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central tax base is comprehensive so few areas are untaxed.
The decentralization of health took place without resolving any of the longstanding
distortions in health expenditure and without an institutional program to assist those
ACs with more limited capacity. The central PP placed high-ranking health personnel
in permanent contract positions just before devolution, hamstringing ACs hoping to
reverse the cutbacks in INSALUD under PP rule. Socialist ACs found that INSALUD
had been operating in a manner not to their ideological liking, with reliance on
overtime and short-term contract employment, as well as private contracting out,
rather than the creation of stable full time positions within the public sector. After the
transfer, the ACs across the board discovered that the waiting lists and infrastructure
projects were in worse shape than they had expected26. As we shall see, fiscal crisis
in the health system, which had been covered up within INSALUD but marginally
understood for years, came to light after devolution and produced a crisis of health
debt among the ACs that has still not been resolved. The crisis of financing did not
begin with the governance of the PP, by any means.
What drove the PP to push for devolution of health competencies? The core of
conservative identity in Spain has been a commitment to centralization and devolving
health required a nasty set of battles within the party, as well as with the opposition.
The most important reason was ideology regarding social policy. In its first term the
PP had attempted a substantive reform to health care with a plan to turn all hospitals
into foundations with institutional decentralization and self-governance along market
principles. The reform met with massive opposition from health care workers and
unions and the decision to decentralize health care to the ACs was linked directly
to the failure of this reform—with the Director of INSALUD stating that the reform
would be tabled and instead the government would decentralize health and allow
26El Pa´ıs 2/17/2002 “Unas transferencias envenenadas.”
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the ACs to make their own decisions27. The PSOE centrally had agreed to the
decentralization of health, conditional upon the set up of funds to compensate for
the needs of poorer ACs and clear that its affiliates were not obliged to follow along.
Regardless, the five ACs governed by the PSOE in 2001, as well as several governed
by the PP, all tried to reject the transfer.
Active un-commitment to equity may have been a driving factor behind the 2001
reform, but it was not the only important reason. The PP as a party is ideologically
opposed to asymmetry. It has always wanted as little regional variation as possible in
order to dilute the special status of the nationalist ACs. While the party cannot do
away with the foral regimes or undo the asymmetry that existed previously, it used
its control of the central government to try to level the playing field—increasing the
authority of v´ıa lenta ACs while limiting access to new competences for the historic
ACs28. Paradoxically for the PP, eliminating asymmetry meant increasing devolution
to the rest, whether they wanted it or not. After 2001, all Spanish ACs had the same
overall policy scope (not just in health).
The PP did not prioritize distributive outcomes in its reforms, so ceded normative
authority over the income tax and a higher portion of its revenues without compen-
satory funds. It did create a set of transfers to guarantee health financing in the
first few years after the reform if own source revenues did not meet the formula laid
out for minimum service provision, but this was not a significant transfer of resources
and the disbursements did not have a redistributive criterion. The Fondo de Suficien-
cia (sufficiency fund) took the place of the Participacio´n en los Ingresos del Estado
(PIE, Participation in State Revenue) and continued its function as the catch-all fund
for ensuring the financing of transferred responsibilities, but only beyond where own
27The Lancet 10/28/2000 “Spanish government reverses hospital independence ruling.”
28El Pa´ıs 3/1/1998 “El Gobierno ve concluidos los grandes traspasos a las autonomı´as y abre la
fase de cooperacio´n.”
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sources covered what the formulas said was “needed.” If the collection of ceded taxes
covered the formula, transfers would not be forthcoming. If poor ACs had high rev-
enues in a particular year, they would get no extra help despite the deeper health and
wealth hole they were trying to climb out of. Two thirds of central transfers would
come from ceded taxes and one third from the sufficiency fund.
These financing schemes were designed to ensure that no AC ended up with less
money than in previous years—the so-called status quo guarantee that has dominated
AC finance reform across governments of the left and the right. And for the Sufficiency
Fund, this meant that when rich ACs with high growth collected more taxes than
what their formula called for, they had to pay into the fund. This has generally been
true for Madrid and Baleares. The AC finance formulas are progressive, overall—they
combine per capita financing with some conditions for the aging of the population,
insularity, and low population density, which are all things that make social provision
more expensive, particularly health care. The less dense ACs also tend to be poorer
and older, as young people move to urban centers with greater opportunity.
Yet there is nothing equity-enhancing about the original financing framework that
set the foundation of the status quo, which has been untouchable. In addition, until
2009 there has never been any attempt to ensure that in practice the distribution of
the various funds produced similar funding levels per capita and ACs can (and do)
top off their central funds. The result has been highly unequal health spending per
capita across ACs, though the differences were harder to measure within INSALUD.
AC health spending data become available in 1995 and Figure 4.4 shows variation
in per capita financing across the case study ACs, with Madrid and Catalonia for
contrast. One can see clearly the increased divergence after 2002, as well as the poor
performance of Madrid and Catalonia in relative terms. In December of 2001 the
PP also approved the General Law of Budgetary Stability, imposing on all levels of
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Figure 4.4: Health Spending in a Subset of ACs
public administration what has been called “the zero deficit rule.” Criticisms arose
from the opposition and the health sector, arguing that the EU’s 1997 Stability Pact
only required that public debt remain below three per cent of GDP. Critics also
pointed out that health care in Spain had historically been under-funded at all levels,
creating a situation in which increases in spending had been financed with a high level
of borrowing for years (Garcia-Mila´ 2003). The new law meant that increased health
spending could only come from cuts in other public services, from increases in those
taxes controlled by the ACs and municipalities, or from an increase in regional GDP
above and beyond the increase in Spain as a whole (Puig-Junoy and Rovira 2003).
While the Ministry of Health had not been the primary actor in these major
political reforms around health, the conflicts took their toll and the Minister who had
overseen the devolution process stepped down in 2002, halfway through her term.
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Under the administration of Ana Pastor, a professional health administrator, the
third major piece of health legislation after the primary care reform and creation
of the SNS was passed. The Ley de Cohesio´n y Calidad del SNS (SNS Quality
and Cohesion Law) marks the shift of the Ministry away from a policy-making role
to one of coordination among 17 independent health services. Pastor opted not to
make radical conservative reforms to the SNS, despite pressure from other members
of the cabinet in that direction29, which would only have been possible with the
absolute majority the PP had at that particular moment in time. But after16 years
of development, the costs of radical retrenchment were high. In an EU context where
national health systems were common and universal coverage was the norm, what
was politically feasible or even desirable for many center-right actors had shifted.
While in some ways the new law made few substantive changes (Rey del Castillo
2003), at the time the primary opposition had to do with two issues related to ter-
ritorial relations. One was that new services were to be included with no central
guarantee of financing since the law included an update of the basic central cartera
de servicios (list of covered services) and had added vaguely worded requirements for
coverage of dental care and mental health (Ley 16/2003). Opposition was strongest
from minority nationalists, while the non-nationalist left was most concerned with the
financing proposals30. A number of coordinated oversight institutions were created,
including research and public health centers.
In contrast to concerns in nationalist ACs about the center overstepping its
bounds, one change may have weakened the role of the center in health policy making.
Before the reform, the CISNS had equal representation of central and AC represen-
tatives. Because a strong planning and oversight role was never given to the center
29El Pa´ıs 11/21/2002 “Ana Pastor reivindica que el Gobierno ‘lleve las riendas’ de la Sanidad.”
30El Pa´ıs 2/14/2003 “Pastor estudia aportar nuevos fondos para consensuar la ley de sanidad.”
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even under the 1986 health law31, this reform further inhibited the already minimal
capacity of the center to either plan or enforce the important areas of basic legisla-
tion and standards that were within its purview. Under the 2003 reform, the CISNS
only has one representative of the center—the Minister of Health. Prominent health
economists and health system managers argued that the reform left the central gov-
ernment with no role at all32. In its favor, the law created mechanisms for centralized
data collection and health information systems that have been sorely lacking. Over-
all, the reform was supported by political actors and did not make radical changes to
the structure of the SNS.
4.7 The Third Way in Spain: 2004-2011
Amidst the scandal surrounding its handling of the Madrid train bombings, the
PP lost the 2004 general elections. The PSOE did not win an absolute majority, but
was still able to form a government. The health debt of the ACs—-what they must
spend to cover their systems above and beyond what the central state guarantees—
hit all 10 of the newly empowered ACs in 2002. Most political actors recognized the
need for assistance for the ACs. When the central PSOE took power in 2004 its path
was once again determined by promises made to Catalonia. When the PP modified
the system of AC finance and devolved health and education to the v´ıa lenta ACs,
it expressly denied the desire of the Catalans to modify their Estatut, which had
remained unchanged since 1979 (still true for the Gallegos and Basques). The PP
31“La Ley general de Sanidad olvido´ darle un papel relevante al Ministerio de Sanidad en la
planificacio´n. El ministerio no se ha quedado en su mano ninguna medida so´lida que garantice la
equidad en el acceso, porque lo importante es saber a que´ se tiene acceso”, “The 1986 General Health
Law forgot to give a relevant role to the Health Ministry in terms of planning. The Ministry has
been left with no msolid measures to guarantee equal access because the crucial issue is to know
what one has equal access too,” says Juan Cabase´s, professor of Applied Economics at the Public
University of Navarre and spokesman for the Spanish Society for Public Health and Epidemiology
(SESPAS). El Pa´ıs 1/29/1996 “La asistencia sanitaria mantiene notables desigualdades regionales
en Espan˜a.”
32El Pa´ıs 4/29/2003 “Lejos de la realidad.”
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saw the State of the Autonomies as consolidated with this final set of devolutions.
During the campaign the PSOE had promised to pass a revised Catalan Estatut,
taking a stance of transcendental importance for Catalan nationalists. The Catalan
socialists, after 25 years out of power in the AC, won the autonomous elections prior
to the general elections, binding central socialist fortunes even more tightly to the
nationalist sentiments in that AC. The PSOE had promises to keep.
Under Jose´ Rodr´ıguez Zapatero, the program of the socialist party had shifted
somewhat33. In relative terms it was still a left of center party, and certainly the
previous PSOE governments had instigated a variety of less-than-egalitarian fiscal
policies in the early 1990s. But Zapatero was part of a younger cohort of socialist
politicians for whom high levels of decentralization were the norm and for whom “third
way” politics had pulled the party further toward the center—with less antagonism
toward business and greater acceptance of the liberal rules of a globalized economy34.
Part of this derived from the fact that Spain had experienced strong growth for nearly
a decade, despite the downturn after September 11th, 2001. Many people had made
small fortunes in real estate and had risen out of a precarious lower middle class into
a solidly middle class situation. Revenue was relatively abundant, which minimized
the trade offs the PSOE felt it had to make between potential constituent groups.
The first Minister of the Economy, Pedro Solbes, implemented a regressive reform to
the IRPF and tried to block some of the social policy expansions described below out
of a desire to avoid raising taxes to cover new social expenditures.
The PSOE central government spent two years developing an AC finance reform
that could appease its dual demands of democratic self-rule and equality. In the
interim, it began subsidizing the health spending of the ACs with additional transfers
33See Interview with Zapatero in Gabilondo 2006: 419.
34El Pa´ıs10/1/2006 “ ‘El problema es que Zapatero no ha explicitado su modelo de Estado’. ”
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in 2006. While the new financing system was being drafted and negotiated, the
socialists implemented major additions to public service provision and social welfare
guarantees. In 2006 the PSOE at the central level, with the support of the ACs, passed
the Ley de Dependencia35 (Dependency Law 39/2006)—adding a fourth pillar to the
welfare state by providing cash benefits for those in situations of dependency either
because of old age or disability. Financing was supposed to be split in thirds between
users, ACs, and the central government, but has fallen mostly on the shoulders of the
ACs, who are directly responsible for implementation and face the primary burden of
public accountability—similar to what has happened with the chronic underfunding
of health services in Brazilian municipalities.
In 2007 the socialists pacted the expansion of youth dental coverage with all of
the ACs through the CISNS and began with coverage of 7 and 8 year olds, gradually
expanding upward each year, and providing a portion of the resources to fund the
expansion. As we shall see in the case studies, this was a catch up measure to pull up
ACs that were not implementing important services, as the committed and capable
ACs had long since implemented youth dental coverage more generous than what the
center was now requiring. When an AC takes on decentralized health competences
it may produce its own cartera de servicios, which can go above and beyond what is
guaranteed by the center. The Basques and Navarrese had implemented full youth
dental coverage within the public system in 1990 and 1991, respectively, and many
other ACs had followed as soon as they took over health responsibilities. Yet the
central reform was still important because when the center guarantees services, it
generally must also provide resources. ACs that had been tapping their own coffers
to provide youth dental care would now get some compensation for their efforts. This
was particularly important in places like Extremadura, which had implemented the
35Actually called the Ley de Promocio´n de la Autonomı´a Personal y Atencio´n a las personas en
situacio´n de dependencia y a las familias.
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policies on their own but were tapping a poorer tax base to do it.
Here we see how committed central actors can find ways to enhance equity in the
health system, even when their authority has waned. The PP had placed dental cov-
erage on the list of covered services in 2003, but taken no action to implement, fund,
or ensure AC expansion, so coverage had remained highly disparate. Uncommitted
ACs had not responded to the new mandate. The PSOE plan had to be agreed with
the ACs, but as both parties in theory supported the expansion, conservative ACs
were hard pressed to turn it down, particularly since it came with some additional
funds. However, the reform was difficult to negotiate and could not be implemented
all at once. It illustrates the real loss of authority, on the part of a committed center,
to ensure equitable access to guaranteed services across the territory under high levels
of decentralization, particularly when fiscal resources are scant.
The SNS was a PSOE project and from its position in the opposition for eight years
from 1996-2004 had campaigned on a platform to provide major injections of funding
to the ACs, all of whom were running health deficits (regardless of when devolution
took place). The central government, under Zapatero and Public Administration
Minister Jordi Sevilla, committed to paying half of the health care debt while asking
the ACs to cover the rest, though legally the responsibility for health care financing
had been completely devolved. The government argued that ACs such as Madrid and
Baleares, run by the PP, were those that had cut taxes most on the wealthy and were
most unwilling to increase them to fund health care and cover their debts.
The 2009 revision of AC financing, passed after three years of negotiating, rep-
resented another dramatic shift. This time, all ACs were on board. For the first
time, the reform introduced mechanisms for updating guaranteed resources to the
ACs based on actual changes in the cost of service provision in order to, hopefully,
adjust spending on an annual basis without having to overhaul the entire system. It
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forced 80 per cent of ceded taxes back into a central fund that would be re-disbursed
to cover basic social services on a per capita and need-based formula (the Fondo
de Garantia de Servicios Pu´blicos Fundamentales, Fund to Guarantee Fundamental
Public Services). This reform ameloriated some of the distributive damage done by
ceding tax revenues generated over AC populations, from an equity perspective.
In 2009, for the first time, specific portions were allotted to help account for the
extra health spending needs associated with elderly and highly dispersed populations.
The Sufficiency Fund continued to operate and two new funds were also created,
one (the Fondo de Cooperacio´n, Cooperation Fund) with redistributive aims and the
other (the Fondo de competitividad, Competitiveness Fund) to compensate the largest
economies. The reform also implemented the precise proportions of new ceded taxes
that the Catalans had demanded in their new Estatut—50 per cent of the IRPF,
50 per cent of the VAT, and 58 per cent of alcohol, tobacco, and hydrocarbon taxes
(Law 22/2009). En balance, the reform was an improvement from the previous system
from an equity perspective, though deepened some forms of revenue sharing that had
previously been problematic.
Yet the PSOE misdiagnosed the seriousness of the recession that began in its
second term and made several fiscal decisions that have proven problematic. In 2008
it eliminated the property tax, a fully ceded tax to the ACs, arguing that it had
become a tax on the middle class. Not only did it have to compensate the ACs for
the lost revenue, but in 2011 it had to reinstate the tax because it could not afford
the loss. The government also overpaid the ACs in the first few rounds of the new
2009 AC financing scheme. While the center has always paid up when it underpaid
the ACs, the ACs are now in poor conditions to repay the center. The PSOE held
early elections in full economic crisis and the PP won an absolute majority in 2011.
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4.8 Entrenched Economic Crisis: the PP after 2011
Despite the declining role of the Health Ministry as protagonist of health policy
making in Spain, the central government still has important latitude for action, as the
economic crisis has revealed. In 2012 the PP cut the health budget by more than 14
per cent, passed copays for seniors on medicines for the first time, and made the SNS
inaccessible for those who could not document their residency status. Nearly half the
ACs have attempted to defy both the centrally mandated copay and the restrictions
on access to the SNS. Yet if ACs did not want to cut their health budgets to reflect
lost resources from ceded central taxes and guarantees, they would have to come up
with the extra themselves, which at the moment is nearly impossible for many.
Centralizing efforts have also emerged in other areas. In 2001 Extremadura passed
a regional tax on bank deposits and credit operations, and was followed by Andalusia
and Canarias. Implementation was held up by the PP in the courts, and when the
rulings favored the ACs in 2011, the PP changed central laws to prohibit the taxes—
a touchy process given that Extremadura was now in the hands of the PP and had
made public plans for spending the new revenue36. When several AC governments
tried to pay their public employees the traditional extra holiday paycheck, which had
been rescinded by the center, the PP took them to court to block the payments.
Some policies untertaken to ameliorate the crisis and quell public discontent have
had an equity-enhancing impact. Income tax rates were increased on the wealthy
in 2011 by the PP. Some of the cost savings proposals, such as centralizing drug
purchasing and unifying the menu of available services, pose difficult questions for
a system where those who provide more than average are unwilling to cut back to
appease the center, but might be more efficient and equitable for lower capacity ACs.
In ACs with high capacity, these central efforts are perceived as incursions into the
36El Pa´ıs 11/20/2012 “Hacienda elimina la tasa a la banca y compensa a las autonomı´as que la
ten´ıan”
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terrain, while those with low capacity and without strong minority nationalisms are
more inclined to see the silver lining of some level of recentralization.
4.9 Case Study: Extremadura
Extremadura is a poor AC whose political forces mostly share a Spanish terri-
torial definition of the reference community and that experienced one of the longest
unbroken stretches of left rule. In addition to the impact of democratic consoli-
dation, central commitment at key moments, and economic development that have
been shared by all ACs, abundant resources from the EU and redistributive domes-
tic transfers have helped Extremadura converge toward the countrywide average on
health outcomes and quality of service provision. Political leaders in Extremadura
have fought hard against increases in fiscal autonomy and policy scope that they did
not have the capacity to manage. In contrast to the traditional view of decentral-
ization as the achievement of regional demands for self-rule, Extremadura is one of
several ACs upon which high levels of decentralization have been imposed in efforts
by central governments of the left and right to accommodate the self-rule strivings of
minority nationalists, without increasing asymmetry.
This case allows for an in depth assessment of the impact of Spanish central
commitment and capacity with a constant level of commitment at the AC level.
Extremadura highlights the way that the EU’s commitment and capacity has im-
pacted health provision in the AC, primarily by supporting economic development
and growth with large structural fund transfers and allowing quasi-fungible fiscal re-
sources to be spent elsewhere37. Because Extremadura and Andalusia have similar
profiles in many respects, one can also explore the different outcomes under early and
late decentralization of policy responsibility for health between the two.
37Structural funds are designed for economic development purposes and are technically prohibited
from replacing other spending.
138
4.9.1 Overview
Extremadura—situated geographically between Portugal, the two Castillas, and
Andalusia—has long been the poorest AC in Spain. Still, while GDP per capita was
57 per cent of the Spanish average in 1980, it was 82 per cent in 2010. Figure A.11
captures these shifts over time along with the other two case study ACs.
Extremadura is, per capita, the largest Spanish regional beneficiary of EU trans-
fers at around three times the AC average from 1987-2009 (BADESPE 2012). EU
funds managed directly by the AC represented 10 per cent of transfers to Extremadura
in 1987, increasing to 35 per cent from 1995-2001. By nature, EU funds are more
redistributive than Spanish central transfers so these resources have played a major
role in supporting equity-enhancing policy in the AC.
The AC is made up of the two most expansive provinces (by surface area)—
Ca´ceres and Badajoz—and was a Roman capital in the dying days of the empire.
Social policies must cope with the existence of a highly dispersed population, with
only three cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants and 383 municipalities (2.36 per
cent of the Spanish population) spread across 8.25 per cent of the country’s territory.
Extremadura was repeatedly devastated in wars of nation building between Spain
and Portugal, and later in the Napoleonic wars. Like the rest of southern Spain it was
also characterized by the presence of large terratenientes, the social and economic ac-
tors who pushed back the hardest against democracy and redistribution (Moore 1966;
Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). The economic development strategy of
the Franco regime during the 1960s and early 1970s focused on the industrial and
financial centers of Bilbao, Barcelona, and Madrid, producing unequal development
and an internal periphery in ACs like Extremadura (Curbelo 1994: 24). In the ab-
sence of ideological commitment to redistribution, centralized authority was used to
foment economic development that exacerbated existing territorial inequalities.
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The region has been bleeding population for centuries. From Pizarro and Corte´s
on, Extremadurans have been searching for places of greater opportunity—emigrating
in modern times to the wealthier ACs of Spain. Population plummeted from 1960-
1980 and then stabilized for the next thirty years, increasing for the first time in half
a century to just over 1.1 million inhabitants in 2011 (INE 2012).
Extremadura is also the AC that vies with Andalusia for the staunchest history
of left rule in the country (see Figure A.7), with the PSOE in control of AC gov-
ernment from 1983-2011, with the PP forming a minority government in 2011. In
Extremadura, unions mobilized with an artisan and campesino base (Ayala 2002:
172). There is no conflict over the territorial scope of the reference community—the
traditional left and right dominate politics and the legitimacy of the central govern-
ment as a source of authority and redistribution is not broadly questioned.
While in 1973 regional income inequality was the third highest in Spain at .36
on the Gini index (Goerlich 2012; Goerlich and Villar 2009)—topped only by Gali-
cia and Castilla y Leo´n—by 2011 Extremadura had a distributive profile similar to
that of the other ACs (see Figure A.12), despite little change in its relative level of
economic development. The decrease in inequality is particularly notable given that
unemployment rates have risen steadily from around five per cent in 1976 (INE 2012).
Income inequality increased in the AC, as it did in most of Spain, beginning in the
mid-2000s, well before the onset of the 2008 housing crisis.
In 1975 the infant mortality rate in Extremadura was 22.9, lower only than Galicia,
Murcia, and Castilla y Leo´n, and a full eight points higher than in Madrid. By 1991
not only had infant mortality dropped to about 6, lower than the central average,
but life expectancy was 76.8 years, only four months below the Spanish average
and substantially higher than other poor ACs. In 2010 infant mortality rates had
stabilized around 3.5, en par with the most advanced industrialized countries. Life
140
expectancy reached 80 years in 2005 and was almost 81 by 2010—an impressive
improvement in one generation, but still a full three years less than those living in
Madrid or Navarre and one of the lowest in Spain (but within a much diminished
range of variation). As in the rest of Spain, the most drastic improvements in health
came quickly in the years after the death of Franco, but have steadily continued
to improve over time. Figures A.13 and A.14 show infant mortality rate and life
expectancy patterns in the three case study ACs.
The socialist government of Extremadura for a quarter century has focused on
increasing the quality and accessibility of social services, viewing these as key to
economic development and growth in the AC, as well as part of the social democratic
commitment. Average health ministerial tenure in Extramadura is the highest in
Spain, with two competent ministers in office for over a decade (see Figure A.15), one
of whom went on to become the President of the AC. Extremadura has benefited from
a high level of political commitment to equity-enhancing policy among AC, central,
and supranational actors, which has increased its capacity over time.
While none of the Spanish ACs suffered the levels of utter debilitating lack of
capacity experienced in the poorest Brazilian states after its democratic transition,
Extremadura came the closest in the early years. At the democratic transition, many
in the AC were living in deep rural poverty with no access to social services, often
without electricity or running water, in the service of the large-landowning nobility.
4.9.2 Multilevel Health Reform in Extremadura
Despite the lack of nationalist identity there was little doubt in 1977 that Ex-
tremadura’s two provinces would become an AC—however limited its purview was
expected to be. There was no expectation, for example, that Ca´ceres and Badajoz
could have joined other ACs. Though there was an upsurge of debate in the years
after Franco’s death regarding whether or not Extremadura “existed” (Garc´ıa 1991:
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307), the questions its nascent regional leadership grappled with were how to manage
autonomy, not what territories should be included. This experience stands in stark
contrast to that of Castilla y Leo´n and, to a lesser extent, the Basque Country.
The UCD governed in most regions during the early years of the transition from
1977-1979. Precisely because the pre-autonomic governments that functioned in the
regions from 1978-1983 had the awkward status of being indirectly elected executives
(mostly chosen from among the provincial representatives in the central legislature)
during a pacted democratic transition, their composition was more balanced in terms
of partisanship than later cabinets would be, when directly elected leaders could form
governments with clear mandates. Once again, we see a stark contrast with Brazil
where the democratic transition began with the states having the only competitively
elected leaders. Within a month after the first central democratic elections in 1977, a
Junta de Parlamentarios de Extremadura (Council of Extremaduran Parliamentari-
ans) had formed, made up of all the central government deputies and senators elected
from the region that year.
In 1978 Real Decreto 19/1978 created the pre-autonomy framework for autonomous
governing institutions in Extremadura, a sign of the strength of desire for autonomy
that had arisen, despite its lack of regionalist history. In contrast, several ACs never
had pre-autonomy statutes because they had not been expected to form ACs of their
own. In August of 1978 the Junta Regional took shape and in mid-September the it
formed a cabinet with policy portfolios, in anticipation of the policy transfers that
were expected to take place soon after. As we shall see, the ruling party at the
time the AC was first formed mattered a great deal for the path to autonomy, which
determined the scope of health policy making and fiscal autonomy.
As in the other ACs, a Comisio´n Mixta was formed, in this case with 15 central
administration representatives and 15 members of the Junta—eight from the UCD,
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five from the PSOE, one from AP, and one from the PCE—to organize the passage of
transfers (Chavez Palacios 2002: 535). While the central government recognized the
new regional government and passed legislation to begin transferring competences, no
responsibilities shifted for over a year. The central government was undergoing total
transformation itself and, despite attempting a process of “cafe´ para todos” with the
passage of the Spanish Constitution before any of the Statutes, had not been able
to avoid bilaterally negotiating unique processes of decentralization, with unique sets
of transfers in each newly formed AC. The UCD won the 1979 general elections in
Extremadura by just a few points.
The Extremaduran socialists and communists stood firmly behind the v´ıa ra´pida
outlined in Article 151, already taken by the historic nationalities, because they be-
lieved that the slower route would lead to simple deconcentration, rather than sub-
stantive political autonomy, and leave them at a disadvantage compared to other ACs
(Chavez Palacios 2002: 540). This position placed the regional parties in conflict with
the central PSOE, which was advocating the v´ıa lenta.
But it was the UCD that controlled the Junta Regional from 1978-1983 and the
UCD did not have an expansive view of the prospects for autonomous institutions in
the new ACs. The UCD leadership in Extremadura took the process forward slowly
in an effort to avoid having what was arguably the least nationalist region in the
country opt for the autonomy path created with only the most fiercely independent
regions in mind. Instead of making a decision about what path to take, President
Ramallo created a commission to study the issueand then another.
In December 1979 the “actividades molestas, insalubres, nocivas y peligrosas”38
were transferred: urbanization, regional festivals, tourism, transportation, local ad-
ministration, culture, public health, and some elements of agricultural policy—and
38“The bothersome, unhealthy, damaging, and dangerous activities” Chavez Palacios 2002: 536.
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while these did not go into effect until the spring of 1980, it is still notable that
transfers were made a full two years before the Statute was passed. The process
of bilaterally negotiating new responsibilities in advance of formal changes in the
Statutes has been common across ACs. In the end the socialists and communists
were outnumbered and the slower, more limited path to autonomy was chosen by the
UCD majority. Extremadura was one of the last ACs to form, despite its quick start
out the gate. Like the other v´ıa lenta regions, its Statute gave it the competences
outlined in Article 148.1 of the Constitution—the only transfers allowed in the first
round of policy devolution for those accessing autonomy through the v´ıa lenta.
Article seven of the original statute enshrined exclusive competences in own in-
stitutional set up, urban planning and housing, internal transportation and public
works, agriculture, natural resources, economic development, culture and tourism,
social assistance39, and local police (though with regulation through Organic Law in
this last case). The Statute also covered a more extensive list of responsibilities over
which the region would have shared and implementation authority. Extremadura was
to have an Assembly elected by proportional representation (Art. 20-32) that would
elect a President from within its ranks (Art. 33), who would choose the cabinet (Art.
37). This set up is shared by all the regions, though the names of the governing bodies
differ. While the organization of the judiciary was not controlled by the region, the
regionally organized judicial branch gained the final word on a broad range of civil
and penal matters within the territory (Title III). Laws passed by the Assembly could
only be challenged in the Tribunal Constitucional (Art. 49).
Crucially—and something that has never happened in Brazil—the central govern-
ment stated that if the economy of Extremadura did not allow the public administra-
tion to provide its new service responsibilities at the level of the national average, the
39Social assistance is the only major facet of the Spanish welfare state that was immediately
decentralized everywhere and had a legacy of provincial provision even under Franco.
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center guaranteed financing to eliminate the disparity (DA 2). This language com-
plied with the 1980 LOFCA on regional financing that made the center responsible
for ensuring that fundamental social services like education and health were financed
equitably on a per capita basis and achieving service provision that adhered to the
national average (though in practice this has not been the norm). Still, Extremadura
and other regions have successfully demanded additional one-off resources at various
times, citing this clause.
Until 2001 when health was decentralized, the Consejero de Sanidad (Health Sec-
retary) in Extremadura was responsible for representing the region in the CISNS,
coordinating with INSALUD, and managing the devolved responsibilities in sanita-
tion and public health. Levels of commitment and capacity in the secretariat were
less important during this period because of the diminished responsibilities of the of-
fice, yet many ACs did not even create Health Secretariats until responsibilities were
devolved. While it is common to see control of sanitation and public health as resid-
ual competences, in reality these are some of the most important for the poor. Low
levels of capacity would have made even these difficult to ensure for the population—
particularly with widespread rural and urban poverty—as we shall see in the poor
regions of Brazil. Alfredo Jimeno Ort´ız was named Consejero de Sanidad y Consumo
under Ibarra and remained in his post from 1983 to 1995 during the first three PSOE
governments in Extremadura. During this period, health policy was still an almost
fully centralized responsibility and the AC government coordinated the expansion of
primary care and the SNS with INSALUD.
In regional economic shifts more broadly, land reform was one of the outstanding
questions that would have shifted the level of inequality in southern Spain and that
had been a major focus of reformers in the Second Republic. Ultimately, pacted
reform by moderate parties took radical land reform off the table at the central level.
145
Most of the expropriations that did take place, however, took place in Extremadura
and Andalusia and these were the two regions whose socialist leadership fought hard
(and successfully) to acquire regional authority over land use. Extremadura and
Andalusia were the territories with the highest rates of land ownership concentration
in a country with one of the highest concentrations in the world. Southern Spanish
society was defined by the large agricultural working class, tied to the land, without
ownership rights.
In 1984 Andalusia and in 1986 Extremadura passed laws that would allow the
new regional governments to expropriate land and redistribute it (Law 8/1984 and
Law 1/1986 Sobre las Dehesas en Extremadura, respectively). These laws were high
profile political battles that pitted the new governments against the most powerful
landholders in the country, a mix of nobility and large corporations. The reforms
required going head to head with the PSOE in Madrid, which had decided not to
implement redistributive land reform through the central government. After several
years of intergovernmental challenges, Andalusia convinced Madrid to devolve control
of the Instituto de Reforma y Desarrollo Agrario (IRYDA, Institute for Agrarian
Reform and Development) and passed its law. Extremadura’s law was more limited,
applying only to the dehesas40 and not to all land, and in the end was more successful.
While the right of the region to expropriate property for the public good was upheld
in the Tribunal Constitucional, lengthy court cases ensued over particular parcels
of land, with Franco-era judges ruling that the peasants’ goat herds decreased the
profitability of the Duchesses’ hunting grounds41.
In 1986, the first year for which data are available, 90 per cent of transfers to
Extremadura from the central government were from central revenue sources and no
40The dehesa is a particular type of semi-forested agricultural land often used for pasture in the
southern Iberian Peninsula.
41El Pa´ıs 4/8/1990 “La vieja batalla por la tierra.”
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taxes were legislated by the region. In 1991 the first regional taxes were collected, rep-
resenting about .3 per cent of total revenue. For a poor region, having most costs paid
for out of central government general revenues is generally the most redistributive way
to finance services. Some other common fiscal regime regions without historic status
did choose to impose regional taxes as early as 1986 and collected relatively larger
amounts. In this regard, the regional government took advantage of a redistributive
central revenue stream.
But from the perspective of central government distributive policy, Extremadura
still lost out in relative terms. The unavoidable asymmetry in regional intergovern-
mental power and bilateral nature of transfer negotiations did not benefit the poorest
regions. Until the end of the 1990s, real central transfers per capita in Extremadura
were about 70 per cent of the Spanish average42. In addition, if the central government
were successfully implementing pro-poor regional financing schemes, we should have
seen an inverse relationship between relative GDP per capita and relative transfers per
capita—which was the case for transfers from the EU. Instead, Extremadura’s relative
receipt of transfers was precisely proportional to its level of economic development—
the most regressive arrangement in the country at the time. No region as poor as
Extremadura had such a low relative level of transfers per capita, and this was with
the PSOE at the center and in the AC.
On the policy scope front, while in theory new competences could be devolved
five years after the passage of the Statute, this reform did not take place for nearly
a decade. While the ACs clamored for more authority, the center—controlled by
42Relative real transfers per capita to the ACs includes all resources except AC borrowing, own
source taxes, and contracting between levels of government. I also exclude health transfers because
those ACs that were receiving health transfers had much higher levels of per capita transfers, but
were also paying for health provision themselves. I therefore compare only the parts of the budget
that cover the same activities by the ACs. The Basque and Navarrese cases are excluded entirely
because their fiscal regime is not comparable. “Real” transfers means that I have controlled for
regional inflation using the regional CPI. All data on transfers and revenue from own sources comes
from BADESPE.
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the PSOE—held these demands at bay. In 1992 the major parties at the central
level pacted an expansion of competencies to the 10 v´ıa lenta ACs (the Acuerdo
Autono´mico, Autonomic Accord) and on December 23rd passed LO 9/1992 enabling
the reform of the Statutes to accommodate 32 new responsibilities. In March of 1994
the new Extremaduran Statute was passed (LO 8/1994). Slowly, the v´ıa lenta ACs
were converging with the early decentralizers in policy scope.
While these reforms and financing debates were taking place, INSALUD was
steadily expanding and implementing the primary care reform of 1984—the most
progressive component of the SNS and the most ideological. Extremadura outper-
formed even the INSALUD average. In 1992 the primary care teams covered 68 per
cent of the population of the region, while the INSALUD average was 58 per cent
and the SNS as a whole just 50 per cent. In 1996, Extremadura tied Castilla y Leo´n
and was behind only Navarre and Castilla la Mancha for extension of primary cov-
erage at 88 per cent. The rate was 93 per cent by the year 2000 (Gonza´lez, et al
2004: 83). Central reforms such as the incorporation of rural health providers into
the Equipos de Atencio´n Primaria (Primary Care Teams) resolved long-standing dif-
ferences in rural ACs like Extremadura and helped eliminate disincentives to public
health employment by equalizing salaries.
In Extremadura the PSOE and Rodr´ıguez Ibarra continued to dominate AC pol-
itics. From 1993-1996 Extremadura vocally rejected the new autonomous financing
scheme that had been implemented by the center after hard bargaining by the Cata-
lans, therefore remaining within the old scheme that had been in effect from 1986-
1991. In 1996 Guillermo Ferna´ndez Vara took over the Social Welfare Secretariat and
in 1999 shifted with the renewed creation of a separate Health Secretariat, where he
served until 2007 when he became President of the Junta de Extremadura.
When the PP deepened the devolution of tax revenue generated in the regions and
148
incorporated a real element of fiscal autonomy in 1997, Rodr´ıguez Ibarra completely
opposed the measure, as he had before. The regions governed by the PP, which had
opposed the measure when it was proposed by the PSOE central government, accepted
it from the PP43, though they did not go along as quietly for health devolution in 2001.
In 1997 Extremadura and the other socialist regions sued the central government over
the transfer in the Tribunal Constitucional, but were unable to prevent the agreement.
Still, they could abstain from participating and Extremadura did just that, along with
Andalusia and Castilla la Mancha. Somewhat paradoxically, Extremadura leveraged
its full authority in shared rule in an attempt to prevent greater authority in self-rule
over resources and policies it felt would increase regional disparities and negatively
impact the population.
In 1999 under the PP minority government at the center, the second reform of
the Extremaduran Statute took place, raising its maximum level of policy scope near
that of the historic nationalities (Ley Orga´nica 12/1999). This reform paved the way
for the decentralization of health and education policy to the remaining regions and
permitted substantive devolution from the ACs to the municipalities and provinces
within their borders. The reform was similar to that being negotiated in most of the
v´ıa lenta ACs at the time, as the PP prepared for more substantive decentralization.
Rodr´ıguez Ibarra was a firm believer that decentralization should be tied to a
redistributive program and that committed actors should theorize what distribution
of responsibilities would best meet the demands of social justice44. He continued to
oppose devolution of health and the simultaneous fiscal reform proposed by the PP in
43El Pa´ıs 10/4/1995 “Las autonomı´as socialistas dan la espalda al Gobierno y CiU en la concesio´n
del 15% del IRPF.”
44“Yo quiero un Estado fuerte porque mi regio´n, que es Extremadura, necesita un Estado fuerte.
Y, s´ı, soy un patriota. Porque a mı´, si me quitan la patria, me dejan sin nada.” “I want a strong
central state because my region, Extremadura, needs a strong central state. And yes, I am a patriot.
Because for me, if they take away my country, they leave me with nothing.” El Pa´ıs 10/1/2006 “‘El
problema es que Zapatero no ha explicitado su modelo de Estado’.”
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2001. The primary concern of all the ACs that opposed the transfer from INSALUD
was whether the resources transferred were fair and sufficient. The PSOE tried to
present legal challenges to the PP’s decision to tie access to the new fiscal system to
health care devolution so that ACs could reject health decentralization without having
to accept lower levels of revenue by staying in the old system, but was unsuccessful.
With nearly two decades of administrative capacity development in regional self-
governance, Extremadura was in good standing to take on health competences, aside
from the question of sufficient fiscal resources. Committed leadership took over the
newly empowered Health Secretariat and the Servicio Extremen˜o de Salud (SES,
Extremaduran Health Service). In the years since taking charge of health provision
in 2002, the government has pumped resources into the system and improved upon
the user/GP ratios achieved under socialist central government when the system was
at its strongest, decreasing the number of people per GP from 1441 in 2000 to 1190
in 2004 (SIAP MSCIS 2012; Go´nzalez, et al 2004: 84). The number of clinics has
increased steadily since devolution, as well. While coverage of dental health has
generally been residual in the SNS, in 2005 Extremadura implemented the Programa
de Asistencia Dental Infantil (PADI, Program for Juvenile Dental Care), initiated by
the Basque Country and Navarre in 1990 and 1991.
This expansion in the regional health system took place under the direction of Sec-
retary of Health Ferna´ndez Vara, a popular and capable prote´ge´ of Rodr´ıguez Ibarra.
Like Ibarra, Ferna´ndez Vara has repeatedly argued that certain responsibilities should
be transferred back to the center, particularly in basic social services and environ-
mental management (Palomo 2006: 3). In 2007 Ferna´ndez Vara was elected president
of Extremadura. Public health spending relative to private household spending in-
creased after devolution and health outcomes continued their trend of improvement.
Despite the pressures of economic crisis, until 2011 no public clinics in Extremadura
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had closed their doors, which has not been the case everywhere (SIAP 2012).
Yet the fiscal burden this has required cannot be ignored and lies at the heart
of the redistributive problem of decentralized financing. Under the top-down process
of fiscal devolution in 2001, Extremadura’s finances have become much more highly
concentrated in revenues generated over its own still poor population. The shift in
2001 was particularly important because it ended central government accountability
for AC health financing. From receiving almost all revenue from Spanish general
budgets, Extremadura shifted to receiving 33 per cent of the IRPF, over which the
AC could exercise some normative authority, 35 per cent of the VAT, and a series
of consumption taxes generated in the AC. From 1995-2001, the central government
through INSALUD spent approximately 7.5 per cent of regional GDP on Extremadu-
ran health care, compared to just over 5 per cent spent in the country as a whole. But
the spending in the poorest ACs was financed by taxes raised over the entire country.
In 2002 Extremadura increased health spending to almost 8 per cent of GDP, from
money raised in significant part over its own population. In 2009 it was spending
over 9 per cent of GDP on health, a full three points above the country average, and
this time with half the VAT and IRPF collected over a local base .
In terms of regional commitment and administrative capacity, the first year of PP
governance in Extremadura has seen a visible shift away from the expansion of services
and managerial continuity seen under the PSOE. The first PP Consejera de Sanidad
served for six months before shifting to another position in the government. She
was followed by a surgeon and hospital administrator, who served for three months
before resigning when it was discovered that he was operating a private office in
Portugal, which violated Extremaduran law prohibiting cabinet members from any
private business activity while in office. As part of cost-containment efforts, in May
the new government took the drastic step of closing all primary care clinics—the
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gateway to public health services—in the afternoons45. Extremadura is now one of
several PP governed ACs taking rapid steps toward privatization of health service
provision. The Monago government plans to implement direct private administration
of some services within two new hospitals (Ca´ceres and Don Benito-Villanueva) in
the coming years46.
4.9.3 Extremadura and Andalusia in Comparative Perspective
The clearest way to assess decentralization is to compare cases in which most
other explanatory factors are held constant, yet level of decentralization varies. In
politics, creating the conditions for such a comparison is always a challenge. Yet
Extremadura and Andalusia are the closest approximation in the Spanish case. They
are both southern ACs that were peripheral during the dictatorship, have been run
by the PSOE for the entire democratic period, lack strong minority nationalisms, are
among the poorest ACs, and have faced similar economic conditions over the past
few decades. The two major differences are greater ethnic heterogeneity in Andalusia
(because of the Roma population and larger numbers of African and Latin American
immigrants) and the larger size of its economy and population47. However, this latter
should make it a conservative comparison, as one would expect it to have greater
capacity and intergovernmental leverage due to the size of its economy.
Unlike Extremadura, Andalusia formed through the v´ıa ra´pida and took on health
responsibilities in 1984 (Real Decreto 400/1984). I argue this is largely due to the
fact that the PSOE held the majority in Andalusia from 1978, which meant its pro-
decentralization zeal in the early years was unfettered by a minority position in the
45El Pa´ıs 5/8/2012 “Extremadura suspende las consultas de atencio´n primaria por la tarde.”
46El Pa´ıs 11/3/2012 “La gestio´n privada de la sanidad se extiende en las autonomı´as del PP.”
47There also appear to be institutional differences in the cleanliness of socialist governance between
the two regional affiliates. While scandal and corruption has been fairly low within the PSOE de
Extremadura, despite the longevity of party rule, the Andalusian affiliate appears to have been much
more prone to cronyism and patronage politics.
152
cabinet, as it was in Extremadura. While it is certainly true that Andalusia has a more
substantial history of self-government and autonomist leanings than Extremadura, if
the socialists had governed Extremadura from 1978-1983 it would almost certainly
have opted for the v´ıa ra´pida.
In terms of health outcomes like infant mortality and life expectancy, despite start-
ing out in a worse position in 1975, Extremadura improved more and more rapidly
than Andalusia. The total share of health spending done by the public sector has also
been higher in Extremadura both under INSALUD and after decentralization. While
in Andalusia the user/GP ratio has steadily increased since 2004, in Extremadura the
number has remained stable. In 1995 Andalusia was spending about 6.5 per cent of
GDP on health care and decreased slowly until the onset of the recession in 200848.
In 1995 INSALUD was spending 7.5 per cent of Extremadura’s GDP on health care,
which increased steadily to 9 per cent by the time the crisis hit, with Extremadura
determining its own spending levels from 2002. Health systems have been tradition-
ally underfunded in all the common regime ACs, so higher levels of spending should
generally be associated with supplying needed resources to the system.
What does this brief comparison tell us? Here are two ACs that faced similar
challenges as poor, agricultural peripheries with a history of high inequality and
poverty. They have both been run exclusively by the PSOE since 1983 and are both
recipients of large transfers both from the EU and the Spanish central government.
Andalusia took over health policy in 1984, while Extremadura did not take it on
until 2002 after nearly two decades of democratic decentralization in which to develop
administrative capacity and experience with self-rule.
While actors committed to redistribution in both ACs felt the v´ıa ra´pida was
the best avenue to achieve their goals in 1978, the evidence from policy and health
48Because GDP has fallen faster than spending during the economic crisis, social spending as a
portion of GDP has risen in all Spanish regions since 2009.
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outcomes suggests there may have been substantive trade offs to early devolution.
Taking the v´ıa lenta meant that Extremadura was guaranteed to remain within the
INSALUD system for a longer period of time, and it turned out INSALUD under
social democratic governance at the center did a better job of promoting egalitarian
access and outcomes than the health systems developed in some of the early devolution
ACs. Extremadura arguably had the lowest levels of administrative and fiscal capacity
out of the gate, with no history of self-government, and is the strongest case in favor
of a managed devolution process that allowed the AC to develop capacity over time
before taking on health responsibilities. The differences in outcomes are not stark,
but Extremadura outperforms Andalusia on health outcome indicators and measures
of the progressiveness of the health policies of the government, despite starting out
in a substantially worse position in both health and capacity.
4.9.4 Extremadura: Conclusion
Despite Extremadura’s peripheral status under the Franco regime, the population
of the AC still benefited from economic growth, modernization, and major invest-
ments in social services undertaken by the military regime after the abandonment of
autarky in 1959. We see this in the improvements in population health indicators
that were clearly underway before the democratic transition. Yet internal regional
income inequality was still very high in 1973, infant mortality was over 50 per cent
higher than in the wealthiest and most urban ACs, and life expectancy even today is
almost three years below the ACs with the greatest longevity.
In the initial moments after the onset of the democratic transition, the left in
Extremadura pushed hard for the highest possible level of autonomy, associating
this with “true” democracy. The quicker path would have permitted fast-paced de-
centralization. The unintended consequences of center-right governance during the
decision-making period in 1979 ensured that Extremadura would be one of the ten
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ACs that remained under centrally provided health services until 2002. The per-
formance of INSALUD from 1978-2001 and the universalizing central health policies
passed and consolidated under the periods of absolute socialist majority at the cen-
tral level (1982-1992) have been the most equity-enhancing for health policy and
outcomes. The UCD, with the PSOE in parliament, also made crucial reforms under
democracy in the early years—primarily in the establishment of a progressive taxation
system and beginning to reform social security and taking early steps in expanding
health coverage.
Revenues, on the other hand, have been more complex in their distributive impact
because the equity-enhancing nature of revenue generation at the outset is then influ-
enced by the way that money is distributed between ACs. Because Extremadura is a
poor AC with many poor people, the continuous expansion of decentralized tax bases
has had a negative distributive impact on social policy financing. At the same time,
Extremadura was disadvantaged in the status quo per capita territorial distribution
of resources for the first two decades after democracy and only began to receive more
than the central average in 2000. Yet because variation between the ACs diminished
greatly after 2000 and most ACs were centered closer around the mean, this represents
a larger relative shift than it would in absolute terms.
When comparing Extremadura to poor states in Brazil, its higher levels of capac-
ity, the fact that the PSOE and PCE had persisted in exile and did not require a long
period of societal consolidation to begin influencing politics, and the role of the EU
are clear contributors to better outcomes for equity. And unlike northeastern Brazil
with its legacy of slavery, the poorest ACs in Spain are not primarily populated by
an historically oppressed and disenfranchised ethnic group.
In comparing Extremadura to other Spanish ACs, the regional PSOE’s high level
of commitment to equity-enhancing health policy, capacity improvement, and strong
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leadership in intergovernmental bargaining have been key. In the Spanish context, the
fact that the dominant left forces in Extremadura were not minority nationalists also
played a role. It is one thing to advocate for redistribution when it will cost your AC
money, and quite another when redistribution will benefit your constituents directly.
Independent of issues of nationalism, Extremadura’s place in the socio-economic hi-
erarchy meant its committed leaders did not have to choose between resources for
redistribution in Spain and resources for redistribution in the AC. Yet because com-
mitted actors at the center were constantly pulled toward regressive arrangements
that would benefit wealthier ACs, intergovernmental conflict has persisted.
4.10 Case Study: The Basque Country
The Basque Country is unique on a number of fronts. It has a special fiscal status,
unique ethno-linguistic heritage, and is the only AC in which violent conflict over the
definition of the state has persisted into the democratic period. It is an important
case because it is one of only two ACs with asymmetric fiscal autonomy and I con-
trast it with this other special case—Navarre. The dominant Christian Democratic
nationalist party also has a unique position on social policy that even competitors on
the left characterize as progressive. Among the 17 Spanish ACs, the Basque Country
most closely approximates a case with high capacity, high commitment, and early
devolution of health responsibilities49. Health outcomes in the Basque Country are
not as good as in Navarre, but are still among the best in the country. The health
service, Osakidetza, is credited across the country as the best regional health service
in terms of coverage, innovation, quality, and efficiency.
While the special fiscal regime in the Basque Country represents a regressive
outflow of resources for the rest of the country, the fact that it consolidated fiscal
independence early in the democratic transition has removed a major area of conflict
49Catalonia was nationalist and high capacity, but low commitment. Galicia and Andalusia were
low capacity, while Navarre, Valencia, and Canarias were low commitment.
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from the arena of intergovernmental relations. As we have seen in the Catalan case,
persistent territorial conflict is detrimental to equity enhancing outcomes, in and of
itself. Resolving these disputes definitively, even if regressive in name, can allow
all parties to get back to the business of policy-making. Because Basques know that
regardless of which party is governing them, they will have their Concierto Econo´mico,
parties must compete on substantive policy issues more so than in Catalonia where
the rules of the game are deeply problematic for voters. Still, while this resolution
has taken place for fiscal matters, it has been less settled in matters of policy scope
and the cost of intergovernmental conflict there has been significant.
Until 2010 when ETA declared a permanent and unilateral end to the use of
violence, the “Basque Problem” dominated intergovernmental relations along another
dimension that certainly did take attention away from other areas of policy-making.
4.10.1 Overview
The Basque AC is composed of three of the four historic Basque territories in
Spain—A´lava, Guipu´zcoa, and Vizcaya. Provincial identities and institutions are
more politically important here than in most ACs. The Basque Country lies on
the northern coast of the Iberian Peninsula and because of early sea trade with the
United Kingdom and continental Europe, became an industrial ship-building and
financial center in the 19th century. Geographically the population is disbursed in a
tight network of small municipalities, as well as a handful of dense, mid-sized cities.
Overall, while many Basques live in very small communities, they are concentrated
over a much smaller territory than those in Castilla y Leo´n or Extremadura. It is the
most densely populated AC in the country, outside Madrid.
In terms of real GDP per capita, the Basque Country has been one of the wealthiest
ACs in the country, but with more variation over time than some. While it had
the highest GDP per capita in 1980 and 1981, the first years for which we have
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regional data, de-industrialization and the loss of the ship-building industry required
massive restructuring and the AC spent the 1980s and 1990s behind Arago´n, Navarre,
Catalonia, Madrid, and Baleares—but still above the mean. The Basque economy
has been second only to Madrid since 2007 and has felt the effects of the recession
less than many other ACs. Figure A.11 shows the inflation-adjusted relative regional
GDP per capita of the Basque Country in contrast to the other case study ACs.
Income distribution has historically been more egalitarian in the Basque Country
than most ACs, hitting its most equitable point in the early 2000s (see Figure A.12).
Yet over the past decade income inequality has increased in the Basque Country at
the same time that its relative position has moved closer and closer to the mean—
no longer a substantially more egalitarian community. Population in the AC has
increased from 1.9 million in 1973 to almost 2.2 million in 2010. As in the rest of
Spain, in the mid-2000s population increased as the second wave of the democratic
transition baby boomers were born. The urban centers of Bilbao, San Sebastia´n,
and Vitoria have also seen significant increases in immigration from Latin America,
sub-saharan Africa, and the Maghreb over the course of the democratic period.
Franco’s economic development policies, which poured investment into infrastruc-
ture and industry in Bilbao, also had a cultural component—he intentionally moved
large numbers of southern Spanish workers to Barcelona and Bilbao and settled them
in public housing projects and neighborhoods built to supply cheap labor to his
projects, but also to dilute minority nationalism. In addition, the uniquity of Eu-
skara as a non-Romance language, the particular efforts of the regime to eradicate it,
and its historically more limited use in Navarre meant the Basque language was much
more thoroughly wiped out than other minority languages during the dictatorship.
After the death of Franco, 90 per cent of Catalans and Gallegos still spoke those
languages, but in the four Basque provinces only 41 per cent of native-born Basques
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(let alone immigrants) spoke Euskara (Linz 1981: 23).
The special fiscal autonomy of the AC has allowed for greater levels of social invest-
ments over the years, enabling the Basque Country and Navarre to become pioneers in
a variety of areas of social provision and policy innovation. At the same time, politics
has been dominated by conflict over the institutional relationship between Spain and
the Basque Country. The intergovernmental conflict has been unique on two fronts—
the lack of major conflict over fiscal arrangements because of the consolidated nature
of the foral regime and the history of violence and its effect on institutional relations.
In 1973 infant mortality hovered around 18, much lower than in the poorest ACs
but still reflecting Spain’s incomplete process of development (see Figure A.13). As
in the rest of the country, infant mortality dropped rapidly over the course of the
1970s and has continued to fall, just as life expectancy has continued to increase.
Throughout the 1980s Basque cities showed the health costs of rapid industrialization
with high levels of pollution, work place injuries, and related health problems. Major
efforts at environmental and urban clean up, the decline of industry, and the expansion
of health services have all ameliorated these special challenges.
The Basque Country had special constitutional status as one of three “historic
nationalities” that had approved Statutes during the Second Republic. It took on
health in 1987—with Valencia and after Catalonia and Andalusia. Given its high
capacity and strong desire for self-rule, 1987 was a very late date for the transfer of
health and was felt as an intentional effort at central domination by actors in the AC.
The regional health service has been at the forefront of equity-enhancing policy
innovation for many years, while at the same time private care has been strong and
expanding. The extension of the 1984 primary care reform was slower than one
might expect given the reputation of Osakidetza, yet in the early years this was
fundamentally the responsibility of INSALUD and not the Basque government and
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at the same time, high levels of conflict between the nationalists and the central PSOE
presented coordination challenges. In addition, the extension of this reform has not
hampered access as much as it has elsewhere because of the uniquely integrated nature
of the Basque health system, which its founders designed to be an actual NHS and
implemented as such, even before the formal transfer of authority in health.
As we shall see, the PNV has governed for most of the democratic period and
while technically a center-right party, has had a unique commitment to social service
provision that is fundamentally different from other center-right minority nationalist
parties in Spain. The party supports gay marriage and adoption and has fought to
maintain health access for illegal immigrants in the most recent round of reforms.
The PNV has governed in coalition with the Basque socialists several times and from
2000 to 2009 formed a stable electoral coalition with a leftist Basque nationalist
party to run in elections. Among both socialist and abertzale- (leftist independentist)
officials, the idea that the PNV is a center-right party in matters of social policy was
consistently rejected (Ezenarro 2011; Fantova 2011).
Figure 4.5 shows the partisan trajectory of Basque government. The Partido
Socialista de Euskadi (PSE-EE-PSOE, Basque Socialist Party) is a federalist party
that formally supports the Basque right of self-determination, but is not a Basque
nationalist party, as the PSOE affiliate in Catalonia (PSC) has become. Because of
the foral regime, the Basque government has had only a peripheral role in conflict
over the way revenue is generated and distributed in the rest of the country. But
outside of fiscal matters, the Basque AC is no different from any other and must
operate within the constitutional limits of its authority.
4.10.2 Multilevel Health Reform in the Basque Country
In the Basque Country, as in Castilla y Leo´n, there was great conflict and debate
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Figure 4.5: Basque Government Partisanship
about what territories would be included in the new AC. Yet while there was sig-
nificant uncertainty about what the form the central state would take and how this
would relate to Basque aspirations for self-rule, there was no doubt that whatever the
highest levels of autonomy were to be, the Basque territories would be at the top of
the list. Basque forces, both pacific and insurrectionist, had been at the forefront of
the movement for democratic transition.
The history of self-rule in the Basque territories contributed to high levels of
administrative capacity at the outset of democracy, with little learning curve required.
Prior to the 19th century, the territories had been collecting their own taxes and
running their own affairs for centuries. While this self-rule was forcibly diminished
after fighting on the losing side of the Carlist civil wars in the 19th century, the
Basque Country still retained a higher level of administrative self-government than
other territories. Nationalism and the loss of self-rule through war contributed to the
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sense of these autonomous responsibilities as valuable in and of themselves, which
has not been the case for most ACs.
In more proximate terms, the first contemporary autonomous Basque government
formed in 1936, a coalition between members of the Frente Popular (Popular Front)50
and the PNV under nationalist Jos’e Antonio Aguirre in the three provinces (already
excluding Navarre, which in a contentious set of votes had decided to form its own
government). In fact, the Health Secretary at that time was an anti-monarchical
doctor and republican political activist, Alfredo Espinosa, who took charge of the
Basque operations of the Red Cross, social assistance for victims of war, and basic
rural hygiene programs until he was assassinated by Franco’s forces in 1937.
The PNV formed in 1905 and was actively involved in oppositional politics from
exile under Franco. Only Vizcaya and parts of A´lava and Guipu´zcoa were under
Republican control during the Civil War, yet the government functioned in these
territories and mobilized its own army while cut off both from France and the rest of
the Republican territory. The government provided social services and took control of
the Spanish armed forces within its reach, reorganizing them for land and maritime
defense. Ultimately the Basque government forces held Bilbao for a year before
succumbing after the bombings of Durango and Guernica in the spring of 1937.
We have seen that in contrast to Brazil, established left parties in Spain hit the
ground running after the transition. Previous experience with political opening and
competition during the Second Republic also became the point of reference for demo-
cratic actors during the transition that began in 1975, particularly because the ter-
ritorial organization of the state had already been taken up in the Second Republic,
so the nationalist regions had a sense of where the starting point for negotiations
50The Frente Popular was an electoral coalition that formed in 1936 to run in what would be the
last democratic elections in Spain for more than a generation. It was composed of all the major
Spanish left parties, as well as leftist nationalist parties in the Basque Country, Galicia, and Valencia.
162
should be. But the levels of autonomy achieved from 1931-1936 were much higher
than conservative forces and the military were willing to consider in 1978.
While earlier roots of territorial conflict can surely be sought, the way the pacted
transition and new democratic constitution emerged played a significant role in the
alignment of political forces moving forward in the Basque AC. The dynamics at the
center were different than they had been when the first Statute was negotiated. The
dictatorship had weakened central forces of the left51 and reminded democratic actors
of the price of antagonizing the military. The UCD was mostly made up of reformers
from the old regime, which meant they had no experience with strong minority na-
tionalists as legitimate democratic veto players and were not accustomed to accepting
that Spain was not the legitimate definition of the political reference community for
large portions of the population. They had never had to anticipate the role of a free
press nor the potential costs of not treating minority nationalist negotiation part-
ners seriously. These shortcomings derailed the UCD’s attempts to bring democratic
Basque nationalism into the broader constitutional project and generated ripples that
have influenced politics throughout the democratic period.
In the general elections of 1977 the PNV formed a coalition with the PSE to
compete in all four provinces. The formation was called the Frente Autono´mico
(Autonomic Front) and the simple fact that it existed is of note. The coalition
showed both the support of the PSOE for a Statute for the four Basque provinces, as
well as the shared interests the PNV perceived with the Basque socialists. While the
nationalists and socialists have formed ex-poste coalition governments several times
since, this is the only time they ran together—and was the most loaded political
51While forty years of exclusion from politics certainly took its toll, it is important not to ignore
the physical eradication of the left that took place. Many Republican forces died on the battlefields
of the Civil War or in the persecution that followed defeat. Half a million Republicans fled to
occupied France after the fall of Catalonia and overall 10,000 were sent to Hitler’s death camps, in
particular to Mauthausen in Austria. In Spain, unmarked common graves are still being uncovered.
Many of those who would have led the democratic left were, quite literally, gone.
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moment to do so, for both sides.
Historically, conflict over the nature of the state had been more intense in the
Basque Country than in Catalonia, and it showed in the way the constitutional ne-
gotiations played out during the transition. The Basque problem was thorny and the
UCD, in power centrally after the 1977 general elections, faced intense pressure from
the far right and the military leadership to ensure the unquestionable unity of the
Spanish state and limit special rights for the historic nationalities. The government
attempted to sideline the Basque problem by constructing a model of autonomy based
on the reality of the Catalans. Among the authors of the first draft of the Constitu-
tion, only a Catalan representative was involved to speak for the minority nationalist
parties (Miquel Roca i Junyent). While the Basque and Catalan nationalists shared
the desire for a constitution that would prevent the central government unilaterally
making decisions about their level of autonomy, as well as concerns over linguistic
and cultural rights, only the Basque territories were concerned with the return of the
fueros, which was an absolutely transcendental issue for most Basque politicians.
In reality, the UCD was not prepared to take on resolution of the Basque conflict as
part of the process of democratic constitutional reform and likely hoped to set forth
the basic rules of the game and take these issues on later, in line with its general
approach to regional autonomy. Ironically, the Basques are likely to be content with
their arrangement for much longer than the Catalans, despite their marginalization in
the negotiation process during the transition. But as a result of not dealing with the
Basque question from the outset, the issue was forced later in the game and resulted
in several feverish months of difficult negotiations among the major parties and a
high level of tension and sense of limited time. When all else had been decided, the
negotiations with the PNV dominated newspaper headlines and held up finalization
of the document. While the issues would have been difficult no matter what, shutting
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the Basques out at the beginning encouraged the PNV to take a firmer stance, with
less good faith, once talks finally began.
The UCD, facing intransigent Spanish nationalism to its right, was not able to
make credible commitments to the agreements it reached with the PNV and other
political forces behind closed doors. In the end, after several agreements made by the
UCD and later broken when those not at the table declared the arrangements unac-
ceptable, the PNV determined that it would not be possible to negotiate a binding
consensus with the government. The nationalists walked away from the negotiating
table and the constitutional process unfolded in the Spanish Congress without the
consensus the major central actors had hoped for.
While it was not at all clear early on that the UCD would permit the special fiscal
regimes to persist in Navarre and A´lava, let alone reinstate them in the other two
territories, in the end the PSOE supported an amendment in favor of the reinstate-
ment of the fueros (Euzko-Alderdi Jeltzalia 1978). The indissolubility of the Spanish
state—negating the right to self-determination (Art. 2)—and the constitutional basis
of the Statutes—which ensured that the center controlled the rules of the game by
which Basque autonomy could be modified moving forward (DA 1)—were eventually
included in the final document. The combination of a fundamentally different concept
of the legitimate scope of the central state, the inability to guarantee its own auton-
omy in crucial areas, and the lack of faith engendered by the way the decision making
process unfolded lead the PNV to formally call for abstention in the constitutional
referenda carried out in the four territories.
Radical Basque independentists had rejected the entire constitutional project from
the beginning and ETA violence continued throughout the process. The political
grouping Herri Batasuna (HB, Popular Unity) would eventually run in elections only
to refuse to occupy its seats in the central governing bodies. Yet the izquierda abertzale
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(leftist independentists) had split in 1978, with HB only representing a part. Many
of those who chose to abandon armed conflict, accepted the Constitution as a frame-
work for working toward independence, and participated in politics formed the party
Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE). The PNV had participated intensively in the process in an
attempt to attain the highest possible levels of autonomy and to promote a model
of the Spanish state that would be viewed as legitimate for Basques (Euzko-Alderdi
Jeltzalia 1978: 24).
HB and the far right Spanish nationalists (AP) both called for no-votes on the
1978 Constitution. Between the forces calling for abstention or no-votes, majorities
of eligible voters in favor of the Constitution were not attained in any of the three
provinces that later formed the Basque AC. Because the PNV had not called for
no-votes, but only for abstention, the constitution still passed in these provinces
among those who went to the polls. This is notable, as A´lava has never been strongly
nationalist and like Navarre maintained its fueros during the dictatorship because of
its support for Franco. Yet even there 41 per cent of the voting population abstained
and another 11.38 per cent voted no. In Guip’uzcoa and Vizcaya, abstention was 56
per cent and no votes similar to the other territories (though from the far left, rather
than the Spanish nationalist right, as in A´lava and Navarre). Even in Navarre, 33.5
per cent of the population abstained (Congreso de Diputados 2012).
The democratic period therefore began in the Basque Country with no resolution
for several crucial issues and with the vast majority of the political class feeling it
had not been democratically included in the decision making process. In contrast, the
Catalan provinces passed the Constitution by a significant margin of eligible voters
and the only Spanish provinces where it was not supported by a majority of eligible
voters were the four Galician provinces. A weak starting point indeed, and one that
has shaped the sense of commitment to the broader Spanish community ever since.
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Yet despite its sense of failure in other arenas, the PNV had won the inclusion of
a special disposition guaranteeing the foral regime and proceeded to negotiate back
historic Basque fiscal autonomy. In practice, this has meant that the Basque AC
could effectively plan and implement budgets for its own social priorities (Ezenarro
2011), and that it—like Navarre—has had higher revenues than other ACs.
The main Basque political forces that supported autonomy had agreed in advance
of the 1977 elections that the elected Senators and Deputies from the territory would
write the Statute. As soon as they were elected, all the representatives except those
of the UCD created the Asamblea de Parlamentarios Vascos. The UCD did not want
to negotiate permanent Statutes for Navarre and the Basque Country before the
passage of the Constitution, and it was due to this reservation that the pre-autonomy
system was created, though it was eventually used countrywide. The pre-autonomic
entity that governed with limited authority during this period was called the Consejo
General Vasco (CGV, Basque General Council) and in 1978 included Navarre. The
first president, Ramo´n Rubial, was a Basque socialist. Rubial was elected with the
support of the UCD representatives of the CGV, who preferred the Spanish left over
the Basque nationalist center-right.
While in Extremadura competences were transferred to the pre-autonomic gov-
ernment two years before the Statute was signed, the CGV was a purely executive
organ charged with drawing up the Statute and a plan for the restoration of the spe-
cial fiscal regime, as well for the status of Navarre. As we shall see, the striving of
minority nationalists has not always been the driving force behind asymmetry. Span-
ish nationalist forces have regularly applied different standards for the different ACs
in an effort to stymie the self-rule aspirations of minority nationalist ACs, granting
authority to “espan˜olista” ACs that it refuses to minority nationalists.
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The provincial and municipal elections of 1979 produced a major increase in sup-
port for the PNV, as well as an evening out in its support across the territories. While
Basque political leaders had begun drafting a model for self-rule in early 1977, they
were not able to negotiate the project with the central government until the UCD and
AP were satisfied that this could be contained within the Constitution. The Statute
of Guernica was sent to the central government as soon as the 1978 Constitution was
passed, but was not submitted to referendum until October of 1979 and then not
signed by the King until the end of the year. While for Basque leaders the process
felt unfair and unbearably slow, it was still the first Statute passed in Spain.
Once again we see the contrast with Brazil, where the distribution of responsibil-
ities laid out in the constitution did not require organic enabling legislation before
municipal and regional governments could begin to act because there were no new
territorial political institutions to be created. Yet in Spain, nothing could be done
until the territorial framework was settled and the very earliest institution took a full
two years to approve. The vote on the Statute in the Basque territories was very
similar to that on the Spanish Constitution, with 40 per cent abstaining and 10 per
cent voting against. Yet this time, the no votes came almost exclusively from the
AP, which felt the Statute threatened the territorial integrity of Spain. This is the
Statute that was still functioning in 2013, and aside from Galicia is the only AC never
to have renegotiated its basic law (though not for lack of trying).
Within just a few years, the existence of the special fiscal rights in the Basque
Country and Navarre had become completely unquestioned and off the table for ne-
gotiation. So much so, in fact, that concerns about equity almost always focus on
Catalonia and its push back against participating in the common fiscal regime. Cer-
tainly, Catalonia is much larger than the Basque and Navarrese economies and its
loss would be more harshly felt. Still, one can easily understand why the Catalans
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strive to rewrite the rules of the game. The future of the fiscal arrangements was not
at all certain at the outset of political negotiations in 1978, yet almost as soon as the
agreements were made, the Basque and Navarrese arrangements became their status
quo. The starting place for negotiations in the future shifted with the acceptance of
a basic foundation of asymmetry in devolution that is perceived as unchangeable. It
is for this reason that Spanish nationalist forces fought bitterly to prevent the exten-
sion of special rights in the Constitution and why Catalan demands for independence
cause the military to start rumbling. For Spain, the path of decentralization since
democratization has been that of a boulder rolling downhill, for all that it has not
felt that way to most Basque political actors.
The Basque Country and Catalonia were the only two ACs to form in 1979 and
immediately had the highest level of transferrable responsibilities. However, health
competencies still had to be negotiated bilaterally and while Catalonia was able to ne-
gotiate the transfer of INSALUD and take over health provision in 1981, the Basques
were unable to wrest health control from the center until the end of 1987, nearly a
decade after being legally empowered to manage health provision. While a variety
of competences were devolved immediately after passage of the Statute, the PSOE
government of Felipe Gonza´lez struggled to square legal recognition of the “hecho
diferencial” with its ideological commitment to regional solidarity and cohesion. The
Basque government saw it as a “permanent boycott” of transfers52. Competences
listed in the Statute still had to be negotiated one by one and took place at what
seemed a snail’s pace for Basque leaders. Once again, this perception persisted along-
side the comparative reality that what the Basque AC had was still a much higher
level of autonomy than other ACs had (and in some cases, wanted).
Prior to the Civil War, the Foru Iurralde (Historic Territories, coinciding with
52El Pa´ıs 10/7/1994 “Euskadi afronta el bloqueo de siete an˜os sin transferencias.”
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the boundaries of the provinces) had been the locus of Basque self-government. The
special status of the four Basque Historic Territories was recognized by the Consti-
tution and in 1983 the Basque Ley de Territorios Histo´ricos (Ley 27/1983, Historic
Territories Law) set out the institutional relationship between the Historic Territories
and the AC. Of special importance, the Territories have full fiscal autonomy and co-
ordinate AC finances with the AC government. They set taxes and decide how much
revenue the AC will generate, for example, even though the Basque government sets
the budget. They keep a portion of their revenue (around 30 per cent) and send the
majority on to the Basque government.
The coordination challenges of these arrangements are intense. The difficulties
emerged immediately and produced a significant division within the ruling PNV dur-
ing the early 1980s, with the Lehendakari, the Basque President, supporting cen-
tralization in the AC and the party leadership supporting decentralization to the
Territories. The Lehendakari, Carlos Garaikoetxea, resigned and early elections were
called in 1986. The conflict caused the PNV to split, with a new party forming around
Garaikoetxea, Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), as a secular, social democratic Basque inde-
pendentist party. EA has been stronger in Guipu´zcoa and Navarre than the PNV and
identifies with the izquierda abertzale, yet has governed frequently in coalition with
the PNV and/or PSE since 1990.
The elections of 1986 and the Basque government it produced, from 1987-1991,
were the most important for social policy production in the democratic period. A
number of important equity-enhancing programs were innovated by the Basques in
this period, sparking uptake by other AC governments and placing pressure on the
central government to keep up—lest the central PSOE with an absolute majority be
out-done by an AC it governed in coalition with a center-right party.
Unlike other ACs where provincial representation in the AC assembly is at least
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somewhat tied to population, each Territory receives the same number of representa-
tives in the Basque parliament. The elections of 1986 created a situation in which the
popular vote went to the PNV, but the PSE won a larger number of seats. The result
was the first socialist/nationalist coalition government for the Basque AC. Up to this
point, not a single transfer of substance had taken place since 1982 and frustration
over the inability to gain control of health care was running high. Under the first
Basque government with socialist participation, the transfer of health competences
from the central PSOE finally took place, just before the provincial and municipal
elections. After these, there were no more for another seven years when a few minor
transfers were made, once again just before election time53.
Social services were also transferred at the end of 1987, from the central adminis-
trative counterpart to INSALUD, called IMSERSO. The Basque government passed
the responsibilities immediately to the Diputaciones Forales (provincial governments)
that had historically managed these services. The example of social service provision
allows an illustration of the role the special fiscal regime has played. While A´lava
has always been more socially conservative, governance by an economically liberal
party—the PP—has been a recent phenomenon. In the democratic period, A´lava
was governed by the PNV or the PSE except for the 1999-2007 and post-2011 period.
That A´lava had kept its special fiscal arrangements under Franco meant it had
greater resources than the other two territories coming out of the dictatorship. The
legacy of this difference is notable in the high quality of public social services adopted
and financed autonomously in A´lava, a tradition that began under Franco when in the
other two territories such services were residual (Mondrago´n 2006). These publicly
provided social services have become entrenched, as public employees mobilize in
their support and the PP has been unable to implement liberalizing reforms (Fantova
53El Pas´ 10/7/1994 “Euskadi afronta el bloqueo de siete an˜os sin transferencias.”
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2011). In addition to spending significantly more per capita on social services, in
A´lava 80 per cent of social service spending is public, while it is between 60 and 70
per cent in the other two territories (Mondrago´n 2006: 77).
On September 30, 1988 Lehendakari Ardanza (PNV) announced the Basque War
on Poverty (Plan de Lucha Contra la Pobreza). The plan involved an integrated
set of programs, including the Renta Mı´nima de Insercio´n (RMI, Minimum Income
Guarantee). The Basque RMI was the first such program in all of Spain, where
social assistance and social services have never been protagonized by the central
government. Within three years every other AC had adopted some version of the
Basque RMI, but it has remained the only true minimum income program and the
most generous—spending more money on higher benefits with fewer limitations, a
truly universal program. The Basque RMI in 1995 reached 2.5 per cent of Basque
households, almost twice as many as the next most significant program in Navarre,
and paid 75 per cent of the minimum wage (increased to 80 per cent in 2003), also a
higher benefit than in any other AC (Arriba 1999). Between social assistance, social
services, and health care, the safety net for Basque citizens had rapidly become the
strongest in the country.
The Health Secretary under the coalition government when health was transferred
was the socialist Freire Campos. Freire was a pioneer in health policy, defining Os-
akidetza, which in only a few short years had the highest user ratings, the shortest
wait times, and had begun to win a variety of awards from provider and user asso-
ciations. Osakidetza was created under the PNV in 1983 and was designed as an
NHS (Osakidetza 2012). This step has not been taken in most ACs and represents
a greater level of public commitment to provision of services than the model of the
SNS. The provincial governments had owned and managed a small network of public
hospitals even through the dictatorship and public health responsibilities had been
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transferred early on, as it had been in other ACs. Osakidetza took over management
of these services with an early orientation toward a fully integrated system with high
quality basic care at the foundation. There was significant opposition on the part
of professional medical associations to the creation of a unified system that was free
and universal in coverage54. It was the first AC health service to integrate mental
health and then took on the property, personnel, and clinics of INSALUD when it
was transferred at the end of 1987.
That the PNV was ready to take on private sector interests, in addition to its
efforts in universal, public, social welfare provision, illustrates the theory that ide-
ological commitment to equity-enhancing reform could potentially also come from
social solidarity within a salient national community. Yet there are no other such
cases in either country. Certainly, the fact that its fiercest competition comes from
the socialist and abertzale left plays a role. Still, in the Basque Country, humanist
and egalitarian trends within Christian democracy have been strong and have deeply
influenced political culture and society (Espiau 2011).This commitment to social co-
hesion is unique among center-right nationalist parties in Spain and is rooted in the
particular heritage of the Basque Country, where feudalism was rejected early on and
civil society has always been strong. Even the Basque PP does not challenge social
policy in this AC to the extent that it does in some.
Two major equity-enhancing reforms were undertaken immediately under Freire
and the newly empowered Osakidetza: universalization of health coverage and the
inclusion of youth dental care within the public system. In February of 1988, bare
months after taking on health competencies, the Basque Country mostly eliminated
the gaps in coverage by passing legislation to ensure that those without sufficient eco-
nomic resources could access health care (Decreto 26/1988). The central government
54El Pa´ıs 10/26/2003 Interview with Azkuna “‘Hubo mucha resistencia al principio entre los
profesionales’.”
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in Madrid was put in an awkward position, having been shown up by its Basque
affiliate, which was initiating more progressive reforms than it was instituting cen-
trally (Esnaola 2011). On September 8, 1989 the central government, following the
Basque AC, passed health coverage for those without resources who were not tied to
the Social Security System (Real Decreto 1088/1989).
At the end of April 1990, the PADI was passed (Decreto 118/1990). The law
was immediately followed by implementation guidelines from the Health Secretariat
for basic coverage guarantees and the hiring of providers (Orden 2 de Mayo and
3 de Mayo, respectively). In both the Basque Country and Navarre (which also
implemented the program as soon as it received health competences) the PADI has
reduced social class based differences in dental health significantly, in addition to
overall decreasing cavities, extractions, and other dental problems requiring treatment
among the young (Freire 2003).
The first Spanish National Health survey in 2003 showed staggering regional dif-
ferences in dental health outcomes and the PSOE placed the issue of extension of
the PADI into its electoral program. The major parties that together negotiated the
2003 health reform under the PP’s leadership also included dental health as a covered
area of the SNS. Yet no enforcement or implementation action had been taken at the
center, so regional differences remained large.
Universalization, the PADI, and the RMI are examples of best practice sharing
where other ACs or the central government have improved services in order to keep up
with the highest performing ACs—in this case the Basque Country. The possibility of
regional innovation and diffusion, in Spain and Brazil, is the most significant equity-
enhancing attribute of decentralization, even though its impact is structurally limited.
Innovation in the Basque Country should be credited with a portion of the equity-
enhancing improvements in health policy in the Spanish territory as a whole.
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While in general corruption has not been as significant an issue in Basque politics
as in some other ACs, one quite spectacular case directly impacted health care. In
1990, actors associated with the PSE changed 581 civil service exams for high level
technical and management positions in Osakidetza, ensuring that supporters of the
PSE and UGT55 received the jobs. The 50,000 people who had taken the exam had to
take it again. The event was glossed over at the time and only four years later, when
electoral relationships had shifted, did the PNV bring forth documents allowing the
stalled court case to move forward56. The Director General of Osakidetza, his second
in command, and two others were found guilty and sentenced to jail time at the end
of the 1990s. In 2007 the central PSOE pardoned them before they had begun to
serve their sentences57.
The governing pact with the socialists continued in the fourth and fifth legislatures,
from 1991 to 1999, yet was not a static process, which can be seen in Figure 4.5, above.
A nationalist coalition between the PNV, Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE, Basque Left) and
EA in 1991 broke down after just six months, causing the renewal of a coalition
with the PSE. Yet in 1993 a fundamental shift took place, with the Basque socialists
forming a permanent coalition with EE. The decision tied the PSE to an historic
political formation of the izquierda abertzale that had been born from the political
wing of ETA and split, reformed, and moderated over time to accept democracy, the
Statute of Guernica, and more moderate social democratic positions. This pattern
of alliances and coalitions illustrates the way that parties with shared moderate left
of center views on social cohesion and support for Basque autonomy have blurred
the distinctions between traditional left and right, nationalist and non-nationalist
55The UGT—Unio´n General de Trabajadores (General Workers’ Union)—was founded in 1888
and was originally affiliated with the PSOE. It is the second strongest union at the central level in
Spain.
56El Pa´ıs 5/30/1994 “El otro ‘fraude Osakidetza’.”
57Gara 10/7/2007 “Indultan a los implicados en el ‘caso Osakidetza’.”
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partisanship in the operation of pragmatic Basque politics.
Under the leadership of the nationalist In˜aki Azkuna, Osakidetza improved pa-
tient care despite high pressures for cost containment. During the 1990s, costs were
controlled primarily by avoiding excessive hospitalization. Mobile care teams for dial-
ysis and other specialized areas of provision were used to permit patient care at home.
Whereas in Spain overall the trend has been toward concentrating health spending in
the most expensive and least equity-enhancing areas, Osakidetza bucked this trend
and improved wait lists, the time GPs spent in clinic visits, and perceptions of the
system, while still controlling costs58. The reforms were not perfect and particularly
nurses’ unions articulated concerns that cost savings were being attained by forcing
their members to work more, without more pay. Osakidetza has not been impervious
to liberal market reforms and private sector pressures.
During this period Osakidetza restructured the health system, incorporating some
market principles of management and administrative decentralization, as well as some
rationalization (the Plan Osasuna Zainduz, approved by the Basque Parliament June
23rd 1993). Reforms that rationalize access to services or provision of care are not
automatically regressive, since health care has the perverse status of being a service
area in which higher levels of consumption are not necessarily better for outcomes.
However, as was true for the early reforms by the central PP during this same period,
granting hospitals and providers greater autonomy has often been used as a way of
sidestepping collective bargaining by health workers. The largest Basque unions and
parties to the left of the PSE have criticized the measures.
In the Basque context, where cooperatives and public/private ventures have a
long history and have often been imbued with a commitment to equity, the results of
58El Pa´ıs 10/13/1998 “Curar mejor sin gastar ma´s.”
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central rationalization efforts after the Informe Abril appear to have been less detri-
mental than has been the case in Catalonia, for example. One of the most significant
differences is that the Basque mechanisms have generally been to incorporate stan-
dards for performance and accountability, as well as cost containment, into public
contracts with public employees, rather than outsourcing to private providers. For all
ACs, the cost pressures have always been real and neither Health Secretaries nor their
administrators set budgets. After the central reform of under the PP, the PNV and
Azkuna introduced legislation in 1997 to change the juridical status of health cen-
ters and hospitals, after which they became foundations that operated under clearer
market principles, though still owned by Osakidetza (Ley 8/1997). The new Basque
health law also took citizen rights and participation in the system to a new level,
incorporating a patient bill of rights, deepened options for provider choice, and insti-
tutional paths for public accountability.
In 1996 the PNV supported the candidacy of the PP in the Spanish Congress and
was rewarded in the next round of negotiation over the Concierto Econo´mico in 1997
with an increase in authority over direct taxes, which amounted to almost complete
autonomy (Ru´ız-Huerta and Lo´pez 1997). In October of 1998 the PP was in power
in the center for the first time when autonomous Basque elections were taking place
and ETA had signed an indefinite ceasefire. In Vizcaya the PNV won the elections,
in A´lava the PP, and in Guipu´zcoa, Euskal Herritarrok (the unreformed izquierda
abertzale formation, EH). With the support of EA and EH, the PNV candidate Jua´n
Jose´ Ibarretxe took office in coalition with EA. Territorial government in the AC
could not have been more ideologically disparate. Gabriel Mar´ıa Incla´n took over
Osakidetza in 1999 and remained in the post until 2009, making the Basque Country
another AC with exceptionally high ministerial tenure in Health (see Figure A.15).
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Coalitions of convenience and the politics of concessions illustrate the ideologi-
cal complications of multilevel governance. The PNV supported the PP centrally in
Madrid, despite deep antagonism on both sides, because it knew it could extract valu-
able benefits for the AC. The PP had vowed not to bargain with minority nationalists
during the campaign, but in the end had no alternative if it wanted to govern.
But by 2001 the central PP was governing alone with an absolute majority and
when ETA broke its ceasefire, regional politics in the Basque Country shifted radically
and quickly. The Basque PP and PSE joined together in an attempt to unseat the
PNV, forcing early elections. The PP and PSE partnered across perhaps the most
acrimonious political divide in the country in order to keep the izquierda abertzale
out of the Basque government, and in defense of a (somewhat) similar vision for the
future of the Spanish state. Yet their attempt backfired. The PNV, in coalition with
EA, won all three territories in the early elections forced by the “constitucionalistas.”
Of note, the unreformed izquierda abertzale—still unprepared to break with ETA—
was the biggest electoral loser. Violence and insecurity were at the forefront of voters’
minds and they overwhelmingly supported Ibarretxe and the democratic, moderate
nationalists to deal with ETA at that historical juncture.
In 2001 Ibarretxe began the process of reforming the Statute of Guernica, which
in 1979 had not been able to overcome a number of crucial issues Basque nationalists
had with the Spanish Constitution. Non-nationalist forces declined to participate in
the project and the izquierda abertzale rejected it, so the proposal was elaborated
only by the moderate nationalist forces. The reform was presented to the Basque
parliament in 2003, narrowly passed in 2004, and presented to the Spanish Congress
in 2005. It would have enshrined the right to self-determination, representation for
the Basque territories in the EU akin to that enjoyed by the regions of Belgium,
Holland, and Germany, an autonomous judiciary, and reform of the Constitutional
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Tribunal that would ensure the Spanish central government could not unilaterally
change the character of Basque autonomy through constitutional reform.
It was defeated in the Spanish Congress overwhelmingly, with only the central
deputies from the PNV, the Catalan nationalist parties (left and right), EA, Nafarroa
Bai (the Basque nationalists in Navarre), and the BNG (Bloque Nacionalista Galego,
leftist nationalist party in Galicia) in support. Therefore, along with Galicia, the
Basque Country remains one of only two ACs that has never been able to reform its
Statute, in this case because of a central veto when the project was attempted.
At the turn of the millennium the Basque Country was flush with resources and
at its strongest economic point relative to the rest of Spain, with income inequality at
its lowest level ever. Investments were made in completing extension of the primary
care network. Osakidetza has continued to win awards for the quality of its services
and more Basques use and support the system than in other ACs. Rates of double
coverage through the purchase of private health insurance are lower in the Basque
Country than elsewhere (Esnaola 2011). The Basque Country has steadily expanded
public coverage and access to reproductive and women’s health, as well as mental
health—both areas historically neglected in basic coverage requirements at the center.
In the autonomous elections of 2009 the PSE-EE won election outright, for the first
time able to form its own Basque government. The unreformed izquierda abertzale
had been illegalized as a terrorist organization by the Spanish courts and could not
participate, while EA and the PNV were running separately for the first time in years.
The Basque Country now had a government in which the AC was governed by the
PSE-EE while all three Territories were governed by the PNV.
Rafael Bengoa, Director of Planning and Evaluation from 1991-1995 under Azkuna
and author of the Plan Osasuna Zainduz, became Health Secretary in 2009. The most
significant reforms during this time have been the elaboration of the Estrategia de
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Cronicidad—a measure to reorient the entire health system toward the management
of chronic illness, which with an aging population has become increasingly important.
The reform has already begun to save money for the department by allowing for home
care and electronic management of chronic illnesses. In 2011 Osakidetza was the first
regional health service to institute unified electronic patient histories, which appear
to have reduced errors in medication significantly59.
In 2011 the foral elections created an historic and challenging scenario for fiscal
management in which four different parties governed in the Territories and the AC.
The newly legalized Bildu (reformed izquierda abertzale) governed Guipu´zcoa for
the first time, the PNV in Vizcaya, the PP in A´lava, and the PSE in the Basque
Government. When the new PP central government with a large absolute majority
introduced co-pays on drugs for seniors and banned those who could not document
residency from using the SNS for free, the Basque Country was one of several ACs
that challenged the decisions, in this case by simply saying it would not comply.
The distribution of responsibilities has never been as fast or as deep as the Basque
Country wanted. While the authority of the center continues to be regularly ques-
tioned, the courts appear to be the only source for clarification, which themselves
are politicized and ultimately controlled by the central government. The autonomous
elections of 2012, the first since the permanent and unconditional ceasefire of ETA,
yielded almost equal numbers of seats for the izquierda abertzale and the PNV, and
this latter will govern as the economic crisis continues. The Basque independentists
have steadily improved their electoral performance since rejecting violence, so as the
Catalans draw closer and closer to a referendum on independence, the Basque Coun-
try may not be as far behind as they seem. Other forms of “civil disobedience” may
be more likely in the near term if the izquierda abertzale were to govern—refusal to
59Sanitaria 2000: Directivos de la Salud 10/18/2011 “La historia cl´ınica de Osakidetza reduce el
67% los errores asociados a la medicacio´n.”
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pay the cupo or meet other agreements made with the Spanish state (Fantova 2011).
The segment of the izquierda abertzale that has long rejected violence60 has played
a role in bridging the left and nationalist political tendencies in the AC. Yet the threat
of ETA violence has also had an impact on the functioning of government. Violence
places democratic policy-makers in the situation of having to take difficult positions,
which can easily be encased in absolutist language. When ETA attacks, Basque
nationalists become defensive about the Spanish government using the violence as an
excuse to ignore democratic calls for increased home rule, while Spanish politicians
face intense pressure to appear “tough on terror.”
Arguably, like corruption, violence has limited administrative capacity in the AC
and the central government. Perhaps one of the starkest examples is that politicians
have historically risked their lives and the lives of their families by participating in
politics, particularly in the Basque Country, but also in Spain. The threat has been
real and persistent and has placed high stakes on interactions that might otherwise be
mundane, as well as dissuading capable socialist or popular officials from participating
if they felt their views would draw the threat of violence.
The outlook of health officials has been bleak, with an assumption that in the
coming years inequality in the system will likely increase as the crisis shows no signs
of abating. But it is clear that the Basque Country will still suffer less than many
other ACs because of its high capacity and high commitment. Early investments
in quality facilities, personnel, and coverage—not only in health care but also social
60In 1978 a group of forces of the independentist left met at the Mesa de Alsasua. Most of these
forces formed HB. For many years HB and its successors did not denounce violence and maintained
a relationship with ETA. This is usually the reference when the term izquierda abertzale is used. Yet
EE (before joining the PSE), EA, Aralar, the coalition Nafarroa Bai in Navarre, and the coalition
Amaiur that presented in the general elections of 2011 after the definitive ceasefire of ETA are
all leftist independentist groupings that should not be considered part of the insurrectionist and
violent opposition to the Spanish state. These forces have participated in democratic government
and eschewed violence, unlike HB and its posterior formations before 2011. The issue of what is
required to have substantively rejected violence is a difficult one, but lumping all independentist
forces together without making this distinction misses important variation in Basque politics.
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services and welfare—meant that when the crisis hit, as one official put it, there was
“more fat, and room to cut deeper before hitting the bone.” The Basque Country
has not been as hard hit economically as many other ACs and the extra padding of
a healthy, highly educated population impacts other areas of the economy, feeding
back into lower health service demand, as well.
4.10.3 Commitment or Capacity?: Comparison with Navarre
Navarre and the Basque Country differ on a number of dimensions, but are the only
ACs with special fiscal autonomy. The cases are worth understanding in historical
context because Navarre arguably has the most equity-enhancing health system of
all and the best outcome indicators in terms of life expectancy and infant mortality.
These are the only ACs in which a majority of the population feels that management
of health is better under decentralized government management and in which longer
experience with decentralized management has increased the percent of people who
feel decentralizaiton is better. In all other ACs, the positive valoration of the system
under decentralization has decreased over time (Baro´metro Sanitario 2012).
While the perception of the PNV as a “special” center right party that really
does prioritize social cohesion within its territory is widespread, this factor is weaker
in Navarre. Despite having lower levels of vasquitud (basqueness), health outcomes
have been even more egalitarian than in the Basque Country. As we shall see, the
history of Navarre militates against such progressive health policy, as it has always
been more conservative than the northern Basque territories. Certainly, there are no
other ACs where center right parties have governed as long as in the Basque Country
where health policies and outcomes have been as equity-enhancing.
Navarre was within INSALUD three years longer than the Basque Country and is
much smaller, but has performed better on primary care reform implementation and
has been nearly as pioneering as the Basque Country in health policy—introducing
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universal coverage and youth dental coverage at the same time. Its health outcome
indicators are also superior. Comparing these cases highlights the importance of fiscal
capacity, as well as high levels of ideological commitment at key moments.
In the 19th century, carlismo (support for the conservative traditional monarchy)
was a strong political force in both regions, but while it ceded to strong commu-
nitarian Christian democratic tendencies among Basque nationalists in the north,
in Navarre carlismo encompassed a staunchly conservative “espan˜olista” and anti-
Basque nationalist political wing. The anti-feudalism of the Basques in the north was
less pronounced in the Navarrese foral institutions and the more egalitarian thrusts
within carlismo were weak in Navarre. These differences favored the creation of a
large political sector in Navarre that supported autonomy from the Basque project.
The Navarrese party that came to power after Franco was much more conservative
than the PNV in the Basque Country—the UPN in 1979—and defined its regional-
nationalism in the context of avoiding absorption into the Basque nationalist project,
rather than over tension with Spain.
In fact, part of the reason the PNV is less staunchly aligned with the conservative
ideology of other right of center parties emerging from carlismo is that its leaders
felt betrayed by the Carlists, who did not fully back Navarrese membership in the
Basque autonomy Statute in 1932 (de Pablo 2007: 2; Blinkhorn 1974: 596). Because
foral rights in the Basque areas would have allowed religious government to persist,
resistance to autonomy within the Spanish left and on the part of the Republic was
even stronger than on the right, at first (de Pablo 2007). Basque nationalists warily
welcomed the Republic in 1931 because for the first time limited democratic self-
determination and autonomy were actually on the table, but at the same time the
anarcho-sindicalist and communist left at the heart of the Republican project were
deeply antagonistic to the religious government enshrined in the Basque fueros.
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Different proposals were put forth for a four-territory statute of autonomy in
Navarre in 1931 and 1932 and the one that was eventually determinant in 1932 would
have diminished provincial authority significantly vis-a´-vis the new four-territory au-
tonomous government. Navarrese provincial elites feared domination from Bilbao and
support for integration into the Basque autonomy project diminished. Because the
municipalities voted not to join the Basque region in 1932, Navarre entered the post-
Franco democratic period in the unique position of having a specially recognized foral
fiscal regime protected by the Constitution, without a clear road map for whether it
would join the Basque AC or form its own. A´lava had backed out of the Statute
in 1933 (Blinkhorn 1974: 595), but was still considered part of the Basque project
after 1978 because it had approved the original Statute almost unanimously, unlike
Navarre, which had rejected it.
The fiscal arrangements in the regions are different, but in terms of their revenue
generation produce similar results. The legacy of experience with self-government,
high levels of own-source revenues, and commitment to social cohesion within the
region helps explain why the quality of decentralized health services in these two ACs
has been so far superior to that in the rest of Spain.
Yet there are differences between the two ACs in terms of health reform. For
the 1984 primary care reform, the divergence was large by 1992, eight years after
implementation61. At this point, Navarre had 80 per cent coverage and the Basque
Country 47 per cent. The gap was the same in 2000, with Navarre at 100 per cent
coverage and the Basque country at 67 per cent (Gonza´lez, et al 2004: 83). Both were
within INSALUD until the late 1980s and in both ACs the Territories had maintained
and continued to operate their own hospitals and health centers.
61One must keep in mind that some elements of the primary care reform were implemented
uniformly across the country—namely the extension of schedules and incorporation of GPs and
support staff for primary care into the consultorios—so these numbers should not be interpreted as
total lack of change in primary care (Bengoa 2012; Lamata 2012).
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The patient load on each GP has decreased steadily in the Basque Country while
stagnating in Navarre since at least 2004, if not earlier (SIAP 2012). The same
pattern has held true for the number of inhabitants served by each health center.
While the number of centers has not changed in Navarre since 2004 and population
has grown, increasing the number of people assigned to each center by nearly 1000,
in the Basque Country since 2004 the number of centers has increased to keep pace
with the population and the burden on each center has not increased (SIAP 2012)62.
So what trends might explain the early superior performance of Navarre with the
Basque Country slow to catch up in the early years of the system, then stagnation
in the Navarrese health service later? Two important differences stand out. First,
in Navarre fiscal resources have existed longer and the network of foral hospitals
and health centers had been established before the return of democracy. Second, in
Navarre, the Partido Socialista de Navarra (PSN-PSOE, Navarrese Socialist Party)
governed from 1983 to 1991—during the most important period of primary care ex-
pansion and in concurrence with socialist government in the center (yet before the
devolution of health care). In the Basque Country those years were dominated by the
PNV and high levels of conflict with Madrid. The PADI was instituted at the end of
the PSN government in Navarre, immediately after the transfer of health competen-
cies and before the end of socialist government in the AC. Clearly, the smaller size of
Navarre also made reform simpler in some respects.
Yet in other ways reformers in Navarre faced significant obstacles that required
ideological commitment to be overcome. The Opus Dei has played a strong role in
the Navarrese medical establishment, with the PSN early on generating high levels of
conflict in an attempt to disengage the public sector from its long history of reliance on
62Population density is five times higher in the Basque Country than in Navarre, which explains
the higher numbers of inhabitants served by each clinic there. This is why it is best to avoid direct
comparison of the number of people served by each clinic.
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religious medical institutions for contracting service provision through social security.
These elements of reform were never complete and private medicine still plays a
more significant role in Navarre than in some other ACs. Despite the fact that
medical doctors in Navarre have virtually refused to provide legal abortions and the
health service must pay to send women to neighboring ACs for care, in other ways
the Navarrese health service has continued to be exemplary even under conservative
control by the UPN.
The primary care reform is the most notable difference between the two ACs. In
1992, only Cantabria, Baleares, Murcia, Catalonia, and Galicia had lower primary
care reform coverage than the Basque Country—all but one governed exclusively by
right of center parties up to that point. Certainly this relationship is not deterministic,
as many other ACs were governed by the socialist party during that period, under
INSALUD, without coverage rates as high as those in Navarre. Yet the Basque
government in the early 1980s was not a coalition government that included the left
and after being forced to wait so long for the health transfer, the Basques prioritized
their own integrated reform model. Yet the difference in primary reform, which has
clearly played a role in improving health outcomes in Spain, casts doubt both on
the notion that the PNV has been universally supportive of equity-enhancing social
policies, despite being a right of center party, as well as on the notion that Navarre
has achieved what it has simply because of higher levels of financing than other ACs.
The Basque Country had the same special resources, took over health care earlier,
and chose not to invest as heavily in primary care.
4.10.4 The Basque Country: Conclusion
When comparing the Basque Country and Navarre to the rest of Spain, a tra-
ditional left-right assessment of policy preferences is clearly insufficient to explain
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vastly higher quality health services, with far superior user ratings and excellent out-
comes. Left parties have been important at key moments in fighting tough battles
with entrenched private sector interests opposed to redistributive public social service
implementation, and their impact is observable. Yet center-right parties have domi-
nated in both ACs and have not behaved in the way that the PP has or that even the
Catalan CiU has, despite also being a minority nationalist party (in the case of the
PNV). The dominant features, then, that make these two ACs different are their su-
perior level of fiscal capacity, their historical experience with self-rule (administrative
capacity), and the salience and inclusiveness of a territorially defined reference com-
munity. The characteristics of the Basque reference community are unique in Spain
in generating a commitment to social cohesion across social class, for the historical
reasons outlined above.
The Basque language is completely unique, the only minority nationalist lan-
guage in Spain that is not a romance language. The ability to distinguish insiders
from outsiders is much easier in the Basque territories than elsewhere because the
ethno-linguistic differences are larger. The intensity of repression and persistence of
independentist violence have both contributed to increasing the salience of the refer-
ence community. For the PNV, in particular, showing that it could do better by its
community than the Spanish, left or right, has been important. This is also true of
other parties, which in the Basque territories have to respond to the strong sense of
identity and the alternative options available to Basque voters under democracy.
The significantly higher level of fiscal resources combined with the long legacy of
self-governing institutions and provision of social services before (and in some cases
during) Franco is the other obvious difference between the Basque territories and
the rest of Spain. These are ACs that were collecting their own taxes and running
their own hospitals for decades when only centralized authority existed elsewhere.
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They have been innovators in health care, finding more equitable ways to cope with
cost containment pressures than other ACs and more willing to experiment with
alternatives to traditional medical organization and practice.
Despite high levels of intergovernmental conflict over policy scope and the vision
of the Basque Country’s role in the Spanish state, sufficient political capital has
remained to invest major resources in producing a high quality and highly egalitarian
health service. As with high commitment states in Brazil, the Basque Country is
the prime example of what decentralization would do under best case scenarios—
promote innovation that pushes the center to improve its own policies and provide an
excellent service for its citizens. Yet there is no way around the fact that this project
has been made possible primarily by a fiscal model that would functionally end the
Spanish state if it were applied to all ACs. That the Basque Country is wealthier
than average also means the health challenges it must confront are less acute than
those for poor ACs with higher income inequality and unemployment, as well as a
higher concentration of poor health.
Finally, it is worth noting that if the Basque AC were a country, its process of
health reform would have been highly centralizing in an effort to ensure equality
of access and universal coverage, bringing provincial and municipal health resources
into the centralized system under the authority of the Basque AC. In this case, the
territorial scope of the reference community has been the key difference. Within the
Basque Country, a majority of citizens view the authority of the AC as legitimate.
4.11 Case Study: Castilla y Leo´n
Castilla y Leo´n is one of the clearest cases of a AC that might have functioned
better if it had been several ACs, instead of one. Yet major support from the EU,
lack of high poverty and inequality, and rule by a more pragmatic regional PP affiliate
have made this AC the best performer among those with low levels of commitment.
188
Problems with corruption and inter-provincial territorial conflict have hindered ad-
ministrative capacity.
4.11.1 Overview
The AC of Castilla y Leo´n is composed of nine provinces, the most of any AC in
Spain by a significant margin. It is the most expansive geographically and one of the
largest regions in Europe, yet with a small and highly dispersed population that had
been declining for decades and only reversed course slightly in 2002. Of the three ACs
considered here, Castilla y Leo´n was the least coherent when it formed. It still has
no official capital and no unified regional newspaper, as well as completely lacking a
strong, shared identity. Still, it is the birthplace of Castilian Spanish and encompasses
the majority of the UNESCO recognized historical patrimony of the country.
Castilla y Leo´n is a middle-income AC that has hovered near the Spanish aver-
age for most of the democratic period and has had almost exclusively conservative
leadership, with no minority nationalism (see Figure A.7). Using this particular AC
to assess the role of political forces with low levels of commitment to equity is a
conservative choice meant to press the theory. The PP is not a monolithic party and
while Madrid, Valencia, and Galicia have been the centers of the harder right of the
party (and bear clear signs of ideologically rooted social policy retrenchment), the
leadership of Castilla y Leo´n has tended to be somewhat more pragmatic.
While in 1973 the infant mortality rate in Castilla y Leo´n was the highest in
Spain at 24, by 1982 it had been cut in half and was below the country average. Life
expectancy was a year and a half higher than the Spanish average in 1991 but had
diminished to a few months difference by 2010 (see Figures A.13 and A.14). As in
Extremadura, the benefit of being within INSALUD until 2001 was that during the
most important years for the implementation and consolidation of the system, it was
in the hands of a committed center. By the time the last phase of devolution took
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place, the SNS was unquestionable as a social right for Spanish citizens.
Still, while Castilla y Leo´n has basically maintained a steady effort in health policy,
Madrid (another AC run by the PP that took on health in 2001) has instituted
a variety of reforms that have drastically damaged access to and quality of public
health services. EU investment in the AC has been notable, around twice the country
average throughout the period, beginning in 1987, as in other ACs.
4.11.2 Multilevel Health Reform in Castilla y Leo´n
Castilla was the region in which the rural campesinado overwhelmingly supported
Franco, quite possibly determining his victory in the Civil War (Blanco Rodr´ıguez
1998). These were for the most part small independent farmers, without the high
concentration of land ownership found in the south (384). Yet far from investing
economic and political energy in the glorified rural roots of Spain, after the war the
countryside languished for a decade and could never compete for the regime’s interest
with the more lucrative investment centers of Madrid, Bilbao, and Barcelona. Franco
also bypassed the region in choosing his cabinets (Almeida, et al 2003: 90).
The AC was originally imagined as an eleven-province region, including Santander
and Logron˜o in the 19th century. Geographically, the provinces surround the basin of
the Duero river and bring together the historic regions of Castilla la Vieja and Leo´n.
A pre-autonomy project was even elaborated to this end, just before the Civil War.
The politics of the creation of this AC expose the complexity of the political
maneuvering that was taking place among the newly empowered democratic actors.
From the beginning, the PSOE and PCE were juggling a complicated ideological
balance. They had set themselves up as defenders of regional democracy and the
right of the historic communities to determine their political organization, yet had
powerful pragmatic political interests as well. Democracy was not consolidated or
guaranteed at this stage and the forces of the right had been ambivalent toward the
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democratic project, at best. For the new democratic left, the future of democracy
was intertwined with successfully unseating the right from power. In Castilla y Leo´n,
where the right had more popular support than almost anywhere else in the country,
parties on the left tried to minimize the number of ACs that would be created there.
For the UCD, warring pressures and visions for Spain generated territorial dis-
agreements over how the ACs should be constructed. The Basques and Catalans had
pushed their Statutes to be as decentralizing as possible, taking centrist reformers
aback. The problem of centrifugal minority nationalism overlay an UCD vision of
Spain that militated against creating large numbers of small ACs with a great deal of
authority. It disliked the idea of uniprovincial ACs and so ended up in the same camp
as the PSOE in the case of Castilla y Leo´n—pushing with heavy handed authority to
enforce an encompassing geographic territory for the new AC. If the ACs had to exist,
let there be as few as possible. The UCD feared a free-for-all with every province
trying to win maximum power and resources for itself in the heartland of the Spanish
nation. This pitted the central UCD against the parochial interests of the political
leaders in the provinces, who saw resources, jobs, and central legislative seats slipping
away from them, the larger the projected new AC became.
While the PSOE in Castilla y Leo´n, as in Extremadura, originally advocated
for the v´ıa ra´pida (Reol Tejada 2005: 395), it became clear there was no way the
provinces and municipalities would pass the Statute under those conditions. The
issue of where the capital would lie was an enormous problem, as well as what the
relative status of each province would be. While Santander (which became the AC of
Cantabria) and Logron˜o (which became the AC of La Rioja) had legitimate enough
claims to historic nationhood to go it alone, Segovia did not, despite its attempt
to form its own AC. Rodolfo Mart´ın Villa, Minister of Territorial Affairs, central
legislator elected from Leo´n, and authoritarian enforcer from the “sector azul” of the
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franquistas, legislated the inclusion of Leo´n in the project, against the wishes of the
elected provincial leadership.
These provinces had all been strongholds of the right and socialist and commu-
nist forces feared that calls for uniprovincial autonomy masked attempts to create
personalistic fiefdoms of conservative economic and political power with ties to the
UCD at the center. Segovia voted not to join the new AC due to the provincial
representation formula being considered for election to the AC assembly63, yet the
UCD central government approved it as part of Castilla y Leo´n, regardless. In the
case of Leo´n, 53 senators from the AP in 1984 sued in the Tribunal Constitucional to
try to separate Leo´n from Castilla y Leo´n, but to no avail64 The formation of Castilla
y Leo´n is yet another example of a decentralization process driven by central forces
with little substantive commitment to the preferences of the regions themselves.
In much of the region during the democratic transition, the ideological space
on the far right was occupied by the UCD, rather than the AP. Many of the most
important central leaders in the UCD had come from the region and forces on the
right had historically supported them, so the AP was weaker. Mart´ın Villa was
utterly invested in the nine-province Castilla y Leo´n, while provincial UCD members
wanted their own ACs, so the majority of the conflict played out within the UCD
itself65. In Leo´n, the provincial AP wanted provincial autonomy while the provincial
PSOE and PCE advocated for joining the autonomy project of Castilla y Leo´n66.
These conflicts persisted well into the 1980s, with a portion of the regional UCD
63El Pa´ıs 12/7/1980 “El cantonalismo de Segovia, otro problema interno de UCD.” and 6/4/1983
“AP-PDP-UL recurre contra la inclusio´n de Segovia y Leo´n en la comunidad castellana.”
64El Pa´ıs 9/29/1984 “El Tribunal Constitucional no permite que Leo´n se separe de la comunidad
castellano-leonesa.”
65El Pa´ıs 10/9/1981 “La opcio´n uniprovincial de Segovia, sin posibilidades de e´xito en el Con-
greso.”
66El Pa´ıs 3/19/1980 “La posible ruptura de Castilla y Leo´n inquieta a las fuerzas pol´ıticas de la
regio´n.”
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abandoning the party and joining AP—one of many nails in the UCD coffin.
The 1983 Statute did not fix the capital, but left it for a later date, a decision
that remains impossible to make formally even today, though the government seat is
in Valladolid. Election to the Cortes (the assembly) is based on a provincial circum-
scription, with a minimum of three representatives in each province and another for
each 45,000 inhabitants (Art. 11).
Politics in Castilla y Leo´n has been less stable than in many ACs, across all parties,
and largely due to the same lack of regional identity and high levels of provincial
competition that characterized the initial creation of the AC. The UCD governed
the pre-autonomic territory until 1983. After the fundamental issues of territorial
organization were mostly resolved, the first autonomous elections took place in 1983.
The PSOE won these elections in the heartland of conservative Spain, yet in a deeply
conflicted AC affiliate headed by Demetrio Madrid, a politician who had been at odds
with the central party leadership on and off throughout the transition67.
Health was caught up within the social welfare department until 2002, which was
common among ACs without decentralized health competences. While the Basque
Country planned for an autonomous NHS, creating the institutional structure to be
ready for the responsibilities five years in advance, and even Extremadura had a
Health Secretariat throughout most of the period of INSALUD control, Castilla y
Leo´n did not. Still, for the early years of the primary care reform, Castilla y Leo´n
was also under center-left governance at the AC level. Coverage in primary care was
similar to that in Extremadura and better than in the Basque Country after the
initial phase of implementation. As in other ACs such as Madrid, which later became
conservative strongholds but started out socialist, having committed government at
the time of reform improved implementation.
67El Pa´ıs 3/4/1985 “La direccio´n del PSOE teme fuertes tensiones en el pro´ximo congreso regional
de Castilla y Leo´n.”
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The problems culminated with Madrid’s loss in internal elections for Secretary
General in 1985 (a race with four candidates, each provincially affiliated), which was
followed by his resignation in 1986, when charges were brought against him for the
alleged mismanagement of the sale of a company he owned. He was eventually cleared
of all charges, but the PSOE in Castilla y Leo´n never recovered. The socialists have
never won another election in the AC, after losing to Jose´ Mar´ıa Aznar and the AP in
1987. Aznar was an economic liberal and a pragmatic politician who lead the reform
and rebranding of the Spanish AP to become the PP in 1989. He governed in the AC
for two years before stepping down to run the central party as candidate for president
in every general election until his victory in 1996. The AC passed a reform to take on
new competences in 1988, but as in the case of the other ACs, the central government
held the proposal at bay for years before renegotiating all the v´ıa lenta regimes at
the same time through the Acuerdos Autono´micos 1992 (LO 11/1994).
Beginning in the late 1990s, charges began to emerge around issues of preferen-
tial dispensation of public jobs to friends and family of the governing PP, so called
“enchufismo.”68 The Health Secretary in 1999, Carlos Ferna´ndez Carriedo, was also
implicated in the irregularities69. The Statute was reformed in 1999 to expand ele-
ments of AC executive authority and made administrative adjustments in preparation
for the transfer of health and education (Ley Orga´nica 4/1999). When Castilla y Leo´n
took on health competences at the start of 2002, Carriedo was Secretary, an economist
and president of the PP in Palencia. He took over the Consejer´ıa de Medioambiente
(Environment) after leaving health, as had his predecessor.
After the transfer from INSALUD, most ACs found that wait lists were longer than
68El Pa´ıs 4/2/1998 “El PSOE denuncia 3.500 ’enchufados’ en la Junta de Castilla y Leo´n” and
5/24/1999 “Una comunidad amenazada por la despoblacio´n.”
69El Pa´ıs 10/2/1999 “Condenado por malversacio´n el ex presidente del Consejo Econo´mico de
Castilla y Leo´n.”
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they had been told and that public infrastructure projects were not as far advanced as
they had been led to believe. In addition, INSALUD appointed a significant number
of permanent staff, including high-level political appointments, just before making the
transfer. In Castilla y Leo´n these “contratos blindados” were not a major concern,
since they been made from within the existing ranks of PP leadership in the ACs.
After devolution, the norm in Castilla y Leo´n was to contract with private providers
to deal with wait lists rather than expanding the capacity of the public system—in
contrast to the Basque decision 15 years earlier to confront private medical interests
head on in the process of consolidating an integrated NHS, or the socialist path in
Extremadura of greatly expanding the scope of public service provision. This policy
came to a head after the first few years of autonomous health management, when a
series of scandals revealed that the public system had been paying private providers
high prices for services that were performed at lower cost in the public system. The
scandals involved many resignations within the ranks of the AC health service.
Unlike the Basque Country where provincial health responsibilities were central-
ized under Osakidetza, in Castilla y Leo´n provincial directors managed significant
responsibilities in contracting and service provision. The first Director of SaCyL in
Valladolid was Pedro Luis Antona. When he was first appointed he proceeded to
grant public contracts with private providers for large sums, when it turned out that
the private middle company—owned by a friend—was paying much less to provide
the service than it was being reimbursed for, making a hefty profit at the expense of
the government. Yet it had been the Health Secretariat itself that had told provincial
directors and hospitals to pay bills directly through the hospitals, rather than going
through the legal approval process for paying out contracts, which required defending
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and explaining the payments70. The so-called “Caso Antona” unfolded in the mid-
2000s when the AC government had passed into the hands of a new executive, Juan
Vicente Herrera. The government itself pushed prosecution of the case and tried to
recover the money, as well as reorienting the administration of health resources after
the scandals, generating immediate savings for the AC by eliminating many of the
high cost private contracts.
What occurred in Castilla y Leo´n in 2001 was the turnover of health services to
an AC government that was not ideologically committed to equity-enhancing health
reform and had significant problems with cronyism and conflicting private interests in
the public administration. The AC also faced significant administrative coordination
challenges because of the large number of provinces. In addition, the costs of serving
a highly dispersed population are significantly higher, yet only recently under the
PSOE was territorial dispersion incorporated into the financing formula for health.
While the SNS was consolidated after 15 years of implementation and was not,
itself, at risk, public resources were directed toward private business interests in a
way that prevented investments in public capacity and ate into the fiscal capacity
of the AC. It is therefore not surprising that in 2002 only 20 per cent of citizens
thought the health system was doing better under decentralized governance than
under INSALUD, the third lowest evaluation in Spain (Baro´metro Sanitario 2002).
Citizen evaluation of the relative quality of decentralized care has decreased even
further, as it has in every AC except the Basque Country and Navarre, and Castilla
y Leo´n remains at the very bottom.
Yet Castilla y Leo´n is an interesting case in which to study low commitment
because it is not as starkly ideological in its antagonism to equity-enhancing reform
as several wealthier ACs also governed by the PP, such as Madrid or Valencia. The
70El Norte de Castilla 5/7/2006 “Exigen a Antona que explique la dimisio´n del gerente de SaCyL
en Valladolid.”
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economic elite in the AC was smaller, without the base of large landholdings or
finance capital present in some other ACs. The population has been more ethnically
homogenous, despite the challenges of distinct provincial autonomy projects. And the
majority of voters are not as high income as they are in the wealthier ACs. Among
political actors of all stripes there is a shared view that the AC has been neglected
in public investments by the center, under Franco, the PSOE, and the PP.
Although in 2001 the two serving vice presidents competed publicly for the ex-
ecutive post, outgoing President Lucas (headed to run the Senate in Madrid) chose
Herrera, someone who had not been in line for the job71, yet who was seen as a concil-
iator, capable of managing the complex relationships within the party. He had been
an AC legislator for several years and had experience working with the opposition.
Like Ibarra in Extremadura, he has had a reputation for putting what he believed
to be the interests of his region before obeisance to the central party, even though
the PP is not as decentralized internally as the PSOE. In 2005 he refused to vote
against the PSOE’s AC financing plan, which he believed would be an improvement
for Castilla y Leo´n. During the debates about an ideal financing system, while in
Madrid and Valencia PP leaders stated that they felt the PP’s 2001 system did not
need reform, Herrera clearly articulated the problems of equity in the existing system,
defending the need to pay more attention to inter-regional solidarity72. The previous
system implemented under the PP only took into account population and not aging
or dispersion (both significant issues in Castilla y Leo´n).
Herrera has a strong support base and since the crisis has once again illustrated
differences with Madrid—giving a speech defending the State of the Autonomies at a
71El Pa´ıs 2/28/1995 “Juan Vicente Herrera, portavoz parlamentario del PP, sera´ el nuevo presi-
dente de Castilla y Leo´n.”
72El Pa´ıs 5/23/1995 “Los presidentes autono´micos piden ma´s dinero.”
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time when central actors and AC leaders in Madrid were calling for recentralization73.
Still, Herrera’s view of how autonomy should be used is in line with his party’s
ideology: the model for public provision should be “austere and rational”74.
In 2003 after Herrera was elected, he replaced Health Secretary Carriedo with
Ce´sar Anto´n Beltra´n, an economist who had previously coordinated the Health De-
partment’s services, as well as managed the Social Services division of the AC execu-
tive branch. A number of new services were added to the cartera de servicios during
these years75. While the Caso Antona came to light during this time, there appears
to have been a general improvement in management of health services, partly in re-
sponse to public outrage over the scandals and awareness in the government of how
costly the previous patterns had been from a fiscal capacity perspective.
Since 1987 EU funds had been of nearly as important for Castilla y Leo´n as for
Extremadura—ranging from five per cent of transfers at the beginning to over 50
per cent in the mid-1990s. EU transfers declined incrementally after 2004 when the
AC began to phase out of Objective 1 for EU cohesion policy. In 2010, EU funds of
various kinds represented 14 per cent of transfers to the AC (BADESPE 2012).
In 2006 the PSOE at the central level, with the support of the ACs, passed the
Ley de Dependencia. While in Madrid and Valencia dependency benefits have been
slow and irregular in approval and dispersal, Castilla y Leo´n has been one of the most
competent among the ACs governed by the PP. In an AC with an aging and highly
dispersed population, implementation of the law has provided important sources of
employment in small towns and “quietly” improved the quality of life of dependents
73El Mundo 10/2/2012 “Herrera defendera´ el modelo de las autonom’ias en la Conferencia de
Presidentes.”
74El Mundo 10/2/2012 “Herrera defiende el modelo autono´mico, pero cree que ‘algunos lo han
usado mal’.”
75El Pa´ıs 3/7/2005 “Una comisio´n de las Cortes de Castilla y Leo´n aprueba la financiacio´n del
cambio de sexo.”
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and their caregivers (Diego 2012).
In 2007 Herrera was reelected, Anto´n moved on to the Social Welfare Secretariat
and Francisco Javier A´lvarez Guisasola took over in Health. Guisasola had previ-
ously served as Secretary of Education and had been implicated in the 1990s as the
responsible party under whose supervision the grades for university access exams had
been changed for the children of his fellow rectors76. In 2007 Castilla y Leo´n was one
of five ACs whose health funds for fighting smoking were rescinded because they had
not implemented the law77—one of the few areas in Spanish health policy where the
center has successfully tied resource transfers to policy implementation.
As in several other ACs, the Statute was substantively reformed in 2007. In line
with a general movement in public policy during this period, participatory instru-
ments were built into the institutions of governance, guaranteeing social dialogue as
a responsibility of the government and considering the social rights laid out in the
Constitution and the Statute to be legally defendable for the first time (Art. 7-18).
Title II expands the policy authority of municipalities, which with a highly dispersed
population has been defended by all major political actors. In particular, Article 45.3
gives municipalities residual powers to implement policy in any area of local interest
that is not expressly forbidden to them. In Title V new competences were laid out,
authorizing the AC to create an autonomous police force and to exercise authority
over the Duero river basin (authority which was unanimously rescinded by the Tri-
bunal Constitucional later). Article 77.3 specifically demands that the competences
of Castilla y Leo´n be updated in accord with those held by other ACs .
The central PSOE 2009 regional finance reform established measures to take dis-
persion and old age explicitly into account in the health financing formula (Manzano
76El Pa´ıs 9/14/1999 “Condenado un catedra´tico por falsificar notas de selectividad”
77El Pa´ıs 10/31/2007 “Cinco comunidades perdera´n los fondos de Sanidad para prevenir el
tabaquismo.”
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Mozo 2010). This is an equity-enhancing reform for Castilla y Leo´n, yet inequal-
ity has not been a focus of health planning by AC officials at either a symbolic or
operational level (Borrell, et al 2005).
After 2001, while most of the conservative ACs chose not to use their new health
authority to expand youth dental coverage, the stance of Castilla y Leo´n was in line
with its overall approach to health services. It did not institute the PADI system
that most of the socialist ACs initiated, which was more comprehensive and anchored
in the public health system, following the Basque and Navarrese model. Instead,
it contracted with private dentists form some services beyond what was included
under primary care (Bravo-Pe´rez, et al 2006), therefore offering more than the bare
minimum of coverage, but not through the public system. Castilla y Leo´n is not one
of the best performers nor one of the worst in public health provision.
4.11.3 The PP Context
Why has Castilla y Leo´n taken a more nuanced approach to territorial policy at
a time when the PP was calling for greater central authority, yet also been more
supportive of a pro-poor model of AC financing than other conservative ACs? The
bulk of the answer is simple—Castilla y Leo´n has been a net beneficiary of central
government redistribution. It has always been near or just below the average in GDP
per capita and remained within the network of redistributive transfers from the center
and the EU. Common fiscal regime ACs that are higher income than average with
traditionally conservative government (Valencia, Madrid, and La Rioja) have a double
incentive (practical and ideological) to shun redistributive central transfers. Yet when
responsibility and accountability for provision of health care lies with the AC, it is
lower income than average, and financing formulas have a component of territorial
redistribution, rational actors do not turn down resources. The position of Castilla
y Leo´n is only unique because few conservative ACs are below average income and
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among those, the ideology of Herrera’s PP has been more moderate on issues of the
territorial organization of the state.
Castilla y Leo´n performs better than higher income conservative ACs in terms of
equity-enhancing health policy. The ruling PP organization in Castilla y Leo´n has
been more moderate ideologically on the economic left-right spectrum than in Valencia
and Madrid. The latter two ACs have large and densely populated communities with
a sizeable upper middle class that is entrenched in politics and has clear interests in
residual public service provision. The scandals of illicit party financing and funneling
of public money to private interests have been the most acute in Madrid and Valencia.
These influences have existed, as we have seen, in Castilla y Leo´n as well, and have
certainly compromised the equity-enhancing nature of health provision.
Where Madrid and Valencia have unabashedly cut public spending on social ser-
vices and begun to dismantle the public system during the crisis, Castilla y Leo´n
has not. When former Health Secretary Ce´sar Anto´n was named the new head of
IMSERSO under the central PP to manage the Ley de Dependencia country-wide,
this was seen as a political statement in favor of a more moderate conservatism that
favored competent service provision in the public sector.
Yet executives in Castilla y Leo´n have had lower administrative capacity because
of the need to balance the competing demands of nine unique provincial party iden-
tities. As we have seen, executive portfolios have revolved through provincial PP
leaders who often use the AC government as a platform for becoming executives in
their province of origin. Castilla y Leo´n has had less continuity in the secretariats
than Extremadura or the Basque Country, where these provincial demands for rep-
resentation have been less powerful. The Health Secretariats in Castilla y Leo´n have
been held by economists or professional party leaders who have also managed edu-
cation, economy, or environment portfolios. These problems are partially the result
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of creating a territorial administration that does not overlay the primary reference
communities of its members, and where lower level territorial loyalties are dominant.
Castilla y Leo´n has shown visible lack of commitment to equity-enhancing reform
with resulting deficiencies that stand in contrast to the way health policy has been
prioritized in the Basque Country or Extremadura. Yet results have been better
than in other conservative ACs where fiscal capacity is lower (Galicia and Murcia), or
where commitment has been noticeably lower still (Madrid and Valencia). Services
“existen, pero no van ma´s alla´” (Diego 2012)78. The case illustrates the way that
the impact of decentralization depends on the relative position of the AC and the
resulting availability of resources, as well as ideological commitment commitment.
4.11.4 Castilla y Leo´n: Conclusion
The case of Castilla y Leo´n is a hard case for exploring the absence of commitment—
it is arguably the least neoliberal of the PP governed ACs. Yet this is in large part
because it has historically been poorer, with a smaller elite and many small-holders.
Because of its relative lack of wealth, the AC has been a net beneficiary of central
government redistribution, as well as a recipient of EU funding, which has made it
hard for AC government to snub resources and programs funded by the center.
The large number of provinces in Castilla y Leo´n has created dynamics not present
in any other AC. Capacity has been limited by provincial politics because the AC does
not line up with the primary reference community for any of the parties or leaders in
the region. Just as Extremadura benefited from late decentralization from a capacity
building perspective, Castilla y Leo´n benefited as well.
In addition, due to lack of commitment in the AC, having health reform imple-
mented primary by the center under the PSOE meant the system was consolidated
before it was devolved. Once it was decentralized, conflicts of interest emerged as
78“Services exist, but they don’t go the extra mile”
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political actors connected to private medical industry channeled public resources to
friends and business partners. In the past decade, AC government has been more
stable and capacity has increased, yet the difference from the more highly committed
ACs has been palpable.
4.12 Spain: Conclusion
In Spain we have seen that while economic development created crucial impulses
for the expansion of the welfare state, ideological commitment to redistribution and
pro-poor social policies by centrist and leftist parties under democracy have driven
equity-enhancing health reform. Fiscal and administrative capacity have constrained
or enabled equity-enhancing reform, depending on their relative abundance. Minority
nationalism has rarely been positive for redistributive policy production at the AC
level—the Basque Country is the only case that shows such benefits and even there
these results cannot be fully disentangled from high levels of fiscal capacity and a
long history of coalition government with the left. Decentralization has activated
local sources of commitment and capacity, bringing variation to the fore.
At the central level, minority nationalism has clearly constrained equity-enhancing
policies by dividing the left, inhibiting institutional reforms that would benefit poorer
ACs, and pushing hard for fiscal decentralization that was regressive at the country
level and for poor ACs. If the minority nationalist forces in Spain were poorer than
average, or leftist, their role would likely have been less regressive. But the con-
flicts of overlaying territorially divergent reference communities on traditional left-
right policy cleavages should generate competing pressures that moderate ideological
commitments to redistribution, regardless. The challenges of defining the state are
particularly difficult when two visions of the reference community are incompatible,
yet highly salient for actors. Spanish nationalists see Catalonia as part of Spain and
Catalan nationalists do not. It cannot be both, yet significant actors on both sides
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are willing to go to great lengths to realize their vision of the reference community.
The most enduring characteristic of AC finance in Spain has been its constant
reform. The ACs are powerful and not equally content with the organization of
the state and their role in revenue, so conflict is a constant and significant drain
on political resources for policy making. The dominance of territorial conflict has
diminished energy on the left for redistributive policy advances both at the central
and AC levels.
The scarcity of revenue at various levels of government gnaws at the foundation of
the SNS and poses the greatest risk to its future. In the face of the economic crisis of
the past five years, this has been the dominant ideological struggle over health policy.
Committed ACs are trying to keep their systems adequately funded, but the central
government is now cutting back on the coverage and services it guarantees, placing a
greater burden on individual ACs that wish to maintain high levels of coverage. As
the sources of revenue for health have been mostly decentralized, the possibilities for
greater inequality now increase regardless of commitment.
In the case studies we have seen committed poor ACs pouring resources into
historically underfunded health services while wealthier committed ACs achieve even
better results with far less effort and fewer trade offs. The consolidation of the
system during its formative years under socialist tutelage at the center prevented
major retrenchment until the current crisis, but disparities creep in at the margins
under constant pressure to contain cost in a system that has been underfunded since
its inception.
The role of timing cannot be overstated. In 2010, the seven early decentralizing
ACs were split in terms of health spending per capita in a telling manner. The
Basque Country and Navarre were the two highest spenders, Catalonia precisely in
the middle, and Galicia, Andalusia, Valencia, and Canarias dead last, with only one
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AC spending less. Madrid, the AC with the highest level of GDP per capita in Spain,
spends less per capita than any other AC on health care. As the broad-based 2012
protests and mass resignations of clinic directors in Madrid illustrates79, it is not
that madrilen˜os desire less public health provision than others. These decisions are
directly tied to regional variation in ideological commitment. These figures illustrate
the way that decentralization opens the possibilities for dispersion, which are realized
(or not) depending on combinations of central and AC capacity and commitment, as
well as the starting point for equity prior to shifts in territorial authority.
Timing is also important because equity-enhancing social policies often display
patterns of increasing returns. A number of ACs appear to be anomalies in health
policy, with long legacies of conservative government or low capacity, yet high coverage
rates for equity-enhancing reforms. But the impact of commitment, as we have seen,
is particularly important at particular points—especially when policies are passed,
implemented, and consolidated. Once they become viewed as social rights, they are
harder to rescind. In 1984 and 1986 the PSOE, with an absolute majority in the
central government, passed health reforms that were highly contentious and ideolog-
ically contested by private medical associations and parties on the right. Where the
PSOE governed regionally during the crucial early years of implementation, coverage
rates started out higher and then increased over time regardless of which party gov-
erned. Early decentralizers had the greatest variation in policy implementation and
include the worst performers, as well as the best. Table A.7 illustrates this process
in the context of the primary care reform, with the most recent data on per capita
spending and GDP per capita relative to the Spanish average. In addition, Table A.8
presents overall primary reform coverage in the ACs given the levels of commitment
and capacity at particular moments.
79El Pa´ıs 1/8/2013 “Directivos de ma´s de la mitad de los centros de salud presentan su dimisio´n.”
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Where Brazil began the democratic period with little authority to hold subnational
units accountable for guaranteeing health care rights but has steadily strengthened
mechanisms for central oversight, Spain has had the opposite experience. Over time,
the Spanish central government has found itself with less and less authority to oversee
or ensure even the basic minimum social policy guarantees it has the authority to leg-
islate. While ACs with committed and capable government can fend for themselves
without the center, ACs without committed and/or capable governments need com-
mitment and capacity at the center to avoid leaving the poor and vulnerable without
protection. The socialists in Spain, as the only centrally committed political agents,
have continued to defend social and fiscal policies that will protect these members
of society. Over the course of the past thirty years we have seen Spain reach a high
level of social cohesion, given the reality of democratic decentralization. A zero-sum
shift in health responsibilities from the center to the ACs has weakened possibilities
for equity-enhancing health reform at the center, while prolonged economic crisis has
eroded the capacity of all territorial actors.
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5 BRAZIL
In this chapter I assess the development of equity-enhancing health reform in
Brazil over the past few decades1. I trace the development of Brazilian health policy
in terms of capacity, commitment, and the territorial distribution of authority from
the policy legacies generated under Vargas, through the initial political opening af-
ter 1946, and the military regime through the 1988 democratic constitution to the
current day. Compared to Spain, health reform in Brazil has been slower and more
halting, with significant shortages of capacity and commitment at key moments in the
reform process, but has still continued to improve access and coverage for the neediest
members of society over time. Key for reform expansion has been improvements in
capacity and commitment at multiple territorial levels.
Progress has been slowed by inconsistency in the level of commitment at the
center, great variation in commitment and capacity in the states and municipalities,
the stigma attached to crucial parts of the Sistema U´nica de Sau´de (SUS, Single
Health System) because of failure to achieve high coverage and quality provision early
on, its complex relationship with private providers, and the regressive nature of public
finance in the country. The one crucial arena that has not become more equitable since
democratization is that of health financing, where the burden has shifted significantly
toward local governments, private spending has continued to outpace public spending,
and the overall tax system continues to be dominated by indirect taxes, many of which
are collected subnationally.
1Parts of this chapter were presented at APSA 2011 and I am grateful to Barry Ames for his
thoughtful comments on that early draft.
In addition, whereas in Spain the commitment of the central government to equity-
enhancing social reform has been fairly uniform across policy areas, the nature of
Brazilian presidentialism means this has not been the case in Brazil. As Ed Amenta
describes in his work on the United States, in presidential systems the attention of
the executive is crucial for successful social policy reform (2000). Combined with the
high levels of authority exerted by individual ministers over their portfolios in the
Brazilian system, the opportunities for variance in level of commitment and capacity
across policy areas under the same government are far greater than in Spain.
The territorial distribution of health authority in Brazil is far more nuanced than
in Spain and therefore displays tendencies that can seem contradictory. The com-
bination of little conflict over the role of the center in policy making and strong
presidentialism has allowed central executives since the mid-1990s to improve ac-
countability and uniformity in coverage using primarily fiscal conditionalities. Yet
because the 1988 constitution granted concurrent competences in social policy to all
three levels of government (center, state, and municipal), responsibilities are only as
explicit as particular legislative initiatives make them. All three levels retain author-
ity to innovate in health policy, though over time the territorial distribution of the
SUS has become more transparent and accepted by all actors. Yet as long as the
basic framework of the SUS operates, subnational units are not bound to participate
in many programs and quite a few have opted out in order to operate their own
versions—some more equity-enhancing and some less.
Variation has remained high in access to services, quality of care, and health out-
comes in large part because of this policy autonomy, combined with the increasingly
decentralized nature of health service provision and management. The timing and
sequencing of decentralization and health reform have played an important role in the
development of the SUS, which makes a comparative historical approach particularly
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useful. In contrast to Spain, the primary legislative framework for the SUS began
under conservative government at the center and when subnational units already had
substantive authority in health. This has made equity-enhancing implementation
across the country more difficult. I explore these processes with case studies of two
states and their capital cities—Bahia and Sa˜o Paulo—as well as shadow cases of
comparable states and municipalities.
In the first decade after the transition to democracy, Brazil shifted from a highly
centralized contributory health system that served only formal sector workers to the
SUS—a decentralized universal system in which state and municipal governments
bore nearly full responsibility for the provision of health services, as well as some
of the financing. Two decades of authoritarian rule had convinced reformers that
decentralizing health care would be more democratic and would improve outcomes
for Brazil’s millions of poor people. As in Spain, democratic forces had high hopes
for decentralization.
The 1988 Constitution guaranteed health as a social right and implicated the
government in ensuring equity and access to public services, as well as embedding
health care in the broader network of public services necessary for realizing good
health. All three major territorial levels of government were given authority to act in
social policy material, which has made coordinating institutions an absolute necessity.
Municipalities play a crucial role in providing and managing health services. Enabling
legislation was passed in 1990 and 1991 and major health reforms aimed at ensuring
the institutional foundation of the system, improving its financing, and guaranteeing
equity and quality under decentralization have been passed over the past two decades.
Brazilian states have taken on differing levels of responsibilities in health over
time, with all having full competences in coordination and oversight of the SUS in
their territory, but negotiating an increased role in direct provision of medium and
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high complexity care over time. A similar model has been used for municipalities and
states have been responsible for making the decision about when and how to devolve
expanded responsibilities to the municipalities. The early rounds of SUS legislation
gave the municipalities full responsibility for provision of primary care.
The states play a central role in training and assisting municipalities in managing
their health responsibilities, as well as directly providing services—especially hospital
and medium and high complexity infrastructure. All three levels have decision-making
authority, provision responsibilities, and oversight tasks in the SUS. This has allowed
for significant variation in the organization and implementation of health policies.
In Brazil, state and municipal health secretariats are financed directly through the
central Health Ministry, in addition to having own source revenues. Both the level
of transfers and the strings attached have increased substantially over time. Unlike
Spain, Brazil keeps no national system of health accounts, so while we know how much
is being spent on health at different levels and what portion of central government
health spending comes from social security vs. general taxation, we do not know how
much money is being sent to each subnational government from the Health Ministry.
Municipalities tend to be the face of the SUS and an increasing burden for supple-
mental financing has developed over time as municipalities top up insufficient central
transfers. This situation was worsened by Constitutional Amendment 29 in 2000,
which fixed set per cents of state and municipal revenues for health and education,
but froze federal spending by tying it to real GDP growth. Not only are tax rev-
enues insufficient, they are quite regressive. Public health spending in Brazil is just
over three per cent of GDP and private spending is over 60 per cent of total health
spending, as it has been since the mid-1990s (World Bank Database 2013).
Poverty and inequality in Brazil are so intense that there has been little ideological
opposition to pro-poor social policies in health, education, and social assistance when
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these have remained fairly inexpensive and targeted. Yet as committed central actors
have attempted to expand the primary care programs originally designed for very poor
regions, transforming public primary care providers into the gatekeepers envisioned
by early health reformers, opposition has increased.
There has never been enough money for universal access with dignified levels
of quality for three main reasons: pension spending has never been fully reformed
and consumes significant resources, the tax system is regressive and the wealthy
do not pay their share of direct taxes (even though the overall burden is large),
and the elitist nature of national politics combined with many veto actors means
reforms are introduced and then slowly wither away with no resolution. The early
institutionalization of private markets for health insurance and service provision has
been one of the dominant barriers to fulfilling the constitutional mandate of the SUS.
Yet until the public primary care system becomes valued by the middle class, the most
equity-enhancing and efficient components of the SUS will continue to be vulnerable.
The central government has never been interested in hands-on management of
health care provision. For example, the center never directly provided care in the
states and municipalities, as it did in Spain until 2002. While in Spain there is signif-
icant conflict over what territories represent the legitimate terrain for redistributive
social policy reform, even among actors committed to equity, in Brazil this dimension
of conflict does not exist. Actors at different levels of government have their pref-
erences and constituencies, but there is no debate about whether Brazil is a single
nation. Levels of opposition to territorial redistribution are muted by comparison
and the federal rules of the game are fairly settled.
Commitment has been no less defining in Brazil than in Spain, it simply arrived
late. Leftist parties and social actors were wiped out during the dictatorship and had
not been particularly independent or institutionalized beforehand. The Partido dos
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Trabalhadores (PT, Workers’ Party) is by far the most disciplined and programmatic
of the parties on the left, which in turn are generally more programmatic and disci-
plined than most other parties, with some exceptions. Table A.4 lists the Brazilian
parties with a brief description and partisan coding.
Yet the PT began modestly in 1980 accumulating municipal electoral victories
and awards for good governance and innovative social programs, not winning its first
governorship until the end of 1994 and the presidency until the end of 2002. Because
the PSDB governed in coalition with right wing parties and, itself, shifted right over
time, its eight years in central government from 1994-2002 are complex to assess.
While issues of redistribution were not as central as they are for the PT, the state
reforms of the PSDB that stabilized the economy and its decision to federally back a
large number of equity-enhancing local initiatives mean its governance of Brazil was
positive for equity.
Brazil has long had a strong intellectual tradition that permeates the federal bu-
reaucracy. Major public and non-profit think tanks and universities, with prestigious
records of research and publication, have forcefully backed the movement for equity-
enhancing health reform, and politicians have paid attention. Since the mid-1990s,
evidence-based policy making in the social arena has been the norm. Because there
has been broad academic and bureaucratic consensus that Brazil’s elevated poverty
and inequality levels are bad on multiple fronts, successful health pilot programs from
the states and municipalities have been taken up at the center over time and sent
back, countrywide, with resources and technical support.
The phenomenon of the direita envergonhada (the ashamed right) has made politi-
cians shy away from being labeled as right wing because of the images it conjures of
the military regime (Power and Zucco 2009). While this can complicate assessments
of party placement, it also bends political elites toward support for equity-enhancing
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policies when the benefits appear clear and the costs are low. The social programs
expanded or created once the PT came to power at the center in 2003 have generated
strong public support for the policies, including health reforms that had stagnated
since the late 1980s.
Yet the obstacles facing committed actors at the center have been staggering in
Brazil. The SUS languished without adequate financing or implementation for years
after its conceptualization. Entrenched private interests attempted to block reforms
at the outset and high levels of decentralization limited the ability of the center to
implement programs and policies that could be applied uniformly across the country.
Health care was not the PT’s primary focus and for significant periods during the
first two administrations of President Lula (2003-2010), the Health Ministry was in
the hands of less committed actors from centrist parties.
Unlike Spain where a large middle class defends public health provision as a cit-
izenship right, in Brazil the SUS does not have powerful defenders outside those
ideologically committed to the project. While almost all transplants and the bulk of
the most expensive complex procedures are performed by public surgeons in public
hospitals (and paid for with public money), middle and upper class citizens have pri-
vate insurance and providers for specialist and primary care and often do not think
of the SUS as “theirs” to defend. The constant tinkering since the system’s inception
has prevented consolidation of certain aspects of the SUS, as layers of bureaucracy
have been added and removed and new procedures and policy tools created.
Despite the fact that important reforms were initiated by subnational actors and
the central PSDB, as well as health care being relatively low on the policy totem
pole once committed actors took the helm in Bras´ılia, this case study still shows that
the most equity-enhancing components of health reform have advanced the farthest
under the PT at the center. This argument may be somewhat controversial among
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Brasilianists, but the evidence is clear both in the statistical and comparative his-
torical analyses. The neediest states and municipalities did not have the capacity to
innovate or implement reform under the high levels of decentralization that were in
place when health reform began. Equity-enhancing reforms were pioneered first by
left-of-center actors at the subnational level, but overwhelmingly in areas with high
levels of education and capable local governments.
While the PSDB took the first important steps toward incentivizing diffusion, it
was not until the PT arrived in Bras´ılia that equity was mainstreamed as a priority
across all ministries and major efforts were made at expanding public primary health
coverage. The PT’s dedication to the poor has permeated other policy areas, which
feed into outcomes. Social exclusion has been addressed from the perspective of race,
gender, poverty, and sexual orientation in ways that have increased access to health
and other social services for the most disadvantaged members of society.
The SUS is organized fairly specifically through national organic laws and reg-
ulations set forth by the Ministry of Health (Normas Operacionais Ba´sicas, Basic
Operating Norms or NOBs). However, it took several years for the roles and re-
sponsibilities of the three levels to coalesce and some aspects of the distribution of
responsibilities continue to change over time. The case of Brazil is particularly com-
plex because very few exclusive responsibilities exist at any level. States do not have
legal control over municipalities, which are autonomous entities (C1988 Art. 18), and
social policy and financing responsibilities are shared between all three levels.
While not all subnational governments do what they “should,” there is less con-
fusion about the territorial distribution of responsibilities than in the past. Despite
the protagonism of municipal and state governments in social policy, their autonomy
is not as great as it may seem. In social policy, as in other areas, there are few
functional limits on the scope of action of the central government. The history of
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statism and presidential politics in Brazil often produces strong executives capable of
recentralizing policy control. Health care has been no exception.
Brazilianists often disagree about the extent to which subnational governments
have political control over the SUS. Some argue it is a completely centralized policy
since national health law is binding on subnational units, while others argue that
the innovation shown by subnational governments proves that they do, in fact, have
authority over health policy. Social policy has become more centralized under both
the PSDB and PT central governments since 1994 (Melo 2008: 174). State and local
governments, as well as users and providers, have important input into the develop-
ment of national health policy through various intergovernmental and participatory
mechanisms, which are discussed in detail in below. Yet subnational units cannot
override the basic provisions of national health law, so for example they could not
formally limit access to services or abolish the private health sector in their territory.
As in Spain, the central government has the authority and responsibility to set
minimum standards. I argue that the center plays a stronger role in health policy in
Brazil than in Spain not only because its hands are not tied once a zero sum transfer
of health responsibilities is made (the Spanish case of devolution to the ACs), but
also because there are no actors fundamentally contesting the right of the central
government to be involved in social policy. The action and inaction of the center
have been the primary stimulants for health policy developments at all three levels.
Policy authority is shared and all three levels are capable of making decisions that
can have a substantive impact on the equity-enhancing nature of the SUS within their
territory, but ultimately, the central government holds more cards than the states and
municipalities in health policy.
Representatives to the national congress have been considered “ambassadors” of
the states because of the history of powerful ties to elite state level politics, which
215
induce legislators to keep the interests of the states and their own future careers front
and center while serving in the national legislature (Samuels 2003). It could therefore
be argued that the legislature is an outlet for subnational interests. However, the 1988
constitution gave significant powers to the executive and as the case studies show,
while the national congress has substantial legislative authority, there is great latitude
in social policy for unilateral action on the part of the national ministries. Federal
deputies are directly elected rather than formally chosen by subnational governments
(Hooghe, et al 2014, forthcoming), so as subnational power relations shift over time,
the relationship of the national congress to the states remains fluid.
At the same time, subnational governments have broad latitude regarding how
they fulfill their obligations under national law. They can create new programs and
run clinics and hospitals themselves or contract services through private providers.
The upper limit for subnational initiative is not clearly defined and innovative states
and municipalities in Brazil have taken full advantage, to the benefit of their popu-
lations and in many cases, the rest of the country. The precursors for the Agentes
Comunita´rios de Sau´de (ACS, Community Health Agents) and the Programa Sau´de
da Familia (PSF, Family Health Program) were created and diffused by municipali-
ties, supported from the national Health Ministry beginning in the early 1990s (Borges
Sugiyama 2007: 4). Once the ACS and PSF became federal programs, municipalities
still decided which neighborhoods would receive health teams and new facilities.
States are responsible for training municipal health administrators and have au-
tonomy to determine how and when full devolution takes place, and in extreme cases
revoke some health responsibilities. States can also initiate new programs and build
new facilities at their discretion. While subnational units have to comply with spend-
ing requirements for health and education since 2000, they are not constitutionally
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bound to follow the programs developed at the center. As a result, since the mid-
1990s the central government has primarily used incentives and conditionalities to
entice subnational cooperation (Arretche 2004).
Because of the autonomy of municipalities and the incipient institutionalization
of oversight in the SUS, accountability has been one of the most serious obstacles
to the realization of equal health access and constitutional rights. State and federal
regulators took over management of health services in two municipalities of Rio de
Janeiro in 20092 and the state of Bahia revoked medium and high complexity care
management (gesta˜o plena) for a municipality that year as well. But this process is
politically sensitive to intergovernmental power relations. It would be nearly impos-
sible to hold a large municipality like a state capital accountable for major failures.
In addition, municipalities are now fully responsible for primary care, but when they
fail to provide services, state financed hospitals end up treating those patients.
5.1 Health Inequality in Brazil
What is the status of health inequality in Brazil? The improvements in Brazilian
infant mortality by state dwarf the convergence seen in Spain. Figure A.1 shows
average infant mortality rates over time for the Brazilian states, as well as the level
of variation (one standard deviation above and below the mean). Figure 5.1 shows
that while in 1985, infant mortality rates were very high in poor states, there were
many states at various intermediate and higher levels of economic development that
had attained similar (lower) levels of infant mortality. By 2010, the relationship with
GDP per capita was much more consistent. The distribution of infant mortality across
the country is tightly tied to the legacy of slavery and labor repressive agriculture.
Regional variation follows a clear North-South pattern, highly correlated with the
white portion of the population. While all states have dramatically decreased infant
2Folha de Sa˜o Paulo 2/12/2009 “Fiocruz ‘assume’ gesta˜o da sau´de em duas cidades do Rio de
Janeiro.”.
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mortality, the stratification by income is clear.
The overall decreases have been most dramatic in the areas where infant mortality
was highest to begin with, but the per cent declines have been similar across states.
Greater policy effort is likely required to decrease infant mortality at lower levels.
Still, the value of the large overall drops cannot be overstated—these shifts represent
hundreds of thousands of families who did not lose their infants to avoidable illness
caused by dehydration or lack of vaccination for common infectious diseases.
Figure 5.1: Brazilian Income and Infant Mortality Over Time
5.2 Health Politics Before Democracy
As in Spain and much of Latin America, early health policies were developed to
address emerging demands from new industrial working classes and were designed as
social protections associated with the risks of the labor market. In Brazil, Getulio
Vargas (1930-1945) expanded the sectors covered by social security and old age pen-
sions as part of a broader corporatist project (Borges Sugiyama 2012). Vargas’ Estado
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Novo ended in 1945 but among other legacies, bequeathed a modernized and profes-
sional civil service to the new regime, greatly enhancing administrative capacity at the
center. The constitution of 1946 expanded civil liberties and political competition,
though the exclusion of illiterates maintained disenfranchisement of a massive portion
of the population until the democratic transition in the mid-1980s. The communists
were also excluded from political participation at particular moments.
The new capital of Bras´ılia was inaugurated in 1960 during the government of
Juscelino Kubitschek, a period of rapid economic growth and development. Industri-
alization accompanied increased incomes and urbanization, but regional inequalities
were enormous and the interior of the country still lagged far behind. Vice presi-
dent Joa˜o Goulart, who had clashed with elites in 1954 when he raised minimum
wages for industrial workers as Minister of Labor, became president in 1961 after the
executive’s resignation—despite the military’s attempt to prevent him from taking
office. Goulart tried to implement land reform in the cities and countryside, educa-
tion reforms, and fiscal reforms to increase the progressivity and capacity of Brazil’s
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tax system. The military overthrew his government in 1964, ending political com-
petition. The example of Goulart’s attempt at reform is similar to many cases in
Latin America where equity-enhancing reform was inhibited by military intervention.
These experiences are key to understanding how democracy can enable such reforms
simply by eliminating the possibility of an authoritarian veto.
The regime became increasingly repressive over the course of the 1960s. In the
early years a series of Atos Institucionais (Institutional Acts) were decreed, which
removed specific politicians from office, wiped out the political parties that had been
hard-won in the mid-forties, and temporarily closed congress. Under the Atos, all
state and central executives became indirectly elected, as did the mayors of capital
cities and any others deemed politically important. A new constitution was passed
in 1967, which enshrined the practices the military had begun to put in place during
the previous three years, and which governed the country until the late 1980s.
Institutionalization of health policy within the government took place much earlier
than in Spain. The first Ministe´rio de Sau´de (Ministry of Health) was created in 1953
(Lei 1920), separating it from the Ministry of Education. Yet the Ministry of Health
was a weak institution for many years and was primarily focused on residual legal
management of public health (MS 2012). There were 14 Health Ministers from 1953-
1964, yet there were still important moments for the trajectory of health policy.
The nascent movimento sanitarista (sanitary movement)3 that emerged in the
1960s was supported by Health Ministers such as Esta´cio Souto Maior from 1961-1962.
The movement developed around awareness of the deep inequalities that persisted
and worsened as economic development modernized the country for some, but not
3The term “sanitarista” has been used for specific public health campaigns and movements in
Brazilian history. In relation to the SUS, the movimento sanitarista refers to a progressive public
health movement that emerged from transformations in the medical profession and in civil society
during the 1960s, reaching its peak influence with the 8th National Health Conference in 1986 where
the framework of the SUS was developed.
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for others. Decentralization to the municipalities and a reorientation of the role of
the central government in health was advocated for the first time by Health Minister
Wilson Fadul in 1963, following his convocation of the III Confereˆncia Nacional
da Sau´de (Third National Health Conference, CNS), an important moment in the
development of social pressures around health reform. The Brazilian National Health
Conferences have continued to be important moments for defining the trajectory of
health reform in the country.
Brazil’s bureaucracy has a history of being strong, capable, and somewhat insu-
lated from politics. A group of technocrats that emerged from the management of
the public industrial workers’ pension system (IAPI) before the 1964 coup had been
influenced by universalizing doctrine in Great Britain and vied with those commit-
ted to the existing system of contributory social insurance. In 1960 they succeeded
in the equalization of social security benefits for all classes of formal urban workers
(Weyland 1996: 90). In 1966 the Instituto Nacional de Prevideˆncia Social (INPS, Na-
tional Social Security Institute) was created as an umbrella organization to manage
the various institutions involved in social security.
For the first time, anyone could receive emergency care at the expense of INPS,
though in practice this only meant those in urban centers (Weyland 1996: 96). In
1967 the role of the Ministry of Health was expanded to include more significant
public health oversight and implementation, including traditional areas of infectious
disease control, but also drug trafficking (MS 2012). As under the Franco regime in
Spain, the 1960s and early 1970s were a time of economic expansion as well as regime
investments in increased central government capacity.
The late 1960s were also the harshest years of the dictatorship when Ato Institu-
cional 5 (AI-5) was passed, allowing for the closure of Congress and the institution-
alization of repression. In the first decade after the coup, repressive and conservative
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military leadership began to consider incorporation of rural workers into the social
insurance scheme as a way of shoring up the regime’s base of support. In the early
1970s, the same economic boom that was catapulting Spain into the developed world
was also experienced in Brazil. Economic growth permitted the resources for the
creation of FUNRURAL–a social insurance scheme that covered formally employed
rural workers and was free at the point of delivery, financed with a three per cent tax
on agricultural production (Almeida 1981).
The health services associated with the social security system went from cover-
ing just 10 per cent of the workforce to covering a majority (Weyland 1996; Falleti
2010b). But few health posts existed in rural areas and doctors did not reside in
rural communities so even for primary and prenatal care most rural workers had to
travel to cities (Barros, et al 1986), which represented an important limit to access
for the poor. Convincing doctors to serve in rural areas has continued to be one of
the biggest roadblocks for access, quality, and continuity of care for many Brazilians.
The military government from 1964 to 1974 had a statist perspective regarding its
role in national economic development, but lacked commitment to equity-enhancing
reform. While conservative authoritarians had expanded access to health and social
insurance among the employed and their dependents, the regime was not oriented
around solidaristic principles nor was it interested in creating public welfare systems.
The bureaucratic authoritarian regime was ideologically supportive of the private
sector and used public money to subsidize private health expansion (Pa´ım, et al
2011; Paula and Braga 1986). The decision of the military to focus social benefits
and investment on private curative care for urban elites and a narrow middle class
meant the poor majority of the country saw little benefit during this period (Horn
1985; Weyland 1996; McGuire 2001). As those at the top received more access to
care, inequalities in health care increased.
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In the second phase of the military regime from 1974-1985, the gradual reformist
Ernesto Geisel and his successor Joa˜o Figueiredo governed the country. Political and
civil rights began to reemerge in the process known as “abertura” or political opening
(Stepan 1989). Geisel saw social insurance as an important part of ensuring the sta-
bility of politics and the sustainability of the existing model of economic development.
He created the Ministerio de Prevideˆncia e Assisteˆncia Social (MPAS, Ministry of
Social Insurance and Welfare) in 1974, which became an important institutional actor
in pushing for extended health coverage.
In 1977 the Instituto Nacional de Assisteˆncia Me´dica da Prevideˆncia (INAMPS,
National Social Security Institute for Health Care) was created. Coverage under
INAMPS at this time was quite high but was based on contributory social insurance
principles. While originally envisioned as part of the pension system, INAMPS quickly
became a major purchaser of health care services. But because it had not been
designed as a part of an overall plan for the provision of health care, it functioned
primarily as a consumer and did not initially use its weight in the health market to
set policy. While the technocratic corp in the newly created MPAS was interested
in extending access to care for the Brazilian population, this was not a widely held
priority in the military administration as a whole, nor even in the leadership of the
MPAS (Weyland 1996: 92). Therefore, pressure for an equity-enhancing approach to
the fast-expanding public role in health service consumption was limited.
While INAMPS did eventually attain a group of its own public hospitals, most of
its provision was subcontracted. Whereas in Spain the center had a long history of
direct health provision, facilitating the decision to directly provide health services in
a new universal system, no such legacy existed in Brazil. There was no money and no
political will for building a centralized health service from scratch to fulfill the eventual
constitutional mandate, so subnational service provision was overdetermined.
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From 1970-1980 the use of health services increased dramatically, but primarily
through the increase in public consumption of private health services for formal sec-
tor workers. Hospital use, in particular, increased substantially (Weyland 1996: 97).
Without a clear vision of the public role in sustainable provision directed toward the
needy, public health coverage remained largely unplanned and the presence of private
interests within and close to the government ensured that beneficial arrangements
were incorporated into contracts. The result was an expensive system that paid
higher rates for more complex and expensive services, incentivizing expensive cura-
tive service provision (Arretche 2004; McGuire 2010; Falleti 2010b; Borges Sugiyama
2012). Because the state contracted almost all services with private providers, with
lax oversight and no overall model for the goals of publicly subsidized care (outcomes
vs. quantity of procedures), costs skyrocketed during the early 1970s. Extracting the
public sector from this expensive relationship has been nearly impossible.
The case of childbirth coverage is illustrative. In just a decade caesarian sections
increased from 15 to over 30 per cent of births in large part because of expanded
INAMPS coverage. The government paid higher rates for caesarians than for natural
delivery, and with little access to other contraception under the natalist policies of
the military, Brazilian women took advantage of the surgery to have tubal ligations
performed (Barros, et al 1986). This example shows the path dependency of such
processes: in a decade Brazil became the world leader in caesarian births—a pro-
cedure which, when not medically necessary, increases the risks of childbirth with
unwarranted surgical intervention and is much more expensive for a public purchaser.
By the time INAMPS modified its financing scheme, the norms among a generation
of women and the practices of a generation of providers had shifted. Currently Brazil
has one of the highest rates of caesarians in the world at over 45 per cent (Mendoza-
Sassi et al, 2010), with those outside the SUS, using private insurance, receiving the
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procedure at a staggering rate of 81 per cent (Barros, et al 2011).
As all of this was occurring at the central level, states had their own Health Secre-
tariats, which often provided the primary care the central government did not. While
state governments were formally deconcentrated during the military regime (Eaton
2006; Hooghe, et al 2014 forthcoming), they still operated quite independently in a
number of areas. This activity by the states reflects the legacy of high decentraliza-
tion prior to the coup—while centralization certainly increased under authoritarian
rule, the states did not all of a sudden cease activity in all previous areas of respon-
sibility, particularly those that were not the primary concern of the central military
government. States ran health posts and centers that provided primary care, par-
ticularly to pregnant women, mothers, and children and were free of charge, even at
times providing medicines to the poor, if these were available (Barros, et al 1986:
22). Yet there were no guarantees—these were not citizenship or employment based
benefits and their provision depended primarily on the capacity and initiative of the
states. By the late 1980s, states were providing a majority of primary care services
(Borges-Sugiyama 2007: 128), yet the central government did three quarters of the
spending (Medici 2002: 4)—just one illustration of the distorted priorities and incen-
tives created by the regime.
5.3 Democratic Transition, the Sanitaristas and the Constitution of 1988
The first direct elections in nearly two decades were held for governors in 1982 in an
atmosphere of political opening. An amnesty was passed in 1979 (Lei Federal 6683),
which, like the Spanish amnesty, pardoned the regime along with the opposition. AI-5
was also lifted in this year. Exiled leftists could return and political prisoners were
released. Parties of the left were able to participate after the 1979 Lei de Partidos
Pol´ıticos had legalized parties (Lei Federal 6767). The legal opposition under the
military regime, the Movimento Democra´tico Brasileiro (MDB, Brazilian Democratic
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Movement), formed the centrist PMDB and won over a third of the governorships4.
The PT, which had emerged from industrial workers’ organizations in Sa˜o Paulo,
was only just beginning to compete and primarily at the municipal level. Yet along
with the other newly legalized opposition parties, a movement coalesced in support
of direct presidential elections (“Diretas Ja´!”), which were ultimately unsuccessful.
Economic crisis in the 1980s contributed to growing pressures for a return to
democracy in Brazil. The transition began in earnest in 1985 after the indirect elec-
tion of Tancredo Neves of the PMDB under the electoral college rules of the 1967
military constitution. The PT in parliament boycotted the election on principle and
expulsed those of its members that participated in the vote, differentiating itself based
on discipline and program from the start. The constitution of 1988 was therefore ne-
gotiated in a scenario in which the elected officials from the states had much greater
legitimacy than the national executive.
As in many other countries, public health in Brazil had been profoundly trans-
formed during the 1960s and 1970s (Nunes 1998). Publications, professional associa-
tions, and medical school training in sau´de coletiva (public health) developed during
these years. In Brazil, the Sanitarista movement emerged with a deep commitment
to public health and primary care as components of an inversion of social priorities
towards those at the bottom of the socio-economic scale. The 1978 Declaration of
Alma-Ata was influential in Brazilian public health circles, as it was in Spain.
In her insightful analysis of health reform in Brazil, Tulia Falleti (2010b) explains
that universalizing health reforms were successful not because of critical junctures
revolving around economic crisis, but because of gradual institutional changes like
4Rondoˆnia became a state in 1982, having previously been a Federal Territory, but not in time to
elect a governor. As part of the passage of the constitution in 1988, the rest of the Federal Territories
were eliminated. Roraima (previously Rio Branco) and Amapa´ became states and elected governors
in 1991, along with the Distrito Federal for the first time. The state of Tocantins was created at the
same time and is the only state for which data are not available during the previous period, because
it was a part of Go´ıas rather than a Federal Territory.
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those described in the previous section. Universalizing social policies were successful
because the military state first penetrated society with early reforms, and then the
reformers penetrated the state (40). At the heart of the reform movement were the
sanitaristas, many of whom were linked to the parties of the left. Sanitaristas worked
their way into various government agencies even before the democratic transition,
pioneering public primary care projects in the northeast that became models for the
future orientation of the SUS, even after they were shut down (Falleti 2010b).
Unlike Spain where the socialists were a major force in parliament by the time the
constitution was negotiated and the center right leadership that managed the reform
process fully expected the them to govern the country in the near future, in Brazil
the left was weak. The PMDB had already aligned itself as a centrist party and was
coordinating the writing of the constitution with the hereditary parties of the right
under military rule (ARENA). Together the Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL, Liberal
Front Party, a successor of ARENA) and the PMDB held nearly 80 per cent of the
seats in the constituent assembly, as a result of the elections of 1986 (Kinzo 1990).
The drafting process was extended and quite open to the public, resulting in a
long and detailed document (Ames and Power 1990). In the constituent assembly the
four existing parties on the left showed high levels of party discipline compared to
the rest (Mainwaring and Pe´rez-Lin˜an 1998). Yet they held only a handful of seats
and without the public nature of the process, with the strong participation of social
movements and pressures for particular avenues of reform, it is unlikely that health
care would have been incorporated as it eventually was. Where in Spain left parties
were the clear agents of equity-enhancing reform, in Brazil left parties were weak
and the dominant supporters of these policies were civil society organizations. Civil
society has historically been stronger in Brazil than in Spain (Encarnacio´n 2003), yet
as we shall see, civil society cannot make up for a lack of political commitment to
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equity by the actors who control the state.
The sanitaristas played a prominent role in the constitutional negotiations, which
took place far more directly in the public realm than they had in Spain. Health
reform was a major arena of social activism at the time and was a focus of institu-
tional reform. The tradition of National Health Conferences pioneered earlier in the
century resulted in the VIII Confereˆncia Nacional de Sau´de called by Jose´ Sarney,
the first civilian president elected in 1985. At the time, actors on the right and in
the established private medical sector were pressing to prevent health care from being
addressed in the constitution. The conference was the first to be open to the public
and had 1000 official delegates, half from civil society, and 3000 participants more.
It drafted the plan for the SUS that was incorporated into the 1988 constitution, re-
flecting the orientation of the sanitaristas who had become an influential social force
by this time (Falleti 2010b).
The goal was for the SUS to be universal, free at the point of service delivery, and
financed progressively through taxation. Social movements in Brazil mobilized around
the inclusion of provisions for participatory democracy, which impacted health reform
as well as other areas of policy making in the constitution. Therefore, while parties of
the left were not strongly represented in the legislature, the demands of progressive
forces in society for inclusion in the process resulted in committed actors drafting the
health guarantees in the constitution, regardless. Decentralization was a central tenet
of the sanitarista project, which, as in the case of Spain, associated decentralization
with a progressive break from the right wing authoritarian model of centrist gover-
nance of the past. This progressive movement supported decentralization of health
care in large part because they felt the private health sector had captured the central-
ized health bureaucracy under the previous regime (Arretche 2004: 167). They were
not anticipating a country in which the majority of states and municipalities would
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be governed by actors farther to the right than the national executive—the situation
that has existed since the mid-1990s. As in Spain, actors crafted institutions with
their immediate history as a backdrop—likely an unavoidable reality, but still one
that produced less than ideal conditions for equity-enhancing reform.
During the transition period, the central government lacked the fiscal capacity
to finance subnational allies (Lopreato 2000) and the transition process produced
territorial tensions as subnational units demanded resources without responsibilities,
while the center attempted to shift duties downward. In the immediate aftermath of
the transition it was subnational governments that came out ahead in fiscal terms,
although this does not necessarily imply that the fortunes of equity-enhancing social
policies were improved. In addition to substantial new transfers, the states gained
political control over the ICMS value added tax. Municipalities gained massive new
transfers. In neither case were concrete new responsibilities devolved immediately
(Samuels and Mainwaring 2004; Lopreato 2000; Montero 2000: 64).
In 1988 with the promulgation of the democratic constitution, health (not just
health care) was enshrined as a universal social right and an obligation of the state
(Art. 196). The constitution, however, left the actual design of the health system
to enabling legislation that would not follow for several years. The most significant
component that never made it into the constitutional guarantee was the creation of an
integrated National Health Service (NHS) with full public provision. The private sec-
tor, as in Spain, was too established and too powerful. Sandwiched between military
rule and the powerful wave of neoliberal reform and economic crisis that swept Latin
America in the early 1990s, the passage of a constitution with far-reaching progres-
sive citizenship rights took advantage of a unique historical moment. While the lack
of ideological commitment by the governments from 1989-1994 limited the develop-
ment of the SUS, the victory of a constitutional guarantee placed a formal foundation
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against which demands for expansion and access could be made over time.
5.4 Neoliberalism and the PMDB: 1989-1994
Though Tancredo Neves was elected President in 1985, he became ill and died
before taking office and his vice-president, Jose´ Sarney, took his place. In the midst
of a hyperinflationary economic crisis, Sarney implemented the Plano Cruzado in
1986, which for a brief period contained inflation and stabilized parts of the economy.
The first direct elections for President were held in 1989 and were narrowly won
by Fernando Collor, a young and charismatic businessman and Governor of Alagoas
since 1982. Collor had filtered through a number of parties and left the PMDB in
1989 in order to run for President from the Partido da Renovac¸a˜o Nacional (PRN,
National Renovation Party) a center right personalist party created to support his
nomination. The rising star and leftist union leader Luiz Ina´cio Lula da Silva nearly
won the elections and the PT’s loss helped solidified the trajectory of health reform
for the next decade.
For health policy at the national level, the ideological commitment of national ex-
ecutives and their health ministers are of primary importance for policy development.
Brazil’s presidential system gives a great deal of initiative to the national executive
and ministers have great power over the policies that are produced in their respective
areas. While during the transition the legislative process was dominant, afterward,
executive initiative became central for health policy (Arretche 2004: 156).
Collor’s government was characterized by neoliberal reform and the attempt at
an economic reform (Plano Collor) whose failure deepened the recession. In 1992
allegations of corruption prompted an impeachment process and Collor resigned be-
fore the process ran its course, leaving Itamar Franco, his vice president, to run the
country. The Collor and Franco governments were bereft of coherent leadership in
the Ministry of Health.
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The defining characteristic of their terms was the passage of the enabling legisla-
tion that created the SUS in 1990, which involved the national congress to a much
greater extent than later regulation, and the initiation of decentralization to the mu-
nicipalities. These were conservative presidents whose Health Ministers had strong
ties to the private medical community and were not committed to the progressive
goals of the SUS, which had been articulated in the constitution. Large portions
of the enabling legislation from 1990 were not acted upon and the President vetoed
elements of citizen participation and oversight that were reincorporated by the leg-
islature. From 1990-1995 there was little administrative continuity, with six health
ministers at the central level.
An important element of the SUS was implemented in 1990—the creation of the
intergovernmental consultation fora. In 1987 the Conselho Nacional de Sau´de (CNS,
National Health Council), which had operated as a professional organization earlier
in the century, was revived as a body to assess the Ministry of Health and included
appointed members as well as representatives of civil society (Decree 93933). In 1990
the reform of the CNS was enabled with legislation fleshing out its composition. In
addition, the health conferences were institutionalized, made permanent and given
an official role in consultation over health policy (Lei 8142). Accompanying state
level health councils were created across the country and institutionalized (Conselho
Estadual de Sau´de).
In 1982 the Conselho Nacional de Secreta´rios de Sau´de (CONASS, National Coun-
cil of State Health Secretaries) was created in conjunction with state level democrati-
zation and over the decade began to operate as an increasingly relevant advocate for
the concerns of the states. These have revolved primary around issues of financing,
though not exclusively. The Conselho Nacional de Secreta´rios Municipais de Sau´de
(CONASEMS, National Council of Municipal Health Secretaries) was created a few
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years later. Over time, both have become official interlocutors of the federal gov-
ernment in the coordination and planning of health policy. The importance of these
organizations has increased over time.
The failure to move reform forward in the early 1990s illustrates the Achilles heel
of a progressive reform championed primary by civil society actors. After the consti-
tution, legislation would be debated and passed by the legislature, or implemented
from the executive, with little opportunity for the influence of actors outside the
government and out of favor with the party in power. The Brazilian legislature was
dominated by the right and the private medical opposition had easy access to con-
gressional actors, who themselves were not committed to equity-enhancing reform.
Without ideological commitment among legislators and members of the cabinet, the
failure of equity-enhancing implementation was over-determined.
In the early years, decentralization was the constitutional component of the SUS
that advanced the farthest. This is primarily because it was one of the only com-
ponents over which the goals of the sanitaristas and the neoliberals in government
after 1989 coincided. In addition to the ideological challenges posed by the new gov-
ernment, the Sanitarista movement dissipated quickly after 1988 (Borges Sugiyama
2007: 131; Rodrigues Neto 1997). The movement had not been strongly connected to
more lasting national social movements and lacked a strong mass base in civil society
to sustain it after the transition.
The unions, which could have provided such a base, focused primarily on issues
of health rights on the job and did not take up the call to defend the universalistic
project of the SUS (Menicucci 2006: 76). Many of the strongest Brazilian unions
represented formal sector worker whose contracts provided private coverage and who
perceived little benefit from the new system. This is one of the clear and indirect
effects of high inequality—that the natural allies of those in need of public health
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services did not see themselves in the same boat as the poor masses. In addition, it
shows the ripple effects of the lack of direct public provision in health, as the unions
had private health insurance coverage rather than public.
The first round of enabling legislation was passed in 1990 (Lei Orga´nica de Sau´de
8080), but was not implemented by the executive until 1992 (Menicucci 2006: 75).
Subnational governments gained fiscal and policy autonomy without the presence
of accountability mechanisms designed to ensure management capacity or quality of
services and access. The Norma Operacional Ba´sica 1991 (NOB SUS 1/1991) that
began the process of implementing Lei 8080 contradicted various aspects of the con-
stitutional guarantee, which Brazilian health scholars have interpreted as signifying
opposition to the reform from within the bureaucracy (Menicucci 2006).
Financing in Brazil has also continued to come in part from payroll taxes (about
30 per cent), though in a country where those in the formal sector tend to be middle
class, this is not as regressive as it was in Spain. The Constitution mandated that
30 per cent of Social Security resources be spent on the SUS, but this was never
transformed into practice or law. If this level of spending had been implemented,
the Brazilian SUS would be in an entirely different league. As it was, financing
was left with no guarantee at all. This is a significant difference between Spain and
Brazil, as reformers were pushing the same shift for funding and management to
move out of social security. With no strong committed political forces behind the
SUS, bureaucrats in the social security administration, worried about losing funding
to the new health system, went largely unchallenged.
In the early 1990s Brazil was in the midst of an economic crisis and the Ministry
of Health was low on the cabinet totem pole. The Finance Ministry did not support
new taxes so even when Health Minister Adib Jatene won new funding for health in
1992, it was almost immediately offset by health cuts from Finance (Arretche 2004:
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175). The quality of the limited health coverage provided by the incipient SUS at
this stage was hampered by irregular and unstable financing (Menicucci 2006).
Beginning with NOB 1993, municipalities were incentivized to take on the highest
level of responsibilities despite the fact that accountability and oversight mechanisms
were still incredibly weak. Despite the language of the NOB 1993, financing followed
a process like that of the Spanish SNS in the early years, based primary on previous
levels of funding (CONASS 2011). At the height of the influence of the Washington
Consensus in Latin America, neoliberal pressures for state cutbacks and market-
oriented reforms encouraged decentralization with no strings attached. In addition,
central government officials knew that the resources to fully implement the SUS could
not be mustered (Bresser Pereira 2011). This rapid decentralization–primarily from
the center to the municipalities–decreased the capacity of the central government
to address the serious distributional challenges facing the country (Montero 2000:
59). Decentralization of health care under these conditions was decidedly un-equity-
enhancing (Weyland 1996).
The NOB 1993 created two bodies that would become increasingly important
over time—the Comissa˜o Intergestores Bipartite (CIB, Two-level Management Com-
mission) and the Comissa˜o Intergestores Tripartite (CIT, Three-way Management
Commission). The first was made up of the state Health Secretaries and the national
Health Minister, while the second added municipal Health Secretaries. These are im-
portant consultative organs that consult and problem-solve on health policy issues for
the SUS. In theory they are similar to the Spanish CISNS, but because the Ministry
of Health in Brazil has more unilateral authority for health policy making, the role
of the CIB and CIT has been less dominant in policy-making.
Under various pressures, states and municipalities began to innovate during these
years. They had some revenue and many were strongly committed to health reform,
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which they saw going nowhere at the center. The unsustainability of the previous
model, based on curative care and excluding the neediest members of society, had
been critiqued for decades. For some municipalities, the Cuban community-based
family doctor program was a model.
Yet these leftist municipalities that experimented with innovative equity-enhancing
primary care programs in the late 1980s and early 1990s5—Nitero´i (Rio de Janeiro),
Porto Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul), Curitiba (Parana´), Londrina (Parana´), Mar´ılia
(Sa˜o Paulo), Botucatu (Sa˜o Paulo), Fortaleza (Ceara´), among others—almost all had
high levels of capacity, as well as commitment. These success stories have been oft-
told, picked up by international and domestic reformers, alike. The programs have
been particularly important because of their influence on the development of the
Brazilian federal policies, yet as we shall see their application under uncommitted
or low capacity governments has been quite limited. The Programa de Agentes de
Sau´de (PAS, Health Agents Program) in Ceara´ is one of the few that arose in a high
commitment, low capacity area and became the model for the Programa de Agentes
Comunitarios de Sau´de (PACS, Community Health Agents Program) that was picked
up at the central level beginning in 1991 (Borges Sugiyama 2007).
The Minister of Health from 1993-1995 was Henrique Santillo, a pediatrician from
a municipality of Sa˜o Paulo that became one of the earliest innovators in primary
care (Ribeira˜o Preto). Santillo trained in Minas Gerais and was the first Governor
(in Go´ıas) to adhere to the SUS after pioneering an early PACS program in his state.
He had been a student activist during the military regime and was involved in the
founding of the PT in 1980, though later ran for Governor from the PMDB.
In 1994 his ministry launched the PSF along similar lines as the successful sub-
national experiments, over time incorporating most of them, though not all6. The
5This list comes originally from Terra and Malik 1998.
6A few municipalities with high capacity chose to keep their own more generous systems (as
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PSF is based on Unidades Ba´sicas de Sau´de (UBS, local health posts) where a team
of doctors, nurses, health agents, and over time other specialists would base their
primary care activities. The program shares aspects of the Spanish system, with a
particular number of people assigned to each team and, at least in theory, the teams
operating as gatekeepers for access to specialist and curative services. As we shall
see, because of low financing, stigma, and slow extension, the PSF has never been
able to functionally perform this second goal in most areas. In addition, because the
Spanish central government ran health provision directly in almost all regions at the
time of reform, it was the only game in town and had no competition from alternative
regional primary care networks.
For the early years of the SUS, pro-poor developments took place primarily at the
subnational level and were limited in scope. In the context of decentralization, the
diverse levels of ideological commitment and generally low capacity of subnational
units became more salient for social policies. Significant variation in the size of
subnational tax bases, administrative capacity, and ideological commitment to equity-
enhancing health policy will generally lend themselves to greater regional variation.
Federal transfers were skewed towards the poorer states in the North and Northeast
(Serra and Afonso 1999). This might have been equity-enhancing if these governments
had been committed to pro-poor policies, but at the time they mostly were not.
5.5 The Capable Centrists: Cardoso and the PSDB from 1995-2002
The PSDB emerged from a schism within the PMDB in 1988 and Fernando Hen-
rique Cardoso was a central part of the founding group. A progressive sociologist, he
had militated within the PMDB for it to be a moderate pro-democracy party. While
the PSDB was clearly promoting a center left alternative to the PMDB, the party was
discussed in Chapter 2), in addition to implementing PSF in other parts of the city (Porto Alegre
for example). As we shall see, some municipalities maintained less efficient plans not based on
public provision, such as Sa˜o Paulo. In general, only wealthy municipalities can choose to reject
PSF funding in order to pay for their own alternative system. Even in these cases PSF also operates.
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born not primarily over ideological conflict but because there were insufficient lead-
ership positions for all the rising stars coming out of Sa˜o Paulo (Roma 2002). Still,
in the early years there were also differences over “good government” and program.
While Cardoso had been an influential academic and politician in Sa˜o Paulo and in
the Senate, it was his role as Finance Minister under Itamar Franco that solidified
his trajectory in national politics. Cardoso protagonized the Plano Real, a set of
economic reforms that ended the economic crisis of the early 1990s and marked the
beginning of Brazil’s path toward economic stability and development.
The ideology of the PSDB during this period has been the subject of warm, if not
heated, debate7. The party’s alliance with the right wing PFL in 1994 was unpopu-
lar and had an ideological impact on many aspects of governance after winning the
presidency. What the party had was an ideological commitment to capable manage-
ment of public affairs. But what should we make of the fact that Cardoso and his
ministers took proactive steps to activate and incentivize equity-enhancing reforms
that it could have simply left to the states and municipalities? Or the fact that the
PSDB government also carried out a surprising level of land reform? Or that even
the Plano Real did not abide by IMF orthodoxy and employed fixed exchange rates
for several years?
The PSDB’s reform agenda emanated from a commitment to economic stability,
growth, and competent state management. Cardoso may personally have believed in
these goals as necessary preconditions for achieving equity, but the difference between
the ideology of the PSDB after 1994 and the PT since its inception is observable, even
7Coppedge codes the PSDB as secular center left from 1990-1994 based on expert surveys
(Coppedge 1997) and Huber and Stephens (2012) continue this coding. However, Borges Sugiyama
considers the PSDB to be a centrist party during this period, with exceptions for particular politi-
cians that were center-left. Celso Roma (2002: 71) argues that the party became centrist and then
shifted right in its second term. This is consistent with the story captured in the Power and Zucco
partisan placement surveys conducted with Brazilian legislators (2009; 2012).
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with the PT’s moderation once in office. The land reform was not part of an overar-
ching attempt to tackle the plight of the rural poor and left the agricultural system
largely as it had been (Pereira 2003). The social reforms were still vastly underfunded
and were completely in line with the means-tested minimalist programs for the poor
that were supported by international financial institutions, thus representing political
stances that did not require an ideological commitment to equity.
Still, under conditions of low capacity and economic and social underdevelop-
ment, simply governing with a commitment to increasing state capacity and stability
had equity-enhancing effects. Cardoso’s government marked an important transition
period for the SUS, when for the first time the groundwork for consolidation and ex-
pansion was laid. Technocratic governance, policies to stabilize the budget for health,
the appointment of several capable Ministers of Health who were not antagonistic to
the SUS, and the cost effectiveness of promoting prevention and basic care combined
to improve the distributive nature of health policy under the PSDB.
Macroeconomic crisis and state reform dominated the attention of Cardoso’s first
administration. According to one ministerial chefe de gabinete, “Fernando Henrique
always cared about redistribution, he just cared about the economy more.” In health
care, the programs that were the most redistributive were also the least expensive and
the most efficient from a neoclassical economic perspective, which explains why there
is little contradiction between the economically liberal orientation of the government
and its attitude toward health care during this period8.
However, Borges Sugiyama shows clearly that implementation of the PSF, the
most equity-enhancing component of Brazilian health policy, was statistically signifi-
cantly higher in municipalities governed by the left—though not in those governed by
8In fact, there was substantial disagreement within the Sanitarista movement about whether or
not to support the PSF at the outset precisely because the more radical branch believed it was
a “programa pobre para pobre,” a poor program for poor people (Borges Sugiyama 2007: 157;
Capistrano 1999).
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centrist parties, not to mention the right (2007: 75)9. This is an important finding
for two reasons. First, it is commonly held that partisanship does not matter at the
municipal level in Brazil because party machines are not programmatic, not even for
parties like the PT that are programmatic at the center. Second, one might argue
that left parties in municipalities are important for innovation, but not for imple-
mentation once central resources are tied to popular policies. Yet Borges-Sugiyama’s
findings suggest that left partisanship matters even for take up, and that the left is
significantly different from the center, which is where she places the PSDB.
While the Cardoso administration chose to support expansion of the PSF, the pro-
gram was developed and primarily diffused by local left-of-center politicians through-
out the 1990s. The limitations of PSDB commitment can be seen in other policy
areas, in education and minimum income programs where federal attempts at incen-
tivizing local innovations were clumsy, inadequate, or even counter productive to the
development of existing local programs (Borges Sugiyama 2007: 102-103). As part
of the state reform of 1995, Planning Minister Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira designed
a model of private non-profit health contracting that would be used extensively, and
controversially, in the state of Sa˜o Paulo.
Still, two of Cardoso’s Health Ministers were particularly important—Adib Jatene
(January 1, 1995-November 6, 1996) and Jose´ Serra (March 31, 1998-February 20,
2002). In stark contrast to the Spanish case where a “short” ministerial term would
be two years, after Serra, Jatene’s two years in office represent the longest tenure
among the eight Health Ministers who served between 1995 and the beginning of
9It is a common belief among observers of Brazilian politics that parties may “matter” at the
central level, but that municipal and state party machines function differently and are inherently
un-programmatic. There is certainly evidence for this at the municipal level, particularly in smaller
localities, and among those parties that are thoroughly un-programmatic at all levels. It is a good
argument for not trying to extend a theory of commitment to municipalities in statistical analysis.
Yet Borges Sugiyama’s findings, as well as those in this dissertation, suggest that in states and
capitals, as well as nearly everywhere governed by the PT, party and program have been differentiable
and important for outcomes.
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2007. Turnover in most ministries in Brazil is quite high and in the context of a
national process of defining the SUS, this lack of continuity has made the process
slower and less cohesive. The longest serving Ministers of Health under both Cardoso
and Lula were those appointed at the beginning of their second terms, who served all
the way through.
Adib Jatene developed the NOB 1996, which represented a major inflection point
in the development of the SUS, though it was not implemented until 1998. Many
transfers became automatic based on objective criteria and the distribution of re-
sponsibilities was clarified. This norm set the stage for municipalities to be held
accountable for quality and access to services in their territory. For the first time the
Piso de Atenc¸a˜o Ba´sica (PAB, Primary Care Base) was established—an amount of
money that was transferred to each municipality directly for primary care provision in
their territory. The fixed portion was low (10 reais a person in 1998), but incentivized
moving primary care out of ambulatory care facilities and into the PSF. A variable
amount was added for implementing the PACS and PSF, strengthening oversight,
collecting epidemiological data, regulation of occupational health and safety, public
health, and diagnostic testing (Uga´, et al 2003). An intentional side effect of the
reforms was to induce the creation of separate Health Secretariats in municipalities,
with health funds independent from the general budget, which were required for re-
ceiving the transfers and paved the way for slow increases in health administration
capacity and accountability. Once again, decentralization and local capacity building
were enabled and enduced from the center—a logic of decentralization that never
existed for the Spanish regions.
Jatene also strongly defended the creation of the CPMF, a tax on financial trans-
actions destined for health care (Arretche 2004: 175). His dismissal was directly
tied to what the administration perceived as incompatibility between his agenda in
240
health care and the economic orientation of the government (Menicucci 2006: 78).
Finally, and perhaps most important for distributive concerns, NOB 1996 paved the
way for the PSF to become a model for universal basic care coverage and begin to
shift Brazil away from a traditional curative model of care (Duarte de Arau´jo 2010:
89; Goldbaum, et al 2005: 91). As I discuss in the case study of Sa˜o Paulo, Jatene
struggled unsuccessfully to convince city leaders to adopt the PSF and eventually
helped state leaders implement the program in neighboring communities when the
capital city refused (Borges Sugiyama 2007; Capistrano 1999: 90).
The context of decentralization and macroeconomic crisis is part of the reason
that a committed Health Minister like Jatene would be less successful than later
minister Jose´ Serra. Although Serra’s position as a well-known party leader with
national political aspirations made his tenure unique, his Ministry of Heath was also
embedded in a different structural context than Jatene’s had been. By 1998 when
Serra became Minister of Health, financial incentives for the implementation of the
PSF were in place, oversight mechanisms were better institutionalized, and ongoing
health reforms were taking place under a strong national executive who had been
successful maneuvering against subnational leaders (Affonso 1997: 25). Still, Serra
was a strong Health Minister in his own right (Arretche 2004: 156) and spent twice as
long in office as most previous ministers had. He implemented important policies to
control drug prices, expand the PSF, and solidify the dominance of the public sector
in provision of transplants.
Developed over several years and implemented by Serra, the Ageˆncia Nacional de
Sau´de Suplementar (ANS, National Supplementary Health Agency) was envisioned
in June of 1998 (Lei 9656) and made operational with Lei 9961 in 2000. Until this
time the private health market had been completely unregulated (Albuquerque, et
al 2008). For the first time the government was trying to control the outflow of
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public resources to private health plan holders who used the SUS. It took several
years and numerous court battles to force private insurers to hand over their lists of
clients, which eventually the center would use to cross-reference lists of those who
received SUS services and then charge the private insurers directly10. The legislation
more broadly regulated the private insurance market and permitted international
investment in the sector for the first time (Carvalho and Oliveira 2007). As we shall
see, the ANS has offered the possibility of recovering resources for the SUS, but only
when agency managers were willing to pursue the issue.
Serra’s ministry was integral in developing and passing Constitutional Amendment
29 in the year 2000, which mandated spending on health by states and municipali-
ties, though with a somewhat perverse effect over time in terms of adequate central
government financing. Financing from the central government has historically been
highly unstable and this measure prevented decreases, but allowed the center to es-
cape the necessary investments for increases in costs and expansion of the system.
There are no legal requirements regarding the amount that should be received by each
state—no formulas with transparent definition as there are in Spain. Negotiations
and the political clout of particular governors and mayors still plays a role.
Amendment 29 set in place a major shift in financing away from the center and
toward states and municipalities because it required that they spend a specific por-
tion of their revenue on health, while tying central spending to real GDP growth.
This is a regressive reform from a vertical perspective, as most municipalities were
already spending close to the required 15 per cent of revenues on health (BNDES
2002) and as the center has fallen behind, have had to take up the slack. In addition,
while municipalities adhered fairly quickly, states and the federal government have
10See for example Folha de Sa˜o Paulo 11/17/2000 “Planos de sau´de devem R$ 2,6 mi ao SUS, diz
ANS” and 8/15/2000 “Empresas de sau´de se queixam de cobranc¸as para ressarcir o SUS.”
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often not met their required spending levels (Campelli and Calvo 2007). Still, spend-
ing inequality between the municipalities has declined substantially since the reform
(Arretche 2010), suggesting that it forced laggards to catch up. Yet we have little
information about the extent to which regions that lagged in spending did so out
of lack of commitment or lack of capacity, and the difference matters for the equity
enhancing nature of the reform.
Although the Cardoso government was not broadly committed to redistribution,
the combination of several committed and effective ministers with the successes in
macroeconomic stability, debt containment, and state management reforms ensured
progressive advances in health policy during Serra’s tenure. The central government
learned that simply writing a health system into law would not guarantee its im-
plementation across subnational units and began to incentivize compliance by tying
funds for programs like the PSF to conditionalities (Gomes 2008).
While governors lost influence during the 1990s under a powerful national execu-
tive who tightened the public purse strings (Samuels and Mainwaring 2004; Lopreato
2000; Montero 2000: 59), health policy remained highly decentralized at the munic-
ipal level. Enabling rules for the functioning of the SUS were produced consistently
over the course of the decade, but NOB 1996 was particularly important in producing
norms that were objective, binding, and delineated clearly the responsibilities of each
level (Duarte de Arau´jo 2010: 83).
However, the reforms of this period have not been unequivocally positive for equity.
The Lei Camata restricted subnational payroll spending to 60 per cent of revenue
as part of the state reform of 1995. In small municipalities in poor states, these
restrictions make it almost impossible to hire qualified health professionals (Benigno
2011). In Sa˜o Paulo, support for the shift of health provision to the private-not profit
sector was partly due to pressures to cut the portion of revenue going to salaries,
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in adherence to federal law (Sano and Abrucio 2008: 72). NOB 1996 also put in
place the system for tying direct federal funding for health to the different levels of
responsibility taken on by subnational governments. Its implementation did not begin
until 1998 and once it did, states began signing on at different levels of negotiated
responsibility for health. There were two levels: gesta˜o avanzada and gesta˜o plena.
The former included state-level funding for management of primary care only, while
the latter covered medium and high complexity care as well.
These reforms forced states and municipalities to make investments in human
resources and increased administrative and managerial capacity in health care, though
the extent of reform varied. Ongoing economic crisis, austerity, and stabilization
efforts sapped fiscal resources for social policy from all levels of government for most
of the decade, slowing implementation of the SUS. In addition, the state reforms
produced increases in administrative capacity and public finances only slowly. While
not surprising, it means that major improvements in the quality and accessibility of
health services did not appear during the first full decade after the creation of the
SUS (Montero 2000: 72).
Fiscal capacity for health policy at the subnational level improved beginning in
the 2000s because of economic growth and the contribution that the Lei de Respon-
sabilidade Fiscal (Fiscal Responsibility Law, Lei Complementar 101/2000) made to
macroeconomic stability (Serra and Afonso 2007). Amendment 29 stabilized sub-
national health spending to a certain extent. Overall, the national tax burden has
increased steadily since the transition, as has the portion of this that winds up in the
hands of municipal governments. The push-pull between governors and the center in
the immediate aftermath of the constitution is reflected in a major loss of revenue
from the center to the states (as a portion of total government revenue) by 1991,
which was then ameloriated in subsequent years by a shift from states towards both
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municipalities and the center by 2005 (Afonso and Mereilles 2006).
Following the NOBs from 1991, 1993, and 1996, the Serra ministry promulgated
the 2001 Norma Operacional da Assisteˆncia da Sau´de (NOAS, Health Care Oper-
ational Norm), which increased the responsibilities of municipalities, particularly in
the realm of primary care, and further specified norms for oversight and management
at the state and municipal levels (NOAS SUS 01/2001; Duarte de Arau´jo 2010). Be-
cause only a small percentage of municipalities had taken on full health management
and many wound up with no hospitals at all due to problems of scale, the NOAS pro-
moted the creation of health regions for the coordination of service provision (Teixera
2008: 863), which has become a significant logistical task taken on by the states.
The NOAS set out new criteria for states and municipalities to be “habilitados” and
permitted to take on greater responsibilities in health, another asymmetric process
by which states had differing statuses over the course of the early 2000s. Table A.9
shows the timing of health decentralization under NOB 1996 and NOAS 2001.
5.6 The Rise of the PT: 2002-2011
Lula ran for President four times before finally being elected in 2002. The PT
is disciplined even by non-Brazilian standards. The leaders knew that as a small,
new party without the backing of the rich and those already in office (with access
to the resources of the state), it had to build itself from the ground up. This took
place from the late 1980s on, mostly at the municipal level. But one of the most
significant strategies of the PT at the center was to build a unique brand that was
easily identifiable from the pack, and it did this by acting as a disciplined opposition
and voting against nearly everything the PSDB did during the 1990s. The pension
reform Cardoso eventually passed in 1998 was weaker and less progressive than the
PSDB had wanted because of obstruction in the congress led by the PT (Hunter 2009:
69). Immediately after gaining office, the PT passed a pension reform that achieved
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some of these original goals.
While international markets were jittery about the PT, the party has adroitly
balanced a disciplined commitment to equity-enhancing social policies within the
constraints of the international political economy, producing strong economic growth
while dramatically reducing poverty since taking office in 2003. Their fiscal respon-
sibility and economic moderation has left the PSDB in a challenging position. The
party had easily been able to differentiate itself to the left of other Brazilian parties
and as more capable than the non-PT left. But since 2003, the PT has hegemonically
occupied the moderate-left space, leaving the PSDB in an uncomfortable opposition in
which it must oppose popular and effective policies in order to avoid being subsumed
into the ever-expanding PT tent.
Differences between Cardoso and Lula in the health realm were smaller than some
would have expected. For Lula, inconsistency in the commitment of his health min-
isters, a strong focus on social assistance, and the presence of constraints on fiscal
capacity in his second term made his impact on health policy less equity-enhancing.
These findings are consistent with general perceptions of social policy continuity be-
tween the two administrations (Melo 2008: 162). Still, the party had spent years in
opposition fine-tuning a progressive policy platform and planning for the eventuality
of a national presidential win. Its leaders were ideologically committed to the goals of
the SUS and had been part of the movements that defended it during the transition.
Despite the fact that the SUS was not Lula’s primary policy focus and none of his
health ministers were as politically influential as Serra, his administration hit the
ground running and implemented a number of reforms.
Perhaps most important, his administrations mainstreamed an inversion of distri-
butional goals across the board in social policy. The successes in poverty alleviation
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under the PT have clear ramifications for health outcomes and policy. The admin-
istration discovered after several years implementing Bolsa Famı´lia (Brazil’s now-
famous conditional cash transfer program) that the deepest poverty made uptake of
social services almost impossible. Working with the poorest of the poor required
persistence, resources, and long term commitment (Bernardes 2009).
Over the past decade the PT has methodically addressed the road-blocks that
keep the poor from accessing services. This trajectory is illustrated by President
Dilma Rousseff’s Brasil sem Mise´ria (Brazil Without Misery) program to alleviate
the deepest pockets of poverty, once the state realized that Bolsa Famı´lia was miss-
ing many of the poorest people because they were too poor to have papers or stable
residences. The government has implemented campaigns for unified citizenship iden-
tification in order to help millions of undocumented Brazilians gain access to the
social services that could only be accessed with proof of identity (Hunter and Borges
Sugiyama 2011). Social services, education, and the health system have been increas-
ingly integrated and the conditionalities of Bolsa Famı´lia have brought millions of
poor families into the health network. Addressing poverty and social exclusion not
only impacts health outcomes, but also health policy by forcing administrators to
deal with the issues of the poor as the poor become clients.
During the first six months of Lula’s presidency a great deal of political energy
was spent reorganizing the Ministry of Health in order to integrate an increased focus
on primary care, advances in science and technology, and democratic management
(Teixera and Paim 2005). The first PT Health Minister lasted the longest in Lula’s
first term. Humberto Costa was a dedicated party militant for a quarter century
before joining the ministry and has gone on to become the first PT senator elected
from the state of Pernambuco. As Wendy Hunter explains in her crucial work on the
transformation of the PT, Lula had been in a difficult position, needing to reward
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party militants for 20 years of effort, but also appease his allies in the congress. During
the first two years in office, his cabinet went disproportionately to PT members.
In part because of these dual pressures, the PT had engaged in the purchase of
partisanship and votes in the legislature to make up for inflexibility in its ability to
award cabinet seats to important allies (Hunter 2009).
The Health Ministry was a casualty in these partisan battles and scandals. Costa
left halfway through his term in order to run for elected office and his seat was given
to the PMDB. Costa had sustained incremental progress in the process of consolidat-
ing and improving the SUS (Carvalho 2005), but left his post without successfully
achieving the passage of the Lei de Responsabilidade Sanita´ria (Health Responsibility
Law, Projeto de Lei 4010/2004), which would have been an important reform for ac-
countability and oversight in the SUS. Costa’s replacement, Jose´ Saraiva Felipe from
the PMDB, chose not to pursue the legislation. Agenor A´lvares served for one year
(2006-2007) and was replaced by Jose´ Gomes Tempora˜o in an effort to secure PMDB
support for the second round of Lula’s upcoming re-election bid.
Attention to prevention began very slowly in the 1990s and made a significant
leap under Lula (de Brito 2011). During his first term important strides were made
in increased access to dental services, mobile urgent care, and access to government-
subsidized pharmacies (Menicucci 2011). These are some of the same efficiency and
coverage extension measures that the most innovative Spanish regions were imple-
menting at the same time. The number of PSF health teams increased by 57 per cent
(Freitas 2007), the per capita financing for primary care services (PAB) was increased
50 per cent, mental health facilities were expanded in an effort to de-hospitalize the
treatment of mental illness, drug cost control measures were put in place, special pro-
grams were instituted targeting HIV/AIDS, women’s health, children and adolescents,
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black and indigenous populations, and the elderly (Menicucci 2011). Management re-
forms were also undertaken that simplified the fiscal transfer process and reinforced
efforts begun under the Cardoso governments for results-based evaluation with the
first Pacto pela Sau´de (Health Pact) in 2006. In 2005 the Ministry of Health devel-
oped a unified set of health outcome indicators that would be used for all states and
municipalities to set goals and measure results (Portaria 21, 2005).
The first Health Ministry under Lula spent several years designing the first Health
Pact, which was implemented in 2006 and reaffirmed a political commitment to the
SUS. Of central importance, the Health Pact institutionalized the PSF as the access
point for the SUS and the center-piece of the health system. It includes the Pacto
pela Vida (Pact for Life), Pacto de Gesta˜o do SUS (SUS Management Pact), and
the Pacto em Defesa do SUS (Pact in Defense of the SUS). The Pact created an
institutional framework for generating intergovernmental agreements based on specific
goals for health outcomes in each territory and was a major advance in accountability
and oversight, as well as participation for states and municipalities in federal health
decision-making. As we shall see, it has proved to be a stepping stone for increasing
accountability over time.
In 2007 the government began pressuring private insurers to shift their focus to-
ward prevention. Over 100 additional illnesses were added to the list of what providers
had to cover. In conjunction with the Health Ministry, the ANS begins a campaign to
reduce unnecessary caesarians (public and private). In 2010 the ANS begins requiring
that private plans give same sex couples the same rights as heterosexual beneficiaries
(ANS 2013). Yet also in these years the ANS almost completely stopped charging
private insurers for using hospital beds in the SUS and did not begin trying to recover
the under-the-table subsidy until an investigation began in the Tribunal de Contas
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da Unia˜o (TCU, Federal Fiscal Tribunal)11.
Under Tempora˜o, health policy was reframed to focus on social causes of health
outcomes and pinpoint quality of life issues such as alcohol abuse, unsafe abortion,
smoking, obesity, and economic development (Menicucci 2011). Tempora˜o served for
a full three and a half years before being replaced at the beginning of 2011 by Alexan-
dre Padilha under the new Dilma administration. At least in the early months of the
new government, some health officials in Bras´ılia perceived Dilma to be committed
to the SUS in a way that represented a significant break with the past (Oliveira
2011). Unlike Tempera˜o, Padilha is a petista and was trained in Campinas, one of
the strongholds of sanitarista medical influence.
Padilha’s tenure has already been marked by major efforts in several important
areas. The activity of the ANS immediately saw a major uptick, with battles fought
with the private sector for the extension of coverage under private plans to the elderly
and those who lose their jobs. In addition, under the new Ministry leadership, the
ANS immediately began taking the recovery of SUS money from private plan holders
seriously. In 2011, the ANS began directly transferring to the Fundo Nacional de
Sau´de (National Health Fund) the money it recovered from insurers whose plan hold-
ers used the SUS. The amount was 76.1 million reais, 80 per cent of the total what
had been recovered in the entire first decade of the agency’s existence (ANS 2013).
While welcome, the process confirmed critics’ fears that the ANS had previously been
unwilling to go head to head with the private insurers over their debts. Until 2011 the
only monies that could be recovered were for hospital stays, so in that year Padilha
announced that the ANS would begin charging insurers for complex services (such
as chemotherapy and other expensive treatments) provided by the SUS to holders
of private insurance12. Regulation has become more complete and hundreds of plans
11Folha de Sa˜o Paulo 6/27/2011 “Apo´s um ano, ANS volta a cobrar planos por uso do SUS”
12Folha de Sa˜o Paulo 8/30/2011 “Plano de sau´de tera´ de pagar ao SUS por tratamentos mais
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have been removed from the market for violating minimum requirements for basic
coverage and patients’ rights.
While it is still too early to evaluate results, national health officials and observers
suggest that a new decree promulgated in July 2011 could bring about major improve-
ments in the SUS. Decree 7508 fleshes out important elements of the original health
law from 1990 that were never implemented. The first draft was written by sanitarista
lawyer Lenir Santos. Perhaps most importantly, the decree introduces the Contratos
Organizativos da Ac¸a˜o Pu´blica (Public Health Sector Organizing Contracts), which
make the health pacts negotiated between each level of government legally binding.
Until now they have been “gentleman’s agreements,” and national health officials be-
lieve that this change will be a substantial one for ensuring accountability (Oliveira
2011). Some of the most extreme inequality in the Brazilian health system stems from
lack of accountability for subnational governments that do not meet their obligations
in health care (Pinto 2011).
Quality and access in the SUS have suffered as a result of chronic insufficient
financing at a level far beyond what has been experienced in Spain. Civil society and
legislative effort to fix this problem have been enormous, yet progress has been almost
nil until very recently. The original financing for the system was vetoed immediately
and Amendment 29 in many ways worsened the problem. Measures languish in various
parts of the legislature, where private sector vetoes are powerful and many deputies
and senators are themselves medical professionals with little interest in supporting
the SUS. While the PT has controlled the presidency since 2003, it has never had
anything close to a majority in Congress and regardless, has not had nearly as strong
a record of support for the SUS as it has for social assistance, despite the dovetailing
of important aspects of these policies.
caros.”
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5.7 Multilevel Health Reform in Bahia
The state of Bahia is in the Northeast region and is the most developed of these
poor states. Among the state-level case studies it represents an example of a poor
state with historically low capacity and low commitment, with a shift to committed
government in 2007. Like other states in the region, infant mortality has been very
high but has decreased dramatically over the course of the democratic period. It is
the largest Northeastern state and variation between municipal policy performance
and outcomes in the capital and in smaller localities is large.
In the case study I profile the capital city of Salvador and contrast its experience in
health reform and implementation to that in other Bahian municipalities. The Bahian
experience at the state level is compared to that in Ceara´, another Northeastern state
that has had higher levels of commitment and superior outcomes.
5.7.1 Overview
About a quarter of Bahia’s 14 million people live in the state capital of Salvador
and nearly 80 per cent of the population identifies as Afro-Brazilian, the highest level
in Brazil. Salvador was the first state capital in the country and an important port
during the colonial period. It is the largest state in the Northeast both in terms
of geographic surface area, number of municipalities, and population. There are 417
municipalities in the state, the fourth largest in Brazil in these terms. No other states
in the Northeast have cultural capitals the likes of Salvador and despite the economic
challenges faced in Bahia, its levels of income and public revenue have been higher
than in other comparable states.
Infant mortality in Bahia has steadily fallen from about 145 in 1971 to the mid-
20s in 2008 (IBGE). The shift is clear, though the problems of subnational infant
mortality data reliability exist across all the cases. As in Spain, the largest absolute
decline took place before the transition to democracy, in Brazil associated with rapid
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economic development during ISI and the miracle years of the 1960s and early 1970s.
Still, infant mortality fell by nearly half from 1997-2008. Within the Northeast, Bahia
is not the best performer on infant mortality, as many states began the period with
rates near 200 and some had lower rates than Bahia as of 2008. The trends are quite
similar overall, as Figure 5.2 shows.
Poverty in the state has been crushing, as it is in most of the Northeast. The rate
was steady between 60 and 70 per cent from the earliest data in 1981 until the rise
of the PT in 2002. This means virtually no progress was made on poverty for two
decades. Poverty in Bahia has decreased steadily and rapidly from 60 per cent to 38
per cent from 2003 to 2009 (IPEA). These results are very similar to the other states in
the Northeast–Alagoas, Ceara´, Maranha˜o, Para´ıba, Pernambuco, Piau´ı, Rio Grande
do Norte, and Sergipe. Several of these had higher levels of poverty than Bahia and a
few now have somewhat lower, but the poverty pattern is quite consistent across the
states regardless of differences in state politics—in line with the centralized nature of
anti-poverty programs. Figure 5.3 shows poverty rates for the region.
Income inequality, as discussed in Chapter 2, has decreased slightly in the past
decade, but the patterns by state are varied. In every state in the Northeast, income
inequality began the 1980s in the mid-50s on the Gini Index, rose over the next
two decades, and declined to levels that were still slightly above their starting place
by 2010. The only exceptions are Ceara´ and Bahia, where levels at the end of the
period are slightly lower than they were in 1981. While a decent case can be made
for political explanations—particularly, as we shall see, in the case of Ceara´—the
differences are likely not reliable from a statistical perspective, unless they continue
to decline over the next few years. The rough relationships and patterns are shown
in Figure 5.4.
Unlike the poorest Spanish ACs, real GDP per capita in the poor states of Brazil
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Figure 5.2: Infant Mortality in Bahia and the Northeast: 1981-2008
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Figure 5.3: Poverty in Bahia and the Northeast: 1981-2008
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Figure 5.4: Income Inequality in Bahia and Ceara´: 1980-2010
has barely increased and their relative position has worsened. In Bahia, inflation
adjusted GDP per capita has increased from 4,230 reais in 1985 to just 4,520 in 2009.
Yet as a portion of the national average, Bahia has fallen farther behind. While
its income was 86 per cent of Brazil’s average in 1985, it was only 64 per cent in
2009. This is primarily because of the large real increase in per capita GDP in the
wealthiest states during the same period, with the national average increasing from
4,880 to 7,050 reais (IPEA).
Revenues have tended to be higher for Bahia than other Northeastern states for
a variety of reasons. The state economy is fairly large, the entertainment industry in
Salvador produces significant wealth (Carnaval and international tourism, as well as
UNESCO heritage status for historic neighborhoods since the 1980s), and a variety of
natural resources have been discovered and exploited in the past few decades. Revenue
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as a portion of GDP in Bahia was 6.6 per cent in 1985 and increased steadily to hit its
high point in the early 2000s at around 17 per cent of GDP. The portion has dropped
slightly in the subsequent years largely because of fast economic growth at the end
of the decade. Levels have been higher in some of the other Northeastern states in
recent years but generally because of slower GDP growth.
The role of the international community is incomparable to that in Extremadura
and the poorer ACs of Spain. However, the efforts of international actors and the
federal government to promote nascent primary care programs in the Northeast, in
particular the Programa de Interiorizac¸a˜o de Ac¸es de Sau´de e Saneamento (PIASS,
Program for Health and Sanitation Service Coordination), had a significant benefit
for Bahia as well as other Northeastern states, despite the lack of enthusiasm of
uncommitted state-level political leaders. The equity-enhancing effect of these pilot
projects is hard to measure, but the result was positive for the development of the
PACS and PSF programs nationwide (Borges Sugiyama 2012; McGuire 2010).
From the 1970s on the state was controlled by the Magalha˜es family in what was
known nationally as carlismo (after Antoˆnio Carlos Magalha˜es or “ACM”), a classic
example of the regional family oligarchies that have historically dominated many
Northeastern states. There were no left governments until the PT took office under
the popular and influential Jacques Wagner in 2007. I compare Bahia at the state level
with Ceara´, which has had nearly uninterrupted left party rule since the democratic
transition but is otherwise a similarly poor and unequal Northeastern state. I profile
the city of Salvador and briefly contrast it with smaller municipalities that have had
better outcomes under decentralization to tease out the role of commitment and
capacity at all three levels.
The state of Bahia is a case that could have begun to do much more with its
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devolved health responsibilities, much sooner, if committed governors had taken of-
fice earlier. The city of Salvador, on the other hand, is arguably a case where more
centralized health policy authority would have produced better outcomes. The de-
centralization lauded by the sanitaristas and built into the constitution did few favors
for the state and its largest city and the results are visible in comparative analysis.
Yet the social programs designed by committed actors at the center and the health
reforms slowly implemented over time were meant to bypass uncommitted actors at
the state level (if not the local level) and these have been overwhelmingly successful
at improving outcomes in the worst-off parts of Brazil, despite lack of commitment
and capacity in the state and many municipalities.
5.7.2 The State of Bahia
The Northeast of Brazil is the region where the slave trade was most intensely
concentrated, where large terratenentes dominated society, and economic and racial
oppression were most intense. By the 1940s Salvador had become a miserable ur-
ban slum with food shortages and public health crises caused by the explosion of
immigrants from the countryside. In the interior, large landholdings had continu-
ously expanded and rural peasants could not longer survive with sharecropping and
subsistence agriculture13. There was no public infrastructure and the federal govern-
ment had exploited land for cacao production that had little benefit for the economic
development of the state in the immediate post-WWII period (Dias Tavares 2001).
The trajectory of the state before democracy was dominated by structural factors—
its place in the central economy and relative lack of political clout compared to the
major economic and industrial centers farther south. As in much of Brazil, instability
13In fact, this process was in large part responsible for the explosive growth of the favelas in major
urban centers farther south, which are often populated with immigrants from the Northeast who
left in search of better opportunity (Marques and Torres 2005).
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and political violence hampered modest reform efforts. After the first phase of polit-
ical opening in 1946, reformists in state government implemented intensive projects
of school construction during the post-war period, staffed with professionally trained
instructors for the first time. As coffee prices increased and oil was discovered in
the state, fiscal capacity increased. Yet political repression was intense and incipient
protestswere put down with violent force.
Parties on the right dominated the state and competed primarily with each other.
Clientelism and corruption in Northeastern politics have been well-documented14 and
were the norm until economic development and political reform at the center began
to make such political structures more costly. The last directly elected governor
of Bahia was the conservative Lomanto Ju´nior who, while not one of the plotters
against Goulart, successfully negotiated to maintain his seat after the coup in 1964
(Dias Tavares 2001: 477). The indirectly elected Lu´ıs Viana Filho continued modest
efforts at economic development in the region, focused on the expansion of education
in particular, but when AI-5 was implemented and the most conservative sectors
of the military took over, his education team was forced to resign (Dias Tavares
2001: 488). These patterns illustrate how authoritarianism prevented even moderate
equity-enhancing social reforms, an important part of why democracy has mattered
for equity in countries with right wing authoritarian histories.
In 1971 ACM was indirectly elected to succeed Viana Filho and the “ACM” dy-
nasty began. When political parties were legalized in 1979, the Partido Democra´tico
Social (PDS, Social Democratic Party, which was not a social democratic party) be-
came the successor party of ARENA and the Bahian governor joined the new (old)
14Abranches 1978; Malloy 1977; Desposato 2001; Erickson 1977; Chilcote 1990; Lyne 2008; Geddes
and Ribeiro Neto 1992; Hagopian 1996; Tendler and Freedheim 1994; Meneguello 1994; Stepan 2001;
Fleischer 1996 among many others.
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party. Direct elections for the governor were held during ACM’s second tour as gov-
ernor in 1982. For the second time in recent history, a Bahian candidate for governor
perished in a plane crash just before the elections. In this case, ACM’s chosen suc-
cessor died and had to be replaced. In 1985 the PDS split over the chosen candidate
for the national election against the increasingly popular PMDB and ACM helped
to form the PFL, which would remain the dominant force on the right—and in the
Northeast—for another generation. It was not until after Lula’s second term and the
success of targeted anti-poverty measures that conservative electoral dominance at
the state level in Bahia was broken.
One of the most interesting dimensions of health policy reform in the Brazilian
Northeast is that the strength of private sector veto actors has been limited compared
to cases such as Sa˜o Paulo and all regional governments in Spain. Capacity and
commitment has been weak, but the population has been so overwhelmingly poor
that substantive markets for private health service provision and insurance never
developed. But just as the main veto actors were based in the wealthiest and most
developed parts of the country, so were the primary reform movements. Deep poverty
ultimately makes civic participation a challenge and the entrenched power relations
that grew out of systems of labor-repressive agriculture in the countryside left the
Northeast in a weak position from the perspective of civil society mobilization, as
well as for the emergence of strong left parties. Yet in the case of Bahia, when
reformers eventually came to power they faced less mobilized opposition to health
reform than in wealthier states—an unanticipated side effect of near total poverty.
Because the 1988 constitution and subsequent elaboration of the SUS generated
both decentralized authority over health policy and new national criteria and pro-
grams, we see two possible avenues for equity-enhancing health reform after 1988—
local innovation and/or implementation of central policies. Bahia is a case of null
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reform for many years, where decentralization allowed state government to do little
and the long lag before attempts at increased accountability and oversight from the
center meant the guarantees of the SUS were extended even more slowly in Bahia than
elsewhere. Still, serious public health problems that limited economic development
even for those uncommitted to equity made the Northeast a natural opportunity for
testing inexpensive innovations in care focused on prevention, and Bahia participated
in several modest federal pilot programs.
The PIASS, which had been piloted in the Northeast in the late 1970s and formed
the basis of experience for the PACS and later PSF, was (by design) only implemented
in small municipalities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants (Art 1, Decreto 78307).
In fact, the majority of Brazilian municipalities have fewer than 20,000 people. And
while the importance of the PIASS as a precursor to later program innovations is
clear, its immediate impact was fairly limited. The PIASS was implemented in Bahia
in 1977 and expanded quickly, as it did in other states. The internal critiques of the
program at the national level, recounted by McGuire (2010), were echoed in Bahia
by state administrators (Almeida Formigli 1981).
Conservative ideological opposition to public provision of care alongside economic
crisis shut the program down before administrators could tackle the problems they
were observing (McGuire 2010: 166). One of the most significant achievements of
the PIASS in Bahia was an unintended consequence–it brought to light organiza-
tional challenges that would represent roadblocks to public primary care provision
and required administrative reforms in the State Health Secretariat, which over time
increased capacity15.
In the late 1980s innovation in inexpensive community based health programs was
taking place next door, championed by the committed state government of Ceara´,
15See Almeida Formigli 1981 for a discussion of the administrative reforms within the state health
secretariat under PIASS.
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and the sanitarista movement was commanding attention in the press and across the
country. Yet at the state level in Bahia, under ACM and later his chosen successor,
there was no comparable innovation or expansion16. Infant mortality continued to
decline, albeit more slowly than during the 1970s. Real state GDP per capita began
its long descent in the mid-1980s, with no recovery in sight.
In 1986 Waldir Pires of the PMDB united forces of the left and opponents of
carlismo and won the governorship with a broad majority. The opportunity had
finally presented itself for a break with the traditional conservative leadership of
the region. Yet, as in so many other cases, the possibilities for reform were cut short
because Pires chose to leave office after only two years in order to contest the national
vice presidency on the PMDB ticket. ACM won the governorship in 1991 for the third
time and politics as usual continued. Having been in the federal cabinet for five years
with Sarney, then an ally of Collor and supporter of the coalition with Cardoso, with
his son the President of the Congress in the mid-1990s, the traditional leadership of
the state had gained significant national influence.
Weak fiscal capacity during the 1990s was combined with persistent low levels
of administrative capacity and very low commitment to either redistribution more
generally or to an equitable and accessible public health system. The result was that
the early experiments in primary health provision were supported by the national
Ministry of Health and international aid organizations in some municipalities, but
without much support from the state of Bahia. In 1993 the INAMPS contracts with
private providers were shifted to the national Ministry of Health, where they stayed
for a full decade, while in many other states these contracts were taken over directly.
State leaders did not request the management of the health infrastructure until 2003
because health policy was not seen as a priority (de Souza 2011). Still, the expansion
16Jorge Augusto Novis was state Secretary of Health from 1979-1983 and appears to have been
supportive of health reforms, but little movement took place in Bahia at this time.
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of PSF in rural Bahian municipalities produced a significant drop in infant mortality
and other basic health indicators across the state.
Yet the coverage rate of the PSF in Bahia has remained the lowest in the region,
largely because uncommitted executives in the capital city have chosen not to im-
plement the program and its coverage has never been more than 20 per cent of the
population there. The PSF in general appears to have been more successful in smaller
municipalities than in larger ones. However, 70 per cent of doctors are based in the
capital city, leaving rural areas and small towns underserved (de Brito 2011). This
mismatch of commitment with capacity is one of the most significant problems for
the extension of equity enhancing health reform in Brazil. Many small municipalities
are interested in expanding primary care, but lack resources to support the neces-
sary investments. The capital cities where population is concentrated have lacked the
commitment, and sometimes also the resources, for reform.
During the Cardoso years at the center, Bahia remained under the control of
a string of PFL governors affiliated with ACM, who continued to personally name
the PFL candidates for state and federal elections into the 2000s17. While in theory
health care offers significant opportunities for patronage politics (Hunter 2009; Borges
Sugiyama 2007), the possibilities depend on the structure of policy. States have a
lower profile in the SUS than municipalities do, so the incentives for uncommitted
Bahian actors to take on greater responsibility for health policy at the state level
were slim during these years.
From 1998 to 2006 PSF coverage expanded with oversight and funding moving
mostly from the center directly to municipalities administering the program. In 1999
municipal coverage for the PACS (often considered a gateway program to PSF for low-
capacity municipalities) tended to be either zero or almost complete. If municipalities
17Folha de Sa˜o Paulo 4/1/2002 “ACM escolhe candidatos do PFL ao Senado e ao governo da
BA.”
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did the program, they generally fully implemented it. This is in part because federal
funds are more generous the higher the coverage rates, and for implementation there
is little sense to only going partway as the administrative costs are similar.
Yet while PSF had been moving at the federal level for several years, in 1999 only
four Bahian municipalities had any coverage at all (DABSUS 2013). In 2002 over
half of Bahian municipalities still had no PSF coverage, while half of those with some
coverage had less than 50 per cent. While Cardoso had done more to expand primary
care programs than the neoliberal leadership before them, they had not dedicated
the fiscal or organizational resources necessary for more significant implementation.
In addition, the resources required from municipalities were substantial, so uptake
required a fairly high level of commitment by municipal leaders.
From 1994-2002, the SUS began to be implemented in earnest. Alongside primary
care funded through the central government, states and municipalities were being
trained—more or less capably—to take on responsibilities in health provision and
oversight. In theory, Brazilians had the right to all aspects of health care, free at
the point of delivery and guaranteed by the 1988 Constitution. In Bahia, contracts
with private providers for care proliferated because capacity levels were too low for
the state or most municipalities to run hospitals, ambulatory care centers, or in some
cases even manage payrolls.
One side effect of this terceirizac¸a˜o (contracting out) has been that poor patients
sometimes had access to state of the art facilities when the public sector subcontracts
with providers who also offer private services. Yet private clinics and hospitals that
provided services for SUS clients in Bahia for many years kept separate lobbies and
entrances for their public patients, segregating them from private clients, and would
provide the precise service contracted but fight demands for standard follow-up and
post-operative care (Benigno 2011). Battles for equal rights for SUS clients only
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began to shift toward equity at the start of the 2000s and after many years of effort.
These victories are not at all consolidated, pointing to another major cost of only
partially implementing universal reform in the presence of strong private actors18.
While the shift toward per capita transfers has been an improvement over adhoc
and politically determined financing in the past, the inequalities in capacity between
poor and rich states and municipalities are so gross that failure to direct spending
according to actual need is major drawback. In Bahia, 89 per cent of the population
relies on the SUS for health care, while in wealthier states like Santa Catarina in the
South the numbers are closer to 60 per cent (Benigno 2011), so demand in the public
sector is far higher, yet financing is not determined with these criteria in mind.
When Lula took office on January 1st 2003, he had carried the state of Bahia along
with most other states. In just three years, over 90 per cent of municipalities had some
PSF coverage and the overwhelming majority of these had full PACS coverage. Of the
40 municipalities with no PSF, none were governed by left or center-left parties. The
situation of Bahia in terms of health policy shifted swiftly with the election of Jacques
Wagner in 2006. Not only was Wagner the first governor on the left in Bahia, he was
a high powered member of Lula’s inner circle and founding member of the PT. His
electoral coalition was broad, which was not entirely popular among his supporters as
his vice-president came from the PMDB—a traditional political enemy in the state.
The Wagner government began to make substantial investments in administrative
capacity, increasing health spending substantially and negotiating increased funding
from the center (Benigno 2011).
18In 2013, the head of an intensive care ward and several other health workers at an indebted
hospital in Curitiba were arrested on charges of withholding medical treatment and discharging
untreated SUS patients in order free up beds for paying private clients—in at least one case leading
to the death of the patient (Folha de Sa˜o Paulo, 2/12/2013 “Justic¸a do PR decreta prisa˜o de 4 apo´s
morte de pacientes em UTI”).
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Although there is ideological disagreement among politicians regarding the man-
agement of the SUS, there is little organized opposition to the existing model (and
a great deal of lip-service paid to it) because open political opposition to the PT
project has disintegrated. Though the Wagner government in Bahia has formed al-
liances, health officials still see the PT as more committed at both at the state and
national level (de Brito 2011). From 2007-2011 health spending in Bahia doubled,
five new state hospitals were built, the state health secretariat is now staffed by a
professional technical corp rather than by “pol´ıticos,” and spending by the execu-
tive and legislative branches is tracked online and available to the public—a major
innovation in transparency implemented from the central government under the PT.
One third of the state’s resources for health care come from the Fundo Nacional
de Sau´de (National Health Fund at the Ministry of Health) and two thirds come from
the state budget, funded by the sales tax and vehicle tax (dos Reis 2011). All Bahian
municipalities are responsible for primary health services and 62 of the 417 have
negotiated responsibilities for medium and high complexity services like hospitals, up
from 32 in 2006 (Benigno 2011). The state provides medium and high complexity
health services for all municipalities that do not have gesta˜o plena.
At the Universidade Federal da Bahia (Federal University of Bahia, UFBa), which
historically had a conservative orientation, the reform of the medical school curriculum
(passed by Lula at the national level at the start of his first term) did not begin until
2004. Professor Lorene Pinto, who later became the first woman President of the
UFBa medical school, was in charge of compiling the results of the participatory
process that generated suggestions from the academic community and the public for
the new curriculum. The eventual changes, fully implemented beginning in 2011 after
difficult internal struggles with ideologically opposed factions, included refocusing the
curriculum towards primary care rather than specialized care, producing more general
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practitioners, and getting medical students out into the communities that they would
eventually be serving (Pinto 2011).
In Bahia, hospital administration and financing is highly decentralized to individ-
ual hospitals (dos Reis 2011), so the orientation of doctors and those with training as
health officials and administrators has the capacity to influence institutional design as
well as the care received by patients. In addition, because getting doctors to work in
poor areas has been such an overarching problem for the extension of the SUS and the
primary care reform, beginning to train and socialize providers with an orientation
toward the goals of equity and access is crucial.
In Bahia, the private medical sector is weaker than in states like Sa˜o Paulo because
of lower levels of economic development and historically weak demand for private
health services. There is less organized opposition to the SUS in Bahia, for instance,
because in most municipalities the SUS is the only game in town, so regardless of
political ideology the mayors support public provision, as it allows them to take
credit for new facilities and expanded services. In addition, for private hospitals and
clinics, the SUS is often their biggest—and sometimes only—client, so opposing the
SUS is not in their best interest.
Yet major challenges persist as municipalities demand rapid decentralization in
order to take credit for building new facilities and clinics, when often the local admin-
istrations have no administrative capacity at all. Many still have no separate health
secretariat with a separate budget independent from the executive and no experience
managing payrolls. Whereas in Sa˜o Paulo decentralization to municipalities occurred
nearly all at once, regardless of their level of preparation, in Bahia committed actors
in the state government require that municipalities show basic institutional capac-
ity by participating in trainings, separating their health budget, and implementing
concrete preparatory measures.
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This difference between the two states is an important example both of the rele-
vance of the Brazilian states in equity-enhancing health policy reform and the ways
that decentralization without capacity is seen as a problem for committed actors and
ignored by others. Capacity has increased some at the state level and is trickling down
to the local level as many municipalities take advantage of the health management
trainings and other services offered by the state health secretariat.
5.7.3 Ceara´: the Outlier
As a state-level comparison in the Northeast, let us consider the case of Ceara´,
which is located to the north of Bahia, on the coast. The state has been defined by
intense droughts and had poverty rates even higher than those in Bahia at the start of
the period—over 70 per cent. The white population of the state is 33 per cent—higher
than Bahia, but this latter has the smallest white population in the country.
Unlike some other Northeastern states with very few municipalities, Ceara´ has
184, which improves its comparability with Bahia in terms of logistical challenges
faced by state governments in mobilizing reforms across the territory. The city of
Fortaleza is large with a relatively high level of economic development and a history
of innovation in primary care. The first PT mayor of a capital city, as well as the
first woman, was Maria Lu´ıza Fontanele in Fortaleza in 1986.
Improvements in income inequality have not been dramatic, but the drop has
been more significant in Ceara´ than Bahia despite higher levels of poverty and lower
income levels historically. In 1985 when real GDP per capita in Bahia was 86 per cent
of the national average, in Ceara´ it was barely half. Albeit with some fluctuation,
Ceara´ has basically maintained this relative position over the course of the past 25
years, with real GDP per capita growing from 2,490 reais to 3,710 in line with the
growth experienced in the rest of the country. But the most astounding difference
has been in the infant mortality rate, which began the period much higher than in
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Bahia yet in 1997 was only two thirds that of the latter state.
Why has a poorer state facing similar constraints performed so much better on
health outcome indicators? The primary explanation is the presence of high com-
mitment in the state and its capital city, which enabled Ceara´’s early innovation in
primary care provision. The pioneering community health outreach program at the
state level became a model for other states in the early 1990s, and for the federal gov-
ernment. Fortaleza was also an early primary care reformer under Fontanele. While
Ceara´ has had its share of oligarchic rule, in 1987 the state elected a “good govern-
ment” reformer from the PMDB, who left the party for the PSDB when it formed.
Tasso Jereissati governed from 1987-1991 and again from 1995-2002. Left parties
have traditionally been weak in the Northeast and as a centrist catch-all party in the
mid-1990s, the PSDB was home to a number of progressive reformers. Coverage rates
for the PSF were much higher in 1998 than Bahia and were still 10 points higher in
2010, with the early higher rates explained by the folding in of the local primary care
system into the national model.
What had Ceara´ done differently? In 1987 the state government under Jereissati
implemented an emergency employment program designed to provide work during an
intense drought. It was called the Programa de Agentes de Sau´de (PAS) and sent
thousands of women with low skill and education levels into homes around the state
to do basic health education on dehydration and breastfeeding, vaccinate children,
and collect health information. The case won international awards and was brought
to light among international academics through Judith Tendler’s work on the reforms
(1997). The state was committed and chose women from the communities to do the
work. The project succeeded in large part because of its community-based nature
and the ideological orientation of the workers and the state toward achieving goals of
health outcome improvement among the poor.
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Ceara´ innovated in other areas in addition to health and the policy, economic, and
health outcomes over the course of the period show the results. Figure 5.5 shows PSF
coverage rates in the two states from 1998-2010. Lack of commitment in Bahia meant
this innovation was not picked up, though it was happening right next door. This is
one of the most relevant findings of Borges Sugiyama’s work on policy diffusion (2007;
2012). Commitment is required for innovation or uptake. With no national incentives
in place and high levels of decentralization, the ball was in the states’ court. With
no interest in equity, the ACM dynasty in Bahia was uninterested in health reform.
Differences in the economies of the two states meant the pressure for reform was
lower in Bahia. Policies did not trickle through until the central government began to
prioritize the PACS and PSF at the national level. Only with the federal PT victory
in 2002 did major expansion take place in Bahia.
Figure 5.5: PSF in Bahia and Ceara´: 1998-2010
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This may be the starkest example of the role of commitment, when results can
be so different between two states with similar structural constraints and no capacity
to speak of. It also suggests that Bahia’s current leaders are on the right track in
considering that the only way to meet their state’s health need is to begin training
doctors from small rural communities and then sending them back. The lack of
providers in these areas has been one of the most significant limits on health service
expansion in the state. The experience of Ceara´ suggests that providers who come
from needy communities are likely to be the most committed to helping them advance.
5.7.4 Capital City: Salvador da Bahia
At the municipal level in Brazil, mayors are the primary political figures for de-
termining local policy. In Bahia, carlismo was strong in the capital, as well as at the
state level. The city of Salvador is a clear case of the potential negative consequences
of decentralized social policy in a system with low vertical accountability. Salvador
has among the highest levels of health inequality in Brazil (Benigno 2011) and has
never had more than 20 per cent of its population covered by the PSF. Infant mor-
tality has kept pace with the state average largely because hospital and emergency
services, limited as they are, are far more accessible in the city than in the interior. In
2002, a sample of public clinics in Salvador (only taken from those participating in the
Programa de Humanizac¸a˜o no Pre´-natal e Nascimento, PHPN a federal program to
humanize prenatal care and birth experiences) showed only 14.2 per cent of pregnant
women receiving basic prenatal care. Of these, a much smaller number were receiving
recommended vaccinations and preventive treatment (Nascimento, et al 2007).
The chronic shortage of basic care services means gate-keeping has essentially not
taken place and hospitals are overrun with patients who have nowhere else to go.
In theory, small municipalities should contract with larger municipalities for services
they do not have the scale to provide. However, there has traditionally been no
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enforcement or oversight of this process and no costs to municipalities who free ride
on large municipalities with many hospitals and specialized care facilities. Salvador’s
poorly funded and inadequate hospitals therefore serve an overwhelming number of
patients who do not actually need expensive curative services, as well as residents
from smaller towns that make use of large urban facilities for which Salvador has not
managed to gain compensation.
Rather than directly providing or managing municipal hospitals and clinics, Sal-
vador subcontracts almost all of these services with private providers. When these
private hospitals get more users than they have been paid for (those from outlying
municipalities and those seeking primary care), or simply are not paid for several
months, they shut their doors and leave people on the street. The city blames the
federal government for not transferring adequate funds and the federal government
reminds the city that it is responsible for its own contracts and for ensuring that ser-
vices it provides to neighboring municipalities are properly arranged. The three-way
responsibilities for health policy allow different levels to scapegoat each other to the
public, who do not understand the complex distribution of policy responsibilities.
Race continues to be a major social division in Salvador, as it is throughout Brazil
and particularly in the Northeast. In 2010, only 20 per cent of whites lived in poverty,
while 37 per cent of people of color lived in poverty. Yet the relative status of people
of color in the city has improved somewhat since 1991, when the poverty rate among
whites was 32 and for people of color 69 per cent (DABSUS 2013).
Except for the one-term government of progressive centrist L´ıdice de Mata, the city
of Salvador has never had a left government. De Mata was a member of the opposition
PMDB in the early stages of democratic opening and was mayor of Salvador for
the PSDB from 1993-1996, before joining the socialist party in 1997 as the PSDB
consolidated its rightward shift. De Mata implemented the Bolsa Escola program
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when it was first being developed in Campinas and Bras´ılia (Borges Sugiyama 2007),
in a narrow opportunity for equity-enhancing reform. Yet she did not have time to
institutionalize the program and it was discontinued by the next government.
The mayor of Salvador from 1997-2004 was Antoˆnio Imbassahy from ACM’s group
within the PFL. Health officials from his administration did not perceive him to be
committed to social programs and recounted both his skepticism of the PSF and
observed that they had been encouraged to institute PSF teams in certain neighbor-
hoods based on political criteria (Borges Sugiyama 2007: 149).
The mayor from 2005-2013 was Joa˜o Henrique Carneiro, who changed parties twice
during this time, switching from the PDT to the PMDB in 2007 and to the PP in
2011. Beginning with problems in his electoral campaign, Carneiro’s administrations
were fraught with mismanagement and the city’s finances were in constant disarray19.
This period exemplifies the effects of low capacity combined with low commitment,
so pressing social needs continued to go unaddressed.
Salvador was one of the last state capitals to apply for gesta˜o plena in 2005 during
the ambitious tenure of municipal health secretary Luis Eugenio de Souza. After
watching health policy ignored for years by the state and municipal governments, de
Souza felt the best possibilities for improvement in the city lay with taking matters
into their own hands (de Souza 2011), despite the problems of historically low capacity
and commitment in city government.
De Souza’s team faced what turned out to be an insurmountable barrier to the
transformation of the health system in Salvador—lack of administrative capacity and
lack of commitment by the municipal executive. There was no history of filling the
municipal secretariat with health professionals, which was a challenge for the state and
19A limited set of examples include being cut off by Petrobras in 2005 for not paying municipal
bills (Folha de Sa˜o Paulo 12/1/2005), a state of emergency declared by Carneiro in the health sector
in 2008 (Folha de Sa˜o Paulo 05/29/2008), and a 2 million reais fine in 2009 for illegal logging in the
Mata Atlaˆntica (Folha de Sa˜o Paulo 08/16/2009).
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city because of the existence of only two medical schools to train public health officials
(Pinto 2011). De Souza tried to enforce regulations, expand the technical corp working
at the secretariat, and improve the salaries of functionaries to attract more qualified
personnel20. But the private health sector in Salvador had existed on patronage and
clientelism during carlismo and resisted enhanced efforts at oversight. Despite central
government reforms under Lula that generated resources for improving local capacity,
the Salvador health secretariat faced what turned out to be insurmountable obstacles
to reform. The small number of committed public servants in the health department
were overwhelmed by low morale and lack of support from the municipal executive
(de Souza 2011).
Salvador represents a case of almost complete lack of both commitment and capac-
ity at the municipal level. Without commitment by the mayor, committed appointees
in health and the bureaucratic corp could make little headway. While the committed
actors who negotiated full health responsibilities for the city in 2005 had the best of
intentions, this independence now means the state government cannot directly pro-
vide any of the needed services in the city. Regardless, because primary care has
been in the hands of the municipalities since the early 1990s, the area most in need of
reform has long been beyond the reach of state-level actors committed to improving
access and quality in Salvador. On January 1, 2013 the next mayor took office, yet
the possibilities for reform are slim. The new mayor of Salvador is none other than
Antnio Carlos Magalha˜es Neto—quite literally named—the grandson of ACM.
20Despite the reputation in the welfare states literature of Latin American public servants as an
elite group that often fights redistributive cuts to public pensions, in poor or small municipalities
the ability to hire capable public servants, particularly with federal limits on personnel spending, is
a major obstacle to managing public services. Poor municipalities have poor governments and the
retention of qualified personnel is a serious challenge to developing and maintaining administrative
capacity. Paraphrasing one Bahian state health official, “you can’t have a mayor who makes nothing
and then incentivize doctors to come to your municipality by offering them salaries three times as
high as the mayor. That is unsustainable” (Benigno 2011).
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5.7.5 Municipal Reform in the Interior
Yet Salvador is not all there is to Bahia, and three quarters of the population
live in other municipalities. The only reason that Bahia’s average coverage rates for
the PACS and PSF are so low is the downward pull of the capital city. In the other
416 municipalities reform has been more significant and the improved outcomes in
health are most reflected in these municipal experiences. The PDS (later to split and
create the PFL) was almost completely dominant in the municipal elections of 1982 in
Bahia, with the PMDB taking a small portion of prefeituras (mayorships) and other
parties virtually unrepresented.
By 1996 there were still very few parties of the left in any municipal governments
in Bahia, but the number of parties had proliferated. The PT was uncommon, but
there were a few municipalities governed by the PDT and PSB and several by the
PSDB. Parties of the left remain weak in the Bahian municipalities, though the tidal
wave of support for the PT nationally has significantly increased the number of PT
mayors—with 66 out of 417 in 2008 (and the PSB and other minor parties taking
another few dozen). Yet while evidence from particular cases suggests that the PT
tends to be particularly programmatic and focused on good government and equity-
enhancing reforms in municipal government, at this late stage in the game and given
the federal incentives in place, we should not necessarily expect PSF coverage to be
tied to partisanship at the local level. Ideology may have played a role in preventing
early adoption—with the last Bahian municipalities with no PSF coverage at all being
exclusively governed by the right—but as a national strategy, 20 years out, uptake at
some level is now almost universal.
One would expect that it might take a few years before primary care implemen-
tation could be consolidated and begin to produce results. Of the 37 municipalities
in Bahia that in 2011 still had infant mortality rates over 30 (when the state average
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was 16.25), only seven of these had any PSF coverage in 2002—eight years after the
federal government began subsidizing and promoting the program. And we should
remember that by 2002, nearly half the municipal governments in Bahia were imple-
menting the PSF, so 7 out of 37 makes this an outlying group even at the time. Of
the top performers on infant mortality, PSF coverage is less uniform because of the
importance of income levels and economic development in determining infant mor-
tality. The take home message, then, is that even if municipalities began the period
with high levels of infant mortality, if they implemented PACS and PSF early on,
they rarely ended up among the worst performers, down the line.
5.7.6 Bahia and the Northeast: Conclusion
With low capacity and low commitment, the case studies of Bahia and Salvador
paint a picture of an overdetermined failure for equity-enhancing health reform. The
Northeast region overall has been the backbone of clientelistic and oligarchic rule and
the legacy of slavery and racial oppression has remained largely unchallenged. While
life chances improved with economic development, urban conditions worsened as rural
elites concentrated their landholdings mid-century and left increasing numbers of
homeless peasants to migrate toward the cities. This trend in land concentration has
also fed into the growth of urban slums in the rest of Brazil’s large cities, contributing
to some of the most significant problems of security and poverty in the world.
Yet Bahia’s most recent history, as well as the experience of its neighbor, Ceara´,
suggest that such an assumption of impotence in the face of overwhelming structural
constraints is a mistake. As soon as ideologically committed actors gained power
in the state of Bahia, they doubled health investment and provided crucial new in-
frastructure. They began actively training municipal leaders, organizing new health
regions and microregions to facilitate municipal coordination, and required that mu-
nicipalities create the basic infrastructure to competently manage health care before
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devolving greater responsibilities and resources.
In Ceara´ and its capital, Fortaleza, committed actors came to power early and
funded the widespread adoption of a progressive and community-based primary care
model that won awards and inspired the central government. The case of Ceara´ proves
that states with minimal capacity can still find creative ways to meet the needs of
their population as long as leaders are committed. It also shows the stark lack of
commitment in Bahia, where infant mortality and maternal death were shockingly
high and leaders chose not to adopt a cheap, effective model that was saving the lives
of thousands of babies and mothers just next door. These are the cases that most
clearly illustrate the protagonism of commitment, which, if present, can make up for
even the lowest levels of capacity.
5.8 Multilevel Health Reform in the State of Sa˜o Paulo
The state of Sa˜o Paulo is in the Southeast region and has the highest per capita
income in the country after Bras´ılia, the Distrito Federal. Sa˜o Paulo is a case of high
capacity and an intermediate level of commitment. It is a useful case here because
it illustrates the way that outcomes are driven both by wealth and by policy, and
the difference between the policy choices of actors with a primary focus on equity
and those without. Sa˜o Paulo also illuminates one of the overarching challenges for
Brazil (and many other places)—that good governance and high capacity are often
concentrated in the places that, in relative terms, need them the least. The state is one
of several Southeastern and Southern (mostly white) states where income inequality
has decreased significantly over the period and average incomes have grown far beyond
the national average, despite inequality being lower and incomes higher to begin with.
I profile the capital city of Sa˜o Paulo and compare it briefly to other municipali-
ties in the larger metropolitan area that have produced innovative equity-enhancing
health policy in the presence of higher levels of commitment, while sharing Sa˜o Paulo’s
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high levels of capacity. I also contrast the state with Minas Gerais, another South-
eastern state that has varied with Sa˜o Paulo on levels of economic development and
commitment.
5.8.1 Overview
Sa˜o Paulo is the most populous state in Brazil with over 41 million people in 2012.
Despite also being the largest in terms of number of municipalities (with 645), nearly
half the population of the state resides in the metropolitan area of Sa˜o Paulo City. The
state was the primary area of Portuguese settlement and later Italian immigration.
It is the economic motor of the country, producing a third of the national GDP.
Lacking the legacy of slavery that has haunted the Northeast, Sa˜o Paulo state
partly sidesteps Brazil’s most significant source of social stratification and inequality—
though immigration by the Northeastern poor to the favelas has been an important
source of inequality. The state is the whitest in the Southeast at 68 per cent, lower only
than the states of the South, where the populations are almost exclusively descended
from European immigrants. The city of Sa˜o Paulo is significantly more diverse, with
large international communities and religious minorities. Yet the descendents of black
slaves are highly segregated and tend to be extremely poor, populating the favelas
but thoroughly invisible in the posh neighborhoods of the city center.
Infant mortality in Sa˜o Paulo, as in most of Brazil, has fallen steadily since the
1970s. Yet overall levels have been far lower than in most of the rest of the country.
In 1980 rates were in the mid-1960s and had dropped to 11.6 by 2011. Like Bahia in
the Northeast, Sa˜o Paulo has the lowest infant mortality rates in its region and also
like Bahia, rates have dropped by nearly half since 1997.
Poverty is much lower than most of Brazil yet has still decreased from 18 per cent
in 1981 to 11 per cent in 2009. Poverty rates are lower in Sa˜o Paulo than the other
three states in the Southeast region, though by 2011 not by much, despite starting out
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lower. The other three states (Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Esp´ırito Santo) had
over 30 per cent poverty in 1981 and were all within a point or two of Sa˜o Paulo by
2011. Poverty among people of color decreased from 52 to 26 per cent between 1991
and 2010, while for whites the decrease was from 36.53 to 15.5 (DATASUS 2013).
The drop has therefore been larger for whites in relative terms. Still, the gains overall
have been impressive and the absolute racial poverty gap has narrowed.
This state represents one of the few cases where substantive gains in income in-
equality have been made in recent years, with income inequality in 1981 at .513 and
reaching its highest point in 1989 at .557. Inequality barely shifted for 15 years but
begins a marked descent in 2003, reaching .489 in 2009. From 1985, real (inflation
adjusted) GDP per capita in Sa˜o Paulo state stagnated and decreased before begin-
ning to increase again in the 2000s. Per capita GDP was 10,760 reais in 1985—2.2
times the national average—and 12,650 in 2009—now just 1.8 times the national av-
erage. Rio de Janeiro is quite close to Sa˜o Paulo in terms of per capita GDP, while
Esp´ırito Santo is somewhat lower and Minas Gerais is closer to the national average.
Figure 5.6 shows the trajectory of the Southeastern states.
Revenue as a portion of GDP—our quantitative indicator of capacity—is lower in
Sa˜o Paulo than in almost any other state, though en par with other wealthy areas.
While states certainly have some latitude for increasing their tax revenue, the taxes
controlled by the states are fairly regressive, while the direct taxes (and the failure
to adequately collect them) are primarily the problem of the central government.
Because a large portion of the transfers to the states are made on a redistributive basis
favoring poor states, it is not surprising that revenue might be lower in relative terms
in Sa˜o Paulo, particularly given the enormity of its GDP. Over time, revenue/GDP
has increased from 7 per cent in 1985 to 10.5 per cent in 2009. Figure 5.7 shows the
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Figure 5.6: GDP per Capita in Sa˜o Paulo and the Southeast: 1985-2009
trajectory of the Southeastern states.
The state of Sa˜o Paulo has received little international aid or involvement in issues
of public health, though the favelas in the capital city have received some significant
attention. As an important state for industry and finance, politics in the state are
tightly tied to national politics and party leaders often come from or base themselves
in Sa˜o Paulo. The state government was in the hands of the PMDB until 1994
and then shifted to the PSDB, where it has remained. Therefore, state government
has tended to be centrist rather than left or right and policy results have generally
illustrated this ambiguity.
Yet in keeping with the broader theory, the lack of actively committed government
has left its mark in a number of ways, since the pressure of private sector interests in
the state have been very strong indeed. The sanitarista movement has been strong
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Figure 5.7: Revenue/GDP in Sa˜o Paulo and the Southeast: 1985-2009
in the Southeast in general and has maintained its influence in professional associa-
tions and academia in Sa˜o Paulo state even after its influence waned at the national
level. Some of the most innovative programs in equity-enhancing health reform have
emerged from the “Grande ABC” area around the city of Sa˜o Paulo.
5.8.2 The State of Sa˜o Paulo
As a major commercial center from early in Brazilian colonial history, Sa˜o Paulo
has benefitted from economic booms generated in other regions. When gold was
discovered in Minas Gerais, Sa˜o Paulo reaped the benefits as trade moved through.
The same was true with coffee and sugar cane in the interior of the state during the
18th century. Kubitschek’s industrialization efforts generated a major expansion in
the auto industry, centered in Sa˜o Paulo, which became one of the major hubs for
union organization later.
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Politics in the state of Sa˜o Paulo are dominated by the city of Sa˜o Paulo, despite
having the most municipalities of any state. Sa˜o Paulo has an industrial base and
has experienced rapid economic growth in recent years. The state government has
had a high level of administrative and fiscal capacity throughout this period. Sa˜o
Paulo state has never had a government of the left but has not faced the challenges
of administrative and fiscal capacity that Bahia has. The lack of left government
is reflected in Sa˜o Paulo’s status as the state where the most experimentation with
private partnerships in health provision has taken place (Sano and Abrucio 2008).
At the same time, combining central government commitment and progress in health
policy development with a high level of state capacity has allowed access and quality
to improve slowly over time.
From 1979 to 1982 the Governor of the state was the military approved ARENA
member Paulo Maluf, a conservative politician whose combination of populism, cor-
ruption, and grand public works projects in Sa˜o Paulo have earned him his own
brand of politics–“malufismo.” In the 1990s he would become mayor of the city of
Sa˜o Paulo for the second time, having first served during the 1960s. As in many
Brazilian cases, the vice-governor took over from 1982-1983 while Maluf ran for a
national congressional seat.
In 1983 the first directly elected governor took office, the reformist Franco Montoro
who had been Minister of Labor and Social Security under Tancredo Neves in the
early 1960s. While Montoro inherited an indebted administration after the grand
projects of Maluf, he extended basic sanitation and running water to many parts of
the state. The cabinet of the Montoro government included many of those who would
later govern the state from the soon-to-be-formed PSDB.
From 1987-1991 the state was governed by Orestes Que´rcia, leader of the domi-
nant conservative branch within the PMDB (Roma 2002). He was followed by Luiz
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Antnio Fleury, also from the PMDB, from 1991-1995. During the PMDB govern-
ments, public works and infrastructure expansions were costly, but also facilitated
economic development and transportation with the interior of the state. The state
was at an intermediate level with the preparation of its municipalities for the newly
transferred responsibilities of the SUS (Arretche 1998: 125).
In 1996 Mario Covas was elected and governed until his death in 2001. Covas, one
of the founding members of the PSDB, instituted broad economically liberal reforms–
cutting public sector employment and privatizing state owned enterprises. His public
management reforms built state capacity, in the vein of those instituted at the national
level. National reforms in 1995 permitted the privatization of basic sanitation, which
was undertaken in several paulista municipalities, almost exclusively under PMDB or
PSDB control (Arau´jo and Loureiro 1996).
In 2001 Covas’ vice-governor Geraldo Alckmin, another founding member of the
party, took his place and was re-elected in 2002. Conservative DEM (the new name
of the PFL, see Table A.4 ) Cla´udio Lembo briefly governed when Alckmin stepped
down to run for president and was replaced by Jose´ Serra, former national Health
Minister, in 2007. Like Alckmin, Serra stepped down to run for president in 2010 and
was replaced by Alberto Goldman briefly before Alckmin was elected for a third term
in office.
The state’s overall approach to health policy has been driven by an economically
liberal orientation prioritizing the private sector. However, when the mayor of the
city of Sa˜o Paulo refused federal funds for the PSF in order to continue with a
market-based municipal basic health plan (PAS) in 1996, Minister of Health Jatene
convinced the Sa˜o Paulo state health secretariat to start PSF neighborhood health
teams in outlying municipalities of the larger Sa˜o Paulo metropolitan area (Capistrano
1999: 90; Borges Sugiyama 2007: 158). Because of concern that the PSF program
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would have a stigma in rich regions as a poor service for the poor, the PSF in these
municipalities of Sa˜o Paulo was called “Qualis” rather than PSF. It has been deeply
embedded in local civil society, as have most of the PSF programs that have been
successful. Qualis has also been cheaper to run—63.60 reais per capita in 1999 versus
the official 120 reais price tag of the PAS (Capistrano 1999: 96).
Still, the most important developments in health policy have been the use of
the controversial private providers (technically, private non-profits), the Organizac¸es
Sociais de Sau´de (OS, Health Care Social Organizations). The OS were articulated
as part of the state reforms at the national level and conceptualized by Luiz Carlos
Bresser Pereira with the goal of reducing costs and improving the quality of services
by separating provision from financing and oversight (Bresser Pereira 2011)21. In the
decade and a half since they were introduced, Sa˜o Paulo state has been the most
ambitious in experimenting with the use of OS in the health sector. In 2008 there
were 16 in the state, while the next closest state had three and most had none (Sano
and Abrucio 2008: 69).
Perceptions of outcomes under the OS are widely divergent because of the in-
tense ideological debate that has surrounded their use (Arretche 2011). Sano and
Abrucio find that the OS did not improve efficiency or the burden of bureaucracy
as hoped (2008: 64), and that the citizen participation in oversight envisioned by
Bresser Pereira never materialized, since the preferences of the Conselhos were ig-
nored by state government (77). However, costs are certainly lower and a World
Bank assessment suggests that there have been noticeable improvements in service
delivery (2008). As we will see in the city of Sa˜o Paulo, the use of the OS in the PSF
21The idea behind the OS, for Bresser Pereira, was that employment that could be done well by
the private sector should not be done by public civil servants with sheltered contracts, while being
paid high salaries financed by tax-payers. In contrast to the neoliberal view that many have of the
OS, Bresser Pereira argues that they reduce elite antagonism toward the welfare state, giving the
state more room to fulfill the social commitments of the constitution (2011).
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has introduced new complexities into this debate.
As the Basque case in Spain clearly shows, it is possible to create new semi-public
non-profit entities in the health sector without increasing inequalities in access and
outcomes. Yet the experience likely depends a great deal on what the goals of reform
were, and the economic interests of the private medical sector in Sa˜o Paulo have been
at the forefront of reforms in the state. As the Qualis example shows, it is clearly
possible to make the national model of primary care provision work even in rich states.
In 2011 the state government, under Secretary of Health Giovanni Guido Cerri,
decreed the implementation of a 2010 law (Lei 1131) that would allow public SUS
hospitals run by OS to dedicate 25% of their beds to those with private insurance.
While the Secretary argued it would be an opportunity to pilot attempts to charge
private insurance companies at the door rather than trying to uncover their identity
ex-poste22, few other political actors shared this perception. The Ministe´rio Pu´blico
do Estado (Public Ministry) took the state to court in the Tribunal de Justic¸a de Sa˜o
Paulo arguing that the move would generate a “dupla porta” or segregated service for
those in the SUS and compromise the fundamental mission of the public hospitals.
The CNS, the CES (Conselho Estadual de Sau´de, state counterpart to the CNS),
the Conselho de Secreta´rios Municipais de Sau´de do Estado de Sa˜o Paulo (Council
of Municipal Health Secretaries of Sa˜o Paulo State) and the Conselho Regional de
Medicina (Regional Medical Council) all took a stance against the measure for the
same reason. The courts ruled against the state government, though the decision is
has been appealed23. Other reforms under Alckmin have moved in a similar direc-
tion, raising concerns about segregating the SUS, with some representatives of state
22O Estado de Sa˜o Paulo, interview with Cerri 7/14/2011. “Os planos na˜o va˜o querer pagar aos
hospitais pu´blicos”
23O Estado de Sa˜o Paulo, 9/1/2011 “Justic¸a suspende lei que destina leitos de hospitais pu´blicos
a plano de sau´de.”
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hospitals defending preferencial treatment of those with private plans as a way for
public hospitals to finance their SUS operations24.
In terms of equity-enhancing primary care access, municipal authority has been
decisive as the primary actor in implementation. Because the city of Sa˜o Paulo has
minimal coverage under the PSF, the state faces a situation in 2012 in which 550 of
the state’s 645 municipalities have implemented the PSF, yet only 36 per cent of the
state population is covered (DAB SUS 2013). In line with the early innovation in
many paulista municipalities, PSF uptake was more widespread, earlier, in the state
of Sa˜o Paulo than in Bahia.
5.8.3 Capital City: Sa˜o Paulo
The city of Sa˜o Paulo is the sixth largest in the world and the municipality is
home to 11.2 million inhabitants. Approximately one fifth of the municipal health
institutions are public, while the rest are private (IBGE 2011). The city’s leaders
exert great influence over national politics and the city thrives on a highly globalized
finance sector. State and city government have been dominated by the founding club
of the PSDB for the past two decades, with many members cycling between the two.
In the immediate post-transition period the city was governed by a PT mayor,
Luiza Erundina from 1989-1993, whose health policy included expanding the services
of the health posts and increasing access to the poorer peripheral zones of the city.
Erundina was considered a strong left leader and instituted progressive participatory
housing policies, but these were discontinued after her successor, Eduardo Suplicy,
lost to Paulo Maluf in the subsequent elections. Maluf had been governor of the state
and mayor of the city under the military regime and served one term from 1993-1997
for the PP.
Celso Pitta served from 1997 to 2001 but his tenure in office and later political
24Folha de Sa˜o Paulo 11/18/2011 “Lei aprovada reabre poleˆmica sobre ‘dupla porta’ em hospitais
paulistas.”
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life were plagued by corruption, scandal, and legal problems, with little left to show
for his time as mayor. Pitta was succeeded by Marta Suplicy of the PT, whose work
on health care and other social policies is discussed below. In 2005 Jose´ Serra was
elected mayor but left office in 2006 to run for governor and turned the city over to his
vice, Gilberto Kassab. Kassab governed on the right—he was previously a member
of the PL, then the DEMs before leaving the party in 2011.
Paulo Maluf had created a municipal primary health scheme based on market
principles beginning in 1995 and he and Pitta had maintained this program even
when it meant rejecting federal funding for the PSF (Borges Sugiyama 2007: 171).
The PAS was more expensive than the PSF and less effective (Capistrano 1999: 97),
but it was not until Marta Suplicy’s arrival that Sa˜o Paulo implemented the PSF
and scrapped the PAS. The Sa˜o Paulo model of the PSF integrated the existing OS
as service providers, so it was not the public provision model of basic care that the
PSF represented elsewhere (Goldbaum, et al 2005: 91; Elias, et al 2006: 634). The
PSF represents 45 per cent of primary care services in the city and produces better
outcomes than the other programs (Elias, et al 2006: 637).
Yet evidence from Sa˜o Paulo city suggests that even the PSF can be affected by
lack of commitment. A study by Schattan and Pedroso assesses the distribution of
health facilities in Sa˜o Paulo by socio-economic status and find a significant level
of inequality, with wealthier neighborhoods having preferential access to the public
sector. While this inequality diminished over the course of the 1990s, it was still
substantial at the turn of the 21st century (2002: 141).
In Brazil, some of the most innovative local social programs have arisen in the
most developed areas (Bichir 2011). In the case of Sa˜o Paulo, this means that in
a large and complex municipality, many municipal programs and services already
existed when national programs arrived on the scene. Paradoxically, these challenges
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of coordination in high capacity cities may make diffusion of a promising national
policy more difficult than if the municipality were a blank slate in that arena, as was
the case in Salvador. While in a case like Porto Alegre where the pre-existing primary
care program is more generous than the PSF, this is less problematic. But in a city
like Sa˜o Paulo, such conflicts reduce the capacity of equity-enhancing reforms.
Despite these difficulties, in both Sa˜o Paulo state and city, Renata Bichir finds
that the central government under the PT was able to incentivize compliance with
its hallmark programs even under opposition governments (2011: 29), although in
health care this coverage has been low. This suggests an increase in the salience
of commitment at the central level, as Cardoso, then Lula, and now Dilma have
developed institutional tools to achieve their policy goals at the subnational level,
even under parties of the opposition. The immediate, substantive policy changes
that took place in health and social assistance when Marta Suplicy took office also
sustain the argument that the differences between the PT and other parties can be
significant, even under unlikely circumstances.
Other municipalities of Sa˜o Paulo, particularly in the ABC region, have long inno-
vated in social policy. A good example is the health policy activism of Celso Daniel,
PT mayor of Santo Andre´ before he was assassinated in 200225. Sa˜o Paulo state
housed some of the earliest municipal experiments with minimum income programs,
for example (Bichir 2011: 28). As in the case of Bahia, outside the large and com-
plex capital cities, there are capable and committed municipal governments that have
improved the distributive impact of the SUS in their territory.
5.8.4 Minas Gerais: A Contrast in the Southeast
The state of Minas Gerais is a useful contrast to Sa˜o Paulo. Its government has
also been dominated by the PMDB and PSDB and it is also a large state with many
25Daniel’s widow, Miriam Belchior, was also a part of this reformist group in the ABC region and
is now Minister of Planning under Dilma.
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municipalities. It does not have Sa˜o Paulo’s vast wealth—per capita incomes are
much closer to the Brazilian mean. This is true of very few states, most of which
are far above or far below the mean. Income inequality decreased from .568 in 1981
to .513 in 2009, with a bump in the 1990s, as elsewhere. The trajectory in income
inequality improvement has been most pronounced in the South and Southeast and
with the case of Minas Gerais, is clearly not true only for very wealthy states.
Within the South and Southeast, Minas Gerais has the largest number of poor
municipalities (Giovanella, et al 2009: 50). Infant mortality in the state is lower than
the national average and has been over time, yet is higher than the average for the
southern part of the country. Unlike Sa˜o Paulo, which is overwhelmingly white, Minas
Gerais is just under 50 per cent white. While the state government of Minas Gerais
has been governed by centrist parties, parties of the left have had a more significant
presence in local government, earlier. In particular, the capital of Belo Horizonte had
early left government, beginning with Patrus Ananias in 1993 and remaining in the
hands of the PT and PSB for the past two decades. PSF coverage for the state has
been boosted by the over 70 per cent coverage achieved in the city by the early 2000s.
Belo Horizonte, the capital and home to 2.4 million inhabitants, was an early
innovator in primary care expansion, as well as participatory budgeting—a hallmark
of municipal PT government. The city took on full health management in 1994,
several years before the federal implementation of NOB 1996 (after which point most
municipalities began taking on broader responsibilities). The commitment of leftist
municipal executives and their orientation toward expansion and consolidation of the
SUS meant that from the late 1980s the capital city was pursuing equity-enhancing
policies in health. In 1994 specific projects were already being developed at the
municipal level directed at lowering infant mortality—the Projeto Vida (Malta and
Merhy 2004).
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In Minas Gerais the implementation of PSF and other community primary care
programs revealed the need for reorientation of medical training—as in Bahia–and
the new curriculum was implemented in 2003. Once again we see that politics in the
state were driven by commitment in the capital city, with demand for reform coming
primarily from expansion of the PSF in Belo Horizonte (Giovanella, et al 2009: 138).
Minas Gerais now has the highest number of doctors specifically trained in family
health as a specialty, yet still only has half as many as would be needed to fully
cover the state population (Giovanella, et al 2009: 231). The contrast with Bahia,
which could not overcome opposition to curriculum reform until 2011, is notable.
Opposition by the medical profession was high in Minas Gerais as well (Giovanella,
et al 2009: 237), but unlike Bahia where there was no political backing for reform
until 2007, in Minas Gerais the government was pushed to implement reform much
more quickly.
5.8.5 Sa˜o Paulo: Conclusion
While the state of Sa˜o Paulo has one of the highest levels of economic develop-
ment, income inequality is relatively low, and the legacy of slavery is weaker than
in the Northeast, the lack of ideological commitment to equity-enhancing reform in
health has still hampered reform. The health sector is strong in Sa˜o Paulo city and
state, unlike in Bahia, yet tight ties between private medical interests and state and
municipal political leaders have created continuous pressure to focus the energies of
the public sector in ways that benefit these groups.
Even though many leaders from the PSDB have not been especially antagonistic
to a pro-poor agenda, the most equity-enhancing reforms have still taken place in
housing, transportation, and primary care implementation during brief windows of
PT government in the capital city. Many of the municipalities in the state have been
innovators in equity-enhancing health policy, making a substantive difference for the
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most vulnerable members of society for a subset of the state population.
The case of Sa˜o Paulo is a particularly clear illustration of why we should not
assume that capacity-building can be an end unto itself in a broader process of
equity-enhancing reform. Capacity in the state and city of Sa˜o Paulo have done
relatively little for those living in the favelas, without an accompanying commitment
to equality. In the city of Sa˜o Paulo we saw that even the public health resources de-
signed to help the poor, first and foremost, were more highly concentrated in wealthy
neighborhoods. Still, the experience of the city of Sa˜o Paulo also requires that we
keep in mind the increasing capacity needs for the same level of reform, the larger a
city grows. Implementing reforms in an enormous city with enormous slums, when
large numbers of bureaucrats must be involved for successful policy implementation,
certainly complicates the task.
The municipalities of the ABC metropolitan area around Sa˜o Paulo show what
can be achieved when high capacity is combined with high commitment. And the
case of Minas Gerais illustrates what can be done with just an intermediate level
of capacity. The state has a smaller white population, sits almost precisely at the
Brazilian mean in terms of GDP per capita, and has higher levels of poverty. Yet
primarily because of a long history of committed government in the capital city of
Belo Horizonte, social policy innovations and health reform have been considerably
more equity-enhancing than in Sa˜o Paulo.
5.9 Chapter Conclusion
Brazil is an excellent case for exploring the contrasting expectations of those who
see decentralization as a glass half full versus those who see it as a glass half empty.
Decentralization did indeed create the opportunity for municipalities with high levels
of civic engagement, committed public officials, and sufficient administrative and
financial resources to implement innovative policies. Even some very poor areas
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under committed government were able to improve outcomes considerably. The PT
was able to win the presidency in 2002 in large part because it had the opportunity
to establish itself and gain experience in government at the municipal level. Both
Cardoso and Lula drew on successful subnational experiences to develop the national
social programs that have become models internationally. But decentralization has
also allowed for municipalities like Salvador to neglect health policy without being
held accountable. Commitment and capacity were both scant in the neediest regions
until very recently, the result of which has been bigger improvements in areas that
were already doing better.
One of the most challenging obstacles for equity-enhancing health reform in Brazil
has been the timing and sequence of democracy, health decentralization, and com-
mitment at multiple levels. Support for reform peaked in the mid-1980s—as it did in
Spain. Yet in Brazil the democratic transition was just beginning and the advocates
of reform spent their capital ensuring a pro-poor definition of the health system in
the 1988 constitution. This victory was not inconsequential, but the movement for
health reform did not have a strong basis of support in other social movements and
left parties were far weaker than in Spain.
After the transition, neoliberal actors won control of the government and imple-
mented health legislation more or less on their own terms. From 1989-1994 the central
government was uninterested in accountability and responsibilities were transferred
to subnational actors with little regulation or oversight. For the most part, the consti-
tutional guarantee remained unimplemented and unfunded. This situation changed
significantly under the PSDB beginning in 1995, though far reaching reform of the
health system was not part of the centrists’ platform. When the PT came to power
in 2003, many equity-enhancing policies were implemented in the Health Ministry
as part of a broader process of mainstreaming social justice criteria into government
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management. Discrimination based on race, gender, and sexual orientation was tack-
led seriously for the first time. Yet health reform was not a top priority for Lula, who
was invested in social assistance and education reforms. Advances have therefore
been steady, but slow since 1994.
Ultimately, only a central government can implement equity-enhancing policy re-
forms across the national territory. Therefore, when subnational governments fail to
prioritize social policies for the poor, such policies will only be implemented if those
governments are sidestepped or incentivized to change their behavior. In Bahia dur-
ing the 1990s, the state government was uninterested in pro-poor health programs,
so it was the central government with international partners that helped small and
rural municipalities implement community health programs. From the mid-1990s on
the central government has attached conditionalities to transfers for health and in-
centivized equity-enhancing programs with additional funding. Since federal require-
ments for minimum spending levels were instituted, inequality in health spending
across Brazilian municipalities has sharply diminished (Arretche 2010), though there
have been drawbacks to this process as well.
The efforts of the central government under the PSDB and the PT have been
clearly oriented toward regaining authority vis-a`-vis subnational units. In the case
of the PSDB the concerns were primarily around issues of economic stability, while
for the PT they have been dominated by concerns for the ability to implement a
social agenda across the country. The governments of both parties have produced
equity-enhancing reform in large part because of these efforts to hold subnational
units accountable for good governance and equity-enhancing social reforms. Despite
the role of subnational units in innovation, this study therefore affirms the findings
of other case studies of health decentralization–that equitable results are most likely
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when central government regulations limit the scope of policy autonomy of subna-
tional units. Tables A.10 and A.11 show the outcomes on ACS and PSF under
differing levels of commitment and capacity over time in Bahia, Salvador, Sa˜o Paulo,
and its capital city.
What are the prospects, then, for the SUS? The formal territorial division of
responsibilities in health is settled and has been for some time, which narrows the
scope of possible reforms. As former Planning Minister Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira
explains, while exclusive central government financing of health care would be the
most equitable, this option was never considered because the decentralized nature of
the SUS–decided early on in the constitution and enabling legislation of 1990–made
it impossible (2011). While the conditions necessary for pro-poor health reform–
commitment and capacity–have been steadily increasing at the central level, tough
questions for the SUS have not been tackled.
Financing has become more regressive over time, municipalities are stretched thin,
and the center has still not made a commitment to increasing its share in health
spending. Private health spending now outstrips public and the relationship between
the public and the private sector creates structural problems for the SUS that will
have to be addressed. In particular, the fact that the most expensive treatments are
almost exclusively provided by the SUS with no reimbursement from private health
plans is unsustainable. Finally, the understanding of what “universal” means is still
not a settled question and the courts have been increasingly forcing the government
to cover procedures and services it has denied to patients.
While serious challenges clearly exist for the SUS, there are many indicators that
the system will become more equitable over time. This study shows a steady improve-
ment in commitment and capacity at the national level over the democratic period.
Economic growth in Brazil has been strong and increased funding for health is not
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a politically or structurally insurmountable problem. The inclusion of broad social
citizenship rights in the constitution of 1988 has given legal recourse over time to de-
mands for expanded social programs. Most Brazilians know that they have the right
to health care and that the state is responsible for ensuring universal access. The
PSF has finally been institutionalized as the core program for extending coverage and
organizing access to care. Health policy makers have consistently shown a holistic
understanding of health and a preventive approach to care, which bodes well for the
sustainability of the system. For Dilma, equity-enhancing health policy finally ap-
pears to have gained a powerful defender and the reforms implemented under Padilha
just in the past few years suggest potentially significant improvements in subnational
accountability and the public/private relationship in health.
For Brazil, enhancing equity in health will require increasing the capacity of sub-
national governments and ensuring that political actors at all levels are committed
to the SUS. While the case study clearly shows that less developed countries with
high levels of decentralization and asymmetric subnational political power and for-
mal authority can still successfully implement equity-enhancing health reform, the
limitations are also clear. Left parties were far weaker in Brazil and there were no
alternative sources of commitment as there were for a few regions in Spain. The weak-
ness of ideologically committed actors combined with low fiscal and administrative
capacity made it impossible to fully implement the generous guarantees of universal
health protection enshrined in the new democratic constitution. Because a universal
system of public care was not quickly established, the already strong private sector
was able to block implementation as it was attempted, piecemeal, over the years. Yet
the constitutional mandate has remained the standard for defenders of the SUS and
there has been no overall backsliding—access, coverage, and quality of care for the
neediest members of society have improved steadily over time. The opposition to
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reform has largely been manageable because of impressive economic growth that per-
mitted increased spending without clear costs to other policy areas or actors. As the
economic crisis has slowed the economy, we shall see whether Brazil has the capacity
to sustain an unconsolidated SUS.
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6 COMPARISON
In this chapter I come full circle, back to the overarching comparison of the two
country cases taken up in Chapter 1. In depth comparative historical analysis allows
us to tease out the complexities of multilevel reform with several paths to reform.
The countries themselves were chosen precisely because there were important oppor-
tunities for comparison across, as well as within the cases.
In order to gain leverage on this complex causal story, I chose a single policy
area in order to pinpoint concrete changes in the territorial distribution of authority.
Because I argue that starting points constrain the options available to reformers and
define whether a given policy will be equity-enhancing in its particular distributive
context, it was also helpful to choose countries in which the starting points were
fairly similar. Both Spain and Brazil had third wave pacted democratic transitions
in which the status quo prior to reform was right wing centralized authoritarianism
and fairly high, yet inegalitarian, health coverage under a Bismarckian contributory
social insurance model. Leftist reformers in both cases supported decentralization
at the outset of reform, but in both countries center-right actors governed through
the transition period and the early years following constitutional health coverage
mandates. The primary care models have important similarities, as well as differences.
What then, are the differences and similarities in institutions and reform processes
that can teach us something about what to expect for equity-enhancing reform under
decentralization?
In the pages that follow I present a comparison of the two countries in terms of
commitment, capacity, and the territorial distribution of authority, as well as the role
of timing and sequence of reform. I consider rival explanations and show that they
do not adequately explain the variation in equity-enhancing health reform in Spain
and Brazil.
6.1 Territorial Distribution of Commitment
Actors committed to equity-enhancing reform produced innovative and quite sim-
ilar primary care reforms in both Spain and Brazil. However, commitment differed
in three ways that impacted health reform under decentralization between Spain and
Brazil. First, in Spain committed actors were powerful across the country and had
an absolute majority in the central government when the constitutional mandate was
implemented, while in Brazil committed actors were state and municipal leaders from
new parties without a long history of societal support. Second, committed actors
won the central government in Spain early after the transition and before anyone had
attempted to implement the constitutional health mandate. In Brazil, committed
actors did not win the central government until 15 years after the constitution and
long after the structural framework of the health system had been established and
put in motion. Third, committed actors have been strongest in Spain in poor regions
and those dominated by minority nationalists, while in Brazil committed actors have
historically been strongest in the states with higher incomes than average and high
levels of education.
For Spain on the first dimension, the absolute majority of an historic left party
with a large following and a long and venerable history created a solid foundation
for moving quickly with a large scale reform, which proved difficult and incomplete
even under these auspicious circumstances. The EU can be considered a supportive
supranational context for domestic commitment, as moderate social democracy in
Europe does not have the same influence on international investors that it does in
Latin America. In Brazil the strength of committed actors was weaker overall and
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only strong enough for reform in a sprinkling of municipalities and states at the outset.
This meant that early health reform was piecemeal and primary care coverage was
only extended in a few parts of the country.
Even more important was the fact that because of where committed actors were
strong subnationally in Brazil, the places that innovated—except for the case of
Ceara´—were not the parts of the country that most desperately needed reform. How-
ever, as the infant mortality rates in Brazil clearly show, the gains made even in these
higher income areas were substantive and represented a major improvement in life
chances for millions of people. Still, we can see clearly that improvements in in-
come inequality have been distributed unevenly in Brazil (See Figures A.9 and A.10).
Those states that have overall had the best performance on income inequality are
also those that have lowered it the most. In the Northeast, income inequality in
many states is still higher than it was in 1980, while in richer and whiter parts of
the country inequality has dropped far more substantially. If Brazil cannot impact
income inequality in the most unequal and poverty stricken parts of the country, an
important facet of territorial inequity persists and may even have been exacerbated
by better access to basic health services for the poor in the richer regions. Clearly, it
is much better to be a poor person in Santa Catarina or Mato Grosso do Sul than in
Pernambuco or Bahia.
In Spain, the minority nationalist ACs have been higher income than average. The
Basque Country and Navarre are outside the common fiscal regime, but Catalonia
pays a great deal into the central system and resents it. In both countries, the largest
population centers have been in places with fairly poor records on equity-enhancing
health reform, which is important to keep in mind when comparing outcomes by re-
gion. Madrid, Valencia, and Catalonia are home to the biggest Spanish cities and yet
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have been overall poor performers in health provision. Similarly, in Brazil health re-
form is universally recognized to have advanced the farthest outside major metropoli-
tan areas. Our judgment of outcomes should be somewhat more pessimistic in both
cases because of this distribution.
The territorial distribution of commitment matters because the interests of par-
ticular regions are impacted differently by a given model of territorial distribution of
resources. The redistribution that Sweden, Denmark, Austria, or Germany do in the
EU, and which left of center forces in those countries support, requires a higher level
of commitment than when left of center forces in poorer countries support the same
policies. This is true at the domestic level as well. It is one thing for actors in Ex-
tremadura or Bahia to support equity-enhancing reforms from which their population
will benefit, and quite another if those central policies mean that the governments of
Catalonia or Sa˜o Paulo see their own resources diminished by central efforts.
This is also part of the reason that ACs in Spain such as Castilla y Leo´n have
conservative governments that behave differently from those in Madrid or Catalonia.
Castilla y Leo´n is a net beneficiary both of EU funding and of Spanish regional
finance. Its leaders have historically not been committed to equity-enhancing reform,
but it is not especially costly to accept a model of the state that generates benefits
for their AC. In Brazil, the social programs discussed here have for the most part
been fairly inexpensive, which has helped to prevent large-scale opposition by the
wealthiest states. The situation is also distinct because Brazilian states have own
sources of revenue (primary the sales tax) that are quite regressive from a territorial
perspective but which mean the fortunes of the states are not as directly in the hands
of central policy makers as they have historically been in Spain.
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6.2 Territorial Distribution of Capacity
In addition to the significant differences in commitment, capacity has also been
an area of divergence between Spain and Brazil. Spain is a middle income developed
country while Brazil is a high income developing country, yet at every step of the
way Spain has had advantages in both fiscal and administrative capacity. Still, some
differences that appear to be problems of capacity I argue are fundamentally problems
of commitment.
Brazil is a far larger country where the legacy of slavery meant that small-holding
was minimal and forced labor was the norm in the Northeast. In these areas, basic
human development lagged long into the 20th century. In both countries, the regions
with the lowest levels of administrative capacity, education, and human capital are
those where large landholding was the norm.
While a modern bureaucracy developed at the central level during the Vargas era
in Brazil, this administrative capacity did not trickle through to most lower levels
of government. In Spain modernization of the bureaucracy took place earlier, which
may be part of why health provision under authoritarianism had a significant public
component in Spain but not in Brazil.
Aside from the overall differences in level of economic development, the most
significant difference for capacity is Spain’s presence in Europe. Europe supported
efforts at improving the living conditions of the rural and urban poor and treated
investments in education and health as desirable. But in addition, the poor regions
of Spain began receiving EU structural funds in 1987. The resources directed at
economic development in the poorest parts of Spain were on a completely different
level than the sporadic efforts at development of the North and Northeast undertaken
(with some international support) in Brazil. While EU structural funds are not aimed
at social policy, economic development, infrastructure, and training all form part of
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the foundation for sustaining equity-enhancing policies.
In terms of domestic fiscal capacity, Spain’s higher level of economic development
and wealth certainly matters—GDP per capita in comparable international units was
nearly three times higher in Spain in 2011 (IMF 2013). Yet high inequality has created
a vicious cycle in Brazil in which elites have been able to protect a tax system that is
highly regressive and apparently untouchable. While taxation in Spain has become
more regressive over time, in Brazil it was never progressive and does not appear
likely to become more so, despite the fact that the state collects a high level of taxes
mostly from indirect sources.
This is the sense in which I argue part of Brazil’s capacity problem is actually a
commitment problem. There are important untapped resources available for financing
social policy, yet so far attempts at more progressive taxation have been unsuccessful.
Brazil spends only half of what Spain spends as a portion of GDP on a similar health
mandate. The pension system has only been partially reformed, so the lion’s share
of social spending still goes to a privileged set of middle and upper-middle class
civil servants and industrial workers. Clearly Brazil has a competent bureaucratic
apparatus capable of collecting taxes. In Spain, the same privileged workers have
special benefits in health and pensions, yet because of higher levels of commitment at
key moments, the money for health was found and spending on special groups’ health
benefits is less than four per cent of total health spending.
6.3 Territorial Distribution of Authority
There have been important similarities and differences in the structure of decen-
tralization itself in Spain and Brazil and these have indeed been relevant for differences
in outcomes, particular as they interact with timing and sequence. The two cases were
chosen in part because they shared important features of the starting points prior to
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decentralization and health reform, yet some important differences remain and varia-
tion over time has been significant. In addition to the differences in timing of health
devolution, the overall distribution of social policy and fiscal authority has varied in
important ways.
The 1978 Spanish constitution set a specific group of competences off limits for de-
volution, named some as exclusive responsibilities of the ACs, and paid relatively less
attention to municipalities. Residual responsibilities (those not granted to the center)
could be transferred to the ACs, but this was not necessarily automatic. Public health
provision and health planning responsibilities were devolved to all ACs in 1981, while
overarching health responsibilities came later and asymmetrically. Unemployment
and social security have remained centralized for the most part. Education has been
devolved in a similar fashion as health, with the center retaining an important role
in setting minimum requirements and frameworks for curricula and structure.
Some features of social assistance have traditionally been considered a part of
social security while others part of social services. Social services and poor relief have
historically been a responsibility of the provinces and Catholic charity. This vision
did not change with the constitution. Authority over social assistance was granted
to the ACs (C1978 Art. 148) and was generally not a contentious point for actors at
any level. It has remained a residual policy area in many ACs, concentrated in the
provincial governments in some and almost nonexistent in others. Only a few ACs
have developed comprehensive social assistance programs and these have often not
subsumed or replaced those that operated at lower levels.
Fiscal autonomy in Spain has been considered fairly low, as the ACs have little
authority over taxation. Central actors and Catalan nationalists have managed to
devolve large portions of the tax base without actually giving much new authority to
the ACs—taxes are mostly still set at the center yet are collected over AC bases in
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differing proportions.
The Brazilian constitution of 1988 granted residual policy authority to the states—
consistent with their historically powerful role—and “complementary and supplemen-
tary” policy making authority to both states and municipalities in the realm of social
policy (Art. 6). This meant that everyone and no one was responsible for social pol-
icy (Souza 2004), yet it left great room for innovation because there were few formal
limits on what any particular level could do. While in Spain there is much judicial
wrangling about multilevel governance, in Brazil it is not so much that the rules were
not clear as that there were fewer rules. While there is great conflict over who should
pay for policies, there is no existential conflict over whether the center has a right to
legislate social policy or the states and municipalities the right to innovate in models
of provision. As in Spain, social security and unemployment are centralized. But in
Brazil, the center plays a larger role in health and education.
From this brief summary, there are three areas of divergence that are relevant for
equity. The first is that the baseline level of authority of the center in health policy is
more significant in Brazil. Lack of conflict over the reference community means there
is less opposition to central initiatives by powerful potential veto actors in the states.
Subnational health secretariats are hierarchically subordinate to the central Ministry
of Health—mostly in the realm of financing but also in terms of accountability and
implementation of centrally designed initiatives—none of which is true in Spain.
Second, the role of the center in Brazil is much more important for social assistance
than in Spain. Central actors in the mid-1990s began creating federal social assistance
programs, often conditional cash transfers based on earlier federal or subnational pilot
programs, which were applied directly in the municipalities. In Spain at the same
time that health reform was taking place, the PSOE tried to introduce a central law
that would integrate and expand social assistance at the federal level (Moreno 2001:
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78), yet at the time it was blocked in the courts on the grounds that the center
was overstepping its territorial authority. While the center eventually won its case
(Sentence 146/1986), the moment for reform had passed and the ACs had become
dominant protagonists in social assistance1.
It was only after the Basque Country began a “war on poverty” in the late 1980s—
including a minimum income guarantee—that the center added a non-contributory
pension (NCP) to its social security system. Minimum income guarantees have
been implemented in many ACs, while attempts to top up the NCP have also been
widespread. However, under the PP at the center, all ACs who tried to top up the
NCP were taken to court for invading central government authority. While the center
lost, it used its absolute majority to change social security legislation specifically to
make such top ups illegal (Law 52/2003). During the 1990s the management of IM-
SERSO, the branch of social services within social security, were devolved (Moreno
2001) and the ACs now directly manage the NCP in the social security system, but
do not have political authority over the program.
Arguably, the wording of Spanish basic law on who is responsible for social assis-
tance is about as muddy as Brazil’s constitutional division of responsibility for social
policy, so why have outcomes in Brazil been so different? Unlike Spain, Brazil has
no powerful regions that fundamentally oppose the principle of central government
action on social assistance2. Brazil also has no central parties that feel the unity of
the Brazilian state is threatened by subnational policy initiative. In addition, the
1The most the center was able to do was to pass a 1985 law that Spanish municipalities with
more than 20,000 inhabitants were required to provide basic social services (Law 7/1985). Yet most
Spanish municipalities have far fewer than 20,000 people and the average is near 5,000. In 1987
multilevel agreements were signed to provide financing for social services, which was equally split
between ACs and the center, with some also coming from municipalities. The Basque Country opted
out, because it rejects conditional funding from the center on principle (Moreno 2001).
2If Brazil’s flagship social assistance program, Bolsa Famı´lia, were more expensive or states had
to help pay for it, opposition might be higher.
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lack of ideological discipline in parties, as well as the history of credit-claiming for
government benefits means that even actors uninterested in equity do not face strong
party or electoral pressures to actively oppose central programs for the poor3. In
Spain, on the other hand, the right faces significant pressure not to take up policies
viewed as leftist, on ideological grounds.
The third difference in the nature of decentralization between the two countries
returns us to the health policy realm. The lack of clear delimitation of social policy
competences in Brazil means the process of health decentralization has been more
gradual and has not necessarily had a static institutional content. In Spain, ACs
had lower levels of authority in health policy at the outset, but when they gained
authority it was a clear and definitive process that shifted responsibility from the
center to the AC.
In Brazil, the states and municipalities were granted broad latitude to create
policies on their own under the 1988 constitution. The asymmetric decentralization
in health has not been a fundamental shift from center to states in most cases, but a
negotiation of new responsibilities within a given institutional context. While central
legislation prevents lower level actors in both countries from refusing to cover basic
minimum provisions, increases in the role of the Brazilian states and municipalities
does not always impede action by the center4.
These differences in the structure and content of decentralization made it easier
for the central government in Brazil to establish itself as an actor in health policy
after the empowerment of subnational units and also gave it greater leeway in crucial
3There is also evidence that municipalities, at least, have been able to claim some credit for Bolsa
Famı´lia, as they are the face of the programs imlementation (Niedzwiecki 2014 forthcoming)
4The demarcation between states and municipalities in medium and high complexity care is
more clearly zero-sum—states provide these services directly in municipalities that have not taken
on those responsibilities and once they do, states no longer have authority to offer those services in
the municipality.
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support areas such as social assistance, which also influence health. As we shall see
in the next section, however, the importance of timing and the necessity of a strong
role for the center meant that in Spain the alignment of influences was more favorable
for reform in the crucial early years.
Yet in both countries a common impediment to equity-enhancing reform has been
the inability of the center to establish accountability mechanisms that allow it to
step in if citizens are denied their constitutional rights at lower levels of government.
When the courts are the only recourse, citizens have little protection indeed. For both
countries part of the problem comes from the very nature of shared authority. In Spain
an additional weakness has been the inability to condition resources for health, while
in Brazil the problem was first a lack of commitment and later a lack of fiscal capacity.
The new contracts currently begin negotiated in Brazil under Decree 7508 should help
to consolidate the guarantees of the SUS, but over the period considered here, central
actors have been unable to realize important facets of constitutional protections in
health for those living under uncommitted local and intermediate governments.
6.4 Sequence
A crucial difference between Spain and Brazil has been when increases in regional
authority took place in relation to the implementation of health reform. In Spain, cen-
tral health reform took place when only two ACs had control of health competences
(Andalusia and Catalonia). In Brazil, states and municipalities already had broad
authority in social policy when central actors began implementation of the constitu-
tional mandate for health care. The actual variation in outcomes has depended on
the combinations of commitment and capacity present at different levels at important
moments in the reform process. Because of the lack of conflict over the reference com-
munity in Brazil, pre-existing decentralization did not hinder central implementation
nearly as much as simple lack of central commitment—at least initially.
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In Spain, however, Catalonia fought the center in the courts from the first mo-
ments over authority to implement countrywide health reform. Andalusia did not
because of ideological overlap with central actors and weaker minority nationalism.
The high level of variation in primary care coverage in early Spanish decentralizers,
compared to the higher average and far more uniform implementation of the reform in
ACs under central control is a testament to the cost of devolution before full reform
implementation (See Figures A.5 and A.6). Of the ACs governed by conservative
parties in Spain since the mid-1990s, there is a significant difference in the coverage
rates from 1995-2002 in those ACs with early devolution and those without. The
reform was popular and was not rolled back under conservative governments when
full coverage had been achieved under left central actors prior to devolution (see
Table A.7).
The fact that authority over health policy clearly lay with the center under the
constitutional mandate for health care in Spain meant that until health was devolved,
ACs did not innovate in health policy the way Brazilian states and municipalities did.
Yet in Brazil, health care was an important social concern but no one was given clear
responsibility for it under the new constitution and no action was taken at the center
at the outset. The first reforms implemented by the center from 1990-1993 institu-
tionalized the basic framework of the guarantees of the SUS and devolved greater
responsibilities away from the center (primarily toward municipalities for primary
care). Subnational actors in Brazil faced great uncertainty about the commitment
and capacity of the center and had a constitutional prerogative to go their own way, so
many did not wait around for the central government to act. In Spain, if all ACs had
been given open-ended authority in health prior to central reform and central com-
mitment had been lacking, we likely would have seen subnational innovation before
central innovation.
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The clear importance of sequence in these two cases brings into question the
common assumption that decentralization has been good for equity in Brazil because
it permitted progressive actors to cut their teeth first at the local and municipal level.
If subnational avenues in Brazil had not been open and progressive reformers had not
pushed for decentralization, those actors likely would have continued to operate at the
central level as they had in the 1980s, prior to decentralization of social policy. While
the PT clearly grew from the ground up, they came quite close to winning the 1989
elections in Brazil. There is no reason to assume that their failure to win the central
government until 2002 was somehow predetermined and that without subnational
avenues, the party could never have risen to national prominence.
Such assertions make a spurious assumption about the counterfactual—that if
there had been greater centralization, there would simply have been no avenue for
the emergence of committed actors at any level and the reforms would not have taken
place at all. It seems just as possible that if shared authority in social policy had
not been written into the 1988 Constitution, that the sanitaristas would not have
scattered back to state and local government and would have continued to militate
at the center. While there is no way to test a counterfactual in such cases, it is clear
that actors take the territorial distribution of authority into account and that the
need for committed social and political actors to operate at the local level made them
unavailable to maintain the centralized pressure they had been exerting in Bras´ılia
prior to 1988.
6.5 Timing in International Context
Spain’s presence in Western Europe muted the impact of neoliberal pressure from
US-influenced international financial institutions. The role of this supportive context
in forming partisan attitudes toward the welfare state in Spain is clear. Yet among
Latin American countries, Brazil was the most insulated from neoliberal pressures
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because of the size of its domestic market and the history of independence among
its civil servants. And even in Spain the 1990s were a time when neoliberal ideology
was influential in setting the general context of elite expectations about the possi-
bilities for reform. These pressures included policy decentralization and deregulation
(management “decentralization” to individual hospitals and clinics).
I therefore argue that the timing of reform in relation to neoliberal pressure in
the 1990s is an important part of why health reform has been more successful in
Spain than Brazil. In Spain the democratic transition took place while support for
progressive primary care reform internationally was at its peak. The USSR had
not fallen and the Washington Consensus was not yet hegemonic. The ink on the
Declaration of Alma Ata was still drying.The Spanish fiscal system was at its most
progressive when health reform was implemented. Support for progressive health
reform was high internationally and in Europe in the 1980s, yet iberalizing pressures
pushed EU countries toward a focus on indirect taxation starting in the 1990s and the
tax structure in Spain became less progressive. Spain took advantage of what turned
out to be a brief window of opportunity. The result was that health reform had been
implemented, funded, and consolidated before neoliberal pressures appeared.
In Brazil, the same tendencies existed at the same time, but these fell at a different
point in the reform process. Support for progressive health reform also peaked in
Brazil in the mid-1980s, but at this point the democratic transition was only just
shifting into high gear. Brazilian reformists were at their strongest at the same time
health reform was implemented in Spain, but this resulted primarily in a progressive
health guarantee in the Brazilian constitution of 1988. In both countries health reform
was not taken up until several years after the new constitutions, but in Brazil this
meant the early 1990s at the height of neoliberal influence, which reformers at the
time say was a relevant pressure (Bresser Pereira 2011).
310
Opponents of reform were trying to roll back the Spanish SNS in the early 1990s
as well, yet because it was consolidated and popular and the center-left held the
government, the actual effect on policy was limited. Attempts to constrain financ-
ing generated forceful push back countrywide—for example in the outrage over the
proposals put forth in the Informe Abril in 1991.
The international context was therefore not as dissimilar as one might expect, yet
because the Spanish democratic transition happened a decade earlier and committed
actors won government immediately, health reformers were able to implement their
agenda before the international context soured. Brazil was not so lucky, with neolib-
erals in government to implement the health mandate when international views had
shifted toward residual government social provision and an international economic
crisis was limiting fiscal capacity everywhere. Table A.12 illustrates the patterns of
reform in both countries in the international context.
6.6 Models of Reform and Elite Strategy
Primary health care in Spain and Brazil offered a particularly useful place for
analysis of the possibilities for equity-enhancing reform. The reforms were relatively
cheap and highly effective and were often supported by international actors who
in other arenas had been antagonistic to redistributive reforms. If primary care is
cheaper and more effective, all governments faced with cost containment pressures
should support expanding primary care at the expense of hospital and specialist care.
Yet primary care has been one of the most ideologically contested components
of universal health reforms and one of the slowest to be implemented, even though
it is the least expensive care to provide. Parties and actors on the left have been
the overwhelming protagonists of primary care reform in both countries, at multiple
levels. The innovations in primary care in Brazil at the state and municipal level in
the early years after the transition originated almost exclusively under governments
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on the left. Primary care was not implemented by the neoliberal central governments
in Brazil that took the first steps to enable the constitutional mandate for the SUS.
Actors on the right were vocally opposed to the 1984 primary reform in Spain, despite
overwhelming agreement among medical professionals and the public that primary
care was the weakest part of the health system and desperately needed reform.
Why such opposition to what seemed a common sense reform? Primary care is
inexpensive for middle and upper class individuals to purchase privately and not a
money maker for providers or medical equipment manufacturers, so there is little de-
mand for government intervention except to ensure access and coverage for the poor.
Because the Spanish strategy was to push through a comprehensive and generous
reform quickly, with solid funding, the improvements in primary care were felt im-
mediately across the country, even though the institutional transformation of clinics
took longer. This reform model was only possible because the vast majority of the
ACs were still under direct health provision by the central government.
One of the key differences between Spain and Brazil was that early implementa-
tion of the constitutional health mandate began under committed actors in the former
and uncommitted actors in the latter. The PSOE had prepared reforms in a number
of areas of social policy, but health was the most successful. The strategy of Ernest
Lluch in the Ministry of Health in 1983 was to push through a progressive health re-
form that accomplished all of the major goals of the socialist program—universality,
public provision, financing from the general budget rather than social security, and
a reorientation toward primary care. The legislation was written without broad con-
sultation of opposition groups or the private sector because the PSOE anticipated
that these actors would attempt to water down equity-enhancing components of the
legislation. The center was unable to avoid a protracted battle with these groups
once the legislation was proposed, but because it started from an ideal point that was
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public and popular, the compromises that were forced along the way—partial funding
still from social security, no elimination of dual practices, the governments’ right to
subcontract services in the private sector, no full universality, and keeping the system
tied to social security status—were publically viewed as failures, rather than treated
as a legitimate compromise.
While the PSOE was never able to modify the role of the private sector, which
was far too powerful and entrenched by the onset of reform, it was able to attain
almost universal coverage and almost full funding from the general budget within
a few years—items that were largely seen as the completion of progressive promises
that had not been conquered at the original moment of reform. Despite fiscal pressure
at a difficult economic moment toward the end of the 1980s, the tax reform of 1977
had put Spain on much more solid footing. Greater domestic fiscal capacity and
high commitment at the center, combined with the revenue from the EU that began
in 1987, allowed the Spanish SNS to be extended fairly quickly. Under the Franco
regime, social security health provision had been largely public, while in Brazil it had
been almost exclusively private. Spain could expand its health provision within a
personnel and administrative infrastructure it already owned and had operated for
years. In Brazil most had to be built from scratch.
In Brazil, the staunchest reformers in the health arena were not political actors
or parties because the left was small and weak. Rather, they were a broad set of
professional and civic organizations committed to public health, who reached their
highest level of influence in the drafting of the constitution itself. Because the Brazil-
ian reformers wanted health care highly decentralized—in contrast to the Spanish
socialists—there was little opposition when the neoliberals in government at the cen-
ter after the transition acted first to devolve greater responsibilities to the municipali-
ties. At this point there was no national movement and no party that championed the
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original sanitarista goals, which were very similar to those in Spain. In localities and
states where reformers were strong, equity-enhancing reform took place. Elsewhere,
it did not. Fiscal and administrative capacity handicapped whatever reform efforts
might have taken place in the poorest states and municipalities.
Fundamentally because of a lack of fiscal capacity and central government com-
mitment (the same factors whose presence was so enabling in the Spanish case), the
guarantees of the SUS were never achieved. Still, the promise of the constitutional
mandate represented a goal to be struggled toward, for committed actors. The clear
role of the formal guarantee undercuts assertations that formal victories are insub-
stantial if not enabled and acted upon—a common critique of Southern European
and Latin American politics. In contrast, these cases show that the formal guarantee
acts as a doorstop, ensuring that reformers have a legislative leg to stand on whenever
they mobilize enough strength for action.
Because the formal guarantee existed, the distance between what had been at-
tained and what had been promised could be measured. In Brazil, once more com-
mitted actors were in central government, the task was to increase accountability for
all three levels of government. The center had to start actually funding local health
secretariats, as well as coordinating and planning health policy. This happened slowly
over the course of the late 1990s and early 2000s.
At the same time, training for subnational providers began in earnest, though
this was primarily a state-level task and so in uncommitted states happened to a
lesser extent. Here the example of Bahia vs. Sa˜o Paulo is useful, as in Sa˜o Paulo
the state devolved extended health responsibilities to most of its municipalities all at
once without regard for their levels of capacity, while Bahia under the PT beginning
in 2007 required that its municipalities create an institutional support structure and
participate in training before taking on greater responsibilities in health.
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Ultimately, Spanish reformers were willing and capable of taking on entrenched
private interests in a way that was not possible in Brazil. The outcome was a much
more complete extension of reform in Spain both in terms of coverage and access.
Implementing reform piecemeal over time permitted private interests in Brazil to
consolidate their role in health provision, making elements of equity-enhancing reform
far more contentious and difficult later. The presence of the constitutional mandates
has been a crucial enabler for reform in both cases. Reforms have been most equity-
enhancing across the country when devolution of health was limited and controlled
from the center.
From a strategic perspective, there are two interesting processes of note. First, the
private for-profit health sector has attempted to block reform in both countries. The
key to overcoming opposition in Spain was to provide a high quality service and get it
in place quickly so that users would quickly realize the benefits of reform and become
advocates for the system moving forward. Call it shock therapy for the private health
market. Fears were high early on, but once the change took places all actors adjusted.
In Brazil the fact that reform was slow and partial and early implementers were
not willing to challenge the private sector meant that while middle and upper income
Brazilians use SUS hospitals for major surgeries and transplants, they do not use it
for primary care, which carries a stigma as a poor service for the poor. Committed
actors in Brazil recognize this problem and have begun to put great emphasis on
making sure people know that the quality services they receive are coming from the
SUS (in both country, user satisfaction is very high), and to build its reputation and
popularity across the population. But this is an uphill battle. It is far easier to
maintain support than to build it from below. In the meantime, the Brazilian SUS
is far more vulnerable to economic crisis and elite political abandonment than is the
Spanish SNS.
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Still, in some respects Brazilian reformers have been fighting a guerrilla public
health war and winning by stealth. Increases in spending have been implemented
at times of economic growth and expansion, the reforms have been moderate and
inexpensive at the outset, and ultimately demands for better and higher quality access
and services have built as citizens become accustomed to what resources are in place
versus what they know has been promised. High inequality and poverty make it hard
for elites to argue that cheap, common sense public programs with clear results could
somehow be overstepping the bounds of the state.
Yet it is unclear whether this model can be sustained and the quality of the SUS in
primary care is far from adequate for most users with access to private care. Perhaps
a model of basic universalism in health will be adequate in a country with such high
poverty, but as poverty continues to decrease and the population continues to age,
public health care will get more expensive and it will not be so easy to ignore the
costs of expanding coverage. As economic growth has slowed, we may see the SUS
put to the test sooner rather than later—as we are seeing in Spain.
The second strategic difference of note is that the programs that were innovated
in Brazil and became the backbone of primary care reform may only be possible
under conditions of high poverty and low economic development. The PACS program
in Ceara´ was successful because unemployed community women with low levels of
education were seen as legitimate health agents to share basic sanitation information,
carry out health education, vaccinate children, etc. While there is an argument to
be made for a shift away from the assumption that highly trained, elite medical
practitioners offer the best hope of quality care, once basic health care requires more
than safe drinking water and vaccines, a different model will likely be demanded.
This is a surmountable challenge and one that Brazil has already proven itself
capable of managing, as higher income municipalities—for example those outside Sa˜o
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Paulo using the Qualis/PSF model—have successfully modified the model with good
results. While continuing to improve health outcomes and access to quality care
in Brazil will certainly become more expensive than it has been to tackle the most
easily prevented health challenges, the highly participatory and community-based
model that is the foundation of the PSF and health policy making more broadly
should serve Brazil well as it moves forward. The innovations in health provision in
the Basque Country suggest that even the wealthiest areas can lower costs without
sacrificing coverage, but that this requires a population open to being re-educated on
how to achieve and maintain good health—a struggle in any community.
6.7 Alternative Explanations
There are several obvious differences between Spain and Brazil that are often put
forth to explain poor policy performance in cross national comparisons. In particular,
federal and electoral institutions in Brazil and Spain might well have implications for
the successful implementation of equity-enhancing reforms.
The Brazilian upper chamber is a functional body of territorial representation with
a veto in central policy making, while the Spanish upper chamber is not. Yet despite
the presence of the Senate, in Brazil asymmetric influence of strong governors and
intergovernmental bargaining outside the legislature is common, as it is in Spain. Still,
we might expect the intense malapportionment in the Brazilian legislature5, which
carries a territorial logic into the allotment of seats in the lower house (as well as the
Senate), to hamper equity-enhancing policymaking. But as it turns out, the Spanish
lower chamber is nearly as malapportioned as the Brazilian lower chamber (Samuels
and Snyder 2001), granting nearly a third of available seats to provinces regardless of
population. The structure of federal institutions themselves has therefore not been a
major part of the story about differences in outcomes. While Brazil has much higher
5Stepan 2000; Ames 2002; Samuels 2003 among many others.
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malapportionment than Spain in the upper chamber, giving traditionally conservative
actors based in rural areas even greater sway over policymaking, the strength of
minority nationalism in bilateral intergovernmental bargaining has a similar effect in
the Spanish case, from a veto actors perspective.
The differences in the electoral and political systems are substantial. Spain has a
parliamentary system while Brazil has a presidential system in which the executive
has a separate mandate from the legislature. In addition, the closed list proportional
representation and highly disciplined party structure in Spain is a far cry from the
open list system with famously undisciplined parties in Brazil. Yet even these differ-
ences cannot explain variation in reform outcomes. While the implications of having
a presidential or parliamentary system has been much discussed in relation to democ-
racy and veto actors6, under multilevel governance the arguments must be expanded
to take account of the level at which veto players are operating.
In Brazil, the pro-reform actors at the center have generally been stronger in
the national executive than in other federal branches or other territorial levels of
government. Neither the PSDB nor the PT, the two parties that began extending
equity-enhancing health and social policies across the country, had anything close
to majorities in the legislature. Presidentialism in Brazil may have permitted more
autonomy for reform minded presidents than would have been possible in a parlia-
mentary system with the same distribution of legislative seats. The legislature has
often been the most conservative brake on executive attempts at equity-enhancing re-
form during the past two decades. Under a parliamentary system Cardoso and Lula
might never have been. Even if these leaders did emerge from a coalition government,
they may have had greater difficulty implementing many of their progressive policy
reforms given the weakness of their own parties in the legislature.
6Linz 1985; 1990; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Tsebelis 1995; 2011.
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While Spanish institutions are quite different, this variation does not appear to
have been especially consequential for equity-enhancing health reform. Central coali-
tion allies in the legislature—minority nationalist parties on the right for central actors
on the left and right from 1993-2000—generated pressures for regressive reforms (for
the country and poor ACs) that could not be ignored without causing the govern-
ment to fall. In line with Tsebelis’ assessment of how presidential and parliamentary
systems can produce similar numbers of veto actors under certain conditions (1995),
we see that this institutional difference cannot explain variation in outcomes between
these two cases.
From a multilevel perspective where equity-enhancing reform demands a relevant
role for the central government, Brazilian presidentialism has been particularly im-
portant. The central state has become a more powerful actor under both Cardoso
and Lula. Subnational units are no less democratic and their institutional status has
not changed, but capable actors at the center with urgent reform agendas—primarily
economic for Cardoso and social for Lula—pushed these presidents to search for ways
to increase their leverage vis-a`-vis subnational units.
The increased protagonism of central executives has been equity-enhancing for
social reforms. It has not stopped capable and committed subnational actors from
innovating and experimenting, topping up or expanding access and programs, or even
eschewing central funds tied to particular models of service provision. Yet the combi-
nation of macroeconomic reforms and increased transparency and accountability have
made it harder for subnational authoritarians to maintain clientelistic control over
their states. Cardoso and Lula incentivized uncommitted actors to take up equity-
enhancing reforms and stabilized the country’s economy. Strong presidentialism has
therefore not been a brake on equity-enhancing reform in post-1988 Brazil.
The lack of disciplined parties and the additional pressures created by open list
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proportional representation might be a different story. In Brazil, while the parties
on the left are somewhat more programmatic than other parties, outside the PT
discipline is fairly weak7, party switching is high, and personalism intense. Yet once
again the challenges for democracy are more clearly established than the challenges
for equity-enhancing reform.
In Spain, party discipline is high (Montero 2005), yet under multilevel governance
this discipline has often created roadblocks to common sense reform in the realm
of fiscal and health policy. While in the early years after democratization, pacting
among major actors on important reforms was common, this tendency has crumbled
over time (Encarnacio´n 2008). Multilevel governance under high party discipline has
meant that actors in the ACs often take one stance when their analogous party is
in power at the center, and overnight change their position when a new party comes
to power. The same has been true of the center, particularly for the PP, which
has supported decentralizing Statute reforms for non-nationalist ACs while blocking
identical clauses for Catalonia.
In Brazil, on the other hand, the PT has been able to spread its policies country-
wide at the municipal level despite having weak representation in municipal govern-
ments vis-a`-vis other parties, holding few governorships, and having nothing close to
a majority in the legislature. Why? The policies of Lula and now Dilma have been
incredibly popular and other parties, which if more disciplined might have to reject
such alliances, have been eager to jump on board with the PT program. Paradoxi-
cally, lack of discipline in Brazil may have permitted ideological flexibility for center
right parties to adopt equity-enhancing policies and form government with the left.
I do not argue that these are costless alliances, but given the PT’s disproportion-
ate strength in the presidency, the policy results suggest that it has been a winning
7While the DEMS have been fairly disciplined in their opposition since 2003, the party is in the
process of imploding.
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strategy for equity and one that might have been much more difficult with greater
discipline in other parties. The PT has been able to maneuver in this system with-
out fundamentally altering its own internal standards or organizational rules, which
remain highly disciplined and ideological (Hunter 2009).
What lessons should we take, then, from the inability of these oft-cited culprits
to explain variation in outcomes between Spain and Brazil? First, that the need for
a strong center for the extension of equity-enhancing reform requires that we modify
our expectations of particular institutional arrangements, particularly under multi-
level governance. Second, the relationships are probabilistic and not deterministic
and there are simply cases in which constraints that may not be ideal for demo-
cratic development are not so nefarious for equity-enhancing reform given particular
constellations of power.
6.8 Conclusion
In this Chapter I have argued that institutional differences between the two coun-
tries have been far less important for variation in reform outcomes than differing
levels of commitment and capacity. This should be a hopeful sign for reformers, since
commitment and capacity are far more easily influenced by political effort than are
electoral systems and federal institutions. However, to some extent equally uncontrol-
lable historical accidents of timing have had an important influence—in particular,
where the transition to democracy and the first attempt at reform fell in relation
to international ideological support for neoliberalism. World region has mattered
some—the PT in the Latin American context was much more timid about antagoniz-
ing private actors than the PSOE had to be in the context of the EU. And clearly EU
structural funds enhanced the capacity of poor ACs in Spain. Yet being in Europe
did not keep Spain from being affected by pressures for neoliberal reform. Because
Spanish reform was swift and well funded, it was quickly consolidated and was more
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insulated from early demands for retrenchment.
Because I chose a set of cases with comparable histories and subnational variation
in health authority, I could not compare federal and non-federal cases. Yet this
has presented the opportunity to assess the conditions under which equity-enhancing
reforms are more or less feasible in the least likely cases—in particular, assymetric
territorial authority with ethno-linguistic or racial heterogeneity and limited fiscal
capacity. Avoiding high levels of decentralization in health policy and financing poses
less of a democratic challenge in non-federal countries.
Timing and sequence have been important for both cases. In Spain the absolute
majority of the socialists at the center, prior to health devolution for most ACs and
at a moment when the international context was also favorable for reform, greatly
facilitated the process. In Brazil the SUS was created in a context of economic crisis
and support for neoliberalism both internationally and within the conservative central
government, after significant authority had been given to subnational units. Because
reform was delayed at the center and states and municipalities were empowered to
provide health services, innovation and experimentation took place in committed and
capable subnational units. Yet major improvements in the worst off regions of the
country had to wait until committed actors reached the central government.
The pace of reform has lined up almost precisely with the strength of commitment.
In Spain the left prioritized health policy and had an absolute majority, so reform
happened immediately and the SNS was extended and consolidated quickly. In Brazil,
Cardoso’s Health Ministers represented a major improvement over the previous gov-
ernment and took important steps toward fuller implementation and financing of the
SUS. Lula’s governments overall were more committed so the social policy network
became much more equity-enhancing, but health policy was not the primary focus.
Only in 2011 did a major shift in focus toward health commence, and it this point the
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Ministry was beginning a race against the clock as worldwide economic crisis began
to substantially impact the Brazilian economy.
While Spain was quite succesful in implementing reform, the challenges of conflict
over the reference community and the center’s weakness in holding ACs accountable
present clear limitations for equity. Quality, access, coverage, and spending vary sig-
nificantly across ACs and since 2003 it has become increasingly difficult for the central
government to enforce health policy even in the areas theoretically under its authority.
While these problems illustrate the likely consequences of highly decentralized social
policy control, the experience of Brazil suggests that if the center is not emptied of
authority and cares about equity, accountability can be developed over time.
The importance of formal legislative victories is also made clear in these cases.
In Brazil, the presence of the constitutional mandate for health has meant that the
problems that arose from failure to implement health reform early could be overcome
once committed actors were in place in the central government. The pace of primary
care extension has been quite similar in both countries and took two decades to be
fully extended in Spain. In Brazil, the PSF has only been solidified as the national
model for care in the past few years and extension continues to be very slow in the
places that did not attain high levels of coverage fairly quickly. Luckily, the poorest
states have the best coverage. Unluckily, this is not where the bulk of the population
resides and does not bode well for building a broad multi-class coalition in defense of
the SUS.
Commitment has been the single most important element of reform, and it has
been far more important for equity-enhancing reform when concentrated at the center
than when it has been dispersed at the regional level. The interaction of commitment
with the timing and sequence of reform gave Spain an important leg up in consolidat-
ing a comprehensive reform, quickly. Yet in the end, in the face of prolonged economic
323
crisis that has eaten into both fiscal and administrative capacity, both health systems
have proven vulnerable. The Spanish SNS will likely be cut back even further be-
fore conditions improve, while the steady pace of expansion in the SUS in Brazil will
almost certainly slow down.
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7 CONCLUSION
As part of a growing body of empirical scholarship on multilevel governance, this
dissertation uses statistical and comparative historical analysis to assess the impact
of multilevel governance on health reform in Spain and Brazil. I focused on the condi-
tions for generating equity-enhancing reforms even under “hard” conditions—recent
legacies of authoritarian rule, asymmetry in regional authority, ethno-linguistic or
racial heterogeneity, and limited fiscal capacity. This approach suggests that leverage
over complex causal problems can be gained by carefully unpacking the timing and
sequence of reform at multiple levels of government. For distributional questions, hy-
pothesized relationships will be conditioned by multiple factors and the same policies
should have different effects on different regions, depending on their relative position
within the country and sometimes even the international community.
While this is a question of academic interest, the findings should be of greatest
value for reformers contemplating the design of institutions or policies. I therefore
close by summarizing the findings with this application in mind. Both countries
attempted broadly similar health reforms with varying levels of decentralization and
assymetry in regional authority over health. In Spain both commitment and capacity
were strong at the center and in many ACs at the moment when health reform was
first attempted. This resulted in faster and more complete implementation, which
in turn solidified public and political support and safeguarded the system against
retrenchment for many years. The logic of decentralization was unrelated to the
goals of the reform and as a result allowed the quality of reform to be dictated in part
by the levels of commitment and capacity in those ACs with authority over health.
In Brazil commitment and capacity were much weaker at the moment when health
reform was first attempted and early decentralization took place without oversight
or accountability mechanisms. The reform was not funded for several years and then
inadequately, which lead to piecemeal implementation, the consolidation of powerful
private health actors opposed to expansion of the system, and the creation of a stigma
among the middle and upper classes. Yet overall the system has remained more
centralized than in Spain, which has permitted committed central actors to improve
access and quality even in states and municipalities without committed or capable
governments. While the PT government since 2003 has been committed to equity-
enhancing reform, health has not been the focus of the executive and this lack of
prioritization has made progress slow.
In Spain the current economic crisis has generated impulses for dismantling the
SNS, while in Brazil economic belt tightening now threatens to halt the slow but
steady progress made in the SUS in recent years. What, then, are the conclusions
one can take away from the experiences of these two countries?
1. Multilevel governance has always existed and policy makers and
academics could produce more effective policies and more useful theories
by explicitly accounting for its influence. In particular, public finance impacts
regions differently depending on their distributive profile and position within the
country and the international economy. The way multilevel interests interact with
the institutions of the state influences policy outcomes and the results are not always
intuitive.
2. Ideological commitment to equity is necessary for the creation and
implementation of equity-enhancing health reform. In both Spain and Brazil
the extension of citizenship-based rights to even the most basic health services has
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required high levels of ideological commitment and been strongly opposed by conser-
vative political and economic interests at the moment of reform. Only in one region
out of 44 has commitment come from a sense of solidarity with a territorially defined
community—from nationalism. In all other cases of the creation and implementation
of equity-enhancing health policy, left or center-left partisanship was the source of
commitment. Even in the Basque Country, the PNV has been in coalition with the
left from 1986-2009.
Commitment has been most important for the policies that should have been the
least contentious—cheap, effective primary care coverage. Higher levels of curative
health service consumption are not better for health, which makes equity-enhancing
health reform different from social assistance, for example. Shifting from a model
of care in which highly paid medical equipment producers, hospital administrators,
surgeons, and specialists dominate provision to one in which nurses, community health
agents, health educators, and general practitioners offer low-intensity and preventive
care eliminates economic benefits for powerful societal actors. In addition, middle
and upper class users do not demand public primary care as they do access to more
expensive treatment. This explains the seemingly incongruous findings in both Spain
and Brazil, where public coverage of hospital and ambulatory care advanced much
farther, much faster, than universal access to primary health care, with much less
opposition from elites.
Successfully consolidated reforms can be maintained in the absence of high com-
mitment, though as we see in the case of Spain, even the most popular programs can
be retrenched when economic pressure is intense and commitment low.
3. A capable and committed central government is necessary for coun-
trywide equity-enhancing reform. Fiscal and administrative capacity tend to
be lacking in the regions with the poorest and most vulnerable populations. High
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levels of policy authority will disadvantage these regions compared to higher capacity
regions, even if the level of regional commitment is held constant. Since commitment
is not constant, we have seen that in Spain when the center had little authority, if
regional commitment was lacking, even the highest capacity regions did not make
good on their health policy responsibilities.
In Brazil, low capacity and low commitment have mostly been concentrated in
the same regions, contributing to stagnant levels of inequality in the worst off regions
while the biggest improvements have taken place in the areas that were already doing
the best. And like Spain, some of the richest regions have invested the least in
extending universal access to care. Yet because of a strong and committed center,
access to primary care is high in the lowest capacity areas, many of which do not
have committed governments.
This means that regardless of how unsavory central political leadership is at a
particular moment, weakening central government authority to redistribute resources
and hold regional actors accountable for citizenship rights will limit capacity for suc-
cessful equity-enhancing reform, potentially leaving the neediest members of society
with little protection (depending on the commitment and capacity of their region).
This is one of the most significant challenges of multilevel governance.
4. Not all decentralizing reforms are made equal. Among policy makers
there have been two different logics behind decentralization—one that is pragmatic
and determined by policy goals and one in which a particular territorial distribution
of authority is a goal in and of itself. If the former is subordinated to the latter,
decentralization will likely produce unintended consequences. Since decentralization
processes appear to exhibit increasing returns, creating vested interests and new re-
gional veto actors, failure to consider the potential drawbacks of increased devolution
can be costly for reformers concerned with equity.
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Early progressive reformers in both countries supported very high levels of de-
centralization of policy control, in addition to the creation of democratic regional
institutions, because of their particular historical context transitioning away from
right wing authoritarian centralization. In Spain these early reformers largely failed
to achieve early health devolution because the conservative forces governing after the
transition were Spanish nationalists with an ideological preference for centralization,
whereas in Brazil they succeeded because the neoliberals in power after the transition
also supported decentralization. Yet the success of equity-enhancing reform in Spain
is partly due to the fact that most of the country had centrally controlled health
provision when equity-enhancing reform was implemented.
In Spain, decentralization in health was first driven by minority nationalism and
then by a conservative central strategy for retrenchment, rather than a logic of ef-
fectiveness, capacity, or efficiency in health provision. The result was that coverage
and access varied considerably once health responsibilities were devolved. Poor ACs
did better if they remained in the central system longer, as did those whose local
governments were ideologically opposed to public health provison.
In Brazil, the first significant wave of health decentralization took place between
1988 and 1993 and also had no orientation toward guaranteeing equal access or cov-
erage. Later reforms took place under more committed central leadership that tied
new responsibilities to the implementation of oversight mechanisms, regulation, basic
minimums, and successful capacity building. Decentralization of health under this
logic has been far more equity-enhancing for health care.
5. In multi-national states, finding arrangements that satisfy territorial
veto actors is a key part of ensuring the capacity of all regions to imple-
ment equity-enhancing reforms. Ongoing conflict over the legitimate territorial
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reference community for redistribution or other public policies saps capacity for re-
form at the center, in the affected regions, and often in other regions as well. This
conflict also divides committed actors along a territorial dimension.
Hindsight is 20-20 and actors themselves change over time, so accommodating the
self-rule strivings of minority nationalists in a way that does not sacrifice the capacity
of the center to implement equity-enhancing reform in the rest of the country is easier
said than done, yet this is the ideal balance for the long-term sustainability of reforms.
The compromises made among elites at the moment of democratic transition do not
always facilitate this process. In Spain this was the cost of peace, yet the fact that
some actors had a vision of their territorial community that was incompatible with
the vision of others has been a source of ongoing political and violent conflict.
While I would reject the notion that there exists an objective “ideal” territorial
arrangement for multinational states, I do suggest that political actors in Spain have
tended to underestimate the cost of ongoing conflict. Keeping Catalonia in the com-
mon fiscal regime has meant a large and powerful region successfully demanding across
the board increases in regional authority that reduce the equity-enhancing capacity of
the center and disadvantage poor regions. Asymmetric arrangements with the Basque
Country on fiscal matters has largely eliminated conflict along this dimension.
5. Shock therapy is not just for neoliberal reform. While some opponents
of equity-enhancing social policy reform are ideologically antagonistic to equity itself,
many act out of uncertainty about how their professional or economic interests will
be affected by reform. If reforms can be implemented and consolidated quickly, actors
adjust and markets find ways to operate under new conditions. Yet when reform is
incomplete and is always on the table but never consolidated, opposition can become
entrenched and uncertainty lingers. The OECD countries are full of former opponents
of health reform whose opposition shriveled once the shift was consolidated.
330
6. Integrating social policies expands the equity-enhancing possibilities
of each component. The most innovative regions in both countries have been
integrating not only the different components of health care provision, but integrating
health care with social services and social assistance, as well as with education in some
circumstances. This requires changes in the way state agencies function but has led
to increasing coordination and a more holistic approach to the idea of “welfare.”
7. Equity-enhancing policies do not have to be more expensive. Com-
mitted actors under fiscal pressure must prioritize spending, but the notion of “ratio-
nalization” or “cost-cutting” often provokes strong negative reactions from the tradi-
tional bases of support for left parties. Yet empirical evidence has increasingly shown
that the shift of social care (the prevention of illness, the care of young children, social
care for the elderly) from families to markets has had some important social costs un-
der existing models of care provision. Many of these social costs manifest themselves
in worse health outcomes related to stress, isolation, and the replacement of social
bonds with institutional ones. Public providers therefore have a unique opportunity
to think creatively about how to protect families from risk, support women’s equality,
provide a solid starting point for the young, and create the foundations for reducing
socio-economic inequality without supporting a logic of ever-increasing consumption.
In part because of economic necessity and in part because of a broadly framed
constitutional guarantee of the protection of “health” (rather than a right to health
care), Brazilian reformers have gone the farthest in thinking about the protection of
health as a process that must be embedded in community and empower users to be
protagonists of their own health outcomes. This shift requires confronting the most
powerful economic interests in medicine and often other areas such as the hospital
management, construction, and insurance industries. Paradoxically, the shift has been
easier along some dimensions in regions that were so poor they had never established
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powerful private medical interests. This suggests that poor countries and regions
may have a unique opportunity to develop equity-enhancing social policies that have
a different logic from the consumption-based market models that dominate in most
advanced industrial countries.
Finally, these shifts also require transformations in areas that feed into social
policy—in the case of health, the reform of medical school curricula has been an
important focus in Brazil. Helping socialize young medical professionals toward a
different model of care plays an important role in the sustainability of reform.
8. Primary care is not just for the poor. While evidence in support of
primary care as an organizing model for the most efficient and effective public health
systems has grown in recent years, the framework has often focused on an assumption
that this is a model for poor countries. Yet outside of utterly desperate cases, the
most serious modern health problems are increasingly shared across rich and poor
countries, alike. And the health problems of the poor in rich countries are often not
so different from those in middle-income and developing countries. As the British
NHS undergoes radical reform and the United States searches for a way to lower
health care costs and cover 50 million uninsured Americans, rich countries are just as
much in need of a new model for health care as Spain and Brazil were in the 1980s.
8. History matters, but democracy has created the conditions for in-
cremental progress, even in the hardest cases. Aside from the hard-to-measure
qualities of democratic society itself, one of the clearest health contributions of the
democratic transitions in these two countries has been the constitutional mandate for
equal access to universal health coverage, guaranteed by the state. These have been
formal rules that often do not look substantial when financing is scarce or legislation
has never been implemented. Yet in both countries the role of the constitutional man-
date has been clear and present. It has given reformers an anchor against which to
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make demands for state action. Citizens are gaining an awareness of the gap between
their social rights and their political reality. This has been a useful tool for reform-
ers in both countries, and in Brazil meant that the legislative foundation existed for
action, whenever committed actors were able to make headway. For some aspects of
the original 1990 legislation, the lag was 21 years.
Progress in both cases has been steady until now, but the current world economic
crisis will put both systems—one consolidated and one still expanding—to the test.
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Table A.9: Health Authority in the Brazilian States
State NOB 1996
Avanc¸ado
NOB 1996
Plena
NOAS 2001
Acre - - 10/15/2003
Alagoas - 7/3/1998 4/17/2002
Amapa´ - - 2/13/2004
Amazonas - - 2/13/2004
Bahia 4/9/1999 - 10/19/2003
Ceara´ - 1/2/2001 4/17/2002
Distrito Federal - 10.20.1999 6/17/2002
Esp´ırito Santo - - 11/23/2004
Goia´s - 3/16/2001 6/17/2002
Mato Grosso - - 8/29/2002
Mato Grosso do Sul - - 8/29/2002
Maranha˜o - - 11/17/2004
Minas Gerais 5/17/1999 - 12/3/2002
Para´ - 6/27/2001 6/10/2002
Para´ıba 5/16/2001 - 8/13/2002
Parana´ - 12/7/1999 8/14/2002
Pernambuco - - 8/2/2004
Piau´ı - - 4/30/2004
Rio de Janeiro - - 8/13/2002
Rio Grande do Norte - - 9/19/2003
Rio Grande do Sul 5/17/1999 - 12/18/2002
Rondoˆnia - - 4/17/2003
Roraima - - 11/28/2003
Santa Catarina - 12/9/1999 7/10/2002
Sa˜o Paulo 4/9/1999 - 7/22/2003
Sergipe - - 7/11/2002
Tocantins - - 11/26/2004
Source: MS
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Table A.12: Timing and Sequence of Reform in International Perspective
International
Context
Year Spain Year Brazil
1975 Transition Begins 1974 Abertura begins
1979 General Elections
International
Support
1978 Constitutional
Guarantee
1980 Political Parties
Legalized
for Health
Reform
1981-
1984
Devolution to Catalo-
nia and Andalusia
1982 Elections for
Governors
1984 Primary Care
Reform
1985 Return to Civilian
Rule
1986 Creation of SNS 1986 VIII Confereˆncia
Nacional de Sau´de
1987 Devolution to Basque
Country and Valencia
1988 Constitutional
Guarantee
1990 Devolution to Galicia
and Navarre
1988-
1993
Increased role for
subnational units
Economic
Crisis and
1990 Devolution to
Canarias
Neoliberalism 1991 Informe Abril 1990-
1991
Creation of the SUS
1990s State taxes become
less progressive
1991-
1994
Central primary
care incentivization
1990s SNS consolidation 1993-
1998
SUS implementa-
tion and financing
2002 Devolution to last 10
ACs
2000-
2001
Accountability and
financing reforms
Economic
Boom
2002 Decentralization of
health financing
2006-
2007
Ley de Dependencia,
youth dental coverage
2006 Pacto pela Sau´de
Economic
Crisis
2009 Progressive health
financing reform
2011 Attempts at SUS
consolidation
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